dissenting.
However characterized, this case questions the statutory right and economic propriety of the recently departed Insurance Commissioner’s intervention in behalf of franchised ear dealerships who sell replacement parts provided by original car manufacturers. This appeal does not involve identity of original part fabricator since most parts would never have been produced by the vehicle manufacturer. This appeal also does not involve consumer protection or issues of safety, to which I am a fervent subscriber, it speaks to oleomargarine-fair trade type industry protectionist action of government which flowered and generally disappeared in the time of the 1930’s, now about sixty years ago. Implicit also is the absolute axiom of inevitable economics, that there is no free lunch: what you get or what costs more carries a due bill for full payment.
This record reveals that within a national effort in separate states by legislative or administrative action, franchised automobile dealerships and the major car manufacturers, e.g., Nissan, Toyota, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, have authored a campaign to reduce competition from suppliers of car repair replacement parts distributed outside of their franchise system. The Wyoming Automobile Dealers Association directed this attack by requesting intervention by the Wyoming insurance Commissioner. Clearly, consumer disturbance did not author the effort; it was the special interest group which was disturbed by parts market competition as also involving the interest, to some degree, of some body shops who were affected adversely by reduction in repair billings with lower parts cost.
The cost of elimination of competition will inevitably be charged against the insurance policyholder since generalized cost increases are inevitably laid upon purchasers of the product. In this case, it is the physical damage coverage policyholders and may or may not also include the liability insured motor vehicle owners.1 No one *1017questions the significant economies involved or that this “cosmetic part” issue is directed towards fair trading the automobile manufacturer supplied replacement part into a higher priced product for which cost the insurance company and its policyholder will ultimately be charged. Unfortunately, the Insurance Commissioner, who did not understand insurance agency administration in more ways than this, brought his office into the economic fray in favor of the automobile dealers against other “impact part” suppliers at the ultimate cost exposure of the entire insurance coverage purchaser.
The after-market part, which is otherwise labeled as an impact part in the litigation, is described in the proposed regulation to mean “sheet metal or plastic parts which generally constitute the exterior of a motor vehicle, including inner and outer panels.” It is one of the curiosities of the subject that what is included is not determined and what is not included is interesting. One description describes inclusion to the cosmetic covering of the operational vehicle. Clearly included are the fenders, doors, hood and quarter panels. Not so clearly included or excluded is the rear deck lid. By definition, the grill may or may not be included, but the headlights are not. Likewise not included is any part of the drive train, including specifically tires and front end steering parts. General Motors Corporation would include the bumper by notation in some literature, but no other source seems to include the bumpers. The definition itself of sheet metal or plastic could well describe the bumper on some vehicle models, but normally, and hopefully not, on most.
Clearly not included are the operational parts of the vehicle like dash, windshield, seats, motor, radiator and drive train as only the shell parts which are subject to first damage by impact. Next to be recognized is that the definition of the market part does not define manufacturer as distinguishable from supplier. The differences, of course, exist between the automobile companies, defined for these purposes as the entity that assembles and resells a completed vehicle. How much of the constituent body parts are actually produced by that entity and how many are acquired from independent source subcontractors/suppliers is totally unadvised. The scenario is described in General Motors Corporation literature as:
For models still in production, GM generally produces sheet metal replacement parts in the same plant, or buys it from the same supplier, as the original vehicle. After the model run, about 80% of the sheet metal production is turned' over to outside suppliers who use GM tool, know GM specifications, certify to GM quality standards, assure timely delivery and are cost-competitive with other bidders. GM suppliers prove themselves to our standards through frequent audits, and in the quality of the products they provide.
(Emphasis added.)
Although OEM supposedly applies to original equipment manufacture, in application it applies to the assembler or car builder and has no necessary relevance to the actual entity that may have fabricated the part. A non-OEM (non-original equipment manufacturer) is not a company other than the entity from whom the car manufacturer may have acquired the part; it is any vendor other than the car producer which sells replacement parts outside of the franchised dealership. Source of supply for *1018part manufacture is not necessarily relevant. A non-OEM parts fabricator may, in some cases, be the same producer who supplied the parts for the original car production as the initial supplier.
