(specially concurring):
While I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case, I must respectfully dissent from the rationale of lack of jurisdiction on which they base their decision.
The majority opinion holds that Judge Brown “lacked jurisdiction” to enter a minute entry holding Lamb in arrears in child support contrary to statute and that Judge Scott “was without jurisdiction” to deny defendant’s motions to quash a writ of garnishment and a debtor’s examination based on Judge Brown’s minute entry order. The opinion infers that it is subject matter jurisdiction which was lacking in the court below.
Subject matter jurisdiction is generally defined as the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular proceedings belong: First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971); Arizona Public Service Co. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 76 Ariz. 373, 265 P.2d 435 (1954); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914). It is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as “authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case was conferred upon the superior court by Article 6, § 14, of the Arizona State Constitution, and A.R.S. § 12-123. The superior court exercised its jurisdiction from sometime before April 17, 1973, when the original decree of divorce was entered, through the orders complained of here. The majority opinion implies, however, that each of these orders, because erroneous, extinguished the superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. I believe such a proposition to be contrary to the weight of authority.
The existence of subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of a court’s decision. Arizona Public Service, supra; State v. Phelps, 67 Ariz. 215, 193 P.2d 921 (1948); accord, Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n., 39 Ill.2d 172, 233 N.E.2d 543 (1968); Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453, 516 P.2d 987 (1973); State ex rel. Green v. Kimberlin, 517 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. 1974). We have said that “ ‘[t]he power to determine and decide a case includes the power to decide it wrong as well as to decide it right.’ ” Tube City, supra, 16 Ariz. *405at 313, 146 P. at 206. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. Arizona Public Service, supra; Phelps, supra; City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz. 214, 29 P.2d 1062 (1934); Tube City, supra. Therefore, although I agree with the majority that both orders challenged here were erroneous, I fail to see how the issuance of those erroneous orders deprived the superior court of its jurisdiction over this matter.
While I feel that the orders discussed in the majority opinion were within the jurisdiction of the trial court, I feel they amount to abuse of discretion in both instances and rest my concurrence on that ground.