dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In contrast to the majority, I view the actions of the Secretary of State (secretary) in certifying the initiative for the ballot, and in later dismissing Rita Montero’s amended protest, as contrary to law. Considerations of basic fairness lead me to conclude that Montero should be afforded a hearing on her amended protest before the initiative measure can be validly accepted as part of the Colorado Constitution.
I.
Because the power of the initiative is a state-created right, a review of Colorado’s legal framework for the initiative and protest processes, as they existed during the events in question, should prove helpful to a proper understanding of the legal significance of the secretary’s actions in this case.
A.
Article V, section 1(2) of the Colorado Constitution states;
The first power hereby reserved by the people is the initiative, and signatures by registered electors in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for the office of secretary of state at the previous general election shall be required to propose any measure by petition, and every such petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed. Initiative petitions for state legislation and amendments to the constitution, in such form as may be prescribed pursuant to law, shall be addressed to and filed with the secretary of state at least three months before. the general election at which they are to be voted upon.
This provision of the constitution is “in all respects self-executing.” Colo. Const, art. V, § 1(10).
*250The version of 1-40-109(1), IB C.R.S. (1982 Supp.), which was in effect in 1987 and 1988, provided as follows:
All petitions which have attached thereto an affidavit of some registered elector that each signature thereon is the signature of the person whose name it purports to be and that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the affiant each of the persons signing such petition was at the time of signing a registered elector shall be prima facie evidence that the signatures thereon are genuine and true and that the persons signing the same are registered electors, unless a protest in writing, under oath, is filed in the office in which such petition has been filed by some registered elector, within thirty days after such petition is filed, setting forth with particularity the grounds of such protest and the names protested. Whereupon the officer with whom such petition is filed shall forthwith mail a copy of the protest to the persons named in such petition as representing the signers thereof at the addresses therein given, together with a notice fixing a time for hearing the protest not less than five nor more than twenty days after such notice is mailed. If at such hearing, such protest is denied in whole or in part, the- person filing the same, within ten days after such denial, may file an amended protest, a copy of which shall be mailed to the persons named in the petition and on which a hearing shall be held as in the case of the original protest; but no person shall be entitled to amend an amended protest. (Emphasis added).1
Section 1-40-105, IB C.R.S. (1989 Supp.), states that no amendment to the state constitution shall be submitted to the people for adoption or rejection at the polls unless the petition for the submission of the initiated amendment “is signed by registered electors in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of voters who cast votes for all candidates for the office of secretary of state at the preceding general election.” The secretary is required, at least fifty days before a general election, to certify to the county clerks the names and party or other designation of each candidate on the ballot. § 1-6-202(1), IB C.R.S. (1989 Supp.). At the same time, the secretary is also required to certify to the county clerks “the ballot titles and numbers of each initiated and referred measure theretofore filed in [the secretary’s] office to be voted upon at such election.” § 1-40-112, IB C.R.S. (1980).
B.
In October 1987, the Official English Committee submitted to the secretary signed petition forms containing signatures in support of an initiative petition for a constitutional amendment declaring the English language to be the official language of the state of Colorado. On November 27, 1987, Montero filed a timely protest to the petition, and the secretary conducted a protest hearing on December 15, 1987. The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the initiative petition contained a sufficient number of valid signatures for placement of the initiative measure on the ballot at the general election on November 8, 1988. When it became apparent during the protest hearing that Monte-ro was claiming that the petition forms were printed in English only but were circulated in several language-minority counties in possible violation of the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1981) (any state subject to prohibitions against discrimination against citizens of language-minorities must provide such citizens with voting forms or other materials or information relating to the electoral process in “the language of the applicable language minority group as well as in the English language”), the secretary ruled that Montero’s claim was to be determined by a federal court. The secretary then concluded the hearing and dismissed *251Montero’s protest. Montero sought review of the secretary’s action in the Denver District Court, which upheld the order of dismissal.
On June 10, 1988, Montero filed a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The federal district court, on September 16, 1988, entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the state of Colorado from conducting an election on the English as Official Language petition initiative. Montero v. Meyer, 696 F.Supp. 540 (D.Colo.1988). The secretary appealed the district court’s ruling to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
September 19, 1988, is one of the critical dates in this case. On that day the secretary ruled that because the federal district court had determined that a large number of signatures on the petition forms were presumptively invalid under the federal Voting Rights Act, the Official English Committee would be permitted to submit additional signatures and to amend the petition in a manner consistent with the federal district court’s ruling. The secretary further ruled that, pursuant to section 1-40-105, IB C.R.S. (1989 Supp.), a total of 50,668 signatures were necessary to certify the initiative petition for the ballot and that the petition lacked 13,794 signatures for ballot certification. The secretary permitted the Official English Committee to withdraw the original petition and to resubmit a new petition with additional signatures. On this same day, notwithstanding the secretary’s determination that the signatures were insufficient under Colorado law to place the initiative petition on the ballot, the secretary certified the English as Official Language initiative petition to the county clerks for placement on the ballot at the general election on November 8, 1988. It was the secretary’s opinion that the federal district court’s ruling enjoined the state from holding an election on the initiative but not from certifying the initiative for placement on the ballot. On October 3, 1988, the Official English Committee submitted additional signatures. On October 5, 1988, the secretary ruled that the additional signatures, when added to the 36,874 signatures previously determined to be valid, provided a sufficient number of signatures for placement of the petition on the ballot.