There is another anomaly. A substantial part of impact replacement parts come from wrecked vehicles. Used body parts also have a highly favorable pricing structure and, in quality, may often be superior to the so-called new OEM supplied items. Used parts are not subject to the regulatory provisions in the Insurance Commissioner’s enactment. For example, a fender (or bumper for this writer’s 1975 Pontiac Ventura) would most unlikely come from whatever entity produced that item originally. If the “new” part is available from a dealership at all today, it would be highly unlikely that it would come from the 1975 plant which fabricated the original item. Out-sourcing is the mode today and certainly so for post-production replacement part acquisition. The heart of this litigation is not sources of fabrication; it is monopoly in distribution. It is that competition against which the Insurance Commissioner seeks to intervene.2
The monopoly maintenance agenda of the franchise car dealerships and car manufacturers arrives with an aura of authenticity. The message is “tell your customer-insured that you will pay for what you sell, no matter what the price, so that he has a choice for the higher priced item.” Unfortunately, the intended message is postured to get your money’s worth, if more expensive, whether or not better or more usable.
In this statistic society of which we now march for government supervision and regulatory control, I resent this additional adventure which will only affect a higher cost to the consuming public. It must first be made absolutely clear in today’s manufacturing, assembling and distribution environment that quality maintenance in this controversy is almost a non-existent factor. The insurance company has an equal responsibility whether the part is supplied through a franchised dealer, comes from another supply network, or, like replacement organs of modern medicine, comes from a compatible donor. The only real valuable “guaranty” provided to the insured is furnished by reputable body shops and a reliable insurance company. An ill-fitted quarter panel or a rusted out fender skirt will never reach any realistically maintainable claim against the car manufacturer or its overseas parts supplier with any greater reliability than will be the case as to the non-OEM part, whether fabricated in Taiwan or St. Louis.
Within this economic environment, I disagree with the majority about existent statutory authority to justify this price fixing regulation and reject sufficiency of the evidence to sustain any exercised administrative agency discretion. In historical perspective, Wyoming, like many states, tried this route for both fair trade legislation and oleomargarine control. From these efforts, both precedent and history reveal that this type of economic protectionism is invalid in application, unsustainable in concept, and improper in adaptation when provided by prohibitive regulation. The majority ignores this historical basis in its present decision and now attempts to re*1019trace past anti-competition legislation judicial failures.
First addressed was the fair trade laws which became the mode to limit economic competition as flowered in most jurisdictions during the depression of the 1930⅛. Wyoming’s effort was addressed in comprehensive detail by Chief Justice Blume in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938), finding “ruinous” competition to be an evil, the police power authority of the legislature to prohibit was authenticated by the decision. Fair trade as then applied only really lasted until Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo.1962) when the successor litigation found the parallel act unconstitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power when offending the required due process protection and beyond the police power of the state.3
The majority conceptually postulates approval of the dealership fair trade regulation on implied statutory authority and reasonably exercised discretion. I would find premise and conclusion in the majority decision to be faulty in both regards on both issues. To be recognized initially is that only those powers expressly conveyed by the legislature are granted.to the administrative agency. Hupp v. Employment Sec. Com’n of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo.1986). Here first, the majority’s source of statutory authority without supporting precedent is extracted from the insurance deceptive practices statutes, W.S. 26-13-101 through 26-13-118. There are two problems with application of this chapter and, particularly, W.S. 26-13-102 specifically cited. In initial misadaptation, these statutes are authored to control insurance selling practices and have nothing at all to do with property damage adjusting activities. We are not authorized to ignore clear statutory language in order to apply legislatively provided provisions to situations that do not reasonably fall within the ambient of the enactment. Matter of Abas, 701 P.2d 1153 (Wyo.1985), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Parnell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Div., 735 P.2d 1367 (Wyo.1987).
The second fallacy is in finding authorization for the adaptation of regulations which do not exist in the cited statutes. Tri-County Elec. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3 (Wyo.1974). Unquestionably, the Insurance Commissioner has no inherent or common law power. Brasel & Sims Const. Co., Inc. v. State Highway Com’n of Wyoming, 655 P.2d 265 (Wyo.1982). The regulated and prohibited transactional activities are enunciated in the statute and the remedy provided to the administrative agency is a cease and desist process. Nothing is statutorily stated *1020about fair trading a particular supplier of replacement parts and nothing is stated authorizing adoption of implementing or amendatory regulations to enforce the specific prohibitions provided in statutory text. No statutory extension without explicit authorizing provision can justify this stretch to validate administrative agency rule adaptation where express authority has previously been required by our strict construction precedent. McNeill v. Park County School Dist. No. 1, 635 P.2d 818 (Wyo.1981); Tri-County Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 525 P.2d at 9. Consequently, the statutory citation by the majority is erroneous in two regards. First, the subject addressed by the cited statute is different, and secondly, authorization for regulatory implementation of the statutory prohibition stated is not provided and particularly so to add criminal penalties to a cease and desist enforcement provision. It is the regulation that must be reconciled with authenticating statute and not the statute to be reconciled with the administrative regulation. The regulation must be consistent with the statute in addressing the same subject, if it does. In this case, the adopted regulation finds no proper or even actual parentage in the enacted statute. Gudmundson v. State, 763 P.2d 1360 (Alaska App.1988).
