concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with that part of the majority opinion where they concluded that the judgment in the principal action should be affirmed. I dissent from that part of the majority opinion that reverses the judgment in the cross-action.
I agree with Thompson, J., in his dissent, where he concludes that the Allen’s claim for damages from Title Insurance is barred by the statute of limitations. However, I believe that their claim is barred because they had constructive notice of the conveyance from Phillips to Yuma which was recorded before their deed of trust.
Constructive knowledge of the intervening conveyance was sufficient to apprise the Allens of their precarious position brought about by the title company’s failure to record their deed of trust.
Our recording statute, NRS 111.320, is extremely explicit in providing that “Every such conveyance or instrument of writing, acknowledged or proved and certified, and recorded in the manner prescribed in this chapter, shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof; . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Allens are among those covered by the statute. As soon as the deed from Phillips to Yuma was recorded the statute of limitations began to run against them. NRS 11.190(3) (d).
In Strong v. Clark, 352 P.2d 183 (Wash. 1960), that court held: “When an instrument involving real property is properly recorded it becomes notice to all the world of its contents. (Citations omitted.) When the facts upon which the fraud is predicated are contained in a written instrument which is placed *274on the public record, there is constructive notice of its contents, and the statute of limitations begins to run at the date of the recording of the instrument.” See cases collected in Annot. 137 A.L.R. 268.
The judgments of the district court should be affirmed in their entirety.