dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest were not sufficient to give rise to probable cause that the defendant, Chester Davis (Davis), was loitering. Maj. op. at 4, 6. I dissent because I believe that the officer had probable cause to arrest Davis for loitering based upon his observations at the Loaf-N-Jug combined with the information received by the officer that on the previous night, a female customer of the convenience store had seen a “transient type male” at that location who reportedly had been attempting to sell marihuana and who exactly matched the defendant’s description. Further, I disagree with the majority’s reliance upon People v. Greer, 860 P.2d 528 (Colo.1993), since Greer is not dispositive as to the circumstances surrounding the search here, and neither *7addresses a probable cause determination nor presents a factually similar situation. Maj. op. at 5-6. Because I conclude that the officer had probable cause to arrest Davis, I would reverse the district court’s order suppressing the marihuana seized in connection with Davis’ arrest.
I.
The following facts were disclosed at the suppression hearing. Officer Thomas Rum-mel of the Pueblo Police Department was on routine patrol when he approached a Loaf-N-Jug convenience store. Officer Rummel testified that he observed Davis sitting on the ground at the corner of the Loaf-N-Jug and that he had reason to believe, that Davis was panhandling. Davis was situated on several duffle bags outside the store where he was able to observe people entering and leaving the store.
Officer Rummel testified that he noticed a female customer exiting the store and walking towards her car. According to Officer Rummel, Davis lifted himself up from the ground and approached the woman. Officer Rummel observed Davis engage in a conversation with the woman and stated that he “could tell [that Davis] was saying something to her because she turned around to look at Davis and then turned quickly away and walked towards her ear.” Officer Rummel additionally testified that he believed that Davis was “asking for money.”
Officer Rummel radioed the dispatcher to advise her that he was planning to contact a male who appeared to be panhandling. The dispatcher then informed him that a female customer of the same store had called the Pueblo Police Department the previous evening about a “transient type male” at that location who reportedly had been attempting to sell marihuana. The dispatcher described to Officer Rummel the physical characteristics of the male that the woman had seen. The customer had reported that as she exited the store, she observed a group of neighborhood children approach a man with long hair and a beard, wearing army fatigues, who was sitting on top of two Army/Navy duffle bags outside the Loaf-N-Jug. The customer had heard the children ask the man if He had any “weed,” to which he replied, “Yes, in my knapsack,” and then reached for his knapsack.
Based upon this incident, Officer Rummel determined that the defendant matched this description given. He subsequently exited his patrol ear and approached the defendant. Officer Rummel informed Davis that it appeared to him that Davis had been panhandling in violation of the municipal loitering law and requested that he produce identification. Officer Rummel asked Davis if he had been panhandling or attempting to sell drugs. Davis answered “no” to both questions. According to Officer Rummel, Davis explained that as a female customer was leaving the store, she saw him sitting there and asked him if he was hungry and then handed him some money. Officer Rummel testified, however, that “[tjhat’s not at all what [he] had seen occur.”
At that point, Officer Rummel expressed to Davis that he believed that Davis had been panhandling, and asked Davis whether he could search his duffel bags. Davis refused to consent to a search. Officer Rummel subsequently placed Davis under arrest for loitering and requested that Davis place his hands up on the wall so he could perform a pat-down search. Davis refused to comply. After Officer Rummel asked him several times to comply with this request, Davis took off running.
Officer Rummel chased him a short distance, apprehended and handcuffed him. Officer Rummel escorted Davis to the police station where an inventory search was performed on his duffel bags. As a result of this inventory search, Officer Rummel discovered several large freezer bags filled with marihuana. Davis was charged with one count of unlawful possession of marihuana with intent to distribute,1 one count of unlawful possession of marihuana with intent to distribute (second offense),2 and one count of possession *8of eight ounces or more of marihuana.3
Davis filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the inventory search incident to his arrest. The district court concluded that although Officer Rum-mers initial contact with Davis was appropriate based upon the information the officer had received from the dispatcher and from his initial observations of the defendant, the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant for the crime of loitering. Specifically, the district court stated:
I just have a difficult time saying because this person is dressed this way, therefore this person must be engaging in this type of activity. I just can’t make that jump.... Dress is a very, very individual type thing. Some people prefer to dress in $1200 Armani suits. Other people are relaxed in how they dress. Some people don’t place a great deal of priority in terms of dress. I just think it’s too vague. I can’t find that I could draw any valuable conclusions as to what a person’s activity is simply on the way they’re dressed.
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The fact that he might have been at this Loaf and Jug the day before, I don’t think I can place a whole lot of value in that, because that’s what Loaf and Jugs want you to do. They want you to go to visit them as often as you possibly can.
Consequently, the district court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the inventory search.
II.
Davis was arrested for violation of a Pueblo municipal ordinance prohibiting loitering or panhandling. Pueblo County Municipal Code § 11-1-202 states:
(1) Definitions. When used in this section:
(A) “Loitering” or “loiter” shall mean remaining idle in essentially one location, to be dilatory, to tarry, and shall include but not be limited to standing around, sitting, kneeling, sauntering or prowling.
