I dissent. Petitioner was duly registered as an assistant pharmacist on January 14, 1939, presumably after meeting the requirements of the applicable statutes, to wit, sections 4160-4162 of the Business and Professions Code which had been in effect since 1901. (See Stats. 1901, p. 299.) Those sections required that in order to secure registration as an assistant pharmacist an applicant must have had three years of pharmaceutical experience, completed at least one-half of the course required for graduation in a school or college of pharmacy or a department of pharmacy of a university recognized by the State Board of Pharmacy, and passed an examination to the satisfaction of that board.
Section 4250 of that code required, and still requires, that every person holding a certificate shall renew his registration with the board annually. Petitioner requested renewal of his registration as an assistant pharmacist for the year ending June 30, 1945, but his request was denied by the assistant director of respondent board, on the ground that the registration of assistant pharmacists had been abolished by law. It is assumed that this conclusion was based upon the fact that in 1943 the Legislature repealed sections 4160 to 4162, inclusive, of the Business and Professions Code. But it is the contention of petitioner that when he acquired the status of a registered assistant pharmacist by compliance with effective statutes he became vested with a valuable property right of which he may not be deprived by the repeal of the statutes under which he acquired such right.
The first question then is did petitioner, by his compliance with the statutes in effect at the time he secured his right to practice as an assistant pharmacist, acquire a vested right. In Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal.2d 774, 783 [147 P.2d 531], it *76was said that “a vested right, as that term is used in relation to constitutional guaranties, implies an interest which it is proper for the state to recognize and protect, and of which the individual may not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.” (Also see City of Los Angeles v. Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299, 310 [283 P. 298].)
In Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 835 [123 P.2d 457], the Supreme Court definitely stated that “The appellant’s right to practice optometry was a vested property right,” citing Hewitt v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590 [84 P. 39, 113 Am.St.Rep. 315, 7.Ann.Cas. 750, 3 L.R.A.N.S. 896]; Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247 [187 P. 965], In the Hewitt case, supra, it was said, p. 592, that “The right to practice medicine is, like the right to practice any other profession, a valuable property right, in which, under the Constitution and laws of the state, one is entitled to be protected and secured”; and this language is quoted in Suckow v. Alderson, supra. In Cavassa v. Off, 206 Cal. 307 [274 P. 523], where it was sought to revoke the license of a registered pharmacist, the court said, page 314: “The right of a person to practice the profession for which he has prepared himself is property of the very highest character.” It also said, p. 315:
“Due to the severe and exacting tests, now generally required before a person can legally follow a profession at the present day, this right can only be acquired after years of arduous effort and closest application. It is generally the only means of the holder thereof whereby he may support himself and family and it usually affords such holder the best opportunity to become a useful and sustaining member of the community in which he resides. This right should not be taken from one who has thus acquired it, except upon clear proof that he has forfeited the same, and then only in strict conformity to the statute authorizing its forfeiture.”
In Klein v. Board of Education, 1 Cal.2d 706, 708 [37 P.2d 74], it was held that petitioner’s tenure as a vice-principal teacher was not affected by repeal of section 1793 of the Political Code in effect when she was elected a vice-principal and for a period of some ten years while she served as such vice-principal. The court said, page 708: “Of course, any tenure previously acquired by respondent was a vested right and remained unaffected by such repeal, ’ ’ citing Gastineau v. Meyer, *77131 Cal.App. 611 [22 P.2d 31], decided by this court, where, at page 616, permanent tenure acquired by a teacher was held to be a vested right of which the school board could not deprive him.
In view of the foregoing decisions it seems to me that if the rights of physicians, optometrists and pharmacists to practice their respective professions, and the rights of teachers in tenure once acquired, are valuable property rights which, when acquired, become vested, the conclusion is inevitable that assistant pharmacists who have complied with the statutes creating assistant pharmacists and have been registered as such, have, likewise, acquired valuable vested property rights which, in the language in Miller v. McKenna, supra, “it is proper for the state to recognize and protect and of which the individual may not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. ’ ’
Assuming, then, that petitioner had acquired vested property rights prior to the repeal of sections 4160-4162, supra, the next question is whether the repealing statute properly may be given retroactive application, so as to deprive him of same.
