MEMORANDUM OPINION
SUMMERS, Justice.Petitioner Roger Robinson was divorced from Susan Daugherty in 1983 in the District Court of Cleveland County. The divorce decree provided for Robinson to pay the debts of the marriage “plus all claims by the Internal Revenue Service for past due taxes ... [and] any and all debts.” The decree divided the marital property. No findings pertaining to support were made, nor did the decree award any amount for support.
Robinson filed a petition for bankruptcy in 1987. In the bankruptcy proceeding he sought to discharge his obligations to his former wife arising from the divorce decree. He did not, however, seek to discharge his tax liability as to the Internal Revenue Service. Daugherty appeared in the bankruptcy proceeding and objected to Robinson’s efforts to discharge the decree-imposed obligations. She argued that payments in the decree were intended as alimony for support and that the tax obligations were non-dischargeable. The bankruptcy court, after a hearing, denied Daugherty’s objection, and subsequently granted a discharge as to all dischargeable debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523.
A few months after the discharge Daugherty filed a citation for contempt in the District Court of Cleveland County, alleging that Robinson had failed to pay the taxes due to the I.R.S. in violation of the divorce decree. Robinson objected to the jurisdiction of the district court on the ground that his obligations under the divorce decree had been discharged. The *515trial court overruled the objection and set the contempt matter for trial.
Robinson then sought a writ of prohibition here to prohibit further proceedings in the trial court on the citation for contempt. We assume original jurisdiction pursuant to Art. VII, § 4, of the Oklahoma Constitution, issue a writ of prohibition, and dissolve the temporary stay previously issued herein.
Property rights embodied in a divorce decree are enforceable as a judgment. Dickason v. Dickason, 607 P.2d 674, 677 (Okla.1980). Property rights are also enforceable via the trial court’s power of indirect contempt. McCrary v. McCrary, 723 P.2d 268 (Okla.1986) and 43 O.S.Supp.1989, § 111 (formerly codified at 12 O.S.Supp.1982, § 1276.2). Bankruptcy courts are frequently called upon to determine whether particular decree-imposed obligations are in the nature of support or property rights. Examples of such are found at Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir.1989); In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir.1987); and In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.1986).
In this original action we are only concerned with the legal issue as framed by the parties and presented by the record before us. See, State ex rel. Cartwright v. Dunbar, 618 P.2d 900, 904 (Okla.1980). Robinson has maintained herein that his decree-imposed obligation for the payment of taxes was discharged as to Daugherty. Daugherty has argued that the obligation to pay the taxes to the I.R.S. remains unfulfilled. Daugherty is attempting to force Robinson to pay the I.R.S. by virtue of Robinson’s obligation to Daugherty, i.e., the obligation arising from the divorce decree. The decree-created obligation was discharged. In Davis v. Davis, 593 P.2d 88 (Okla.1979), we held that a discharged decree-imposed obligation could not, as a matter of law, be the basis of a finding of contempt for a party’s failure to perform the obligation.
We dissolve the temporary stay issued herein, issue a writ of prohibition, and prohibit the respondent and any other assigned judge of the District Court of Cleveland County from proceeding further in this contempt action against the petitioner Roger Robinson.
HARGRAVE, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., and HODGES and DOOLIN, JJ., concur LAVENDER (joins WILSON, J.), SIMMS (joins WILSON, J.), ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., dissent.