The essential determination that the court must make in this case is whether tort theories may be invoked by a purchaser of a product in an instance in which the failure of the product causes damage only to the product that failed (economic loss in the parlance of the authorities). An additional issue is raised questioning the propriety of the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the seller when the buyer asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the contractual duties owed by the seller to the buyer. The parties also have argued the applicability of the law relating to an insurance company acting as a volunteer in the payment of the claim for insurance proceeds filed by the buyer. The trial court ruled that the complaint of Continental Insurance, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, St. Paul Insurance Company, Royal Insurance Company, Centennial Insurance Company, and American Home Insurance Company (Appellants collectively referred to as Continental) failed to state a claim in those counts asserting negligence, strict liability, or failure to warn against Page Engineering (Page) because the only damages asserted were the economic loss to Bridger Coal (Bridger), the buyer of the product. With respect to contractual claims that were asserted, the trial court found that the contract was not ambiguous and that Page’s duties expired long before any cause of action accrued. In addition, the district court ruled that Continental was a volunteer with respect to its payment of Bridger’s insurance claim. We hold that the trial court correctly ruled that Continental’s claims of negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We are in accord with the district court’s ruling that Page had no existing duty under the contract that related to Bridger’s loss in this case. Given those determinations, the question of whether Continental acted as a volunteer in paying Bridger’s claims for insurance is moot, and we need not address it. We affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Page, recognizing that, in substance, the judgment constituted a dismissal with prejudice of the claims for relief under tort theories and was a true summary judgment with respect to claims based upon breach of an express or implied contract.
This case arose out of the failure of a reeving block on a very large dragline that Bridger had purchased from Page. A break in the reeving block caused the 100 yard long boom to separate from the rest of the dragline structure and, when it fell, the boom was destroyed. Continental paid Bridger for its damages, which were caused by the collapse of the dragline, and then sought to recover from Page asserting its rights as a subrogee of Bridger.
In the Appellants’ Brief, Continental sets forth five primary issues to be addressed, each of which encompasses several sub-issues and arguments. Those are stated as:
*643“A. Whether a district court in treating a Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion may make factual assumptions as to the type of loss, cause of loss, and insurance coverage for the loss; deny plaintiff the right to conduct further discovery; and then grant summary judgment to defendant on the basis of the assumed type of loss, cause of loss, and insurance coverage?
“B. Whether a manufacturer who sells heavy machinery in Wyoming and later discovers that one component of said machinery has a correctable unreasonably dangerous defect may escape liability for ‘negligent failure to warn’ under the ‘economic loss’ doctrine when the dangerously defective component fails in a foreseeable manner and destroys a non-defective component of the machinery?
“C. Whether the ‘economic loss’ limitation on product liability actions should entirely preclude a product liability action which sounds in negligence or strict liability where an unreasonably dangerous defective component of a product fails in a foreseeable manner and destroys a now-defective component?
“D. Whether the district court may make factual assumptions as to cause of loss and based thereon enter summary judgment that the loss was not covered by insurance and thus that insurers are not entitled to subrogation?
“E. Whether any continuing obligation should be implied under a contract for sale of heavy machinery where, after the sale, the manufacturer continues to conduct technical, training and assistance visits to the jobsite; and, if there is no such continuing obligation, whether discovery should be allowed to ascertain the obligations and requirements understood by the manufacturer or imposed by industry custom and practice as to the subsequent visits to the jobsite?”
Page Engineering, in its Brief of Appel-lee, states the issues presented in this way:
“I. Whether the trial court properly applied the economic loss doctrine, which is cited with approval by the Wyoming Supreme Court and is the controlling law in a clear majority of jurisdictions, to enter summary judgment for appellee on appellants' tort claims (Counts I, II, IV-VI) which seek to recover only for loss to the dragline boom?
“II. Whether any finding of fact was necessary to the district court’s award of summary judgment for appellee as a matter of law?
“III. Whether the courts recognize an exception to the doctrine approved by the United States Supreme Court in the East River decision denying recovery for economic loss (damage to the product itself) when the failure of one component of a product damages another component?
“IV. Whether the economic loss doctrine bars strict liability claims for damage to the product itself?
“V. Whether the economic loss doctrine bars claims for negligent failure to warn?
