I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the discipline recommended by the State Bar, supplemented by a requirement of restitution, *9is appropriate. However, I would specify the nature of the misconduct which subjects an attorney to discipline.
As the majority concede, this court has not resolved the legal question as to what conduct short of moral turpitude constitutes grounds for discipline. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5; see In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [145 Cal.Rptr. 855, 578 P.2d 102].) The six judges who participated in Rohan wrote three opinions. Each opinion proposed a different standard of attorney misconduct which would warrant discipline. Each proposed standard had the support of two justices. No one standard commanded a majority, or even a plurality, of this court.
This case presents the precise question which was left unanswered in Rohan, and we should take this opportunity to clarify the type of misconduct which warrants discipline. Members of the State Bar must be given a meaningful definition of what misconduct will warrant discipline.
In In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842 [106 Cal.Rptr. 313, 505 P.2d 1369, 63 A.L.R.3d 465], this court unanimously determined that an attorney should be “subject to discipline only if he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6101-6102) or an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106).” (Id., at p. 849.) In my view, this court should reaffirm the standard unanimously adopted in Fahey.
I find the court’s explanation in Fahey for its formulation of the moral turpitude standard compelling: “Offenses that do not involve moral turpitude or affect professional performance should not be a basis for professional discipline simply because they fall short of the highest standards of professional ethics or may in some way impair the public image of the profession. Otherwise the imposition of discipline may tend to be influenced by the degree to which the offense has become known to the public. [Citation.] Our standard of moral turpitude depends not on popular impression but on the violator’s own motivation as it relates to his moral fitness to practice law. [Citations.]” (Fahey, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 853, fn. omitted.)
I concur in the imposition of the recommended discipline in this case because petitioner’s misconduct involved moral turpitude. Each of the 27 crimes of which petitioner was convicted involved his failure to pay taxes and unemployment insurance contributions with funds withheld from employee paychecks for that purpose. Petitioner committed these crimes without the knowledge or the consent of his employees. This wilful and dishonest misconduct which prejudiced the rights of his employees meets the moral turpitude standard defined in Fahey.
*10The purpose of imposing discipline is not to punish attorneys but “to aiford protection to the public, maintain the integrity of the legal profession, maintain high professional standards for attorneys and preserve public confidence in the legal profession.” (Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 879 [153 Cal.Rptr. 602, 591 P.2d 1254]; see also Bradpiece v. State Bar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 742, 748 [111 Cal.Rptr. 905, 518 P.2d 337]; Clancy v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 140, 151 [77 Cal.Rptr. 657, 454 P.2d 329].) The moral turpitude standard is the most appropriate standard for accomplishing that goal.
Grodin, J., concurred.