The second statute cited by the majority is the recently enacted Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 43 (1986), the unfair claims settlement practices statute, W.S. 26-13-124. This statute at least relates to the subject of adjustment and claim settlement.4 That statute identifies fourteen prohibited activities, none of which relate to controlling supplies of replacement parts. Although quoted and cited by the majority, the statute provides no authorization for the adaptation of implementing regulations by the Insurance Commissioner to supplement the stated explicit prohibitions clearly enumerated. Again, nothing in that statute, its stated purpose or text indicates authorization for control of source of repair parts by designating a vendor or, for that matter, the part fabricator. No criminal provision was provided in the session law enactment. Crimes can only be created by the legislature, Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877 (Wyo.1987), since the state has no common law offenses. W.S. 6-1-102.
We have recently restated the guiding mandate:
[TJhis court cannot constructively expand statutory powers conferred upon an agency by the legislature, and the statutes which create and delegate authority * * * must be construed strictly with any reasonable doubt as to the existence of regulatory power resolved against the exercise of such power.
Matter of Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 745 P.2d 563, 568 (Wyo.1987). By Matter of Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., we demonstrated a disinclination to expand statutes to justify expensive regulatory authority, which was in that case to regulate the publication of an advertising directly. Conversely here, the majority now implies a rule making authority completely independent of statutory justification to control source of supply of certain repair parts chargeable in cost to the insurance carrier which may have written physical damage coverage for a particular vehicle.5
*1021I am further unable to follow an attribution of W.S. 26-13-116 which is the administrative enforcement section to authorize adoption of self-standing regulations.6 It is suggested that the majority misreads the statutory enforcement provision speaking in terms of cease and desist to be a delegation of power rule adoption provision. Furthermore, W.S. 26-13-102 does not add justification as statutory authority to adopt rules involving fair trading parts suppliers to franchised dealerships. The additional citation of W.S. 26-13-106 within the pro-vence of a cease and desist proceeding adds no further substance to any contention of statutory authority.
Not finding adequately stated authority for the particular type of rule adaptation within Chapter 13 of the Wyoming Insur-anee Code, W.S. 26-13-101 to 26-13-124, *1022the majority then reaches for outside authority granted to the Insurance Commissioner to supplement the explicit statutory provisions to justify this adoption of his own wash list of adjusting requirements, including fair trading parts suppliers. That resource is claimed from within the general authority provided by W.S. 26-2-110 and 16-3-101. Unfortunately, it is perceived that the reasoning used has gone around in a circle and provided no statutory authority for adoption of a source consent repair part provision to fair trade in favor of one supplier or to create administratively criminal offenses. There simply is no effectuating statute granting authority to the administrative agency to augment or amend what the legislature has done or not done in express prohibition.7
Lacking definable statutory authority, cause remains to address the exercised discretion and rule adaptation as if that authority did exist. To properly understand this litigation, it is necessary to reflect that impact parts (however they may be defined) in number, constitute only a small portion of the number of assembled items constituting the motor vehicle. Secondly, the record reflects testimony that this particular appellant, as a major in automobile insurance, started using non-OEM parts two years earlier and that only seven percent of their appraisals included these items. The factual significance demonstrated is that competition reduces price and monopoly increases price.8 Availability and possible use is the critical factor in pricing moderation.
