I dissent. Our decision in People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468 [186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321] compels a conclusion contrary to that reached by the majority. When a trial court conducting a probation revocation hearing specifically finds that the prosecutor has failed to prove that the probationer has committed a new offense, that finding should collaterally estop a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense. We should affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal directing the superior court to dismiss the indecent exposure charge on collateral estoppel grounds.
I.
People v. Sims, supra, enumerated the three essential elements of the doctrine of collateral estoppel:1 (1) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue decided at the previous proceeding is identical to that which is sought to be relitigated; and, (3) the previous proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits.2 *362(Sims, supra, at p. 484; see also Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439]; Lockwood v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 667, 671 [206 Cal.Rptr. 785].) Implicitly rejecting the reasoning of earlier decisions (e.g., Chamblin v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 115 [181 Cal.Rptr. 636]; People v. Demery (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 548 [163 Cal.Rptr. 814]), we concluded that the district attorney in Sims was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of defendant’s alleged welfare fraud in a criminal prosecution when the Department of Social Services, after holding a hearing on that same issue, had exonerated the defendant. (Sims, supra, at p. 489.)3
The requirements for application of collateral estoppel have also been met in this case. First, the parties in the revocation hearing were the same as they would be in the criminal trial. Second, whether petitioner violated section 314 was “properly raised” and was “submitted for determination” at the revocation hearing. The court’s express finding that the People failed to prove a violation of probation based on the alleged offense leaves no doubt that this issue was actually litigated and “determined,” and that the determination was “based on a failure of proof.” The question of fact that the state now seeks to prove has already been resolved adversely to it. Indeed, the major difference between the two proceedings in this case is the standard of proof applicable at the revocation hearing and criminal trial, *363but it was the lower standard of proof4 the state failed to meet in the revocation hearing. Having failed to meet that burden, the state is now seeking to relitigate the same issue of fact under a more difficult burden of proof.5
Third, the probation revocation proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The court originally placed petitioner on probation only after suspending imposition of sentence. When it later revoked that original grant of probation, the court reinstated petitioner to probation upon different conditions. This order could have been appealed by either party—by petitioner (Pen. Code, § 1466, subd. (b)(1) & (2); People v. Woods (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 149, 154 [148 Cal.Rptr. 312]) or by the state (Pen. Code, § 1466, subd. (a)(6); see People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 682, fn. 1 [143 Cal.Rptr. 885, 574 P.2d 1237]). There is nothing in the record to indicate that either party appealed. Thus, the revocation order being final, petitioner has met the third requirement for collateral estoppel. (See People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 486; cf. In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 613, 621-622 [94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206] [state bound by final judgment granting relief in habeas corpus from which no appeal was taken].)
II.
The majority maintains that the policies and purposes underlying probation revocation hearings and formal trials are so different that the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine would permit the revocation hearing to displace the intended fact-finding function of the trial. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 346, citing State v. Dupard (1980) 93 Wn.2d 268 [609 P.2d 961]; People v. Fagan (1984) 104 A.D.2d 252 [483 N.Y.S.2d 489], affd. (1985) 66 N.Y.2d 815 [498 N.Y.S.2d 335, 489 N.E.2d 222]; United States v. Miller (6th Cir. 1986) 797 F.2d 336; see also Chamblin v. Municipal Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at pp. 120-121.) In Sims, however, comparable differences were found to have no effect on the applicability of collateral estoppel. It did not matter, for example, that the state chose not to make the full evidentiary *364presentation necessary to demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. (See People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 481; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd., supra, 58 Cal.2d 601, 607.) Similarly, the state had an opportunity to present its evidence. The state participated fully and the fact that it may have failed to produce all of its evidence is irrelevant. What is significant here is that the state made the decision to proceed with the revocation hearing before the trial, electing to present its case with the advantage of a lesser burden of proof. Having exercised its discretion in this manner, the state cannot now avoid the result of the revocation hearing simply because it chose not to present all of the evidence at the proceeding it instituted.
Nor is the difference in the formality with which the rules of evidence are applied at the hearing dispositive. In People v. Sims, supra, the administrative hearing—like the revocation hearing here—was not conducted according to the judicial rules of evidence. (See 32 Cal.3d at pp. 480-481.) It did not matter that the state’s interest in a jury trial was impaired. (See id. at pp. 483-484, fn. 13.) Nor was the difference between the two proceedings determinative on the question of whether to apply collateral estoppel: “The decision exonerating respondent of fraud may be given collateral estoppel effect. This is true even where, as in this case, the successive proceedings involved are different in nature and the proceeding to be estopped is a criminal prosecution.” (Id., at p. 482.) For purposes of collateral estoppel, we viewed the function of the administrative hearing as “virtually identical to that of the criminal trial.” (Id. at p. 483, fn. 13.) The majority presents no logical basis why the same conclusion should not extend to the revocation hearing and trial in the present situation.