On October 12, 1988, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district court’s preliminary injunction and held that the minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the English as Official Language initiative petition. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.1988). On that same day the secretary issued a new ruling in which she concluded that the federal litigation was “part of the appellate process from the original protest filed in late 1987” and the effect of the circuit court’s decision was to reinstate the original signatures declared presumptively invalid by the federal district court. In this ruling the secretary expressly authorized Montero to file an amended protest, and Montero did so on October 24, 1988, within the time expressly designated by the secretary. Montero’s amended protest included challenges to a myriad of petition signatures on grounds authorized by Colorado law. The secretary set Montero’s amended protest for hearing on November 2, 1988.
On the date of the hearing on Montero’s amended protest, the secretary, acknowledging that statutory law was unclear on the issue, reversed her previous decision authorizing the amended protest and granted the Official English Committee’s motion to dismiss the amended protest as untimely filed. The secretary ruled that, because a previous hearing was conducted on Monte-ro’s original protest on November 27, 1987, and her protest was dismissed at that time, Montero had ten days from the original protest hearing to file an amended protest. Noting that Montero had not filed an amended protest within the ten day period and instead’ had chosen to pursue remedies in state and federal courts, the secretary concluded that Montero’s right to file an amended protest had been abandoned. Montero unsuccessfully sought judicial review in the Denver District Court, and thereafter applied for review by this court pursuant to section l-40-109(2)(a), IB C.R.S. (1989 Supp.).
*252II.
In my view, the secretary acted contrary to law on September 19, 1988, when she certified the English as Official Language initiative petition for the ballot at the general election on November 8, 1988, while simultaneously finding that the signatures on the initiative petition were insufficient in number for ballot certification. Colorado’s statutory scheme regarding initiative measures precluded the secretary from certifying the initiative in the absence of the requisite number of valid signatures on the petition at the time of the certification. §§ 1-40-105, IB C.R.S. (1989 Supp.); 1-40-112, IB C.R.S. (1980).
The secretary ruled on September 19, 1988 — the fiftieth day preceding the November 8 election — that 36,874 valid signatures appeared on the initiative petition and that this number was 13,794 less than the 50,668 signatures required for certification. Nevertheless, on that same day, the secretary certified the initiative for the ballot by reasoning that the federal district court had enjoined the state from holding an election but not from certifying the initiative for the ballot. The federal district court’s ruling, however, only addressed the question of whether the minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act were applicable to the initiative petition, and not the nature and extent of the secretary’s authority under Colorado law for certification of a ballot title with respect to a state constitutional amendment. It is state law, not federal law, that defines the secretary’s authority, as well as the limitations on that authority, with respect to ballot certification. Having determined on September 19, 1988, that the number of signatures on the initiative petition were substantially short of the number required by Colorado law for ballot certification, the secretary was without authority to certify the initiative petition for placement on the ballot.
The fact that the Official English Committee submitted additional signatures that put the number of signatures over the minimum number required for certification does not serve, in my view, to legitimize the secretary’s prior act of certification when that certification did not satisfy the express requirements of state law. The validity of the secretary’s certification must be judged on its own terms at the time of the attempted certification, and not on the basis of events occurring subsequent thereto. The secretary’s decision to certify the initiative for the ballot on September 19, 1988, was unsupported by the facts then existing and was contrary to Colorado statutory law.
The secretary was not without an appropriate remedy to preserve the English as Official Language initiative petition for adoption or rejection at an election. The constitutional provision with respect to the initiative is intended to be self-executing in all respects. Colo. Const, art. V, § 1(10). Once the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision on October 12, 1988, the secretary could have then declared the signatures on the initiative sufficient in number, and in the event the secretary thereafter heard and rejected Montero’s amended protest, the secretary could have filed a petition in the Denver District Court requesting the court to set a special election on the initiative in light of the unique circumstances of the case. No such effort was made by the secretary.
III.
