Appellant, Loy A. Jennings, seeks child support from appellee, Robert D. Jennings, for a child who has reached the age of majority. The district court denied her petition for modification of the divorce decree. She identifies the issue as:
“The sole issue before the. Court is whether the District Court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an Order providing for support for a minor child in a divorce action after that child attained the age of majority.”
Appellee identifies the issue as:
“[Wjhether the District Court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an Order providing support for a non-disabled adult child based upon a post di*179vorce modification petition filed after the child attained the age of majority.”
We affirm.
FACTS
Robert and Loy Jennings were divorced on April 6, 1987. Under the divorce settlement, Loy obtained custody of the couple’s two children, and Robert was required to pay child support for each child until that child became emancipated. The parties’ agreement, which was incorporated into the final divorce decree, defined emancipation as occurring when a child either reaches the age of 19, marries, dies or enters into the United States armed forces. Wyoming law recognizes emancipation when a person reaches the age of 19, marries, or enters the United States military. Additionally, a 17-year-old minor may apply for emancipation provided he is willingly living separate and apart from his parents with at least his parents’ acquiescence, is managing his own financial affairs, and has a legal means of income. See W.S. 14-1-101 through -206.
During August 1988, the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wyoming placed Christopher, the child whose support is at issue here, on probation after a guilty plea to a criminal charge. Christopher had been charged as an adult. The terms of Christopher’s probation required that he live with his mother. On October 28, 1988, he attained the age of 19 years.
During November 1988, Robert petitioned the district court to modify the divorce decree to terminate his child support obligations. Christopher’s attainment of age 19, in part, prompted the petition. Loy counter-petitioned for modification of the divorce decree extending Robert’s child support obligations for Christopher during the time Christopher remained on probation and lived with Loy. The district court denied Loy’s petition, noting that Robert had no legal obligation to support his son beyond age 19 years.
DISCUSSION
W.S. 20-2-113(a) (1988 Cum.Supp.) gave a district court continuing jurisdiction over matters involving child custody and support arising out of divorce by providing in pertinent part as follows:
“In granting a divorce * * * the court may make such disposition of the children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. * * * On petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children * *
The legislature revised this statute in 1989 to clarify this continuing jurisdiction. See W.S. 20-2-113. In Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48 (Wyo.1982), we held that the language of this statute did not necessarily limit its applicability to minor children of divorced parents. 640 P.2d at 50-51.
The Kamp case concerned the obligation of a divorced father to provide support for a child so severely disabled that she required around-the-clock attention. Id. at 49. The child in Kamp suffered from severe mental deficiencies, cerebral palsy, and spastic paraplegia and was beyond the age of majority when the question arose. We held that the child fell “within the category of ‘children’ with respect to whom the legislature intended the divorced parent would be called upon to support.” Id. at 51.
Although we held in Kamp that W.S. 20-2-113(a) had broad application, we noted as well that its reach was not without limit. The circumstances in Kamp did not require us to determine that limit. 640 P.2d at 51. Without disturbing the premise that “[t]he obligation to support such a child ceases only when the necessity for support ceases,” id., we hold that the factual circumstances of this case fall beyond the limit where a parent is required to support a child.
In the instant case, appellant and appellee agreed in their settlement that emancipation would terminate appellee’s child support obligation. Such provisions are frequently found in divorce settlements, and their validity, here and in general, is beyond question. See Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1126 (Wyo.1985). *180The divorce decree incorporated this settlement agreement. When a decree incorporates a settlement agreement, we are reluctant to disturb the decree because doing so would infringe upon the freedom of contract, as well as concerns of finality. Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo.1989). Therefore, when a decree for termination of support upon attaining the age of majority as provided in the parties’ incorporated agreement is entered, the obligation to support terminates upon the date the age of majority is attained, except that there is a duty of parental support of a child beyond the age of majority in the case of a physically or mentally disabled child because the continuing disability prevents such a child from becoming emancipated. See Kamp, 640 P.2d at 53 (Rooney, Justice, specially concurring). See Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to Support Child, 48 A.L. R.4th 919, 923 (1986).
In conclusion, appellant’s reasons for allowing Christopher to live in her home, despite his attainment of the age of majority, are her own, and we laud her acceptance of a perceived moral duty as a parent. However, she was under no legal duty to provide a residence for Christopher. His living arrangement was a term of his probation imposed upon him as an adult. The court imposing Christopher’s probation had no authority to require appellant to abide by its terms. She agreed to them of her own volition.
Affirmed.
URBIGKIT, J., files a specially concurring opinion.