(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur in the result reached by the majority but dissent from its analysis. I believe the majority construes RCW 43.09.260, upon which it predicates the Auditor's standing, far too broadly. I would construe that provision more narrowly, limiting it to actions more closely related to the general duties of the Auditor, and conclude he has no standing here. Nonetheless, I agree that we should reach the labor law issue as it is one of substantial public interest.
I
While RCW 43.09.260 does impose upon the Auditor a duty to "examine into all financial affairs of every public office" to assure that state law has been complied with, this does not grant the Auditor general powers of law enforcement. The inquiry into compliance with state law is not independent of the examination into financial affairs but is merely one aspect of it. See RCW 43.09.260 (" [o]n every such examination, inquiry shall be made . . . whether the Constitution and laws of the state . . . have been properly complied with" (italics mine)). Moreover, RCW 43.09.260 must be read in the context of the rest of the act of which it is a part. See Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 627, 548 P.2d 310 (1976). The general duties of the Auditor, as set forth in RCW 43.09.050, are to audit and inspect public accounts, provide information to the Attorney General regarding the need to collect monies due the State, and provide information regarding the financial affairs of the State.
Read in this context, RCW 43.09.260 grants the Auditor *248standing to redress violations of only those laws intended to assure the integrity of the public fisc or more generally govern the financial affairs of the State or its subdivisions. Actions may be brought only to correct "malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office on the part of any public officer or employee". RCW 43.09.260; State v. Miller, 32 Wn.2d 149, 152, 201 P.2d 136 (1948). The type of action permitted by RCW 43.09.260 is perhaps best exemplified by State v. Miller, supra. In that case, the Auditor brought an action to recover monies paid by a county clerk to his wife in violation of the conflict of interest statute governing public officers. Miller, at 150-51, 152-53. Since the law there involved was specifically intended to protect the integrity of the public fisc, the action was squarely within RCW 43.09.260. Similarly, the Auditor has standing in the case at bar to raise the issue of the school district's authority under RCW 28A.58.100, for the central purpose of that statute is to control the use of state funds by school districts to pay compensation.
RCW 43.09.260 does not give the Auditor standing, on the other hand, to enforce laws which are merely incidentally related to state finances. To hold otherwise, as the majority apparently does here, grants the Auditor almost unlimited enforcement powers, for almost every action by state officials has at least an incidental effect on government finances. For example, criminal prosecutions affect government finances. The majority's analysis, logically extended, would apparently grant the Auditor standing to bring an action to stop spending on prosecutions under any criminal law he claimed to be unconstitutional. Such a result cannot have been countenanced by the Legislature.
The case of Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wn.2d 756, 567 P.2d 187 (1977) also suggests a more narrow reading of RCW 43.09.260 than that taken by the majority. In that case the plaintiffs based their action on a report by the Auditor which suggested that the State could recover monies paid out to private schools as tuition supplements under a law struck down as unconstitutional. Berge, at 758. Despite the *249fact that the funds had been paid out pursuant to a law violating the state constitution, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that RCW 43.09.330, a statute analogous to RCW 43.09.260,4 required the Attorney General to bring a reimbursement action. After noting that RCW 43.09.330 applies only if the Auditor's report discloses malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, the court held it inapplicable on the ground that merely making payments pursuant to an unconstitutional law did not constitute such conduct. Berge, at 760-61.
The present case is analogous to Berge. The law which the Auditor alleges is being violated here, RCW 41.59.140(1) (b), has nothing whatsoever to do with protecting the integrity of the public fisc. Instead, it is intended solely to protect the rights of public employees. See RCW 41.59.010. Its effect on government finances is merely incidental. RCW 43.09.260 is therefore inapplicable.
To allow the Auditor to enforce RCW 41.59.140(1) (b) is especially perverse, for that provision is not intended to protect any state interest, let alone the type of interests envisioned by RCW 43.09.260. Domination of a union is an unfair labor practice by the employer, i.e., by the State. See RCW 41.59.140(1)(b). Its purpose is to protect the rights of employees, not the interest of the State. Certainly RCW 43.09.260 is at least limited to actions necessary to protect some interest of the State. See State v. Miller, supra at 156. Such an interest is completely lacking here.
The Auditor's contention that no other person has any incentive to bring this action is a red herring. If any employee of the school district believes the alleged domination of the union is denying him or her effective and independent representation, he or she would have standing to bring an action. If no such employee exists, then the issue *250of whether RCW 41.59.140(1) (b) is being violated is irrelevant, for the only purpose of RCW 41.59.140(1)(b) is to foster free choice of employee representatives (Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975)).5
I cannot join in the majority's analysis. The Auditor is a specialized officer whose authority should be circumscribed by his specialized duties.
II
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that we should decide the labor law issue presented in this case. We need not do so by conferring such broad authority on the Auditor, however, for we may exercise discretion to decide issues of continuing and substantial public interest even where standing is lacking.
We have recognized such a "public interest" exception in mootness cases (see, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Coun., 96 Wn.2d 230, 233, 635 P.2d 108 (1981)), and it is just as applicable in cases where standing is lacking. The exception is premised on the need to provide guidance to public officers (Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 559, 496 P.2d 512 (1972)), a consideration which is equally pertinent in cases involving standing problems. In addition, mootness and standing are intimately related. Two requirements must be met to prevent dismissal of a case as moot— the issue presented must remain "live" and the particular party presenting it must retain a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479, 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980). The second of these requirements, however, is simply a requirement that the party retain the standing which was required to initiate the action. Compare, e.g., RCW 7.24.020 *251(person "interested" under contract may bring declaratory judgment action). Thus, the public interest exception recognized in mootness cases is equally appropriate in cases where standing is lacking.
I believe the present case comes within the purview of the public interest exception. Criteria to be considered in determining whether an issue is of sufficient public interest include the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of providing future guidance to public officers, and the likelihood that the question will arise again. Sorenson v. Bellingham, supra at 558. All of these factors militate in favor of review here. A question involving the contracts between governmental bodies and their employees is certainly public in nature. In addition, it is of great importance that we clarify the validity of these contracts. Finally, the question presented here is quite likely to recur, as the defendant education associations will no doubt seek to continue the contract provision at issue herein in future contracts, as well as extend it to other districts.
Since I agree with the majority's disposition of the labor law issue, I need not address it here.
Brachtenbach, J., concurs with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied June 27, 1983.
RCW 43.09.330 provides for postaudits by the Auditor and, just as does RCW 43.09.260, requires the Attorney General to take appropriate legal action if an audit "discloses malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office on the part of any public officer or employee".
Since the wording of RCW 41.59.140(1)(b) is virtually identical to that of section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (compare RCW 41.59.140(1)(b) with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)) and the precedents of the National Labor Relations Board are to be considered in interpreting RCW 41.59 (RCW 41.59.110(2)), federal authority is persuasive.