Indeed, this case is a stronger case than was Sims for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Sims the question was whether collateral estoppel could be applied to administrative decisions made by an administrative agency “ ‘[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity ....’” (People v. Sims, supra, quoting United States v. Utah Construction Co. (1966) 384 U.S. 394 [16 L.Ed.2d 642, 86 S.Ct. 1545].) In the present case, no such question arises. Here we are dealing with the collateral estoppel effect of a judicial decision. It is the judicial decision of a duly appointed judge. Although the majority suggests that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because a probation revocation hearing is neither a criminal action nor a trial and is completely unrelated to a determination of guilt or innocence, such suggestion is misguided. A probation revocation hearing, at which the court determines that defendant did not commit the charged probation violation, is obviously directed at determining the guilt or innocence as to the same charged conduct. Although the revocation hearing is a “proceeding,” not a “trial,” the distinction is *365irrelevant to the question before us. The doctrine of collateral estoppel depends on what issues are adjudicated, not the nature of the proceeding. (See People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 484-486; see also People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 691.)
The majority argues that because the court in a revocation proceeding need only be satisfied that the purposes of probation were not being served, it is not necessary for the court to decide whether the defendant committed a crime. Thus, the issue which the state seeks to litigate at trial, has not necessarily been litigated in the probation revocation hearing. But this argument is misleading. When the state seeks to revoke a defendant’s probation because he committed a new criminal act, the judge will almost always have to decide as a question of fact whether the defendant committed that act. The role of the court in resolving such a contested issue of fact is identical to that of the jury at trial. When the judge actually makes an express factual finding after litigation of the issue, this is no different than a factual decision in any other context and collateral estoppel bars relitigation despite the different purposes and procedures at trial and at the hearing. (Ex Parte Tarver (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) 725 S.W.2d 195, 198; see also State v. Bradley (1981) 51 Ore.App. 569 [626 P.2d 403].)
The majority would not be forced to distort the law of collateral estoppel if prosecutors would simply elect to proceed to trial first, allowing the probation revocation hearing to follow. We have repeatedly urged this approach. (See People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935 [191 Cal.Rptr. 648, 663 P.2d 206]; People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 888, fn. 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473]; People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d 867, 896; cf. People v. Weaver (1985) 39 Cal.3d 654, 659 [217 Cal.Rptr. 245, 703 P.2d 1139].) An initial trial would not preclude a subsequent revocation hearing even if the trial resulted in defendant’s acquittal. (See In re Coughlin, supra, 16 Cal.3d 52, 57-59.)6 Any of the adverse policy consequences that the majority asserts might result from application of collateral estoppel in this case should not bar such application where the state exercises its discretion to bring those consequences upon itself.
*366III.
The majority is of course correct that the collateral estoppel doctrine itself recognizes that collateral estoppel should not be applied if its application would contravene important public policies. In my view the relevant policy considerations favor petitioner’s position.
First, judicial economy is promoted by minimizing repetitive litigation. (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488; People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 695.) Precluding the district attorney from relitigating would not only conserve the court’s time but would protect petitioner from being harassed by repeated litigation. People v. Sims, supra, at p. 489.) The prosecution had an adequate opportunity at a fair hearing to prove its charge. It failed to do so. To subject petitioner to a second proceeding in which he must defend himself against the very same charges of misconduct is unduly burdensome and seemingly unjust.7
Another policy concern is “the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system.” (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.) Whatever the burden of proof necessary to revoke a grant of probation (see fn. 4, ante), it is less stringent than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard required for conviction. (See In re Coughlin, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 56.) The revocation hearing is the sole method provided by the Legislature for retracting improvident grants of probation. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.02.) Just as with the administrative “fair *367hearing” in Sims, and the juvenile dependency proceeding in Lockwood v. Superior Court, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 667, public confidence in the legislative remedy administered by the courts will not be promoted by allowing the prosecution to treat the revocation hearing as a “Heads I win, tails I flip again” proposition. Under the majority view, the probationer must still face trial on the identical issue, whether the prosecution wins or loses at the revocation hearing. In the event the prosecution fails to satisfy the lesser evidentiary standard, it then has an opportunity to refine its case for trial. (Cf. People v. Sims, supra, at p. 485.) Indeed, if the criminal prosecution is allowed to proceed, and ultimately results in the probationer’s conviction, not only the integrity of the judicial system but also the integrity of the probation revocation process will be called into question. (See id. at p. 488.)
IV.
In sum, I submit that the collateral estoppel doctrine is applicable: the requirements for application of the doctrine have been met and the policies and purposes underlying the doctrine support its application here.
I would affirm the judgment.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied October 25, 1990. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.
