(dissenting) — I believe the enactment of the City of Spokane's business and occupation tax ordinance C-25792 is not subject to referendum, as it is an administrative act. Additionally, the ordinance falls under the "support of government" exception to the referendum power. For these reasons, I dissent.
The general rule is that the right to act directly through referendum is not an inherent power of the people, such that the referendum power extends only to matters legislative in character as compared to administrative actions. Leonard v. Bothell, 87 Wn.2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wn.2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973). The criteria for determining when an act is administrative or legislative in nature are:
*352Several criteria have been suggested for determining whether an act is legislative or administrative. One such is whether the subject is of a permanent and general character (legislative) or of temporary and special character (administrative). 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.55 (3d ed. rev. 1969). We believe a preferable standard, at least for this case, to be whether the proposition is one to make new law or declare a new policy, or merely to carry out and execute law or policy already in existence. People v. Centralia, 1 Ill. App. 2d 228, 117 N.E.2d 410 (1953); Heider v. Common Council, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 155 N.W.2d 17 (1967).
(Italics mine.) Ruano, at 823-24.
Another test, cited by the majority at page 347, is whether the ordinance makes new law or merely executes law already in existence.
The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it.
5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.55, at 194 (3d rev. ed. 1981); Durocher v. King Cy., 80 Wn.2d 139, 152-53, 492 P.2d 547 (1972).
Ordinance C-25792 does not adopt a new tax policy or program for the City of Spokane, but merely expands a policy already in existence. The City of Spokane has been collecting a business license tax on all businesses within the corporate limits of the city since 1968. This ordinance is not a new tax bill. In effect, the ordinance reintroduced the same tax but increased the rates on all businesses except utilities by extending the percentage-of-gross-proceeds method to these businesses. Although the initial passage of the business and occupation tax ordinance previously may have been subject to referendum, the current ordinance modifies the method used to collect the tax. The passage of the ordinance was, therefore, an administrative rather than legislative action and, as such, is not subject to referendum.
Even if the ordinance could be classified as a "legislative" action, however, it falls under the "support of government" *353exception to the referendum power.
Article 2, section 1(b) of our state constitution excepts from the power of referendum "such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, [or] support of the state government and its existing public institutions, . . ."A city of the first class has legislative powers as broad as those granted under article 2, except when restricted by the general laws of the state. Const. art. 11, § 10 (amend. 40); Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958). Thus, the limitations the people of the state of Washington have placed upon their own right of referendum also apply to enactments of the City Council of the City of Spokane.
The corporate authorities of municipal government have a responsibility to support the institutions previously enacted. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915). Without the business and occupation tax funds, the operations of the city government of Spokane would be financially weakened, if not jeopardized. Even if the passage of ordinance C-25792 were to be construed as legislative in character, the funds are necessary to support the City's government.
As I have concluded the ordinance should not be subject to referendum, I would affirm the tried court.
Reconsideration denied June 20, 1983.