“VI. Whether the trial court properly awarded summary judgment for appellee on appellants’ claim for breach of contract for failure to maintain insurance (Count III), negligent failure to maintain insurance (Count IV) and express indemnity (Count V) where the clear and unambiguous language of the 1974 agreement, the only contract relied on by appellants in the record, provides that appellee’s duties to Bridger lapsed under the 1974 agreement eight years before the collapse of the dragline?
“VII. Whether the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion for continuance of discovery where appellants only sought discovery of facts to establish their theory of failure to warn and the trial court had already found this theory legally insufficient?
“VIII. Whether the trial court properly awarded summary judgment for appellee because appellants were not entitled to subrogation since appellants admitted that the loss to the dragline was due to a latent defect in the dragline and recovery for loss due to a latent defect was excluded from coverage under appellants’ insurance policy.”
*644In 1974, Bridger commenced negotiations with Page to purchase a dragline, to be used in its open pit mining operations in Wyoming, which Page would manufacture. Those negotiations culminated in a Purchase Contract which demonstrates a carefully negotiated and prepared agreement of the parties with respect to the responsibilities of both the buyer and the seller. That Purchase Contract provided for integration with a merger clause, which stated:
“This Purchase Contract, including these terms and conditions, the specifications attached hereto and any additional terms and conditions incorporated in and attached hereto constitutes the sole and entire agreement between the parties. The Seller’s proposal is incorporated in and made a part of this Purchase Contract only to the extent of specifying the nature and description of the Equipment ordered, and then only to the extent that such terms are consistent with the terms of this Purchase Contract. No other items or conditions shall be binding upon Buyer unless accepted by it in writing.”
In paragraph ten of the purchase agreement, Page’s warranty of the dragline was set forth in this language:
“Seller warrants that the Equipment and all parts thereof shall be free from defects in design, material, workmanship and title, and shall conform in all respects to the terms of this Purchase Contract, and, if no quality is specified, shall be of the best quality consistent with the nature and type of equipment usual and customary for draglines. If within one (1) year from (a) the date that the equipment is available for commercial operation (capable of stripping overburden) or (b) thirty (30) days after the date the dragline first walks, whichever is earlier, the Equipment, or any part thereof, does not conform to these warranties, and Buyer shall have notified the Seller within a reasonable time after its discovery of such nonconformity, Seller shall thereupon promptly correct such nonconformity at its sole expense. The conditions of any subsequent tests shall be mutually agreed upon and Seller shall be notified of and may be represented at all tests that may be made. In the event that the Equipment or any component parts are replaced pursuant to this warranty, such replacement Equipment and parts shall be warranted and guaranteed as provided herein for a period of one (1) year after such replacement and acceptance thereof by Buyer. The Seller shall not be liable hereunder for any damages as defined and excluded in paragraph 6.0 of this contract [relating to consequential or special damages] nor shall Seller be responsible under any breach of this warranty for any injury to any person proximately resulting from the breach of this warranty. THIS WARRANTY IS THE ONLY WARRANTY MADE AND THERE ARE NO OTHER WARRANTIES OR GUARANTEES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR USE.”
The contractual duties which Continental contends were not performed by Page are found in paragraphs eighteen, nineteen, and twenty of the Purchase Contract. According to paragraph eighteen, Page would furnish consultants during the erection, which was defined to terminate when the dragline became operable, and for a period not in excess of sixty days after completion of the erection of the dragline. In paragraph nineteen, Page agreed to “continuously carry” insurance on the dragline in the amount of one million dollars “to protect against and from all loss by reason of injury to persons or damage to property including Seller’s own employees and third persons, and property of Buyer and third parties, based upon or arising out of Seller’s operations hereunder including the operations of his subcontractors or sub-subcontractors.” In paragraph twenty, Page agreed that it would indemnify Bridger for any “damage to or destruction of property” of Bridger’s “resulting from, arising out of, or in any way connected with Seller’s operations hereunder at the job site, excepting only such injury or harm as may be caused solely by the fault or negligence of Buyer, its directors, officers, employees or agents.”
*645In accordance with, and in performance of, the Purchase Contract, Page delivered the dragline to Bridger and placed it in operation by March of 1978. While words may be inadequate to describe this gigantic machine, some idea of its size and function can be gleaned from Page’s brief. It is there explained that:
“* * * The dragline has a boom 100 yards long from which is suspended a bucket capable of holding 50 to 75 cubic yards of material. The bucket scoops up material as it is dragged along the ground. The bucket is then lifted by the boom and the entire dragline, including the housing and boom, then turns so that the contents of the bucket may be dropped into a spoil pile. The dragline then turns back to its original position, the bucket is dropped and dragged again, and the procedure is repeated. The dragline is moved to a new position by ‘walking’ on large legs attached to its sides.