Why then does administrative agency exercised discretion properly run to require the preferential use of a more expensive installation and to enforce disclosure by a criminal sanction?9 The majority here hangs argument not on equivalency of quality, but on characterized “like kind.” The only “like kind” fender for the mythi*1023cal 1975 Pontiac Ventura would be one produced by the identical supplier for the original car manufacturer, whether affiliated or subcontractor. The odds of acquiring a fender for the Pontiac Ventura produced by the same factory existent fifteen years ago is, at best, accidental. Today, if repairs were required to a 1985 Jeep Waggoneer, Chrysler, as the supplier, would likely not have the same fabricator as did American Motors only five years ago. The same Mexican, Asian, European or even American plant could have supplied OEM parts for the Waggoneer as would supply non-OEM parts today. It is a well known fact in the automobile industry that at least in times past better cars of identical models came from different factories when compared between factory A and factory B and some part fabricators provided a substantially better product than others who may have been producing the “identical” or “like kind” item.10 Unfortunately, nothing provided in the contested regulation, Section 6, serves to assure that use of the same “kind of part” will provide one identically fabricated or provide increased safety or welfare.11 Here again, the American industry group seeks assistance of the government to provide competitive advantage from the pressures of a free economy. I might still be concerned constitutionally if the legislature accepted such a 1930 challenge to address a 1990 world economy. However, that is not this case where this public official, who was not elected, undertook this special interest market management by self-standing administrative regulation.
“When exercising its police powers, the State must act reasonably and cannot, under the guise of such powers, impose unreasonable or arbitrary regulations.” Big Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com’n, 715 P.2d 557, 563 (Wyo.1986).
I respectfully dissent from any judicial approval of this non-legislatively authorized Insurance Commissioner regulation.
*1024EXHIBIT
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EXHIBIT II
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. Attached as appendices are two exhibits found in the record reflecting the price competition feature in cost, where Exhibit I, "Alternative Market Pricing," reduced the OEM list price and, in the second case, Exhibit II, where the competition did not exist, a regular price increase occurred.
It is absurd to contend or conclude that the contested regulation is not a pricing accelerator
resulting in increased cost to the user. If the price of the Mustang fender used is OEM costing $148 instead of the competitive item of $82, the insurance policy purchasers will inevitably pay the increased cost which is decreed by anti-competition administrative regulation. If the OEM price is about the same as its competitor, certainly neither the insurance company nor its ultimately responsible insured would care if the local distributorship was the vendor.
If the marketing management concept of consumer behavior has validity, the insured will request the more expensive item as a normalized reaction. Avoidance of cost containment in elimination of competitive supply poses four *1017unpleasant results which were minimally, if at all, addressed by the Insurance Commissioner’s action. First, cost of insurance coverage will inevitably be increased and specifically for some rated renewal policies which could include that specific individual insured. Secondly, body shop and carrier warranty of repair is subverted by the required use of a one-source part which may be good, bad or indifferent in quality. Third, incidental cost increases in repair for individual vehicles mean more total loss incurrences since the vehicle may be rendered economically non-repairable. Fourth, and most significantly, policy holder attitude in loss adjustment is directly related to post-loss insurance policy renewal. Some policy holders, inopportunely and without recognizing the risk involved, will request the most expensive repair parts as a question of obtaining a bargain and then find out at the expiration of the policy term that their insurance coverage will not be renewed.
. There is a third anomaly presented in Section 4 of the regulation as a non-appealed issue which, in term, applies to both the automobile manufacturer and the third-party parts supplier. That section states:
Section 4. Identification. All after market parts, which are subject to this regulation and manufactured after the effective date of this regulation, shall carry sufficient permanent identification so as to identify its manufacturer. Such identification shall be accessible to the extent possible after installation. (Emphasis added.)
By its specific terms, the provision does apply to both OEM and non-OEM supplies and, according to the record, is impossible to enforce in either case. The problems derived from differentiation between manufacturer and supplier was well addressed in the record and additionally noted in communication between a representative of the Governor's office and personnel in the Insurance Department where the basic authority for the imposed regulation was questioned. The actual fabricator of any replacement impact part (or non-impact part), whether OEM or non-OEM, could obviously have been located in Mexico, Europe or many places in the Asian rim countries.
. The first statute, as a selling below cost civil and criminal restraint, remains in present Wyoming law. See W.S. 40-14-107 through 40-14-116, as continued from adoption as Wyo.Sess. Laws ch. 73 (1937). Two appellate efforts at enforcement, Civic Ass’n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941) and Eckdahl v. Hurwitz, 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940), failed and no recognizable effort at enforcement as well as the companion petroleum products discrimination statute, W.S. 40-14-117 through 40-14-121, can be found or is known to have existed in the past forty years. The exceptions of selling perishables or depreciated quality and opportunity to meet legal prices of competitors in this mass media selling era probably explains the dampened prosecuto-rial enthusiasm. See the listed exception in W.S. 40-14-110. Overtly, the minimum pricing statute has no realistic sustained validity in the present economy of this state.
