specially concurring and dissenting.
I.
Having now been out of law school for a respectable time, I concede that I may be unaware of what is and is not taught, or perhaps more appropriately what is and is not learned, at law school. What I learned there, and do remember, is that the right of redemption, when there is such a right, is not an independent right. Rather, it is a right dependent upon a creditor’s having acquired a lien either by a recorded judgment or by a recorded mortgage, and the right of redemption cannot be separated from the mortgage or the judgment, as the case may be. It is not susceptible to being independently transferred. Hence, I have concurred in the opinion for the Court authored by "Chief Justice Bakes.
II.
Mr. Hieb has been put to the expense-of this litigation by the concerted action of a person, not the FHA, but a person purporting to have authority to quitclaim from the United States of America to Dell N. and Lynn N. Mitchell, husband and wife. The latter persons were most likely unaware that the quitclaim could not be done as it was done, but apparently relied on the person who purported to have that authority. One cannot condemn the Mitchells for trying to hang on to their “acquisition,” and trying to convert it into ownership of the property which Mr. Hieb had purchased fair and square. However, under this scenario Mr. Hieb is clearly entitled to be made whole — meaning his expenses of litigation should be paid by the Mitchells, who in turn should seek to recoup them from the person executing the “government” quitclaim deed, their losses in attorneys’ fees for their own attorney, and also what they have to pay to Mr. Hieb.
For the reason that complete justice is neither contemplated nor provided in the opinion for the Court, I am compelled to dissent.