In Higgins v. Bear River etc. Mining Co., 27 Cal. 153, 159, the court said that a “statute which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past, is to be deemed retrospective”; and that it “is a rule never to apply a statute retrospectively by mere construction. ’ ’
In Estate of Taitmeyer, 60 Cal.App.2d 699, 709 [141 P.2d 504], the opinion states that while neither the federal Constitution nor the Constitution of California prohibits the enactment of retrospective laws, a retrospective act may not be given effect to deprive one of a completely vested property right, citing 5 California Jurisprudence, pages 728-729, and pages 751-752. The latter authority states at page 751 that "The power of the legislature to impair such vested rights as are protected by constitutional guaranties has been repeatedly denied by the courts. The right of acquiring and possessing property, as has been already mentioned, is one of the inalienable rights of each citizen, which has been guaranteed to him by the Constitution.”
*78In American States W. S. Co. v. Johnson, 31 Cal.App.2d 606, 613 [88 P.2d 770], this court, also, said that while our Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retrospective statutes, a statute may be invalid if it deprives one of vested rights which are bound to be respected or protected by the state; also that statutes will be construed to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively unless the contrary intention clearly appears; and it defined “vested rights” as they are defined in Miller v. McKenna, supra, and in 5 California Jurisprudence, section 143, page 748.
My associates, in the majority opinion in this case, apparently take the position that since the business or profession of a pharmacist or an assistant pharmacist is a proper one for regulation under the police power of the state, such power to regulate includes the power to destroy. This, however, is not consonant with holdings of our courts. In Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418], our Supreme Court said at pages 592-593 : “Nor can it be controverted that the right to engage in a lawful and useful occupation cannot, in effect, be taken away under the guise of regulation. ’ ’ (Also see Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal.2d 343, 350 [79 P.2d 1080], citing Biley v. Chambers and other eases. Also see In re Jones, 56 Cal.App.2d 658, 664 [133 P.2d 418]; Mattei v. Hecke, 99 Cal.App. 747, 751 [279 P. 470].)
In Rosefield Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 120 [47 P.2d 716], at page 122, it is declared that the question of constitutionality of a statute may be determined upon settled principles; that ‘ ‘ The retrospective application of a statute may be unconstitutional if it is ex post facto, that is, applying to criminal matters; or if it deprives a person of a vested right; or if it impairs the obligation of a contract.” (Also see Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226, 234 [121 P. 924].)
Conceding the power of the Legislature to regulate the practice of law, medicine, pharmacy, or any other such profession, and conceding that acquired rights to practice such professions may, after notice and hearing, be suspended or revoked for good cause shown, the Legislature, by repealing sections 4160-4162 of the Business and Professions Code, did not purport to regulate the practice or activities of assistant pharmacists ; it merely wiped out the statutes under which the registration of assistant pharmacists was authorized. Whether this was done because of some notion that assistant pharma*79cists, who had been permitted registration for a period of over forty years, had become a menace to the public health and welfare, or for some other reason, does not appear. But the question before us is whether, by the repeal of such sections, assistant pharmacists previously qualified may be deprived of the rights theretofore conferred, or whether the repealing statute shall be held to have only prospective operation, that is, prohibit the registration thereafter of assistant pharmacists, while assistant pharmacists previously registered shall be permitted to continue to be registered as such, subject, of course, to reasonable regulation. By refusing to comply with petitioner’s request for his registration for 1944-1945, the Assistant Director of the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards has elected to give the repealing statute retroactive operation the effect of which is to deprive petitioner of his vested property right to practice as an assistant pharmacist.
It is my view that under the decisions hereinabove cited the repealing statute may not be given such retrospective application so as to deprive petitioner of the right to renewal of his registration as an assistant pharmacist for whatever value such registration may have (which is all he asks) so long as he continues to comply with statutes regulating the activities of assistant pharmacists, which regulatory enactments are not under attack in this proceeding.
No demurrer or answer to the petition filed herein was filed by respondent, and at the hearing counsel appearing for it stated that he believed that the petition was good. He said: “Ton might say this: If we had the classification of assistant lawyers, those practicing as assistant lawyers for five years would be entitled to practice in the state of California as attorneys at law, but those who had practiced on that particular date four years and eleven months would be chopped off and there would be no further classification of assistant lawyers. ’ ’ And in reply to the inquiry: ‘ ‘ And they would thereby be deprived of a vested right which they had acquired by virtue of the fact that they had fully complied with the requirements?” he stated: “That is true.”
The writ prayed for should be granted.