“The reeving block is a large steel ‘pulley’ through which steel cables pass from a mast to the dragline housing. Other lines run from the mast to the tip of the boom to support the boom. Engines in the housing are used to raise the boom during erection by tightening the lines which pass through the reeving block. After erection of the boom, static lines are attached to the sides of the reeving block to hold the mast and boom in position.”
This dragline was used by Bridger in its mining operations, without any apparent complaints, from 1978 until March of 1983. Then Bridger notified Page of several problems that it was experiencing with the machine. One of those complaints related to the reeving block. Bridger had noticed some cracking in that part of the dragline. According to Continental’s brief, Bridger had observed the cracking earlier and had welded it. The record supports only a reference in a letter from Page to Bridger referring to a notification by Bridger to Page of cracking in the reeving block in a letter dated March 30, 1983.
Bridger requested Page to send personnel to the mine site to inspect the dragline, and Page did that. After completing the inspection, Page sent Bridger a letter which related Page’s findings and recommendations. The letter includes advice by Page to Bridger that many of the problems were attributable to improper use and maintenance of the dragline. Specifically with respect to the cracking in the reeving block, Page suggested that those cracks be welded properly. There is no claim by Continental that Page was responsible for accomplishing any of these suggested corrections, and there is no evidence or allegation that Page performed any of the suggested repairs for Bridger.
In the same month, March of 1983, Page instructed its company engineers to design a reeving block model that would support a greater stress load. Officers of Page stated that this was sheer coincidence because the modifications were requested in response to a purchase order for a dragline that would be required to tolerate greater stress conditions than those of draglines previously manufactured and sold, including the dragline furnished to Bridger. Several structural changes were made in the design of the reeving block that permitted the boom to apply a straight pull on the load. The new design also employed a thicker gauge of steel, providing greater “impact properties in cold weather.” Continental, in this action, alleged that the redesign developed not only a more durable reeving block, but a safer one as well, and Continental claims that Bridger should have been told of its availability. It is clear that Page did not advise any of its prior purchasers of the redesign of the reeving block, nor did it recommend to Bridger that it should, or could, replace the reeving block on Bridger’s dragline with the redesigned model.
On February 24, 1986, the reeving block on the Bridger dragline broke at one of the previously welded cracks. Continental alleged that the break in the reeving block caused the boom to separate from the housing of the dragline resulting in destruction of the boom with damages in excess of $2,500,000. After learning of the collapse *646of the Bridger dragline, Page notified other purchasers of its draglines that they should inspect their “super-structure system” for possible cracking. Several purchasers responded that they had observed cracking in the reeving blocks on their draglines. Page’s response to that advice was to recommend to those companies that they replace their reeving blocks with the reeving block model designed in 1983.
After the destruction of the boom on its dragline, Bridger filed a claim with Continental for the damages it had suffered. Continental paid Bridger’s claim, and it then filed its complaint in the district court seeking to recover from Page for any cause of action that Bridger could have brought against Page on the ground that Continental was subrogated to Bridger’s claims. Continental’s complaint set forth five claims for recovery that included theories of negligent design of the reeving block, negligent failure to warn Bridger of the redesign of the reeving block, breach of contract for failure to maintain insurance on the dragline, negligent failure to maintain insurance, and express indemnification. Page answered Continental’s complaint, and Page and Continental began to pursue discovery.
Approximately one year later, on July 16, 1987, Page filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Stay Proceedings Pending Disposition of This Motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., asserting that (1) an action in tort to recover only economic loss fails to state a cause of action; (2) any contractual duties which Page might have been responsible for under the 1974 contract had ended at least eight years before the collapse of the Bridger dragline; and (3) Continental was a volunteer in making its payment to Bridger, thereby preventing any claim of Continental to a right of subrogation because the policy which Continental had written for Bridger did not cover the type of damage experienced by the dragline. Continental then filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in which it argued that the economic loss doctrine did not apply to a cause of action which alleged a failure to warn or to any cause of action which alleged negligence because the defect in the product created an unreasonably dangerous condition. In addition, Continental contended that Page’s contractual duties extended beyond the warranty period in the Purchase Contract so that Bridger’s claim was covered by the policy or that, in the alternative, Continental had paid Bridger’s claim in good faith believing that the claim was covered. Continental therefore asserted that it did have a right of subrogation to any claim Bridger could have brought against Page. Continental also filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental Complaint seeking to amend its complaint by supplementing it to include an additional cause of action for strict products liability.
