concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that section 5-5-108, 2 C.R.S. (1992), was adopted by the Colorado General Assembly to “prohibit[] unconscionable debt collection practices.” Maj. op. at 1143. I also agree that Valerie L. Conley, now known as Valerie L. Shaw (Shaw), “commenced this action ... al-leg[ing] that [Greenwood Trust Company (Discover) ] provided false and defamatory credit information to consumer credit reporting agencies which ... caused her to lose credit opportunities.” Id. at 1143. However, because in opposing Discovers motion for summary judgment Shaw continued to claim injury to her “economic status” and because such a claim, in my view, is not inconsistent with or in “outright or actual conflict” with the Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), maj. op. at 1148, nor is it “an action solely for injury to reputation,” id. at 1148, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that state law is preempted.
In my view, under section 5-5-108, a trial court may issue an injunction, in the absence of actual damages, to enjoin future violations of section 5-5-108 and to prohibit what Shaw’s complaint describes as a “continuing course of conduct.” Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s determination that Shaw’s claim falls solely under subsection 5-5-108(4)(d)(IV). See maj. op. at 1142. While I write separately, I also join in Chief Justice *1154Vollack’s separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
The majority determines that “a claim solely under subsection 5 — 5—108(4)(d)(IV) is in the nature of defamation and is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1681 to the extent that malice or willful intent to injure is absent.” Maj. op. at 1142. In my view, the majority mis-eharacterizes the defendant’s complaint by limiting it to falling “solely under subsection 5 — 5—108(4)(d)(IV).” Id. In fact, paragraph eight of the complaint and jury demand filed on February 9, 1993, alleges that “Defendant’s actions and omissions as herein alleged are actionable as a violation of § 5-5-108, C.R.S.” (See complaint attached as Appendix A.) Furthermore, in Shaw’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Response Motion), she relies on section 5-5-108 in its entirety rather than just the subsection (4)(d)(IV) upon which the majority focuses its analysis.
Thus, the majority improperly limits subsection (4)(d)(IV) to reputation despite the statute’s clear mandate that “consideration shall be given to each of the [section 5-5-108(4)(d)] factors, among others-” § 5-5-108(4), 2 C.R.S. (1992). Subsection (4)(d) requires consideration of acts that cause or threaten to cause injury to a consumer’s economic status. Therefore, contrary to the majority’s determination, reputation is not the only aspect of Shaw’s claim. In failing to address the other aspects of Shaw’s complaint, the majority, in effect, preempts not just that subsection, but allows its judgment to be read as applicable to all claims of action under section 5-5-108(2), as applied through consideration of the several factors in subsection 5-5-108(4).
In Shaw’s Response Motion, she lists the acts and omissions that support her argument that Discover knowingly furnished false credit information. The list of acts includes “[clausing or threatening to cause injury to Plaintiffs reputation or economic status in violation of § 5-5-108(4)(d)(I),(III) and (IV).” It is important to note that before the trial court, Shaw claimed injury to her reputation and her economic status. In my opinion, defamation is an action for injury to reputation only. Even if Shaw’s claim for injury to reputation was in the nature of defamation and prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1681, she would still have a permissible claim for injury to her economic status.
As a result, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Shaw’s claim is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1681. In my view, the majority is collapsing the law of our state into a federal cause of action. The majority decides to return the case to the trial court for consideration of “malice or willful intent to injure.” Maj. op. at 1142. This language does not appear in section 5-5-108. I cannot support the majority’s decision to equate a state law claim under section 5-5-108 for injury to economic status with the FCRA defamation claim requiring a showing of willful and wanton conduct because proving such conduct subjects plaintiffs to an unnecessarily high standard without any statutory authority for doing so.
II.
In Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Colo.1994), we held that “[djefamation is a communication that holds an individual up to contempt or ridicule. ...” (Emphasis added.) In Keohane, we further stated that “‘[a]t common law, the tort of defamation existed to redress and compensate individuals who suffered serious harm to their reputations due to the careless or malicious communications of others.’” Maj. op. at 1148 (quoting Keohane, 882 P.2d at 1297) (emphasis added). “Additionally, defamatory statements are so egregious and intolerable because the statement [sic] destroys an, individual’s reputation: a characteristic which cannot be bought, and one that, once lost, is extremely difficult to restore.” Keo-hane, 882 P.2d at 1298 (emphasis added). In footnote six, Justice Erickson, writing for the majority, aptly notes Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reference to Othello, act III, scene 3:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash;
*?‘Tis something, nothing;
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.
Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2702, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)).
Here, as the majority concedes, “Shaw commenced this action ... [and] alleged that Discover provided false ... credit information to consumer credit reporting agencies which ... caused her to lose credit opportunities-” Maj. op. at 3. “Shaw alleged that Discover had injured her ‘reputation or economic status’ by ‘disclosing information concerning the existence of a debt known to be disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact.’ ” Id. at 9. These claims by Shaw, given fair reading under our rules of procedure that adopt notice and not form pleading, see C.R.C.P. 8(a)(2) & 9(b); see also Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095, 1099-1100 (Colo.1995), do not suggest Shaw was held up to “contempt or ridicule,” was caused to “suffer[ ] serious harm to [her] reputation[ ],” or that Discover made statements “so egregious and intolerable” so as to “destroy” Shaw’s reputation. Keohane, 882 P.2d at 1297-98. In essence, like Chief Justice Vollack, I fail to see a defamation action. Nor, in my opinion, can one be constructed out of a statute designed not to create a cause of action “in the nature of defamation,” but, rather, intended to establish a state public policy that protects citizens from unconscionable practices.
