(dissenting).
I dissent from the opinion of the majority essentially for the reason that the transactions here in issue clearly were taxable sales within the meaning of our statute on Transaction Privilege Taxes (A.R. S. Title 42, Chapter 8, Article 1) and. should not be excluded therefrom by virtue of an exception based on “elementary economics” superimposed on the plain, meaning of that statute.
Paragraph 11 of A.R.S. § 42-1301 defines a “sale” as
“any transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, lease or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatever, of tangible personal property, for a consideration * * *.”
This very broad definition of a sale manifestly includes the instant transactions-whereby the plaintiff transferred title and possession of tangible merchandise property in exchange, barter and consideration for trading stamps.
The contention that a tax has once been, paid on the trading stamps, the value of which was purportedly included in plaintiff’s gross sales, overlooks the point that the tax here in issue is based on separate and distinct transactions in which plaintiff exchanged merchandise for stamps. These separate transactions were subject to ner*381gotiation between the parties then, for the first time, and may have been based on a value of exchange which was different from that in effect at the time the stamps were sold. While the majority opinion recognizes that the Transaction Privilege Tax “is not a tax upon the sale of items of merchandise but is a tax upon the privilege of engaging in business measured by the gross income from sales,” it formulates an exception based on the asserted sameness of the “items of merchandise” sold, in situations where the plaintiff has availed itself of “the privilege of engaging in business” by separate transactions.
The imposition of this tax is not “double taxation” for the reason that no tax has previously been paid either on the items of merchandise or on any transactions involving the sale of such merchandise. Whether plaintiff would be entitled, under Paragraph 7 of A.R.S. § 42-1301, to a refund of the taxes allegedly paid on the stamps because the stamps were “accepted as part payment on any new article sold,” need not here be decided as this issue was not raised on this appeal and would become significant only “if and when the full sale price of the new article is included” — contrary to plaintiff’s present position — in its gross sales.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed.