dissenting.
The majority opinion correctly defines the law of apparent authority, but in my opinion has misapplied it to the facts of this case. For that reason, I dissent.
As the majority opinion states: [Ajpparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 27 (1958) (emphasis added). A crucial question in apparent authority cases is what “act” there was apparent authority to perform. The “act” involved here is the redesigning, significant alteration, and refabrication of a stock Mack truck, resulting in the removal of the sleeper cab and fifth wheel and installation of a 5000 gallon water tank on the chassis. The question is whether Mack, “by written or spoken words or any other conduct,” created an appearance that could lead the City reasonably to conclude that Mack consented to have this redesigning, significant alteration, and refabrication of a stock Mack truck done by Alaska Mack on Mack’s behalf.
On review of the grant of a motion for a directed verdict, we must determine whether the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, justifies the decision that reasonable jurors could not disagree on the conclusions to be reached from the evidence. Bullard v. B.P. Alaska, Inc., 650 P.2d 402, 403 (Alaska 1982); Central Alaska Broadcasting v. Bracale, 637 P.2d 711, 714 (Alaska 1981). The majority relies upon the following evidence in determining that the court erred in granting the directed verdict:
1. Mack allowed Alaska Mack to use the name “Mack” as part of its corporate name.
2. Alaska Mack was listed in trade journals and the Fairbanks telephone directory under the heading “MACK TRUCKS.”
3. The telephone directory listing used the Mack bulldog trademark.
4. There was a sign on the Alaska Mack building saying “Alaska Mack, Inc., Mack Trucks” that displayed the Mack bulldog.
5. The Mack logo and Mack posters were displayed inside.
6. Alaska Mack distributed printed Mack brochures in its building.
7. Alaska Mack did not display promotional materials of any manufacturer other than Mack.
8. There were no indications that Alaska Mack was independently operated.
Even indulging every reasonable inference for the City from these items of evidence, the most that a reasonable jury could conclude would be that Alaska Mack was authorized to sell and service Mack trucks. However, none of the testimony relied upon indicates directly or gives rise to the inference that Alaska Mack was in the business of redesigning and altering Mack trucks for Mack, or under Mack’s direction. Indeed, the trial court relied partially upon the paucity of evidence on this point in granting the directed verdict:
Relating this case to [Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.1971)], there is also no evidence in the record to show that Mack Trucks, Inc. ever approved or acknowledged the use of Mr. Haskins or anyone else to refurbish this vehicle into a fire truck. And although they very well may on a national basis allow such things to be done, there is no evidence to that effect, and I have no way of knowing whether they do or not. And there’s certainly no evidence that they ever advertised this sort of rebuilding is done by Mack Truck agents or personnel in other *1133organizations, such as in the Texaco station case.
The trial court obviously perceived the proper issue in this case and ruled accordingly. I fail to see how the majority can conclude that this “is a question for the jury,” when there is a dearth of evidence from which a jury could find apparent authority to redesign and refabricate this fire truck. Although I agree that questions of fact are for the jury when there is any doubt, the evidence in this case leaves no doubt that Mack created no impression that would give rise to a reasonable conclusion that Alaska Mack had authority to alter this truck as it did. I would affirm the grant of the directed verdict.
If the verdict were affirmed, as it should be, the question would still exist whether the court properly denied the City’s motion to reopen after granting the directed verdict to Mack. I believe that the court acted properly. The City offered to present evidence to prove:
1. A distributorship agreement existed between Mack and Alaska Mack.
2. The agreement required Mack to approve its distributors based on their competence and skill.
3. Mack required that the shops maintain certain parts inventories.
4. Mack required sales and services signs.
5. Mack provided training centers for distributors’ employees.
6. Mack engaged in national advertising programs and in joint advertising with distributors.
7. All sales of Mack products were made through distributors; i.e., the factory would not sell directly to the public.
8. Mack has established sales quotas.
9. Mack required distributors to submit reports as to the use of the vehicles sold.
None of this proffered evidence indicated that Mack had engaged in or acquiesced in Alaska Mack’s engaging in conduct which created the appearance that Alaska Mack was authorized to redesign and refabricate stock Mack trucks. Therefore, the trial court acted properly in refusing to reopen the case. The judgment should be affirmed in all respects.