The majority opinion is, as Churchill once said of Russia, “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” The majority proposes to hold that the wrongful discharge claims of plaintiff and real party in interest (hereafter plaintiff) conflict with, and are therefore preempted by, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA or Act), 29 United States Code section 401 et seq. The riddle is to understand how a statute designed to hold union leaders accountable for their actions and to safeguard workers’ rights can be twisted to strip workers of all means of legal redress for employment abuses. The mystery lies in discerning the majority’s analytic route to this bizarre result. The ultimate enigma, of course, is the fact that the case presents no actual conflict between state and federal law. Nothing in the LMRDA compels or even contemplates the unjust result reached in the majority opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*1039Discussion
I. Preemption Doctrine
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has grouped and analyzed preemption cases in three categories. (See, e.g., English v. General Electric Company (1990) 495 U.S. _, _ [110 L.Ed.2d 65, 110 S.Ct. 2270].)
First, Congress may expressly define the extent to which its enactments will preempt state law (“express” preemption).
Second, in the absence of an express declaration, state law may be preempted where it is apparent that Congress intended the federal government to occupy the field exclusively (“field” or “implied” preemption). “Field” preemption may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that it evinces an intent that the states should have no room to regulate, or where the federal interest in the area of concern is so dominant that states will be deemed precluded from enforcing state laws on the same subject. (See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230 [91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459, 67 S.Ct. 1146].)
Third, state law may be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law (“conflict” preemption). Actual conflict with federal law may be found where it is impossible to comply with both the federal and the state law (Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 [10 L.Ed.2d 248, 256-257, 83 S.Ct. 1210]), or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” (Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 [85 L.Ed. 581, 587, 61 S.Ct. 399].)1
Rather than analyze the case in these traditional preemption terms, the majority focuses on an ill-defined and nebulous alternative scheme—“jurisdictional” and “substantive” preemption.
The majority generally declares that preemption cases are divided into two types—“substantive” and “jurisdictional”—citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) section 6-25, page 481, in support of its *1040classification. Tribe, however, unlike the majority, uses the terms to correspond to the categories of “conflict” and “field” preemption.2
The majority fails to make clear the precise meaning of these terms. A distinction has been made, in the context of federal labor law, between preemption based on federal protection of the conduct in question and that based on the need to protect the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). (See Brown v. Hotel Employees (1984) 468 U.S. 491 [82 L.Ed.2d 373, 104 S.Ct. 3179].) Although the majority does not acknowledge this specialized usage of the terms, the labels “substantive” and “jurisdictional,” respectively, actually refer to these two limited classes of cases.
The difference in terminology could be dismissed as largely semantic were it not for the majority’s distortion of the law governing so-called “substantive” preemption.
Specifically, the majority relies on the following statement in Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491: “If the state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law, . . . pre-emption follows not as a matter of protecting primary jurisdiction, but as a matter of substantive right. Where . . . the issue is one of an asserted substantive conflict with a federal enactment, then ‘[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material . . .’” and the federal law controls. (Id. at p. 503 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 384]; see Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663 [8 L.Ed.2d 180, 82 S.Ct. 1089].)
The majority concludes from this that, although a balancing of state and federal interests may be appropriate to “jurisdictional” preemption, it is *1041precluded with respect to “substantive” preemption. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1023.) Thus, the majority simply asserts, without analysis, that plaintiff’s state law claims conflict “substantively” with the LMRDA, and must therefore be preempted by the federal statute. In essence, the “substantive” preemption label is used as a substitute for a proper determination of whether the purposes and effects of the federal and state laws at issue “actually conflict.”3
The majority’s reliance on Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, for this facile “trumping” effect of so-called “substantive” preemption is misplaced. A careful reading of Brown shows that, if anything, preemption is more readily found in cases that the majority denominates “jurisdictional” rather than “substantive.” When there is a need to protect the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, state laws may be preempted even if they deal with matters only “arguably within” the jurisdiction of the NLRB (see San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 [3 L.Ed.2d 775, 782-783, 79 S.Ct. 773]). In contrast to the usual preemption principles, preemption in such cases may be presumed. As explained in Brown; “This presumption of federal preemption, based on the primary jurisdiction rationale, properly admits to exception when unusually ‘deeply rooted’ local interests are at stake.” (Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 502 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 384].)
