In these consolidated cases we must answer several constitutional questions concerning W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.) (hereinafter “new 301”). “New 301” is a probation statute that applies to a criminal defendant who has never before been convicted of a felony and is presently charged with, has pleaded guilty to, or has been found guilty of an offense within a certain group of felonies and misdemeanors. Under the statute, if both the defendant and the state consent, the court may defer further prosecution proceedings and place the defendant on probation without entry of a judgment of guilt or conviction.
*404The three main issues presented by these cases concern whether the state’s consent requirement of “new 301” violates the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1; whether the bill that enacted “new 301” was so altered or amended on its passage as to change the bill’s original purpose in violation of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 20; and whether the bill that enacted “new 301” contained more than one subject in violation of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 24. In several of these consolidated cases there are additional issues that we will address after resolving these three primary issues.
We hold that “new 301” is constitutional. With this holding, and with our resolution of the additional issues presented in some of the cases, we reverse State v. Lowry (No. 88-312) and affirm Billis v. State (No. 88-250), Moon v. State (No. 88-304), Vigil v. State (No. 88-310), McIver v. State (No. 88-311), and Magarahan v. State, (No. 89-4).
FACTS AND ISSUES IN THE CONSOLIDATED CASES
State v. Lowry (No. 88-312)
Facts:
Victoria Lowry was arrested and charged with two misdemeanors, speeding, in violation of W.S. 31-5-301(b)(ii) (1977), and driving while under the influence, in violation of W.S. 31-5-233 (Cum.Supp. 1987). In the evening of April 14, 1988, after meeting her brother at a lounge and drinking several beers, Ms. Lowry was driving home when she was stopped by police for speeding. The police officer noticed that her speech was slurred, her eyes bloodshot, and her balance unsteady. Because he smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on her breath, he conducted a field sobriety test. Ms. Lowry was then placed under arrest. She consented to a breathalyzer test at the police station; the test showed a .185 blood alcohol level.
Under a plea bargain with the prosecutor, Ms. Lowry pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the speeding charge. On being informed of the plea bargain, the county court judge asked whether the prosecutor would consent to Ms. Lowry’s being placed on probation without entry of judgment of conviction under “new 301.” The prosecutor would not consent. The county court judge deferred findings of a factual basis for the plea of guilty and ordered a presentence investigation report.
The presentence investigation report revealed that Ms. Lowry had never before been charged with any criminal offense, had overcome much adversity in her life, was well-educated, had maintained steady employment, normally drank alcoholic beverages only socially, and customarily did not drink to excess. The probation officer making the report recommended probation without entry of judgment of conviction under “new 301.” Although stating that he had considered Ms. Lowry’s good character and lack of any criminal record, the prosecutor refused to give the state’s consent to probation under “new 301” because Ms. Lowry’s blood alcohol level of .185 was too high.
After noting the favorable information contained in the presentence investigation report and the recommendation of leniency, the county court judge concluded that “the state’s entry into sentencing prerogatives is an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial function by that executive branch * * The county court judge held that the state’s consent requirement contained in “new 301” was unconstitutional. Obtaining Ms. Lowry’s consent, as required under “new 301”, the county court judge ordered that her plea of guilty be deferred, she be placed on supervised probation for one year, she be evaluated by Powder River Council and comply with its recommendations, she not use drugs or alcohol, and she reimburse the government for attorney’s fees in the amount of $200. The county court judge informed Ms. Lowry that if she violated her probation, he would immediately accept her plea of guilty.
Following the county court’s action, the state applied to this court for permission to *405file a bill of exceptions1 on the issue whether “new 301” constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of a judicial function. We granted the state’s application, ordered that the state file the bill, and ordered there should also be a ruling whether “new 301” had been constitutionally enacted. Later, this court received appeals from criminal defendants in Billis, Vigil, McIver, Moon and Magarahan presenting identical issues; the six cases were consolidated on appeal.
Issues:
For clarity we have rephrased Ms. Low-ry’s issues as follows:
1. Whether W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), requiring the state’s consent to the court’s deferring further proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department’s sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1.
2. Whether 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, which proscribes altering or amending a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to change the bill’s original purpose.
3. Whether 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, which mandates the passage of a bill containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in the bill’s title.