In essence, section 5-5-108 is designed to deter “unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt” and authorizes courts to “grant an injunction and award ... any actual damages ... sustained.” § 5-5-108(2) (emphasis added). However, it is not a statutory mechanism designed to thwart legitimate and sound business decisions, such as those properly made by a lender who rejects an unworthy applicant for a loan. No one, least not Shaw, suggests that the denial of a loan or other business decision amounts to or is tantamount to defamation. Without more, providing false credit information upon which sound business decisions are made to deny credit or loans is similarly not defamation. Yet, following the majority’s rationale to its natural conclusion, one is left to assume that a denial of credit, based on erroneous credit information, is, in fact, a publication that holds one up to “contempt or ridicule.” Without more, I disagree.
I read section 5-5-108 to reach business conduct or decisions that affect the economic status and well-being of a consumer, but not the publication of statements “egregious and intolerable” so as to hold one up to “contempt or ridicule.” Under these facts, unlike the majority, I do not read Shaw’s complaint to only claim injury to reputation. Moreover, I do not understand the General Assembly’s adoption of the statute to authorize a civil action only in the nature of defamation. For example, ignoring any action to enjoin conduct, a plaintiff who, while interest rates are low, is denied credit based on the communication of false credit information, may bring an action for actual damages, i.e., the difference between what the plaintiff had to pay (in interest) for the loan later acquired and what she would have paid at the time she was denied credit illegally — but not to recover for serious harm to one’s reputation. Where the false information is part of a continuing course of conduct without actual damages, I would expect a successful plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief — even if the false information is not widely disseminated. Such a remedy would be especially appropriate where the defendant admits it engaged in the violative conduct but maintains its actions are immune or protected from any consumer’s reach, as does Discover here. Simply stated, the unconscionable denial of credit, unlike defamation, does not act only to impugn one’s reputation.
III.
Finally, I do not doubt the power of Congress to enact legislation to prevent state regulation and hence, under the supremacy clause, to preempt state law. However, as we recently noted in In re Marriage of Heupel, 936 P.2d 561 (Colo.1997), “ ‘In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually *1156conflicts with federal law ... or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ” Heupel, 936 P.2d at 564 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617,120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992)).
Therefore, while I agree with the majority that “section 5-5-108 will be preempted only to the extent that it is in outright or actual conflict with the [Federal Credit Reporting Act],” maj. op. at 1147,1 find no conflict in a state law designed to protect the public from unconscionable collection practices and a federal statute that prohibits, by its plain language, civil actions in the nature of defamation. While damages may not be the proper remedy where no injury to reputation or economic status is proved, I must note that the statute does permit injunctive relief to prevent future violations which are part of a continuing course of conduct.
I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that Shaw’s complaint for “los[s] of credit opportunity” is not of a similar nature as a complaint “solely for injury of reputation.”
IV.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in Chief Justice Vollack’s concurrence in part and dissent in part, I agree that the trial court erroneously granted Discovers motion for summary judgment, and I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that section 5-5-108(4)(d)(IV) is preempted by the FCRA.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice VOLLACK joins in this concurrence and dissent.
APPENDIX A
DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF EL PASO, STATE OF COLORADO
Case No. 93CV0287 Division No. 6
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
VALERIE L. CONLEY, n/k/a VALERIE L. SHAW Plaintiff
vs.
GREENWOOD TRUST COMPANY, d/b/a
DISCOVER CARD FINANCIAL SERVICES Defendant
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Richard C. Whaley, and for her Complaint states:
1. That at all times necessary to this action, Plaintiff was a resident of El Paso County, Colorado.
2. That at all times necessary to this action, the alleged acts and omissions of Defendant which form the basis of this Complaint took place in El Paso County, Colorado.
3. Upon information and belief, Defendant is a Delaware Corporation in good standing, conducting business in the State of Colorado.
4. Defendant has claimed that Plaintiff is indebted to it in the amount of $1,219.82 by virtue of its issuance of Discover Card # 6011-0096-9750-6066.
5. Defendant has been advised repeatedly that Plaintiff never applied for such card, never had such card in her possession, never used such card for any purpose whatsoever, and is not indebted to Defendant because of any credit extended by it for the use of such card by any person.
6. Despite such advisement and notice, Defendant repeatedly sent payment demand notices to Plaintiff, and threatened suit if Plaintiff did not pay the amount demanded of her. Further, Defendant has reported to various credit reporting agencies that it has charged off to its bad debt accounts the sum of $1,219.00 for non-payment of the said sum by Plaintiff.
7. That at all times relevant to the subject matter of this Complaint, Defendant knew that Plaintiff had no legal debt obligation to it on the subject Discover Card.
8. That Defendant’s actions and omissions as herein alleged are actionable as a violation of § 5-5-108, C.R.S.
*11579. That the false, defamatory credit information remains in Plaintiffs credit file to this date, and as such constitutes a continuing course of conduct. Such conduct by Defendant was, and remains willful, wanton, malicious, unconscionable, and outrageous; and was done and continues to be done with the deliberate intent to cause severe, irreparable damage to Plaintiffs credit reputation.
10. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as herein alleged, Plaintiff has suffered severe, irreparable damage to her credit reputation, lost credit opportunities, and mental and emotional distress.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment in her behalf and against Defendant in an amount to adequately compensate her for her damages, interest as provided by statute from the date the cause of action arose, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees pursuant to § 5-5-108 C.R.S., costs of this action, and such other and further relief as to the Court may seem appropriate.
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY FOR ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.
Respectfully submitted, RICHARD C. WHALEY # 17134 Attorney for Plaintiff 411 So. Cascade Ave. Colorado Springs, CO 80903 (719) 473-3232