However, “substantive” preemption, as that term is used by the majority, is still subject to the ordinary rules of conflict preemption. So-called “substantive” preemption is really a species of “conflict” preemption.4 A state *1042law is “substantively” preempted when it purports to regulate particular conduct which is directly protected by federal law—an obvious case of “actual conflict.” However, whether a state law “actually conflicts” with a federal law is essentially a question of statutory construction. The intent of Congress is the “ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis. (See e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc. (1986) 475 U.S. 282, 290 [89 L.Ed.2d 223, 230-231, 106 S.Ct. 1057]; Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn (1963) 375 U.S. 96, 103 [11 L.Ed.2d 179, 184, 84 S.Ct. 219].)
Therefore, when federal and state laws allegedly conflict, consideration of the respective federal and state interests cannot be ignored. Rather, the purpose and effect of both laws must be assessed to determine whether they “actually conflict”; i.e., whether the state law purports to regulate the same conduct that the federal law “actually protects.” (Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 503 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 384]; see also Linn v. Plant Guard Workers (1966) 383 U.S. 53, 59-60 [15 L.Ed.2d 582, 587-589, 86 S.Ct. 657]; Free v. Bland, supra, 369 U.S. 663, 666-670 [8 L.Ed.2d at pp. 183-186].)
Moreover, although state law may be preempted under a conflict analysis if it frustrates the specific objectives underlying a federal enactment, a “general tension” with the broad or abstract goals of federal laws or programs will not result in preemption. (See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana (1981) 453 U.S. 609, 633-634 [69 L.Ed.2d 884, 904-905, 101 S.Ct. 2946].) In addition, “[preemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored ‘in the absence of persuasive reasons either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’ ” (Chicago & N. W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co. (1981) 450 U.S. 311, 317 [67 L.Ed.2d 258, 265, 101 S.Ct. 1124].) Thus, preemption of state law is not lightly to be presumed (Malone v. White Motor Corp. (1978) 435 U.S. 497, 504 [55 L.Ed.2d 443, *1043450-451, 98 S.Ct. 1185]), and the state law should not be displaced unless there is a significant conflict between the operation of the local law and concretely identifiable federal interests. (Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) 487 U.S. 500 [101 L.Ed.2d 442, 108 S.Ct. 2510].)
With these principles in mind, I turn to an examination of the specific objectives of the LMRDA and their relation to the state claims asserted by plaintiff.
II. The LMRDA
A. Background and Purposes
The LMRDA (29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this source unless otherwise noted) was enacted in 1959 as “the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership.” (Finnegan v. Leu (1982) 456 U.S. 431, 435 [72 L.Ed.2d 239, 243, 102 S.Ct. 1867].) Section 401 sets forth Congress’s findings and purpose: “[I]t is essential,” that section states, “that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-management relations.” (§ 401(a), italics added.)
Congressional investigation during the 1950’s had disclosed numerous instances of union corruption and breaches of trust, as well as general disregard for the rights of individual members. Accordingly, the LMRDA was enacted to “afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and representatives.” (§ 401(b), italics added.)
In addition, Congress declared “that enactment of this Chapter is necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and representatives ....”(§ 401(c), italics added.)
The LMRDA as initially drafted was concerned with disclosure requirements, union trusteeships, and elections for union office.5 The perceived *1044need to provide additional protections for union members led to the inclusion of several amendments. As a result, subchapter II (§§ 411-415), the “Bill of Rights” for union members, was added.6 “The amendments placed emphasis on the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean loss of union membership and in turn loss of livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further the Act’s primary objective of ensuring that unions would be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships. [Citations.]” (Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, 435-436 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 244].)
Thus, the LMRDA was enacted against a backdrop of abuses by union leadership. It was a remedial measure designed to “bid farewell to the regime of benevolent well-meaning union autocrats” (Blanchard v. Johnson (N.D. Ohio 1975) 388 F.Supp. 208, 215), and instead to protect specific rights of union members, to require implementation of democratic election procedures, and to impose obligations of ethical and fiduciary accountability on union leaders.
B. Limited Preemptive Effect
Consistent with the underlying goals of the LMRDA, the history and text of the Act also disclose a very limited preemptive intent. The Act was designed to supplement, not to supplant, available state law remedies.