4.Whether W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.), under which the county court ordered Ms. Lowry to reimburse the state for attorney’s fees, is constitutional.
Vigil v. State (No. 88-310)
Facts:
On January 22, 1988, in Cheyenne, Wyoming, Mr. Vigil sold one-fourth ounce of cocaine to a confidential police informant. He was charged with violating W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1016(b)(iv) (1977). In a plea bargain Mr. Vigil agreed to plead guilty to the felony in exchange for the state’s not opposing probation after sentencing provided the presentence investigation report revealed no prior felony convictions. The state would not consent to “new 301” probation.2 The presentence investigation report revealed that Mr. Vigil admitted to prior drug sales that he described as not amounting to much. Mr. Vigil filed a motion for sentencing under “new 301,” in which he requested probation without entry of judgment of conviction in spite of the state’s refusal to consent and, alternatively, the district court’s certification of the state’s consent requirement issue to this court. The prosecutor told the *406district court that the state refused to consent to “new 301” treatment for Mr. Vigil because his was a drug case and he had sold drugs before. The district court found that the state’s position was rational, denied Mr. Vigil’s motion, and sentenced him for a term of not less than two nor more than five years, suspended in favor of five years probation. The court also ordered Mr. Vigil to reimburse the state for the fees and costs of his public defender. W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.).
Issues:
In addition to the four issues raised in Lowry, Mr. Vigil raises the following:
1. Whether the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to first offender treatment for Mr. Vigil violated his rights to due process, and
2. Whether the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to sentencing under § 7-13-301 was arbitrary and an abuse’ of discretion and therefore violated Article 1, Sections 2 and 7, of the Wyoming Constitution.
State v. Mclver (No. 88-311)
Facts:
On July 1, 1988, Mr. Mclver and two companions discussed stealing money from soft-drink trucks and later spotted two such trucks. One of Mr. Mclver’s companions stole $45 from one of the trucks and $1,500 from the other. They were caught and arrested. The state charged Mr. McIver with one count of conspiracy to commit burglary in violation of W.S. 6-1-303 (June 1988 Repl.). At his arraignment on this felony charge, he pleaded guilty. Before sentencing, he filed a motion for sentencing under “new 301,” in which he requested probation without entry of judgment of conviction or, alternatively, that the district court certify the state’s consent requirement issue to this court. At sentencing, the prosecutor told the district court that the state refused to consent “new 301” treatment for Mr. Mclver because of the premeditated nature of the crime and indications Mr. Mclver and his companions had also planned stealing from trucks in Nebraska. The district court found the state's position was rational and denied Mr. Mclver’s motion. The district court sentenced Mr. Mclver to a term of not less than eighteen months nor more than thirty-six months, suspended in favor of probation for three years. The district court also ordered Mr. Mclver to reimburse the state for defense fees and costs. W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.).
Issues:
Mr. Mclver raises the same issues raised by Ms. Lowry.
Moon v. State (No. 88-304)
Facts:
On September 24, 1987, Ms. Moon sold one-eighth ounce of cocaine to an informant working with the Casper Police Department. The state charged her with one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine in violation of W.S. 35-7-1016(b)(iv), 35-7-1031(a)(i), and 35-7-1042 (Cum.Supp.1987). At her arraignment she pleaded not guilty. Later, the state and Ms. Moon struck a plea bargain under which she agreed to plead guilty to the felony and the state agreed to recommend she be placed on probation after sentence was imposed and she receive neither a fine nor jail time. At sentencing, Ms. Moon requested treatment under “new 301”; the state refused to consent. Although Ms. Moon stated her belief that the state’s consent requirement of “new 301” was unconstitutional because it interfered with the court’s sentencing authority, she did not request the court’s ruling on that issue. Instead, she simply asked the court to disregard the state’s refusal to consent and place her on probation under “new 301.” The district court made no ruling on the issue, concluding that it had no authority to grant probation under “new 301” without the state’s consent. She was sentenced to serve a two-year term of probation.
Issues:
Ms. Moon raises issues concerning separation of powers, original purpose, one subject, and the prosecutor’s arbitrariness in refusing to consent.