The second statute established is Wyo.Sess. Laws ch. 58 (1937), for fair trade was interred on a constitutional infirmity by this court in Bulova Watch Co., 371 P.2d 409. The third Wyoming legislative effort to favor a particular market and control availability or price was the oleomargarine legislation which the court considered in Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 134, 197 P.2d 252 (1948), as originally enacted as Wyo. Sess.Laws ch. 137 (1931). The oleomargarine legislation involving color prohibition and excise tax price application also had a short shelf life when repealed by Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 38 (1949) and Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 117 (1951). See Note, The Changing Oleomargarine Picture and Wyoming, 3 Wyo.L.J. 217 (1949).
The 1989 effort of car manufacturers and franchised automobile dealerships proceed for a virtual recreation of the economically and politically discredited fair trades and oleomargarine legislation of the decade, sixty years now past. The difference is here that a state industry regulatory agency through the Insurance Commissioner, without explicit statutory authority, is the source of the regulatory constraints and not the popularly elected state legislature.
. This statute provides persuasion that the earlier statute relating to the subject of sales technique did not constitute a broad authorization for the Insurance Commissioner to adopt regulations on this dissimilar subject. Otherwise, there was no need for the legislature to enact the very specific provisions included as statutorily itemized prohibitions.
. W.S. 26-13-124 includes provisions which involve both first party and third party adjusting and settlement conduct. The presently contested regulation in the Section 6 consent requirement apparently relates only to first party relationship, namely adjustment with the insured. However, its language becomes cloudy in text even though the ten-point type declaration found in Section 6(b) ascribes notation on the insured’s estimate and not necessarily one prepared for a third party liability claimant. An interesting problem is created if the exception exists that the insurance code has been extended to only provide criminal penalties enforceable against the body shop when any estimate is prepared for an insured and not a claimant by failure to comply with the ten-point declaration criteria of Section 6 of the Insurance Commissioner's regulation. It is additionally not clear that the disclosure requirement for any estimate to be prepared for an insured is limited only to *1021the impact replacement part within the broad terminology used in subsections (a) and (b) of Section 6.
. W.S. 26-13-116 states:
(a) If the commissioner believes that any person in conducting an insurance business in this state is engaging in any method of competition or in any act or practice, not defined in this chapter, which is unfair or deceptive and that a proceeding by him in respect thereto would be in the public interest, after a hearing in which the person charged receives a notice of the hearing and of the charges against him, the commissioner shall make a written report of his findings of fact relative to the charges and serve a copy thereof upon the person and any intervenor at the hearing.
(b) If the commissioner’s report charges a violation of this chapter and if the method of competition, act or practice is not discontinued, the commissioner, through the attorney general, at any time after service of the report, may cause an action to be instituted to enjoin and restrain the person from engaging in the method, act or practice. In the action the court may grant a restraining order or injunction upon any just terms, but the people of this state are not required to give security before the issuance of the order or injunction. If a stenographic record of the proceedings in the hearing before the commissioner is made, a certified transcript thereof including all evidence taken and the report and findings shall be received in evidence in the action.
(c) If the commissioner’s report made under subsection (a) of this section or order on hearing made under W.S. 26-2-128 does not charge a violation of this chapter, then any intervenor in the proceedings may appeal within the time and in the manner provided in W.S. 26 — 2—129(b).
Conversely, the enforcement provision in the regulation, Section 7, states:
Any individual, firm or corporation who shall violate any of the provisions of these After Market Parts Regulations shall be punishable in accordance with W.S. 26-1-107.
W.S. 26-1-107, as a criminal statute, provides:
(a)Each violation of this code [title 26] for which a greater penalty is not provided by another provision of this code or by other applicable laws of this state, in addition to any applicable prescribed denial, suspension or revocation of certificate of authority or license, is a misdemeanor punishable upon conviction by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or both. Each violation is a separate offense.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this code, any lawful rule or final order of the commissioner or any final judgment or decree made by any court, upon the commissioner’s application, shall pay a civil penalty in an amount the commissioner determines of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) for each offense, or twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) in the aggregate for all such offenses within any three (3) month period. In the case of individual agents or adjusters, the civil penalty shall be not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each offense or five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) in the aggregate for all such offenses within any three (3) month period. The penalty shall be collected from the violator and paid by the commissioner, or the appropriate court, to the state treasurer to the credit of the general fund.
(c) Before the commissioner imposes a civil penalty, he shall notify the person, agent or adjuster accused of a violation, in writing, stating specifically the nature of the alleged violation and fixing a time and place, at least ten (10) days from the date of the notice, when a hearing of the matter shall be held. After hearing or upon failure of the accused to appear at the hearing, the commissioner shall determine the amount of the civil penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limitations expressed in subsection (b) of this section. Each violation is a separate offense.