1. Savings Clauses
First, “the Act itself explicitly saves both state criminal actions and state-imposed responsibilities of union officers from preemption by the Act.” (Bloom v. General Truck Drivers (9th Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 1356, 1361, fns. *1045omitted; 29 U.S.C. §§ 524, 523(a).)7 In addition, section 413, immediately following the provision in section 412 for a civil action for a violation of subchapter II rights, states: “Nothing contained in this subchapter [sub-chapter II] shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization.”
Thus, in the context of union-member relations, the goal of the LMRDA is to preserve to the union members, not to preempt, existing federal and state remedies. As explained in Posner v. Utility Workers Union of America (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 970 [121 Cal.Rptr. 423]: “Congress has expressly withheld preemption of any rights or remedies which a union member may have under state law. [Citations.] The rights and remedies provided by the federal statute are additional to other rights of union members under state law.” (Id. at p. 973; see also Tomko v. Hilbert, supra, 288 F.2d 625, 629 [“Rights and remedies [the union member] may have under state law have not been preempted or affected by passage of the bill-of-rights section of the LMRDA.”].)
2. Limited Scope of LMRDA
The scope of the LMRDA is further limited. It does not address the relationship between union officials and union employees in their status as employees, but only as members. Putting the matter more directly in terms of “actual conflict” preemption, it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended to preempt state regulation of conduct (employer-employee relations) which the federal act does not even purport to regulate.
Moreover, “[t]he continued vitality of the California statutes in light of [the LMRDA’s] saving[s] clauses logically implies the continued vitality of the state’s means of enforcing those statutes .... Thus, although the savings clauses addressing union members do not directly save [a union business agent’s] state cause of action . . . the clauses addressing criminal *1046actions and union officers’ duties imply that [the business agent] can maintain his action.” (Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356, 1361.)
In Tomko v. Hilbert, supra, for example, a union member attempted to invoke the federal jurisdiction provided in section 412 in a suit against two other union members, who had allegedly libeled and assaulted him. The court held that the LMRDA “is narrowly focused on protecting the union-member relationship” (288 F.2d at p. 627), and that the plaintiff’s rights as a member were protected from interference by a union official. Because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants were union officials, or that any union official had interfered with his rights, his cause of action was not governed by the LMRDA. However, although the LMRDA did not provide a federal action, neither did it preclude a state action for ordinary tort claims “merely because the conduct occurs in a union hall during a union meeting . . . .” (Id. at p. 629.) The court held that “\t\he state courts remain open to appellant. Rights and remedies that he may have under state law have not been preempted or affected by passage of the bill-of-rights section of the LMRDA.” (Ibid., italics added.)
In Strauss v. International Brother. of Teamsters, etc. (E.D.Pa. 1959) 179 F.Supp. 297, a discharged union business agent attempted to bring suit under the LMRDA in federal court, arguing he was improperly discharged because the union had misconstrued a provision of the Act. The court held that, although section 412 authorizes civil suit in the federal district court for violation of subchapter II rights, “it must appear that the right, title or interest which he alleges has been violated by the defendant is created by or finds protection under one of these sections . . . . []f] The right which plaintiff now seeks to protect as against the defendant is the right to be free from discharge as business agent of a labor union .... As between the parties to this suit, this is at best a contractual right or a right of ‘status.’ ” (179 F.Supp at pp. 299-230, original italics.) Because the LMRDA deals with the union-member relationship, and does not involve jurisdiction over a contractual dispute as between employer and employee, “[t]his [contractual] right is enforceable, if at all, in the common law courts of the state in which the contract arose . . . .” (Id. at p. 301, italics added.)
Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, on which the majority relies, is not to the contrary. In Finnegan, an appointed union business agent attempted to sue in federal court for alleged violation of his rights under the LMRDA. The plaintiff had vigorously supported an opposing candidate in a contested election for the union presidency. The new president discharged plaintiff and other business agents who had opposed him. The United States Supreme Court held that the “Bill of Rights” under the LMRDA, including *1047the right of free speech, applied to protect union members qua members, and was not intended to protect plaintiff in his capacity as a union employee. Finnegan does not, as the majority implies, “sanction” or guarantee the power of union officials to discharge union employees for opposing their election;8 rather, the Supreme Court held only that the LMRDA did not provide a federal remedy. Finnegan does not suggest that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a state claim on a matter admittedly outside the scope of the LMRDA.