*407 State v. Magarahan (No. 89-4)
Facts:
On March 31, 1988, Ms. Magarahan took, without permission, her roommate’s federal income tax refund check for $290.58, endorsed her roommate’s name on it, and cashed it. The state charged her with one count of forgery in violation of W.S. 6-3-602(a)(ii) and (b) (June 1988 Repl.). Under the terms of the plea bargain between the state and Ms. Magarahan, she agreed to plead guilty to the felony and the state agreed to recommend that she not be imprisoned or fined, but that she be placed on probation for eighteen months, pay restitution, and pay $50 to the crime victims’ compensation account. W.S. 1-40-114 (June 1988 Repl.). The state did not consent to treatment under “new 301.” At sentencing, Ms. Magarahan asked the district court to grant her probation under “new 301” in spite of the state’s refusal to consent. She told the district court she believed the state’s consent requirement is an unconstitutional infringement on the court’s sentencing power; the district court did not rule on that issue and declined to use “new 301” without the state’s consent. The district court sentenced her in accordance with the state’s recommendation.
Issues:
Ms. Magarahan raises the same issues raised by Ms. Moon.
State v. Billis (No. 88-250)
Facts:
On December 1 and again on December 10, 1987, Mr. Billis, age 33, sold one-eighth ounce amounts of cocaine to an undercover law enforcement agent in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The state charged him with two counts of delivery of cocaine in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1016(b)(iv) (Cum.Supp.1987). Under a plea bargain with the state, Mr. Billis pleaded guilty to one count of delivery in exchange for dismissal of the other count. At sentencing, Mr. Billis asked the district court to place him on probation without entry of judgment of conviction under “new 301.” The state refused to consent to this treatment because of Mr. Billis’ age and the experienced manner in which he delivered the cocaine. Because of the plea bargain the state had dismissed one count of delivery. Although Mr. Billis stated his belief that the state’s consent requirement of “new 301” was unconstitutional, the district court judge stated that without that consent he was not authorized to consider “new 301” treatment. The district court sentenced Mr. Billis to a term of not less than three nor more than five years, suspended in favor of three years’ probation.
Issues:
Mr. Billis raises the same issues raised by Ms. Moon and Ms. Magarahan.
PRELIMINARY MATTER
In all of these consolidated cases except Lowry, the state maintains that since the defendants did not adequately raise their appellate issues at the district court level, they cannot raise those issues here for the first time. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 927-28 (Wyo.1984); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 50 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246. Moreover, the state asserts these defendants have no standing to raise these issues because they cannot demonstrate any adverse impact on their rights resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional portion of “new 301” requiring the state’s consent. LaCombe v. City of Cheyenne, 733 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo.1987); Gooden v. State, 711 P.2d 405, 408-09 (Wyo.1985).
The state concedes, however, that the county court judge’s ruling in Lowry, and the state’s bill of exceptions thereto, legitimately place the issue of “new 301’s” constitutionality before this court. We agree. Because Lowry presents these constitutional issues concerning “new 301,” we concluded that the defendants in the consolidated cases should gain the benefit of a decision in Lowry favorable to the criminal defendant in that case. Accordingly, we need not discuss the questions of made-*408quate presentation of issues below and standing raised by.the state.3
ANALYSIS
I.
PRESENT STATUTES
“New 301” provides as follows:
§ 7-13-301. Placing person found guilty, but not convicted, on probation.
(a) If a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation of W.S. 31 — 5— 233, or any similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon terms and conditions set by the court. The terms of probation shall include that he:
(i) Report to the court not less than twice in each year at times and places fixed in the order;
(ii) Conduct himself in a law-abiding manner;
(iii) Not leave the state without the consent of the court; and
(iv) Conform his conduct to any other terms of probation the court finds proper.
(b) If the court finds the person has fulfilled the terms of probation and that his rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, the court may at the end of five (5) years, or at any time after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the original probation, discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings against him.
(c) If the defendant violates a term or condition of probation at any time before final discharge, the court may:
(i) Enter an adjudication of guilt and conviction and proceed to impose sentence upon the defendant if he previously pled guilty to or was found guilty of the original charge for which probation was granted under this section; or
(ii) Order that the trial of the original charge proceed if the defendant has not previously pled or been found guilty.