Independently of the secretary’s action in certifying the initiative petition for the ballot, I would apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to this case and hold that the secretary was precluded from dismissing Montero’s amended protest without providing Montero with a hearing on the merits of the amended protest. The estoppel doctrine is available against the government in order to prevent manifest injustice to a person adversely affected by governmental action. “The doctrine is founded upon principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result.” Colorado Water Quality Control Comm. v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, (Colo.1982); Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 376, 473 *253P.2d 725, 730 (1970). The elements necessary for a proper application of equitable estoppel to the facts of this case are the following: the secretary must have known the facts; the secretary must have intended that her conduct be acted on or must so have acted that Montero had the right to believe the secretary’s conduct was so intended; Montero must have been ignorant of the true facts; and Montero must have relied upon the secretary’s conduct to her detriment. Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243 (Colo.1984); see City and County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir.1982).
All the elements of estoppel are present in this case. The secretary, who was responsible for administering the law applicable to the initiative and protest processes, undoubtedly was aware of the facts of this case. The secretary’s order permitting Montero to file an amended protest not later than October 24, 1988, was such that Montero had a right to believe that the secretary’s order was intended to permit the amended protest to be filed, to be set for hearing, and to be resolved on the merits. Furthermore, because the secretary obviously believed that she had the authority to authorize an amended protest, it cannot reasonably be argued that Monte-ro had any reason to believe the secretary’s decision was not authorized by law. Finally, there is every indication in the record that Montero relied upon the secretary’s order by investing many hours in preparing the amended protest and suffering the obvious detriment of never being afforded an opportunity to establish the insufficiency of the requisite number of signatures on the initiative petition.
The majority reasons that because the secretary’s action was unauthorized, estop-pel cannot apply to the facts of this case. This conclusion, in my view, begs the question by presuming that the secretary was without legal authority to permit Montero to file the amended protest. There is nothing in Colorado statutory law expressly precluding the secretary’s action in granting Montero the opportunity to file an amended protest. Indeed, the secretary in her dismissal ruling acknowledged the uncertain state of statutory law on this issue. Arguably, section 1-40-109(1), IB C.R.S. (1982 Supp.), which authorizes an amended protest within ten days after the secretary’s denial ’of an original protest, was intended to apply only in those cases where the secretary had the authority to rule on the validity of the original protest. In the present case, the record is clear that the secretary explicitly ruled that she had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the federal question raised in Montero’s original protest. Consequently, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, Montero had no alternative other than to seek relief from the federal court on that very , significant aspect of her claim. The validity of the petition signatures under state law, however, was neither addressed nor determined by the United States District Court or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Given this state of the record, I cannot say with any degree of assurance that the secretary’s action in authorizing an amended protest was so patently unauthorized by Colorado law as to preclude the application of estoppel principles to the facts of this case.
At the very least, the unique circumstances present here compel the application of the “unique circumstances” doctrine. We have applied that doctrine when a party reasonably relies and acts upon an erroneous or misleading statement or ruling by a trial court regarding the time for filing a motion. Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981). In this case, Montero, relying upon the explicit ruling of the secretary, filed an amended protest within the time authorized by the secretary, but was denied any opportunity to establish her claim, set forth in the amended protest, that the initiative petition did not validly conform to the requirements of state law for ballot certification.
IV.
I fully endorse the proposition that the people’s constitutional right to the initiative process is to be liberally construed in a manner allowing the greatest possible exercise of that right. McKee v. City of Louis*254ville, 200 Colo. 525, 616 P.2d 969 (1980). Liberal construction of the right of initiative, however, should not be such as to preclude a registered elector from challenging an initiative petition on the grounds that such petition does not conform to the requirements of state law. One of the obvious purposes of the protest process is to preserve the purity of elections by protecting against mistake, fraud, and other abuses in the initiative process. Clark v. City of Aurora, 782 P.2d 771, 777 (Colo.1989).
It well may be that the proponents of the English as Official Language initiative petition did obtain the sufficient number of valid signatures to place the initiative petition on the ballot for the November 1988 election. There also is a distinct possibility, however, that a sufficient number of signatures were not in conformity with state law. Unfortunately, the actions of the secretary precluded any resolution of this question and, for all practical purposes, insulated the initiative process from any meaningful judicial review.
In light of the substantial procedural infirmities inherent in the manner in which the initiative petition was certified for the ballot, and in the manner in which Monte-ro’s amended protest was summarily dismissed, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this matter to that court with directions to return the case to the secretary for the purpose of conducting a hearing on Montero’s amended protest, the results of which should then be certified to the district court for judicial review. I accordingly dissent from this court’s affirmance of the judgment.
KIRSHBAUM, J., joins in Part III of the dissent.
MULLARKEY, J., joins in the dissent.
. Section 1-40-109 was substantially amended in 1989 subsequent to the secretary's order dismissing Montero’s amended protest. The present protest procedures are located in the 1989 Supplement to Volume IB of the Colorado Revised Statutes. The other statutes referred to in the text of this dissent were in effect during the events in this case.