March 3, 1961, Charles Augusta Lee informed Dr. H. R. Pyfer that he was in pain as a result of a recent injury to his left knee; that his name was Charles Allen, and that he resided at Issaquah, Washington. An examination of the knee did not disclose any injury; however, the doctor did find that it had been previously fused. To alleviate the alleged pain, the doctor prescribed percodan, a narcotic drug. Lee took the prescription to the pharmacy adjacent to the doctor’s office, again represented that he was Charles Allen of Issaquah, and asked the pharmacist to request the doctor to prescribe a different drug because percodan made him ill. Dr. Pyfer then substituted the narcotic drug demerol. The prescription was filled, and Lee signed a charge slip as Charles Allen, Issaquah, Washington.
March 6, 1961, Lee returned to Dr. Pyfer’s office and obtained a refill of the prescription. Upon this second office call, the doctor recognized him to be Charles Lee, and notified the police.
After Lee left the pharmacy with the demerol, he was arrested. Lee told the arresting officer that the reason he had used a false name and address was that “ . . . he wanted the demerol and he knew that he couldn’t get it by using his right name and address.” He later made a similar statement to his probation officer.
Subsequently, Lee was charged with feloniously obtaining a narcotic drug, in violation of RCW 69.33.380(1) (d), which provides:
“(1) No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain a narcotic drug, or procure or attempt to procure the administration of a narcotic drug ...(d) by the use of a false name or the giving of a false address.” (Italics ours.)
The evidence at the jury trial was substantially as indicated above. In addition, Dr. Pyfer testified that, in prescribing the drug, he had relied upon the defendant’s statement of alleged pain. He further stated that he would not have prescribed the drug had he known the defendant’s *230true name, because his records would have disclosed that Charles Lee had not paid his previous account.
At the close of the state’s evidence, the defendant moved for dismissal, contending that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Dr. Pyfer had relied upon the false name and address given to him by the defendant. The court granted the motion, and the state appeals.
The appeal presents a single issue: Is reliance upon a false name and/or address by the doctor or pharmacist prescribing a drug or filling a prescription, an element of the offense proscribed by RCW 69.33.380(1) (d)?
The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (Laws of 1959, chapter 27, p. 197, RCW 69.33) regulates the possession, use, and disposal of narcotic drugs, and provides for licensing those engaged in the sale thereof. It further provides that
“ . . . The record of all narcotic drugs sold, administered, dispensed, or otherwise disposed of, shall show the date of selling, administering, or dispensing, the name and address of the person to whom, or for whose use . . . the drugs were sold, administered or dispensed, and the kind and quantity of drugs. Every such record shall be kept for a period of two years from the date of the transaction recorded. ...” (Italics ours.) RCW 69.33.300(5).
Penalties are prescribed for violation of any of the provisions of the act. RCW 69.33.410.
The respondent contends that, if, under RCW 69.33.380 (1) (d), proof only of the giving of a false name and/or address in obtaining a narcotic drug is sufficient to establish the offense, persons innocent of any corrupt motive in using a false name and/or address would be guilty of crime, unless a causal relationship in the nature of reliance is a required element of the offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression in this state. It has been decided in other jurisdictions adversely to respondent’s contention.
In People v. Oviedo, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 690, 235 P. (2d) 612 (1951), the defendant was charged with violation of a statute which provided that “ ‘No person shall, in connection with the prescribing, ... or dispensing of any *231narcotic drug . . . give a false name or address . . . ’ ” The defendant contended that reliance was a necessary element of the offense. In this regard, the court stated (p. 693):
“Lastly, in connection with the contention that absurd results would follow if the statute were strictly construed to include defendant, he cites United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354 [46 S. Ct. 513, 70 L. Ed. 986], and argues that the giving of a false name by the patient was of no causative effect whatever on the prescribing or in the distribution of narcotics since the evidence shows that the doctor would have prescribed the drug as readily if the true name had been given. The provisions of the Health and Safety Code set up a system of recordation of prescriptions to eliminate, insofar as it is humanly possible, the use of such narcotic prescriptions for illegal purposes. If the patient is allowed to give a false name and address it would be impossible, through the system, to detect illegal activity. No absurd result is reached by an interpretation of the section which precludes a patient from giving a false name or address in connection with such narcotic prescriptions. That section makes certain conduct criminal and, in the instant case, the person’s conduct falls clearly within the provisions of the section. It can scarcely be material that the defendant would have also received the narcotics if he had not committed the acts forbidden by the statute. It does not follow that, because a police measure may affect persons innocent of criminal intent, it thereby produces an absurd result. [Citing cases.]”