(B) “Begging” or “beg” shall mean the solicitation of money or items of value from passersby without services or items of value being offered or tendered in consideration therefor.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to loiter:
(A) with the intent to beg or for the purpose of engaging in begging; or
(B) in a manner which obstructs any public street, highway or sidewalk or entrance to a public facility by hindering, impeding or tending to hinder or impede the free and uninterrupted passage of vehicles, traffic or pedestrians....
Probable cause exists when the officer has objective facts and circumstances available at the time of the arrest to warrant the belief that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense. People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Colo.1994); People v. Thompson, 793 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo.1990). “In determining whether there is probable cause to arrest, the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest must be considered.” People v. Diaz, 793 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Colo.1990). Probable cause may be based on the personal observations of the arresting officer, or on information provided to him by fellow officers or others. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); People v. Chavez, 632 P.2d 574 (Colo.1981).
A police officer may have probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest where he observes a suspect at the scene of the crime, and the suspect’s appearance matches a sufficiently detailed description of the perpetrator of which the officer has knowledge. People v. White, 117 A.D.2d 127, 503 N.Y.S.2d 59, 62, appeal denied, 68 N.Y.2d 818, 507 N.Y.S.2d 1036, 499 N.E.2d 885 (1986); see, e.g., United States v. Zimple, 318 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir.) (upholding warrantless arrest based on observation of conduct that supported reasonable belief that suspect had committed burglaries), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 868, 84 S.Ct. 128, 11 L.Ed.2d 95 (1963); People v. Polk, 166 A.D.2d 177, 560 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (holding that the officers had probable *9cause to arrest the defendant and his accomplice who were found loitering in a stairwell of a subway station based upon the similarity between them physical appearance and the descriptions given of the duo that had committed a series of armed robberies in the same subway station), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 1023, 565 N.Y.S.2d 774, 566 N.E.2d 1179 (1990).
In the present case, the female customer of the Loaf-N-Jug provided a physical description of the defendant to the police department which was specific in detail and exactly matched the defendant’s appearance as seen by Officer Rummel. Officer Rummel described Davis as “a transient” based upon the “ragged, soiled clothing” that Davis was wearing. Officer Rummel concluded that Davis was the same “transient” that the female customer had identified the previous night as attempting to sell marihuana at the Loaf-N-Jug.
I agree with the majority that wearing army fatigues and maintaining an unkempt appearance does not necessarily imply that a person is loitering as opposed to being homeless. In my view, however, the majority, in affirming the district court’s ruling, misconstrued the weight Officer Rummel placed on Davis’ appearance. Officer Rummel did not assume that Davis’ disheveled appearance suggested that he was committing the crime of loitering. Rather, I believe that the officer had probable cause to arrest Davis for loitering based upon his observations at the Loaf-N-Jug combined with the information received by the officer that the previous night, a female customer of the convenience store had seen a “transient type male” at that location who reportedly had been attempting to sell marihuana and who exactly matched the defendant’s description.
Further, contrary to the district court’s finding, in my view, the fact that Davis was sitting on his duffle bags outside the Loaf-N-Jug on at least two consecutive nights satisfies the definition of loitering in the municipal code.
Officer Rummel had a clear view of Davis. He observed Davis approach a female customer and believed that Davis “was saying something to her because she turned around to look at Davis and then turned quickly away and walked towards her car.” Officer Rummel additionally testified that he believed that Davis was “asking for money.”4 The officer’s assessment of the foregoing evidence, when viewed against Davis’ explanation that the female customer saw him sitting there, asked him if he was hungry and then handed him some money, rendered it more probable than not that Davis had been panhandling.
I believe that the officer acted appropriately in initially contacting Davis. I further believe that, based upon the facts and circumstances known to Officer Rummel, he had probable cause to arrest him for loitering.
Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice MULLARKEY joins in this dissent.
. § 18-18-406(8)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.).
. § 18-18-406(4)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.).
. In my view, the majority’s reliance on People v. Greer, 860 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1993), is misplaced since the issue of probable cause was not implicated. Rather, in Greer, this court held that the police did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a drug transaction had occurred as would justify an investigatory stop of the defendant. Further, I disagree with the majority’s contention that the present case is factually similar to the facts in Greer. Maj. op. at 4. In Greer, the officer was patrolling on top of the roof erf the Cloud Nine Bar and was keeping a lookout for narcotics sales in the parking lot. While on the roof, the police officer observed the defendant leave her car and noticed three men approach her. Based upon the officer’s position on the roof, he was neither able to view the defendant’s body and hands which were totally obscured by one of the men nor able to see the facial expressions or gestures of the participants in the conversation. In contrast, in the present case, Officer Rummel was able to see clearly Davis and the female customer as he engaged her in a conversation. Although Officer Rummel was unable to hear the substance of the conversation, he was able to observe the woman’s reaction.