concurring specially:
If all that the majority opinion is holding is that “a reading of the findings and conclusions indicates that the commission was erroneously under the impression that the doctrine of res judicata precludes any consideration' of the applicability of I.C. § 72-719(3) [manifest injustice] in the absence of either fraud or change of condition,”, then the majority opinion is legally correct (although very likely factually incorrect, since the record suggests that the commission did consider the manifest injustice issue). However, I do .not agree with that part of the majority opinion which approves language contained in Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982), and Iverson v. Gordon Farming Co., Inc., 103 Idaho 527, 650 P.2d 669 (1982), suggesting that the commission shall review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice, and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue when anyone suggests that a prior award is now unjust. Apparently overlooked is the fact that the statute, I.C. § 72-719(3), makes the commission’s review for manifest injustice discretionary. The statute bears repeating:
“72-719. MODIFICATION OF
AWARDS AND AGREEMENTS— GROUNDS — TIME WITHIN WHICH MADE.— . ..
(3) The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice.” (Emphasis supplied.)