The district court then furnished to the parties a decision letter in which the court stated that it intended to treat the Motion to Dismiss filed by Page as a motion for summary judgment and that it would allow Continental two weeks to either approve of or object to the court’s proposed action. Continental did not file an objection, but it did file a Motion for Continuance of Discovery in which it was asserted that additional time was necessary to develop its argument that Page should be held strictly liable in tort due to the unreasonably dangerous condition created by the defect in the reeving block. After additional briefing, the trial court entered an order denying Continental’s motion for additional discovery time and its motion to amend the complaint to add an additional claim of strict product liability. The court then entered a Summary Judgment for Page with respect to all pending claims.
Initially, Continental asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact relating to the cause of Bridger’s damages. Continental quotes language from the decision of the district court that suggests a finding that the damage to the reeving block, which in turn caused the collapse of the boom, was a gradual deterioration caused by a latent defect. It is Continental’s contention that such a finding was prejudicial because several courts have distinguished between *647damages caused by gradual deterioration and those caused by a catastrophic event and also because its insurance policy excluded latent but not patent defects. Continental continues its argument by urging that the error was exacerbated by the district court’s denial of its motion to continue discovery to permit it to develop facts showing that the damage of the dragline was not due to gradual deterioration but was, instead, a catastrophic event.
In a prior case, we reversed the decision of the district court granting a summary judgment prematurely and denying reasonable time for the parties to conduct their desired discovery. Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1987). It was clear in Pace that the decision of the trial court to convert the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment, without giving sufficient notice to the parties and without allowing a reasonable opportunity for discovery, resulted in prejudice to the rights of the parties. We do not retreat from, or diminish, the stance we took in Pace. We continue to recognize the necessity of affording parties adequate time for discovery before a motion for summary judgment may be granted. The difference in this case is that, because of the rule of law followed by the district court, which we espouse, affording an opportunity for additional discovery would be an exercise in futility and would serve only to increase the expense of litigation to the parties.
The recognized majority rule is that a claim for pure economic loss (the damage is only to the defective product) does not lie on a theory of negligence or strict liability. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986); Aloe Coal Company v. Clark Equipment Company, 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 853, 108 S.Ct. 156; 98 L.Ed.2d 111 (1987); Hart Engineering Company v. FMC Corporation, 593 F.Supp. 1471 (D.R.I.1984); Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). See also Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo.1985) (recognizing the majority rule). This rule is founded on solid policy justifications. The concern of tort law in the area of products liability has focused on the need to protect the purchaser or consumer, who often is not in a position to withstand the financial impact if he, or his property, is damaged by a defective product. The social need to spread the resulting, and often catastrophic, losses across a spectrum of consumers thus increasing the cost of the product is, however, substantially lessened when the injury is only to the product itself. Furthermore, this kind of loss relates essentially to the purchaser’s benefit of the bargain which has been made between himself and the seller. The authorities recognize that the law of contracts is far better suited to deal with the dissatisfaction on the part of a purchaser under such circumstances.
“Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements. The manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limits, by disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719. In exchange, the purchaser pays less for the product. Since a commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining power, cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), we see no reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of the risk.” East River, 476 U.S. at 873, 106 S.Ct. at 2303.
In addition, we are in accord with those courts that have concluded it is unwise to intrude, without more justification, into the remedies that legislatures have chosen and which have been provided by the adoption of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code — Sales. Sections 34-21-201 through 34-21-299.5, W.S. 1977. See Sacramento Regional Transit District v. Grumman Flxible, 204 Cal.Rptr. 736, 158 Cal.App.3d 289 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1984); Clark v. International Harvester Company, 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
Continental argues vigorously that this court should not espouse the majority rule, but should, instead, adopt the rationale of those courts that permit recovery of eco*648nomic damages for damage to the product itself when the damage is caused by a sudden, calamitous event that creates an unreasonably dangerous condition. Those courts which have recognized a distinction between loss caused by gradual deterioration and loss caused by a sudden, catastrophic event producing an unreasonably dangerous condition generally relate the latter situation as being more akin to property than to economic damage. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 652 F.2d 1165 (1981); Kodiak Electric Association, Inc. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984), reh. denied 696 P.2d 665 (1985); Arrow Leasing Corporation v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983); Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F.Supp. 1194 (S.D.W.Va.1986), aff'd 813 F.2d 1228 (1987). The Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion, found such a distinction not to be persuasive:
“* * * We realize that the damage may be qualitative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be calamitous. [Citations]. But either way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to recover the benefit of its bargain — traditionally the core concern of contract law. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts Section 12.8, pp. 8397840 (1982).” East River, 476 U.S. at 870, 106 S.Ct. at 2301.