3. “Union Democracy”
At the heart of the majority opinion is its conclusion that the preservation of union democracy requires that union leadership have a free hand in discharging employees for reasons of policy. Even assuming that the LMRDA sanctions “patronage firing” as an adjunct of its purpose to promote “union democracy” (see Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, 441 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 247]; Tyra v. Kearney (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 921, 926 [200 Cal.Rptr. 716]), that purpose does not provide union leadership with an unfettered license to dismiss union employees.
In Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn (1989) 488 U.S. 347 [102 L.Ed.2d 700, 109 S.Ct. 639], for example, a local union in financial crisis was placed under trusteeship by the president of the international union. The plaintiff, an elected business agent, was an outspoken member of a faction in the *1048union which opposed a dues increase as a method of solving the local’s financial problems. The trustee discharged the plaintiff from his position as a business agent because of his (successful) opposition to the dues increase.
The plaintiff brought suit in federal court under section 412 alleging violation of his free speech rights under section 411(a)(2) of subchapter II. The union alleged that the dismissal was immune from attack under Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, because it was “policy” based. The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that the discharge penalized plaintiff for the exercise of his free speech rights, and deprived the union membership of an elected business agent. “His removal, therefore, hardly was ‘an integral part of ensuring a union administration’s responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.’ [Citations.]” (Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 355 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) In addition, in light of the plaintiff’s removal, “other members of the Local may well have concluded that one challenged the union’s hierarchy, if at all, at one’s peril. This is precisely what the Congress sought to prevent when it passed the LMRDA.” (Ibid.)
The court carefully examined the purposes of the LMRDA, and determined that this discharge did not promote the purpose of “union democracy.” Accordingly, the court found not only that the plaintiff’s discharge was not “sanctioned” by the LMRDA, but also that the Act provided affirmative redress for the breach of the plaintiff’s free speech rights.
Justice White’s concurring opinion in Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn underscores the distinction between a union official’s exercise of union patronage, and his or her power to hire and fire as an ordinary employer: “In this case, unlike Finnegan, respondent was not discharged by an incoming elected president with power to appoint his own staff, but by a trustee whose power to dismiss and appoint officers, for all that is shown here, went no farther than the Local’s president to discharge for cause, i. e., for incompetence or other behavior disqualifying them for the tasks they were expected to perform as officers. Respondent’s speech opposing the dues increase was the speech of a member about a matter the members were to resolve, and there is no countervailing interest rooted in union democracy that suffices to override that protection.” (488 U.S. at p. 360 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 713] (cone, opn. of White, J.).)
In Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356, a union member alleged he was wrongfully discharged as coordinator of the business agents and business manager of the union because he refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. The Court of Appeals held the plaintiff could not properly state a federal claim under section 412 of the LMRDA because the discharge affected him as an employee and not as a *1049union member (citing Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, and Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W. (6th Cir. 1983) 710 F.2d 234, 238). The court further held, however, that the plaintiff’s state claim was not preempted-. “The kind of discharge alleged, retaliation for refusal to commit a crime and breach a trust, is not the kind sanctioned by the Act, or by the courts in Finnegan and Tyra. Protecting such a discharge by preempting a state cause of action based on it does nothing to serve union democracy or the rights of union members; it serves only to encourage and conceal such criminal acts and coercion by union leaders.” (783 F.2d at p. 1362.)
The Bloom court properly analyzed the state claim in terms of its relation to the purposes of the LMRDA. Not only would the state action not inhibit “union democracy,” it concluded, but preemption would deprive the plaintiff of any viable remedy, and thus frustrate the very purposes of the Act. (Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356.)
Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, is also instructive. New Jersey casino laws regulated unions representing casino employees and disqualified from union office those persons who had ties to organized crime. The union argued that section 7 of the NLRA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157)—including the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing—preempted the jurisdiction of the state casino commission to disqualify any member from holding office.
The Supreme Court held that section 7 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 157) did not confer an absolute right on employees to choose the officials of their bargaining representatives, notwithstanding the impact on “union democracy.” Ironically, it was the enactment of the LMRDA itself which led the court to this conclusion.9 “Title V [subchapter VI] of LMRDA imposes various restrictions on labor union officials and defines certain qualifications for them .... [H] By enacting § 504(a) [setting forth disqualifications from office for conviction of crime], Congress has unmistakably indicated that the right of employees to select the officers of their bargaining representatives is not absolute and necessarily admits of some exception.” (Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, 505 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-386].)
