with whom SUMMERS, Vice Chief Justice, and SIMMS and HARGRAVE, Justices, join, dissenting:
¶ 2 The Oklahoma version of the Standard Fire Policy, 36 O.S.Supp.1993 § 4803 provides that its terms apply to all “PROVISIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREIN OR ADDED HERETO.” [Emphasis added, capitalization as in the original.] Further, coverage is provided to all property “ENDANGERED BY THE PERILS INSURED AGAINST IN THE POLICY.” [capitalization as in the original] The policy here, of course, insured against theft as well as fire, hail, and a host of other perils. The majority opinion relies on Kearney v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 22 Ariz.App. 190, 526 P.2d 169 (1974). Kearney was the only opinion I have been able to find after diligent research that held a loss from property damage under a fire insurance policy, regardless of cause of loss, was not governed by the one-year fire policy statute of limitations. A better reasoned opinion, in my opinion, is Coach House Inn, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co., 54 Wis.2d 541, 196 N.W.2d 636 (1972), in which the Wisconsin Supreme court rejected virtually the same argument adopted by the majority today. In Coach House, the Wisconsin court held that because the Standard Fire Policy applied to “other loss or damage” to property, in addition to fire damage, the one-year statute of limitations in the Standard Fire Policy applied to a loss arising from a civil disturbance.
¶ 3 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Grice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 359 So.2d 1288 (La.1978), and Simms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 27 Wash.App. 872, 621 P.2d 155 (1980), is unconvincing. Both the Louisiana and *651Washington Courts reached the same conclusion as the Wisconsin court for the same reason: legislative intent was clearly that all losses under a Standard Fire Policy are governed by the one-year statute of limitations.
¶ 4 The majority opinion requires parties to a fire insurance policy to look at the nature of the peril that caused a loss before they can know which statute of limitations applies — not a good idea in my opinion, and obviously contrary to the public policy established by the legislature in the Standard Fire Policy. An analysis of the development of the New York Standard Fire Policy shows that the Legislature intended for all losses under the Standard Fire Policy to be governed by the one-year statute of limitations.
¶ 5 The 1941 New York Fire Policy statute provided that the one-year statute of limitations applied to fire losses, and the courts interpreted the statute to limit the imposition of the one-year statute of limitations to fire losses only. Thus, losses from hail and other loses were not governed by the one-year statute. The New York Legislature amended the statute in 1943 to state that the one-year statute of limitations applied to any loss under the policy, and the New York Supreme Court held that the one-year “period of limitation encompassed every casualty insured against.” Proc v. Home Ins. Co., 17 N.Y.2d 239, 270 N.Y.S.2d 412, 414, 217 N.E.2d 136, 138 (1966).
¶ 6 In 1945, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Standard Fire Policy Statute to comport with the amendment made by the New York Legislature in 1943. In Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Biggs, 1956 OK 114, 295 P.2d 790, this Court interpreted the amended statute of limitations to apply to a hail loss. We reached the same conclusion in Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Bond, 1956 OK 223, 301 P.2d 361. The majority opinion is also contrary to Walton v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 1993 OK 115, 860 P.2d 222, in which we rejected the contention that the one-year statute of limitations provision in the Standard fire Policy was unconstitutional. The dissenters in Walton, who would have held that the one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional, are all members of the majority here. At this late date, no credible argument can be made that the Legislature did not intend that the applicable statute of limitations applies is to be determined by the type of policy involved, not by the peril that caused the loss.
¶ 7 In my judgment, the result reached by the majority is diametrically opposed to the requirements of the Oklahoma Standard Fire Policy statute, and its interpretation in Biggs, Bond, and Walton. The majority by its action today has ignored clear legislative intent and changed the public policy of the State of Oklahoma by judicial fiat.
¶8 The one-year statute of limitations should be held to apply here.
¶ 9 I dissent.