After the Supreme Court articulated its resolution of this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reexamined the wisdom of its decision in Pennsylvania, in which that court had held fhat tort principles could be invoked in an action seeking recovery for damage to the defective equipment when the defect resulted in a hazardous condition and the loss flowing from the defect was caused by an accident that was a sudden and catastrophic event. In that case, the court predicted that the rule ultimately adopted in Pennsylvania would be consistent. In Aloe, however, the court determined that, by applying the concepts of East River, “a murky trudge through sophisticated nuances gives way to an unencumbered flight to basics.” Aloe, 816 F.2d at 119. The court then held that tort principles could not be invoked if the only damage was harm to the defective product. See also Wisconsin Power & Light Company v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 645 F.Supp. 1129 (W.D.Wis.1986). In his treatise, Professor Keeton also advises against the adoption of a rule that attempts to distinguish “accidental” damage to a product from the pure economic loss:
“Making liability depend upon whether or not the loss results from an ‘accident’ creates a difficult issue and arguably an irrelevant issue with respect to the validity of contract provisions allocating a risk of loss for harm to the defective product itself to the purchaser. Distinguishing ‘accidental’ damage to the product from mere economic loss is difficult in many cases, such as defect in a component of a television set that burns out the tubes, or an electric connection to the engine of a refrigerator that destroys the engine.” W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 101 at 709 (5th ed. 1984).
Furthermore, drawing a distinction between a sudden, calamitous event and gradual deterioration may simply turn on the arbitrary factor of whether the purchaser noticed the gradual deterioration of a component part that, left unattended, could result in a calamitous occurrence. This difficulty was noted in S.J. Groves & Sons Company v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corporation, 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn.1985).
We have no quarrel with Continental’s contention that there may be no incentive for manufacturers to produce safer products unless they are held liable for those defective products placed in the hands of purchasers and consumers. We are satisfied, as other courts have been, that rules which permit recovery in negligence and strict liability for damage to property other *649than the product itself or for personal injury adequately serve this social function. See Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo.1986); O’Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1985); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo.1983). We are in accord with those courts that have rejected the distinction between circumstances which demonstrate damage to the product itself caused by a calamitous event and the same economic loss due to gradual deterioration.
We therefore hold that Wyoming does not permit recovery in strict liability or negligence for damage caused to the product itself. The corollary of this rule in context of summary judgment is that, where no cause of action is permitted, there obviously are no material facts. In the context of discovery, if there are no facts which are material, no purpose can be served by further discovery.
In the alternative, Continental argues that recovery should be permitted when the alleged tort is the failure to warn of a known, or foreseeable, unreasonably dangerous condition. Continental refers us to two cases in which recovery was allowed on the theory of negligent failure to warn when the only damage was to the product itself. Those cases are Miller Industries v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 733 F.2d 813, 81 A.L.R.Fed. 163 (11th Cir.1984), reh. denied 738 F.2d 451 (1984), and McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 646 F.Supp. 1520 (D.N.J.1986). In Miller, Caterpillar manufactured and sold an engine, through one of its dealers, to a company that had contracted to construct a fishing vessel for Miller Industries. After the engine had been sold to Miller Industries, Caterpillar discovered that the model of engine that had been sold contained a defect that could render the engine inoperable. Caterpillar sent warning letters to its dealers advising them of the defect and the procedure for correcting it. No letter was sent to the company that had purchased the engine or to Miller Industries, the purchaser of the vessel in which the engine was installed. What followed was that the engine failed at sea causing a loss of fishing revenue and repair expenses. The court permitted recovery for the economic loss beyond that provided in the warranty invoking the theory of negligent failure to warn. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the general rule, which denies recovery for economic loss beyond that provided for in the warranty, was premised upon a different policy from that invoked when the tort alleged is failure to warn:
“* * * A duty to warn of a product’s defect of which the seller becomes aware goes not to the quality of the product that the buyer expects from the bargain, but to the type of conduct which tort law governs as a matter of social and public policy. See Prosser, Section 92, p. 613; Jig the Third, 519 F.2d at 179, 181 (Gee, J., dissenting). To hold otherwise would impermissibly allow a manufacturer who is aware that it has a defective product on the market to hide behind its warranty while the buyer unknowingly uses it.” Miller, 733 F.2d at 818.