(d) A civil penalty may be recovered in an action brought thereon in the name of the state of Wyoming in any court of appropriate jurisdiction, and the court may review the penalty as to both liability and reasonableness of amount.
(e) The provisions of this section are in addition to and not instead of any other enforcement provisions contained in this code.
The administrative regulation apparently attempted to substitute the criminal penalty for the cease and desist provisions expressly provided by statute.
. From a statutory adoption perspective, the imposed regulation has no greater validity than would a regulation that the automobile insurance carrier shall not provide physical damage or comprehensive coverage for any Pontiac Ventura that is older than fifteen years or that the insurance company is not required to pay for a part available for sale by a franchised dealership unless priced no more than parts or equipment equal in workmanship no matter where acquired from any other supplier. If the damaged battery was a Delco, could no other battery of whatever higher price be supplied? A more pertinent regulation would address pricing and parts used if repair was made by the franchised dealer’s garage. Obviously, fair trading regulatory gambits can go any direction the political powers of the particular moment might justify.
. The responsibility for monopoly maintenance is no different than those considerations reflected by the United States Supreme Court in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 166-67, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962) (footnotes omitted), which stated:
[T]he choice * * * may not be automatic; it must be rational and based upon conscious choice that in the circumstances the public interest is "adequate, economical and efficient service” outbalances whatever public interest there is in protecting existing carriers’ revenues in order to "foster sound economic conditions * *
There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion. We are not prepared to and the Administrative Procedures Act will not permit us to accept such adjudicatory practice.
Here lies a further anomaly. It is not suggested that the non-OEM parts are more frequently installed than used parts nor that other automobile parts do not involve a measurably greater portion of the market than impact parts. This litigation is logically confined by a rule of economics within a specified but otherwise undis-tinguishable market that competition reduces price and monopoly increases price. The supposition is for the economic interest when they can get government to provide a monopoly for what they may distribute, that non-competitive opportunity will serve well in profitability and particularly so if the monopoly product is needed and otherwise non-available.
. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983), which considers exercised discretion to deny implementing safety equipment manufacturing requirements for the motor vehicle. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc., the insurance company stood on the side of safety against the resistance of the vehicle manufacturers when the administrative agency failed to exercise proper discretion in rescinding vehicle manufacturer requirements for installation of safety equipment. The action here is not less arbitrary and capricious where again directed to maximize manufacturer profits at the cost of the automobile user.
. Also, at least in times past, it was at least considered in the automobile repair rebuilding and insurance industries that what is now designated as OEM were sometimes original rejects when set aside in the assembly line for fault or misfit. When, as here, “quality” looses pertinence for adaptation of the artificial characterization of "like kind," value and sufficiency are expressly ignored. Brand and kind and not comparative value and usefulness becomes the validating difference for justification of the higher price.
The significance of impact parts to automobile insurance is self-evident. Normally, most damage is to the impact parts first, although radiators and windshields do not fall far behind. Why the classification of impact parts has discriminatory justification is not explained in testimony or present majority decision. The differentiation totally lacks validity when questioning inclusion or exclusion of a hood and possibly a deck lid, while the radiator, a head light, the water pump and the front end axle and steering mechanism are excluded.
. I have another problem with the contested regulation which is ill-considered in briefing and in the majority opinion. Section 6 has two regulatory subjects — insurers and automobile repair companies — against whom criminal punishment can jointly or alternatively be assessed. The general criminal provision of the Wyoming Insurance Code, W.S. 26-1-107, is brought into a statutory cease and desist process by administrative agency regulations to create crimes which may have been committed not only by the insurer, but also by the body shop which makes repair estimates and may then sometimes complete repair. The entire subject of equal and equivalent substitution is implicated by the created criminal regulatory enactment. The body shop provides both the disclosure and subsequent part installation compliance or noncompliance. For example, lesser cost part substitution with or without kick back to the insured is apparently involved in prohibitory purview.
Automobile repair parts (impact or otherwise) are used by body shops; estimates are prepared by the body shop and used by the insurance company. Consequently, the Wyoming Insurance Code is supplemented or expanded by administrative regulation to overtly create crimes which may be committed not only within the regulated insurance industry, but also the unregulated "individual, firm or corporation" which expansively includes the body shop and its personnel.