In addition, the high court noted, “another provision of LMRDA, [section 523(a)], is ‘an express disclaimer of pre-emption of state laws regulating the responsibilities of union officials . . . .’ De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. *1050144, 157 (1960) .... In affirmatively preserving the operation of state laws, [section 523(a)] indicates that Congress necessarily intended to preserve some room for state action concerning the responsibilities and qualifications of union officials.” (Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 505-506 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 386], italics partially added, fns. omitted.)
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the concept of “union democracy” in the LMRDA was designed to make union leadership accountable to its members, not to put the members at the mercy of its leaders. The Act does not, as the majority suggests, demand a broad rule of state preemption in order to effectuate the federal mandate. Instead, each case must be examined to determine whether the conduct regulated by the state actually conflicts with the conduct intended to be protected by the Act. As explained below, plaintiff’s state law claims for wrongful discharge do not impinge upon any federally protected preserve.
III. Plaintiff’s Wrongful Discharge Claims
The majority states as a general principle that the federal interest in union democracy “preempts state causes of action for wrongful discharge or related torts . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1021.) This assertion does not withstand scrutiny.
The majority’s conclusion rests upon an uncritical reading of the statement in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 921, that an elected union officer “must have the unrestricted freedom ‘to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own.’ ” (Id. at p. 926, quoting Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, 441 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 247].)
The Tyra court failed to perceive, however, that the Supreme Court in Finnegan did not hold that the LMRDA guarantees union officials unrestricted power to discharge union employees. It held only that the LMRDA does not address the issue of union patronage. Patronage may, of course, be consistent with the purposes of the LMRDA to the extent that it permits union leaders to implement the policies they were elected to carry out,10 but a proper preemption analysis will focus on the actual effect that a recognition of plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claims would have on democratic *1051union governance. In Tyra (as in Finnegan), the union business agent was discharged precisely because of opposing political views. Permitting a state law action grounded upon such a policy-based discharge could properly be viewed as impinging on the “freedom” of a union leader, under the LMRDA, “to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own,” for the purpose of “promoting] the policies and programs promised to the electorate.” (Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 921, 926.)
However, dismissal of a union employee involving bad faith and related torts, such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as plaintiff herein alleges, does nothing to serve the federal interest in democratic union representation. Indeed, such conduct undermines the very purposes of the LMRDA. As the Court of Appeal stated below, “Union officials are not elected to breach contracts or commit torts and, if they do so, the fact that they are ‘democratically elected’ is beside the point. This case has nothing to do with [union] democracy .... This is a garden-variety ‘wrongful termination’ case which just happens to be brought against a union . . . .”
The majority dismisses the point with the remarkable assertion that it is “unworkable” to distinguish those claims which implicate the interests of the LMRDA from those which do not. It then states that preemption under the LMRDA must not be based upon an analysis of whether the state law claims against a union relate to the purposes of the Act. These statements defy logic and betray a fundamental misunderstanding of preemption and wrongful discharge principles.
As we have seen, when preemption is based upon an “actual conflict” of state and federal law, the precise question before the court is whether the state law conflicts with either the express or necessarily implied purposes of the federal program. (See Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. 53, 61, 64 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589, 590-591].) The very task we are called upon to perform is to discern the specific federal interests Congress intended to protect by its enactment and to determine whether the state law at issue “relates to” those purposes so as to significantly interfere with their achievement. The United States Supreme Court has not, to my knowledge, crafted a new category of preemption based on the “workability” of differentiating federal and state interests.
Moreover, the specter of “unworkability” raised by the majority dissolves into its ephemeral essence when scrutinized in the light of reason. The majority fears that preemption will be “subverted” by artful pleading of a *1052“garden variety” claim of, e.g., discharge for inefficiency or dishonesty rather than for the political needs of the union leadership. However, the complaint must do more than merely allege that the plaintiff was terminated for “inefficiency” or “dishonesty.” Otherwise, the complaint on its face will establish good cause for the termination. In addition, in order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff will be required to support the allegations of the complaint with specific evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue that the discharge not only was not policy based, but was also for improper reasons.