(d) Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose.
(e) There shall be only one (1) discharge and dismissal under this section or under any similar section of the probationary statutes of any other jurisdiction.
We must also take note of W.S. 7-13-302 (June 1987 Repl), which provides:
§ 7-13-302. Placing person convicted on probation; suspension of imposition or execution of sentence; imposition of fine.
(a) After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and following entry of the judgment of conviction, the court may:
(i) Suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation; or
(ii) Impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation.
II.
PREDECESSORS OF “NEW 301”
Before we address the constitutional issues relating to “new 301,” we find it helpful to identify and describe the origins of that statute. Before “new 301” was enact*409ed by the Forty-Ninth Legislature in 1987 as part of a substantial revision of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes (1987 Wyo.Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3), two statutory provisions occupied the field. Originally enacted in 1909, W.S. 7-13-203 (1977) (1909 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 87, § 1) (hereinafter “old 203”) provided probation to first-time felons who had not committed murder, sexual assault, or arson.4 The legislature provided for probation by having the trial court delay passing sentence and place the defendant on “parole.” In Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1038 (Wyo.1979), this court noted that “parole” was a misnomer and the correct status was “probation.”
In 1939, the legislature enacted W.S. 7-13-301 (1939 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 91, § 1) (hereinafter “old 301”). King v. State, 720 P.2d 465, 468 (Wyo.1986). “Old 301” provided another scheme of probation.5 The statute applied to any criminal defendant, not just first-time felons as “old 203” did, who had committed any crime, whether misdemeanor or felony, except a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death. In Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 156 (Wyo.1978), overruled on other grounds in Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 56 (Wyo.1986), this court held that the phrase “crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death” did not embrace offenses which had a sentence of less than life imprisonment as a minimum and a maximum of either life imprisonment or death.
Under “old 301” the legislature established four methods by which the trial court could implement the probation established by the legislature. First, with the defendant’s consent, the legislature authorized the court to suspend trial and place the defendant on probation. We believe the defendant’s consent feature was designed to avoid the later assertion of a *410speedy trial violation by a defendant whose probation was terminated for misconduct and who then faced resumption of the criminal proceedings against him. The three other methods for probation followed a plea of guilty or being found guilty following a trial. Thus, the legislature authorized the court to suspend the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation. In King, 720 P.2d at 468, 469, this court likened “suspension of imposition of sentence” to “delay passing sentence,” as found in “old 203.” In yet another method under “old 301” the court was authorized to suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and place the defendant on probation. In Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1037, this court held that the legislature’s 1971 act creating the board of parole repealed by implication the court’s authority to require a defendant to serve part of a sentence, suspend execution, and place the defendant on probation as to the balance. W.S. 7-13-402 (1977) (1971 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 92, § 10). See also King, 720 P.2d at 467; Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233, 235-36 (Wyo.1984). A final method under “old 301” authorized the court to impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation.
In Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1038 n. 6, this court suggested that “old 203” probably had been superseded by “old 301,” but the suggestion was retracted in King, 720 P.2d at 467, 469. In Peterson, 586 P.2d at 156, this court considered the differences between “old 203” and “old 301.” Later, in King, 720 P.2d at 468, Justice Cardine, writing for the court, drew on Peterson and made further comparisons of the two statutes. He concluded that the legislature intended “old 203” to be an alternative sentencing provision for a limited number of cases. He found that “old 203” allowed the first-time felon a considerable degree of liberty, his or her actions and freedom being subject to rather minimal limitations with the possibility of no sentence at all. Id, at 468. Peterson, 586 P.2d at 156. In “old 203” the legislature intended to preclude first-time felons who had committed the serious crimes of murder, sexual assault, or arson from the benefit of the possibility of no sentence at all. Id. In contrast, “old 301” was “much more restrictive [than “old 203”] since it [did] not itself specify the conditions of any probationary freedom.” Id. In “old 301” the legislature intended “that those criminal defendants excluded from the benefits of [“old 203”] could be in some cases beneficially rehabilitated under the provisions of [“old 301”] with one exception — those guilty of ‘crimes and offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment.’ ” Id.