In McConnell, 646 F.Supp. 1520, a similar situation was involved. A defective crankshaft was placed in the engine of a fishing vessel while the engine was being repaired. That defect resulted in damage to the engine, towing costs, loss of salaries paid, and loss of revenues paid. The district court, in that instance, adopted the reasoning of Miller and concluded that recovery for the economic loss should be allowed for failure to warn of a known defect in a product placed on the market.
This case is different from those because it involves a single manufacturer that was responsible for a single, integrated product, even though it was made up of several components. Cf. Fordyce Concrete, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 535 F.Supp. 118 (D.Kan.1982) (damage to a mixer that was attached to the chassis of a truck was damage to other property). While those cases are factually distinguishable, we rest our rejection of Continental’s argument squarely upon the proposition that recovery for pure economic loss should not be permitted when the tort alleged is failure to warn. Recognizing the conclusion to the contrary in Miller, we perceive that both *650styles of tort concern the conduct of the manufacturer, albeit that conduct may occur at different times in connection with the manufacturer’s business. Certainly, it may be argued that the manufacturer who intentionally, or negligently, fails to warn of a known defect in a product that has been placed on the market is more culpable for his actions. The rejection of recovery for pure economic loss under theories of negligence and strict liability, however, has not been because of the absence of culpability, but because of the policy that economic loss is better adjusted by contract rules than by tort principles. What is true with respect to strict liability and negligence, i.e. the risk associated with a product which does not meet the expectations of a buyer is a risk better suited to resolution by agreement between sophisticated bargaining parties rather than shifting the economic burden through tort principles, also is true with respect to the tort of failure to warn. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 101 at 709.
Recognition of a cause of action based upon duty to warn, in these circumstances, well could impose a duty on the manufacturer to advise each customer of every change in the design of its product that, in some way, might lengthen the useful life of that product. There does not appear to be any inherent wisdom in imposing such a duty. We also have considered, and rejected, the adoption of any distinction based upon whether the defect could create an unreasonably dangerous condition. Imposing liability for damages caused to the user or consumer or to other property is ample incentive to encourage manufacturers to warn of a dangerous defect of which they are, or should be, aware. To permit recovery in the instance in which the product damages only itself simply because the plaintiff has alleged failure to warn of the defect will only encourage plaintiffs to present “a products liability argument clothed in ‘failure to warn’ language,” if for nothing more than its settlement potential. Zidell, Inc. v. Cargo, Freight and Subfreight of Barge ZPC 404, 661 F.Supp. 960, 964 (W.D.Wash.1987). Stated another way, adoption of the tort theory of failure to warn would simply permit the damaged party to reach through a rear door that sanctuary from which he is foreclosed by a bar on the main entrance.
This case is a classic example of the proposition that expectancies with respect to the performance of a product should be a matter of contract between the parties. If a purchaser desires to extend the warranty period, or obtain some form of insurance as to the reliability or worthiness of the product, that may be done through bargaining for an extended warranty at an increased cost or by payment of premiums for insurance. Bridger decided to obtain insurance from Continental to cover certain defects in the dragline beyond the protection furnished in the warranty provision of its contract with Page. As consideration for that coverage, Continental accepted premium payments in accordance with its insurance policy. That decision to obtain, or provide, additional insurance through contractual arrangements represents the business expectancies of each of the parties with respect to the worthiness of the product. The injection of tort principles into the resolution of that bargain, without any compelling justification for doing so, serves only to obfuscate the decision making process by which sophisticated entities conduct their business. We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing, by the entry of summary judgment, Continental’s claims alleging a right to recover economic damages in tort, including the theory of failure to warn.
Continental seeks reversal also upon its right to recover under perceived contractual obligations owed by Page. It contends that there are present in the record genuine issues of material fact which foreclose the entry of summary judgment with respect to contract claims. More specifically, Continental argues that the purchase agreement established a continuing obligation on the part of Page to insure the dragline and to indemnify Bridger against any loss. Alternatively, Continental urges the proposition that, if there was no continuing obligation under the contract, the *651subsequent actions of Page in inspecting the dragline for defects, at the request of Bridger, created an implied contract between Bridger and Page.