Plaintiff’s claims here are based on more than mere termination alone. She alleges in addition that the manner of the firing was contrary to the union’s established personnel procedures, abusive, and defamatory. Plaintiff alleges that defendant and petitioner Brown instigated the termination by intentionally defaming her with charges of dishonesty when Brown knew that the accusations were false. Brown initially attempted to terminate plaintiff without any notice or opportunity to hear or respond to charges against her, contrary to provisions of the union’s personnel manual, while plaintiff was out of the country on leave. When plaintiff was ultimately summoned to the union board meeting—ostensibly to respond to the charges—she discovered that the board had already interviewed candidates to replace her. Brown’s announcement, before the meeting began, that she would appoint a new business agent also indicated the sham nature of the proceeding.
Plaintiff’s allegations implicate no legitimate union policy or exercise of union democracy. As Justice Eagleson suggests (see dis. opn. of Eagleson, J., ante, at p. 1037), there is nothing in the general notion of “union democracy” which prevents a union, as part of a democratically determined policy, from establishing certain rules of personnel practice. And, surely, nothing in the LMRDA is meant to sanction defamation, bad faith, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The point is, unless a termination somehow contravenes the purposes of the LMRDA, the union’s actions will be subject to the same regulations as ordinary employers. The courts have uniformly engaged in a straightforward analysis of the competing interests to determine the question. (See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. 347.)
Where the discharge is premised on union policy, as in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 921, the matter will be deemed preempted. Where the plaintiff is terminated for refusal to violate a state law, as in Bloom v. *1053General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356 (i.e., a Tameny claim; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314]), or for other improper reasons, the discharge is peripheral to any legitimate interests served by the Act and preemption will not apply.
This approach is typified by the high court’s decision in Farmer v. Carpenters (1977) 430 U.S. 290 [51 L.Ed.2d 338, 97 S.Ct. 1056]. There, the question was whether a state court action against a union for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted under the NLRA. The plaintiff was a union member and officer who disagreed with other union officials over policy matters. The union began to discriminate against the plaintiff in hiring hall referrals to employers. When the plaintiff complained about the discrimination, he was subjected to an abusive campaign of harassment, threats and intimidation. The Supreme Court found there was no federal protection under the NLRA for such “outrageous conduct” by union officials. “Thus . . . permitting the exercise of state jurisdiction over such complaints does not result in state regulation of federally protected conduct.” (Id. at p. 302 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 351].)
The Farmer court carefully distinguished those causes of action which implicated the concerns of the NLRA from those which did not. The plaintiff’s separate claims for hiring hall discrimination, for example, if supported by evidence before the NLRB, would have established an unfair labor practice, subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. The allegations of emotional distress and attendant physical injury, however, would have no bearing in any hearing before the NLRB. “[T]he state-court tort action can be adjudicated without resolution of the ‘merits’ of the underlying labor dispute. Recovery for the tort of emotional distress under California law requires proof that the defendant intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct causing the plaintiff to sustain mental distress. [Citations.] The state court need not consider, much less resolve, whether a union discriminated or threatened to discriminate against an employee in terms of employment opportunities. To the contrary, the tort action can be resolved without reference to any accommodation of the special interests of unions and members in the hiring hall context.” (Farmer v. Carpenters, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 304-305 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 353], italics added.)
In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. 53, held that a claim for defamation is not preempted under the NLRA. The court emphasized that “malicious libel enjoys no constitutional protection in any context” and that it was not protected under the NLRA. (Id. at pp. 63, 61 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 590, 589].) *1054A libel in and of itself does not constitute an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and, in any event, “[t]he injury that the statement might cause to an individual’s reputation . . . has no relevance to the Board’s function.” (Id. at p. 63 [15 L.Ed.2d at p. 590].) Thus, the high court concluded that permitting a state cause of action for defamation would not interfere with any national labor policy.
