Dissenting.—The trial court, from a wealth of oral and documentary evidence showing the transactions involved and the relationships of the parties, both contractual and territorial, and including stock ownership, presumptively resolved all conflicts and drew all permissible inferences in favor of plaintiff. Among other things, it expressly found that “said transfer of property [on which the disputed tax is based], as provided for in . . . [the] exchange agreement, was not a sale of property at retail such as is contemplated by and referred to in Section 6051 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, but was an occasional sale within the meaning of that term as used in Sections 6367 and 6006.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and as contemplated by the pertinent law of California.” Certainly, a transfer of property was involved but equally certain is the fact that it was not any ordinary retail sale. Specifically, the trial court found that the subject agreement effected “a reorganization of the Pacific Pipeline and Engineers, Ltd., and of the plaintiff and for a territorial division of ‘pipeline business’ between said corporations” and that the transfer involved was made to carry out such agreement. Based on all the evidence before it, including the inferences it drew, and guided by the applicable statute, the trial court reached its above quoted conclusion of mixed law and fact; i.e., that the,subject transfer “was not a sale of property at retail such as is contemplated by and referred to in Section 6051 . . . but was an occasional sale within the meaning of that term ... as contemplated by *737the pertinent law of California.” Overturning that finding-conclusion necessarily involves a reweighing and reweighting of the evidence, and that is not properly within the function of this court.
It is the duty of this court not only to view the evidence favorable to sustaining the findings but likewise to liberally construe the findings in favor of the judgment. (Richter v. Walker (1951), 36 Cal.2d 634, 639 [1, 3, 4] [226 P.2d 593].) Furthermore, as stated in the Richter case at page 640 [5], “It is ... to be noted that while full findings are required upon all material issues a judgment will not be set aside on appeal because of a failure to make an express finding upon an issue if a finding thereon, consistent with the judgment, results by necessary implication from the express findings which are made.”
It appears to me that the majority, rather than conforming to the rules above stated, have scrutinized and construed both evidence and findings to the end of reversal rather than affirmance. For example, the majority, without relating all of the evidence pertinent to the ultimate fact, state that “The undisputed evidence shows that the sale was one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and character to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller’s permit and was therefore not an occasional sale under subdivision (a) of section 6006.5. ...” That declaration either ignores or gives no weight to the evidence establishing the isolated and distinct character of the subject transaction.
There is substantial evidence that this was “A sale of property not held or used by a seller in the course of an activity for which he is required to hold a seller’s permit,” and that “such sale is not one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and character to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller’s permit” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6006.5, par. (a)). Plaintiff’s manager and plant engineer testified as follows:
“Q. Mr. Porter, to your knowledge have there ever been any other transfers by Pacific Pipeline Construction Company as shown in Exhibit B to Exhibit 16, or as referred to in Exhibit 15? In other words, the two agreements [evidencing the subject transfer] ? A. I take it that you mean transfers between the two companies that did exist at one time?
“Q. That is right. A. Not to my knowledge.
“Q. Or similar transactions between any individuals of the companies? A. No.
*738“Q. That was the only one instance in which you had such a transaction? A. To the best of my knowledge, that is true. ’ ’
The foregoing testimony, although sufficient in itself to support the trial court’s finding on the most critical issue, is only a part of the evidence tending to show that the subject transfer was an isolated and “occasional” transaction. The fact that the witness further testified that “There could be” sales of which he did not know, certainly does not make the quoted testimony incompetent; it goes merely to the weight to be accorded such testimony and, as I have emphasized, and the majority ignore, the weight of the evidence is for the trial court’s resolution.
It is significant, as further supporting the trial court’s finding that this sale was ‘ ‘ occasional, ’ ’ that there is evidence, presumably believed by the trial court, that this was not a sale to an outside or retail customer. There is direct testimony that ‘ ‘ Pacific Pipeline Construction Company, Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd., and Engineers, Ltd., were the three corporations involved in the whole deal. It was transferred to the same people, they were all the same people.” Furthermore, the majority reweighs evidence that the property transferred was used for field operations and that it was not the sort of property in which plaintiff customarily dealt as a seller, and gives to such evidence as reweighed an effect unfavorable rather than favorable to upholding the findings and judgment.
The relationship among the three corporations (its evidential effect is also disregarded or reweighted by the majority) was described as follows by the witness Ramey, plaintiff’s office manager: “Prior to 1946 in October, Pacific Pipeline Construction Company . . . was organized for the purpose of carrying on pipeline maintenance. In other words, what we did was anything pertaining to the pipeline in the field. In other words, the installation and maintenance of oil, gas, water type of pipelines. . . . That was its primary function. .... In October, 1946, the Pacific Pipeline Construction Company formed a partnership with Engineers, Ltd., a corporation . . ., for the purposes of continuing this general field of pipeline work, and that became known as Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd. So Pacific Pipeline Construction Company ceased doing general field operations in its own name at that time. Engineers, Ltd., of course, had their own business doing construction work on dams and large buildings, but they went into a partnership under the name of Pacific Pipeline & Engi*739neers, Ltd., continuing the same work in the same field that had been done prior by the other corporation. In October, 1947, Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd., formed a corporation ; in other words, they changed from a partnership setup to a corporate setup, continuing the same type of work.
“Approximately at that time ... a coating and reconditioning plant was laid out. . . and that would have been under the setup of Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd., inasmuch as I repeated previously Pacific Pipeline Construction Company had ceased any field operations or any functional operations at that time. That operation was continued until March, 1949 [the time of the sale in controversy], at which time it was decided that the Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd., as it had conducted its business in Los Angeles and throughout the state, it was decided by the principals involved in these companies that there would be a reorganization; in other words, a change in the location of where they functioned in their work, and so up to that point that is where the change took place.
“Q. In other words, you are telling us then that at that time they broke up the former partnership which had become a corporation and went their separate ways? A. That is correct. . . .
“Q. And at that time there was a distribution of the assets of the corporation known as Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd. To the various principals that had formerly been partners, and to some of the individuals- A. That is correct.
“Q.-in the corporation? A. That is correct.
“Q. In other words, a sort of a reorganization? A. That is true. ’ ’
The mentioned distribution from Pacific Pipeline & Engineers, Ltd., to plaintiff was in exchange for the subject transfer.
Accepting the view, implicit in the majority opinion, that the “finding” that this was an occasional sale involved also (as do findings in many cases, including those in ordinary personal injury litigation) a conclusion of mixed law and fact, it is obvious that the ultimate determination by the trial court as to whether this was an occasional sale involved consideration of all the evidence which was before that court, including necessarily that which has been summarized, and resolution of the conflicts, including the varying inferences which could be drawn from any part or the whole of it. Although on the *740foregoing evidence reasonable minds could differ, it is manifest that the trial court’s conclusion is supportable from the evidence and the facts found. Accordingly, if we follow the rules hereinabove stated, the judgment should be affirmed.
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred.