I dissent.
The majority opinion concedes that an alimony award based on the agreement of the parties is enforeible by contempt (see also Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214 [198 N.E. 579, 154 A.L.R. 439]; 154 A.L.R. 449) since it is sufficiently related to the statutory duty of support incident to the marriage relationship as to be outside the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. (Cal. Const., art I, § 15.) Rights and duties with respect to property growing out of the marriage relationship and crystallized in a court order are likewise outside the scope of that provision. Such an order has not less a special character because it is based on an agreement of the parties than an alimony award based on such an agreement. Indeed, in some states the very theory *524underlying use of contempt to enforce awards of alimony is that alimony is itself an adjustment of property rights. (Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 185, 196-197; State v. Cook, 66 Ohio. St. 566 [64 N.E. 567, 568, 58 L.R.A. 625]; West v. West, 126 Va. 696 [101 S.E. 876, 877].)
Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App. 64 [214 P. 252], Petry v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.App.2d 756 [116 P.2d 954], and Seymour v. Seymour, 18 Cal.App.2d 481 [64 P.2d 168], upheld the use of contempt to enforce orders pursuant to property settlements even though .they were not in lieu of the statutory duty of support. (See also Sullivan v. Superior Court, 72 Cal.App. 531, 535 [237 P. 782]; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal.App. 485, 488 [289 P. 645]; Shogren v. Superior Court, 93 Cal.App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108] ; Young v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.App.2d 65, 67 [233 P.2d 39].) Although the court stressed the duty of support as a basis for contempt in Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733 [72 P.2d 868], it cited with approval the Seymour and Tripp cases and expressly refused to follow the Maryland cases (Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675 [141 A. 387]; Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166 [145 A. 488]), now invoked by the majority opinion.
Even if the statutory duty of support were the sole justification for enforcing such court orders by contempt, the majority opinion would still be in error in stating that an order to make payments pursuant to an integrated bargain cannot be so enforced, when the wife has not remarried. In Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873], we stated: “When, as in this ease . . . , the parties have made the provision for support and maintenance an integral part of their property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they are designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [ Citations.] On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a division of the community property itself, or constitute an inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties. ’ ’ So long as the wife has not remarried, the characteristics of the support and maintenance obligation remain and alone justify enforcement by contempt. Such a rule is implicit in the Miller case, where the court took care *525to point out that the payments were pursuant to a property settlement and could not be changed without the consent of the parties. (9 Cal.2d at 740 [see also, concurring and dissenting opinion of Carter, J. in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 45 [265 P.2d 873] : “The rule in such a case should be that if the entire agreement is approved by the court and part of its provisions are incorporated in the decree and order to be performed, those portions included in the decree may be enforced by contempt proceedings.”].)
Even if the obligation to make the payments pursuant to the order of the court did constitute a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision, the obligor’s wilful refusal to make them when he is able to do so would be a “ease of fraud” within the meaning of the exception in that provision. In sustaining the validity of a criminal statute dealing with nonpayment of wages this court stated: “The historical background of section 15 of article I and similar constitutional guaranties of other states clearly shows that the provisions were adopted to protect the poor but honest debtor who is unable to pay his debts, and were not intended to shield a dishonest man who takes an unconscionable advantage of another. [Citations.] It has long been recognized that wages are not ordinary debts, that they may be preferred over other claims, and that, because of the economic position of the average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages for the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is essential to the public welfare that he receive his pay when it is due. [Citations.] An employer who knows that wages are due, has the ability to pay them, and still refuses to pay them, acts against good morals and fair dealing, and necessarily intentionally does an act which prejudices the rights of his employee. Such conduct amounts to a ‘ease of fraud’ within the meaning of the exception to the constitutional prohibition and may be punished by statute.” (In re Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801, 809-810 [193 P.2d 734]; see also Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa 208, 213 [79 Am.Dec. 529] ; Ex parte Clark, 20 N.J.L. 648, 650-651 [45 Am.Dec. 394].)
Whether or not the reasoning of the Trombley case would apply to any wilful refusal to pay a debt when the obligor is able to pay, it clearly applies to obligations arising out of property settlement agreements irrespective of whether the payments are solely alimony. “Property settlement agreements occupy a favored position in the law of this state and are sanctioned by the Civil Code.” (Adams v. Adams, 29 *526Cal.2d 621, 624 [177 P.2d 265], and cases cited.) There maybe practical considerations for an order that community property, such as a going business, remain intact and that the wife receive her share in periodic payments. Whether such payments are also intended to discharge a duty of support, they may actually be the wife’s only means of support. As in the case of wages, the payments may be difficult to collect by repeated executions. The enforcement of the obligation by contempt is no more tantamount to imprisonment for debt than criminal punishment for the wilful refusal to pay wages.
I would adhere to the settled law of this state and affirm the order holding petitioner in contempt.
The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing was denied June 5, 1957. Traynor, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.