On a final point of comparison, Justice Cardine noted that under “old 203” when the defendant successfully completed probation the legislature authorized the court to annul the verdict or plea of guilty. Id. In contrast, he observed, under “old 301” when the defendant successfully completed probation the legislature authorized the court, under then W.S. 7-13-304 (“old 304”), to discharge the defendant, but no mention was made of annulling the verdict or plea of guilty. Id.
III.
“NEW 301” AND “NEW 302”
By keeping the chief features of “old 203” and “old 301” in mind and by comparing them with “new 301” and “new 302” as enacted in 1987 by the Forty-Ninth Legislature, we can identify how “old 203” was revised to become “new 301” and how “old 301” was revised to become “new 302.”
A. Revision of “Old 203” into “New 301”
“Old 203” emerged as “new 301,” as follows:
1. From “old 203” the legislature retained the requirement that the defendant be a person who had never before been convicted of a felony and used that feature in the first line of the first sentence of “new 301” to describe to whom “new 301” applied. Thus, the first line of “new 301” reads in relevant part, “[i]f a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony * *
2. Next, from “old 203” the legislature retained the requirement that a first offender be found guilty or have pleaded *411guilty, but then added to that the feature from “old 301” relating to a defendant who had been only charged with a crime. Thus, the next part of “new 301’s” opening line now read, “[i]f a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to.” (Emphasis added.)
3. Next, the legislature retained the felony category of crimes, with slight modification, for which the defendant may receive probation. Thus, that portion of “old 203” that read “any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being” emerged in “new 301” as “any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second degree.” As can be seen, the slight modification related to the arson offense.
At this point, the legislature took from “old 301” the feature relating to misdemeanors, with an exception not important to our purposes here, adding misdemeanors to the previously retained felony category in “new 301.”
4. Next, the legislature deleted from' “old 203” the following phrases that appeared in the first two sentences of “old 203”:
a. The court shall ascertain whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense, the extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and other facts and circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know.
b. If the court is satisfied that he was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the law.
5. Next, the legislature made the change in “old 203” that is at the heart of our controversy. That portion of “old 203” which read, “the court may in its discretion, by an order entered of record, delay passing sentence and then parole the person and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance * * *,” was changed to read, “the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation * * *.” In making this change the legislature borrowed from “old 301” the feature contained in its last sentence, “With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime * * * the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation.” That borrowed feature explains where the requirement of the defendant’s consent came from. It does not explain where the requirement of the state’s consent came from. For that explanation, we must look elsewhere. The details of the source of the explanation are set out later in this opinion. Summarized here, the explanation is the state’s consent requirement probably derives from the prosecutor’s common law nolle prosequi power which in Wyoming was codified in old W.S. 7-198 (1957) and later recognized in W.R.Cr.P. 45(a).
As can be seen, the portion of “old 203” that read “delay passing sentence and then parole the person” was changed in “new 301” to read “without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation * * *.” The legislature’s use of the term “judgment of guilt or conviction” shows its proper recognition of the bright line that divides the prosecution’s power to prosecute from the court’s power to adjudicate and to impose sentence. As W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) informs, “A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. * * * The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.” In Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1349 (Wyo.1977), this court made clear that
there is only one final judgment. The final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. Berman v. United States, 1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 165, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937). This is con*412sistent with Rule 33(b), W.R.Cr.P. * * *. There is no judgment against the defendant until sentence is pronounced.
6. We need not dwell on other changes in “old 203” which emerged as “new 301” for purposes of this opinion. “Old 203’s” feature of a maximum five-year probation period was retained. Also retained was “old 203’s” requirement that the probationer report to the court twice yearly. “Old 203’s” feature that the court shall enter an order discharging the defendant and annulling the verdict or plea of guilty was retained with slight modification in “new 301” which, instead of using “annulling,” made it clear that such discharge and dismissal shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose. By clarifying this last feature, the legislature again showed its recognition that this deferral-probation scheme was taking place in the prosecutorial phase, not the adjudicatory-sentence phase, of a criminal prosecution. Further, the legislature was recognizing that portion of W.R. Cr.P. 33(b) which provides, “If the defendant * * ⅜ for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall be entered accordingly. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.”