Here, similarly, plaintiff’s state law causes of action for defamation, wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress do not threaten any federal interest in “union democracy” or any other national interest embodied in the LMRDA. Plaintiff is not a member of the union and there is no collective bargaining agreement with the union-employer; thus there is no conceivable unfair labor practice or other concern within the jurisdiction of the NLRB with which the action might interfere. Plaintiff’s state law tort actions can be resolved without reference to any matters governed by the LMRDA (e.g., reporting and disclosure requirements, trusteeship procedures, conduct of union elections, fiduciary responsibilities, and other anticorruption measures). The LMRDA does not purport to regulate relationships between a union and its nonmember employees, and therefore plaintiff’s suit does not interfere with any conduct the LMRDA is designed to “actually protect.”
The fundamental question in all cases of wrongful discharge is, “What is the reason for the discharge?” We do not presume in such cases that the finder of fact is incapable of answering that question. We should not presume so here. If the discharge is for a federally protected policy-based reason, then the matter may be disposed of on demurrer or summary judgment. If, as here, it is undisputed that the reason for the discharge was not based on union policies or any other interest related to “union democracy,” there is no basis for a finding of federal preemption.
Conclusion
It is undisputed that plaintiff’s firing did not implicate union policies or democratic governance. In enacting the LMRDA, Congress did not intend to immunize the kind of misconduct alleged here. Indeed, the text of the LMRDA and the decisions construing it demonstrate that the preemptive force of the Act was intended to be quite limited; state law rights and remedies such as those asserted by plaintiff were to be preserved, not preempted, in accordance with the overarching spirit and purpose of the Act—to ensure that union officials “adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their orga*1055nizations . . . .” (§ 401(a).) Ironically, in seeking to preserve the federal interest, the majority subverts it by sanctioning arbitrary discharge.
In earlier times it was said that, “Heaven will protect the working girl.” With today’s decision, union employees may find that heavenly intervention is indeed their last best hope of protection.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
While analytically useful, these divisions are not rigidly distinct. “Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: a state law that falls within a preempted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.” (English v. General Electric Company, supra, 495 U.S. at p._, fn. 5 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 75].)
Tribe states: “Since congressional purposes can be either substantive or jurisdictional, a state action may be struck down as an invalid interference with the federal design either because it is in actual conflict with the substantive operation of a federal program, or because, whatever its substantive impact, it intrudes upon a field that Congress has validly reserved to the federal sphere.” (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra, § 6-25, at p. 481, italics added.)
The majority adds the words “[of regulation]” at the end of the quoted statement to support its use of the “substantive” and “jurisdictional” terms, but the addition is misleading. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1023.) The footnote immediately accompanying the passage makes plain that Tribe refers to traditional preemption principles: “The Supreme Court typically divides preemption analysis into the three categories of ‘express preemption,’ where Congress has in express terms declared its intention to preclude state regulation in a given area; ‘implied preemption,’ where Congress, through the structure or objectives of federal law, has impliedly precluded state regulation in the area; and ‘conflict preemption,’ where Congress did not necessarily intend preemption of state regulation in a given area, but where the particular state law conflicts directly with federal law, or stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives . . . .” (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra, § 6-25, at p. 481, fn. 14.)
Although the majority purports to determine whether there is an “actual conflict” between plaintiff’s state law causes of action and the LMRDA, it does not engage in a proper conflict preemption analysis, expressly rejecting the principle that preemption requires an assessment of whether or not the state cause of action relates to the purposes of the federal act.
So is “jurisdictional” preemption. “Jurisdictional” preemption precludes the states from asserting their jurisdiction over matters clearly governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In addition, in order to protect the right of the NLRB to determine in the first instance what conduct is or is not within the scope of the NLRA, the states are precluded from asserting jurisdiction over conduct which is even “arguably subject” to the NLRA. But, “jurisdictional” preemption in the federal labor law context is not the same as “field” preemption. The federal government has not “occupied the field” of labor relations to the exclusion of all state regulation. Despite enactment of, e.g., the NLRA and the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress has “le[ft] much to the states.” (See Garner v. Teamsters Union (1953) 346 U.S. 485, 488 [98 L.Ed. 228, 238, 74 S.Ct. 161].)
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” (San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. 236, 245 [3 L.Ed.2d at p. 783].) If the state courts were permitted to assert jurisdiction over cases “arguably within” the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the potential for conflicting interpretations would “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (Hines *1042v. Davidowitz, supra, 312 U.S. 52, 67 [85 L.Ed. at p. 587]) to have a uniform body of national labor relations law. The protection of the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB is therefore also an aspect of “conflict” preemption.