In State v. Newstead, 280 S. W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1955), the defendant was charged under a statutory provision identical to that here in question. In commenting upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the court stated (p. 9) :
“It is clear that the foregoing subsection makes it a separate offense ‘to obtain a narcotic drug, * * * by the uses of a false name or the giving of a false address.’ While testimony adduced by the state may not have shown that the prescription was written or filled because of the false name or address given by defendant, and it may be that certain of the state’s evidence may be construed as tending to show the contrary, still, in view of defendant’s admission that he did in fact use a false name and address for the pur*232pose of obtaining a narcotic drug, and in view of the further evidence that he did in fact obtain a narcotic drug under the false name and address admittedly given for the purpose of obtaining it, we are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the essential charge contained in the amended information.” (Italics ours.)
In Geurin v. Nevada, 73 Nev. 233, 315 P. (2d) 965 (1957), the same issue was raised. The court stated (p. 235):
“Appellant further contends that it was not proved that his use of a false name ‘was the motivating and causative basis’ for the druggist’s delivery of the narcotic to him and that it was, therefore, not proved that he obtained the drug ‘by the use of a false name.’ The contention would appear to be that it was necessary for the state to negative all other causes that might possibly have motivated the druggist in delivering the drug to appellant. It appears from the transcript that the druggist required appellant to sign for receipt of the drug, whereupon appellant signed the false name of Virgle Moore. We do not find the argument convincing.”
Respondent contends that the cited cases are distinguishable. He urges that, in People v. Oviedo, supra, the statute was a prohibition against the giving, rather than the use of a false name. We find this distinction to be without merit.
Respondent further contends that, in State v. Newstead, supra, the defendant admitted that his purpose in using a false name and address was to obtain the drug. In the instant case, the evidence established that respondent also admitted that he used the false name and address because he knew he would not obtain the narcotic if he used his true name. We find no merit in this contention.
Respondent cites State v. Powell, 212 Ore. 684, 321 P. (2d) 333 (1958), and argues that this court should adopt the rationale of that case, which requires the element of reliance. The Oregon court, in the cited case, was interpreting two statutes, each of which provided a different penalty for the same offense, one a misdemeanor and the other a felony. The statute which denominated the offense a felony was identical to ROW 69.33.380(1) (d). The court, in giving meaning to both acts of the legislature, determined that the legislature intended that the felony statute re*233quired an additional element of reliance on the false name and address by the person prescribing the drug, but that the misdemeanor statute did not. The case is not apropos for the reason that we are not concerned, in this appeal, with reconciling two statutes.
The state has broad police powers to regulate and control activities which are detrimental to the general health and welfare of the people. State v. Boren, 36 Wn. (2d) 522, 219 P. (2d) 566, 20 A.L.R. (2d) 798 (1950). Because of the extremely dangerous and injurious effect of the unregulated use of narcotic drugs, “. . . We are also committed to allow the maximum scope of police power in the control of the illegal use of narcotic drugs. ...” Seattle v. Ross, 54 Wn. (2d) 655, 661, 344 P. (2d) 216 (1959).
The intention of the legislature, in the enactment of a regulatory measure, must be determined from a consideration of all of the provisions of the act. It is the duty of the court to adopt a construction of the statute that is reasonable, and in furtherance of the obvious and manifest purpose of the legislation. State v. Rinkes, 49 Wn. (2d) 664, 667, 306 P. (2d) 205 (1957), and case cited.
The legislative purpose, in enacting the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, was to curb illegal traffic in narcotic drugs, and to regulate and control their sale and distribution. The section here in question, when read in conjunction with the recording provisions of the act, is directed at a particular aspect of this general purpose, namely, to prevent a person with a seemingly legitimate complaint from obtaining an oversupply of narcotic drugs by using a different name and address in any number of physicians’ offices and/or pharmacies. To curtail such excessive use and the unlawful obtaining of narcotic drugs is well within the proper exercise of the police power of the state.
The respondent’s statement that his purpose for using a false name and address was “that he couldn’t get it by using his right name and address,” brings the facts of this case precisely within the purview of the statute.
*234We conclude that, in enacting RCW 69.33.380(1) (d), the legislature did not intend that proof of reliance upon a false name and/or address by the doctor or pharmacist should be an element of the offense.
The judgment of dismissal is reversed.
Hill, Finley, Hunter, and Hale, JJ., concur.