The majority identifies “several threshold requirements” that must be fulfilled before the doctrine may be applied. Essentially, these are the same as the three-part test formulated in Sims. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 341; cf. People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484.)
The majority attempts to distinguish Sims as confined to the particular and special circumstances presented by the “unique statutory scheme” for resolution of welfare fraud cases. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 345.) But nowhere in Sims did we expressly or impliedly limit its holding *362to that context. Though the Sims opinion logically discusses the statutory scheme relevant to the case (32 Cal.3d at p. 489 [“In addition to the public policy considerations discussed above, the uniqueness of the statutory scheme governing prosecutions for AFDC fraud . . . [makes] application of collateral estoppel particularly appropriate in this case.”]), we did not limit our opinion in Sims to cases falling within the purview of that legislation.
We have also found that the adjudication of an issue in a criminal proceeding may collaterally estop the state from pursuing a second criminal proceeding based on the same controversy. In People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686 [117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622], defendant was the getaway driver in a liquor store robbery committed by Smith and Daniels. In the course of the robbery, the store proprietor shot and killed Smith. (Id. at pp. 689-690.) The prosecution of Daniels for Smith’s murder resulted in an acquittal. In a later prosecution, however, defendant was convicted of the homicide of his coconspirator. We reversed the conviction, finding that collateral estoppel precluded the state from prosecuting defendant. (Id. at p. 691.) We explained that to convict defendant of the homicide, the state had to prove that at least one of defendant’s coconspirators acted with the requisite malice aforethought during the robbery and shooting. The jury at Daniels’s trial, however, had found that neither of the co conspirators harbored the requisite malice during the incident. Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we held that this judgment was conclusive and could not be relitigated by the state at defendant’s trial. (Id. at pp. 691-692.)
The majority asserts that while failure to apply collateral estoppel in Taylor would have resulted in a fundamentally unfair and logically inconsistent result, no fundamental unfairness would result from a jury verdict contrary to a revocation decision. The majority, however, fails to address specifically this potential for unfairness but rather concludes only with an unsupported assertion that the differences between revocation hearings and criminal trials outweigh “whatever adverse effect inconsistent factual determinations would have on the integrity of the judicial system.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 350.)
The question of whether the burden of proof in probation revocation hearings is “preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing evidence” is presently pending before this court in People v. Rodriguez (Cal.App.), but in either case the governing standard requires less than proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 [120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52 [127 Cal.Rptr. 337, 545 P.2d 249].)
As to the identical-issue requirement, the majority implies that petitioner may not have satisfied the requirement when it notes “that the two proceedings threaten petitioner with fundamentally different sanctions.” The majority concedes that “As a technical matter,. . . this fact is not dispositive.” Indeed, this fact is not even relevant because the identical-issue requirement addresses whether the same factual allegations are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate sanctions are the same. (See Zaragosa v. Craven (1949) 33 Cal.2d 315, 321 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461].)
The majority attempts to deal with this question in a footnote (maj. opn., ante, p. 348, fn. 10), recognizing that “the People could avoid being collaterally estopped” from prosecuting “either by prosecuting first (and seeking revocation afterward) or by declining to seek revocation based on offenses for which they wish to prosecute” but concluding that there is no inherent unfairness in allowing the People to seek revocation first, and then exercise their discretion in deciding whether to prosecute. The unfairness arises, however, when the prosecution elects to proceed with the revocation hearing first, but then is relieved of the ordinary operation of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy underscores this protection against repetitive prosecution to criminal defendants. (Harris v. Washington (1971) 404 U.S. 55 [30 L.Ed.2d 212, 92 S.Ct. 183].) Indeed, the United State Supreme Court in Grady v. Corbin (1990) 495 U.S._ [109 L.Ed.2d 548, 110 S.Ct. 2084] recently reinforced and expanded the traditional protections of the double jeopardy clause. “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an oifense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.” (Id. at p._ [109 L.Ed.2d at p. 564], citations omitted.) To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would “give the State an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction for one or more of the offenses charged.” (Id. at p._ [109 L.Ed.2d at p. 562].) Under Grady, a trial court asked to rule on the applicability of double jeopardy in a given case must ask itself whether a second prosecution will give the state, in light of its resources and power, an unfair advantage. It must also question whether multiple prosecutions will cause the defendant to suffer undue expense, embarrassment, or psychological insecurity.
In the present matter the majority insists that its analysis is unaffected by Grady because “probation revocation hearings are not criminal prosecutions and accordingly should not be given the effect thereof.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 343, fn. 5.) I disagree. The policy considerations expressed by the court in Grady —the advantage given to the state when it repeatedly prosecutes a defendant for the same conduct and the burden of multiple prosecutions suffered by the accused—are the very concerns we must have here. Grady supports the conclusion that the state should not be allowed to relitigate the indecent exposure charge.