The rule is clear that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract presents simply a question of law for the court, and disposition of disputes relating to such a contract properly may be accomplished by a summary judgment. See State v. Pennzoil Company, 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo.1988). The existence of an ambiguity in this purchase agreement can be supported only if language is removed from any contextual background. The reading of the agreement that Continental chooses would impose duties on the part of Page to carry insurance and indemnify Bridger for any loss, ad infinitum, despite the express time limitations clearly promulgated in the agreement. The established rule does not support Continental but, instead, requires that the contract be read as a whole. See State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470 (Wyo.1986). Examining this contract as an entity, we are in complete accord with the district court that the language clearly provides that the contractual duties with respect to maintenance of insurance and indemnification of Bridger against any loss terminated at the completion of the period for erection of the dragline or shortly thereafter. We agree with the perceptive observation of the district court that:
“It is readily apparent from the contract, when it is read as a whole, that Page’s ‘operations’ under that contract consisted of erecting the dragline at Bridger, and that once it was erected, Page had no further obligation to maintain insurance for its ‘operations’ under this agreement, as its operations were complete. Also, it was clearly intended by the parties that Bridger would have the benefit of the limited warranty after Page’s operations in erecting the dragline under the agreement were completed, and that there would be no further requirement for Page to maintain insurance. Plaintiffs’ reading of Paragraph 19 to the effect that Page has to maintain insurance on the dragline ‘continuously’ until the end of the world is a nonsensical reading of that provision which totally ignores the rest of the contract and the context in which it is made.”
The assertion of an absurd reading of an unambiguous contract to support a claim does not justify a conclusion of ambiguity in the contract nor require a court to deny summary judgment because a genuine question of material fact exists as to a duty owed under the contract.
Insofar as Continental urges an implied contract between Page and Bridger that extended beyond the period of the express agreement, Continental admits that the terms of such an agreement are unknown to either of the parties. It simply suggests that a jury be allowed to decide what the terms were. It is an axiom of the law of contracts that, in the absence of a meeting of the minds, there is no contract. Thus, in an instance in which the terms of the contract are so uncertain that mutuality of agreement cannot be discerned, the contract is unenforceable because of uncertainty. See Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654 (Wyo.1980); Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater, 590 P.2d 826 (Wyo.1979). Certainly, parties can create an implied contract by their conduct, but the conduct from which that inference is drawn must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the parties expressed a mutual manifestation of an intent to enter into an agreement. See J. Calamari and J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 1-12 at 19-20 (3rd ed. 1987). Although the question of whether particular conduct is sufficient to support a finding that an implied contract exists is generally submitted to a trier of fact, the question may be resolved by summary judgment if reasonable minds could riot differ. 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 18 at 21-22 (1964 & Supp.1984); cf. Petersen v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital District, 760 P.2d 992 (Wyo.1988).
In this regard, Continental’s reliance is upon Page’s response to Bridger’s request to investigate certain problems that it was experiencing with the dragline and to offer suggested solutions. This re*652quest, and Bridger’s response, occurred after the warranty period had expired. We cannot justify a holding that this activity, without more, would serve to extend an express warranty in derogation of the specific terms of a written agreement or result in the creation of a new contract, the terms of which are unknown to either party. Page demonstrated that the only agreement between these parties was that expressed in the written contract, and Continental furnished no evidence which would refute the evidence of Page or, in any way, demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in this regard. For this reason, the summary judgment was properly entered on the claims asserted under contract theories.
While Continental does present arguments relating to the matter of payment as a volunteer, we see no need to address those contentions. The status of Continental as a volunteer would only serve as a defense to valid claims which might have existed in favor of Bridger assigned by subrogation to Continental. In view of our conclusion that Bridger has no valid claims as a matter of law, Continental’s status as a volunteer is not material.
While greater precision might have produced an order by the district court granting the motion to dismiss with respect to the tort theories asserted by Continental and then granting summary judgment with respect to contract claims, we have no difficulty in perceiving the premise for the ruling of the district court. Since there are no factual issues which have any materiality, and this case is controlled by principles of law, the denial of further discovery proceedings by the district court was correct. The disposition of the case by the entry of summary judgment in favor of Page is an appropriate resolution. The order granting summary judgment to Page is affirmed.
URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.