(dissenting)—I will state as briefly as possible my reasons for disagreeing with the majority opinion.
*348The agreed statement of facts, describing in detail the nature of respondent’s services to its members, includes the following:
“3. Building codes, anti-shingle ordinances and insurance differential matters. Throughout the period of the Bureau’s existence, the shingle industry has been constantly confronted with anti-shingle legislation and discriminatory insurance differentials. Both from the Seattle office and through its field men, the Bureau has combated anti-shingle ordinances and legislation and has been able to secure approval for wood shingles as applied to roofs, with some limitations, within the three major building codes in use in the United States. If it were not for the efforts of the Bureau, it is believed that there would be an ordinance or law prohibiting the use of red cedar shingles upon any roof in the United States.”
RCW 82.04.430(2), quoted in the majority opinion, permits taxpayers to deduct, in computing their tax, “bona fide initiation fees, dues, contributions, donations,” and, with respect to dues, contains this limitation:
“. . . Dues which are for, or graduated upon, the amount of service rendered by the recipient thereof are not permitted as a deduction hereunder; . . . ”
Respondent’s bylaws provide, with respect to contributions of its members (dues), as follows:
“Each member in consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered by the corporation shall pay to said corporation twelve cents (12(5) for every four-bundle roof square of No. 1 grade shingles, seven cents (7(5) for every four-bundle roof square of second grade shingles, . . . ”
The majority hold that these dues are not deductible in computing respondent’s business and occupation tax, saying:
“. . . We are convinced that the Bureau’s interpretation of the word ‘dues’ and the word ‘contributions’ is a somewhat strained one. We believe the word ‘dues’, given its ordinary everyday meaning does not connote payments such as those made herein to ‘trade associations’ for services rendered such as those involved in the instant case.
“If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the word ‘dues’, and we believe there is none, the position taken by the Bureau *349is untenable for another reason; namely, RCW 82.04.430 (2) specifically provides: ‘Dues which are for, or graduated upon, the amount of service rendered by the recipient thereof are not permitted as a deduction hereunder; . . . ’ The payments made by each member of the Bureau are proportionate to the size and volume of that member’s business and manufacturing operations. While it is true that the services rendered by the Bureau are general in nature and for the most part cannot be said to be specific services rendered to particular member-manufacturers of red cedar shingles or shakes; nevertheless, the Bureau does unquestionably render most significant services to the industry as a whole. The benefits derived by the individual members are roughly in proportion to their share of the total market; i.e., in proportion to the amount or the extent of the production of each member. Since the payments of each member are based upon that member’s production, such payments thus, in terms of the statute, RCW 82.04.430, ‘. . . are for, or graduated upon, the amount of service rendered . . . ’ Falling, as we believe they do, clearly within the proviso of RCW 82.04.430(2) negatives consideration of such payments as dues or contributions, donations, tuition fees, and thus negatives consideration of such payments as a permissible deduction by the Bureau as to the measure of business and occupation tax levied by the Tax Commission.”
I cannot agree with either basis upon which the majority hold that dues paid by respondent’s members are not deductible under the statute. With respect to the second ground, the majority, in my opinion, are interpreting the statute liberally in favor of the state (instead of the taxpayer) and, in effect, hold that the “benefits” derived by each member is enjoyed in proportion to the volume of his production. This is not what the exclusionary clause relating to dues forbids. The limitation relates solely to sums paid directly by a member for services rendered to him and representing the cost thereof. It has no relation to dues charged for the maintenance and operation of respondent’s functions generally in carrying out the purposes for which it was incorporated.
The portion of the agreed statement of facts quoted above to the effect that, if it had not been for the services rendered *350by respondent to its members, the use of red cedar shingles upon any roof in the United States would be prohibited by law, can only be construed as meaning that all of respondent’s members would have been completely put out of business.
It appears to me that, whether a member’s operation in the production of red cedar shingles be large or small, the compulsory shutting down of the business permanently would be, in all cases, a catastrophy of considerable magnitude.
The fact that the dues payable to respondent are based on the volume of the member’s production of shingles does not, in my opinion, indicate that the member’s contribution to the association is based upon the cost or value of particular service rendered to him by respondent. In other words, referring to the statutory exclusion, they are not “for, or graduated upon, the amount of service rendered by the recipient thereof.” Indeed, the amount of money constituting each member’s dues has no relation to the amount of service rendered by respondent to such member. As above stated, the computation of dues payable in each instance is graduated not upon the amount of work performed by respondent for the individual member but upon the volume of business done by the member. Thus, the statutory exclusion does not apply.
It seems to me that, accepting as we must, the agreed statement of facts, including the facts stated in paragraph 3 thereof (quoted above), the court should conclude that, except for the services performed by respondent, all of its members would now be, in effect, prohibited by law from producing red cedar shingles. This necessarily follows from the agreed fact that, but for the services of respondent, the use of red cedar shingles on any roof in the United States would have been prohibited by ordinance or statute.
For the reasons stated herein, I am of the opinion that items involved in this case were dues within the meaning of the statute and were deductible by respondent in computing its business and occupation tax.
*351I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Hill and Weaver, JJ., concur with Donworth, J.
August 9, 1963. Petition for rehearing denied.