Consequently, the distinction the majority attempts to draw between “substantive” and “jurisdictional” preemption does not bear scrutiny.
San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. 236, is the leading case describing preemption based on the need to protect the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. There, the problem was whether certain labor conduct (peaceful picketing) was subject to sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Section 7 of the NLRA affirmatively protects the rights of workers to organize for collective bargaining, and section 8 prohibits unfair labor practices. Where conduct is clearly protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8, state jurisdiction must yield to the special jurisdiction conferred on the NLRB to administer a coherent national labor policy. So stated, it is difficult to distinguish this aspect of “jurisdictional” preemption from “substantive,” “actual conflict” preemption.
Sections 431-441 (subchapter III) require certain reports to be prepared and distributed by labor unions, by their officers and employees, and by employers. Sections 461-466 (sub-chapter IV) deal with the procedures for establishing a trusteeship over a union, and the administration of a union in trusteeship. Sections 481-483 (subchapter V) govern the frequency and manner of elections for union office. Sections 501-504 (subchapter VI) “prescribe!] a code of fiduciary responsibility on the part of union officers, disqualify] certain persons from *1044holding office in a union . . . , prohibit^] unions from paying fines incurred by its officers or employees, and greatly restrict^ loans that a union can make.” (Tomko v. Hilbert (3d Cir. 1961) 288 F.2d 625, 627.)
Section 411(a) provides that all union members shall have (1) equal rights to nominate candidates, vote, attend union meetings, and to participate in union business; (2) the right to meet and assemble freely with other members and to freely express views upon candidates or union business; (3) the right not to have dues increased without a vote of the members; (4) the right to sue the union, provided internal union grievance procedures are first exhausted and (5) the right not to be disciplined by the union (except for nonpayment of dues) without a written notice of charges and a full and fair hearing. Section 412 provides for a civil action for violation of the “Bill of Rights” subchapter, with jurisdiction vested in the federal district court. Section 413 states that union members’ other rights and remedies under state or federal law are not limited by the provisions of subchapter II. Section 414 provides for a right to copies of any collective bargaining agreement, and section 415 instructs unions to inform the members of the members’ rights under the LMRDA.
Section 524 states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair or diminish the authority of any State to enact and enforce general criminal laws with respect to robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, or assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or conspiracy to commit any of such crimes.”
Section 523(a) provides: “Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or of any trust in which a labor organization is interested, under any other Federal law or under the laws of any State, and, except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall take away any right or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are entitled under such other Federal law or law of any State.”
Nothing in subchapter I, the preamble, or in the provisions of subchapter II, the “Bill of Rights,” directly approves the practice of union patronage in hiring and firing of union business agents. The only other conceivable source of such direct protection would lie in sub-chapter V (§§ 481-483), which governs the procedures for election of union officers. A review of its provisions also fails to show any direct sanction for union patronage.
Section 481 provides for, among other things, the frequency of national, international and local elections; distribution of campaign literature by the union to the members on a nondiscriminatory basis; election of officers of intermediate bodies (e.g., general committee, joint boards); nomination of candidates; voting rights, including “the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof’; election of officers by convention of delegates; prohibition against using union dues on behalf of any candidate; and removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct.
Section 482 permits a member to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor challenging an election; requires the secretary to investigate and authorizes the filing of a civil action in the district court; authorizes the trial court, upon a proper showing, to declare an election void and to order a new election; and provides for appellate rights.
Section 483 states that, except as otherwise provided, the election may be conducted according to the union’s bylaws and constitution; and that, before an election, other rights and remedies are available to enforce the constitution and bylaws, but that, once the election has been held, the procedure provided in section 482 is the exclusive remedy for challenging an election.
The LMRDA does not address and does not provide in any manner for the patronage rights of elected union officers.
Significantly, the unions had also argued in the federal district court that the New Jersey regulations, precluding elected officials from holding office if disqualified under state criteria, were preempted by the LMRDA. The district court held the LMRDA did not preempt the sanctions provided by New Jersey law. The unions did not appeal that ruling. (Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, 500, fn. 8 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 382].)
“[T]he Act’s overriding objective was to ensure that unions would be democratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections. [Citation.] Far from being inconsistent with this purpose, the ability of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration’s responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.” (Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 441 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 247].)