B. Revision of “Old 301” into “New 302”
“Old 301” emerged as “new 302,” as follows:
1. The legislature inserted the phrase “and following entry of the judgment of conviction” between the phrase “except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment” and the phrase “the court may.”
2. In two ways the legislature changed the phrase “the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation.” First, it deleted that portion relating to suspending the execution of “part of a sentence.” This was done in recognition of this court’s decisions in Sorenson, King, and Williams, stating that the power to suspend execution of a part of a sentence and place the defendant on probation was given by the legislature to the board of parole in the 1971 act establishing that board. The legislature then simply fit the phrase back together with a few grammatical changes. Thus, the phrase that read “the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation” became “the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation.” The legislature then retained the “may impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation” language.
3.Finally, the legislature deleted the last sentence of “old 301” that read “with the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation.”
IV.
SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS
With respect to the separation of powers issue we will decide whether the “new 301” requirement, that the state consent to the court’s deferral of further proceedings and placement of defendants on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department’s sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1.
A. Standard of review
In White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo.1984), we reviewed the separation of powers issue using these principles:
We recognize the principle articulated in Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980):
*413“Courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Witzenburger v. State, Wyo.1978, 575 P.2d 1100, 1112; Lund v. Schrader, Wyo.1971, 492 P.2d 202, 206. Though the supreme court has the duty to give great deference to legislative pronouncements and to uphold constitutionality when possible, it is the court’s equally imperative duty to declare a legislative enactment invalid if it transgresses the state constitution. Witzenburger, supra, 575 P.2d at 1114. In our consideration of this case, we have consistently kept these basic principles in mind to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality — but doubt is not present.”
We also are cognizant of our duty in any case in which the constitutionality of a statute is in issue:
“It is this court’s obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the legislative product. Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979). In construing statutes the intention of the law-making body must be ascertained from the language of the statute as nearly as possible. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo.1976, 551 P.2d 687 (1976). We must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.” McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (1980).
See also Hopkinson, 664 P.2d at 54, which involved, inter alia, a separation of powers issue. These principles will guide our way here. Additionally,
[a]ll statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the courts. Civic Association of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 1941, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245.
Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo.1976).
B. Discussion
1. Air-Tight Compartments vs. Integrated Government
Under the Wyoming Constitution, the legislative power is vested in a senate and house of representatives. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 1. The executive power is vested in a governor. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 1. The judicial power is vested in a supreme court, district courts and such subordinate courts as the legislature may establish. Wyo. Const, art. 5, § 1. The Wyoming Constitution contains a definitive separation of powers provision:
Powers of government divided into three departments.—
The powers of government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1.
The state’s framers probably borrowed this provision from the constitutions of our neighboring states of Idaho and Montana. R. Prien, The Background of the Wyoming Constitution 56 (August 1956) (unpublished thesis); see also R. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 534 (1986). During the floor adoption of that provision at the 1889 constitutional convention, the framers discussed precious little about that provision. Journals and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 44, 210, 247, 315-16 (1893) (where Mr. F.H. Harvey said it was the form found in most of the western states). It is likely more was said in committee, but we will never know since *414committee reports are not extant.6 In determining the meaning of the separation of powers provision in the face of such meager evidence, “we must consider the probable intention of the framers of the constitution * * *. [T]he language is to be understood in the sense in which it was used at the time when it was adopted.” Witzenberger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, 1111-12 (Wyo.1978).
In what sense, then, did our state’s framers use the separation of powers language in 1889? Claiming that one department of government may not encroach upon functions belonging to another, these criminal defendants contend it is essential that we preserve each of the powers in separate, air-tight compartments. They refer us, however, to neither legal authority nor historical evidence that our state’s framers had in mind principles of separation of powers any different from those recognized as implicit under the Federal Constitution.7 Surveying our state constitution, we identify convincing evidence that our state’s framers intended an integration of dispersed powers into a balanced, workable government.
Our state constitution, like the Federal Constitution, places the respective powers of the three departments of government into three articles. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 1, concerning the legislative power, is similar to the U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 1, concerning the executive power, is similar to the U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1, concerning the judicial power, is similar to U.S. Const, art. III, § 1. Under both the Federal Constitution and our state constitution, although the legislative bodies propose and enact laws, the executive bodies exercise veto power, which by its nature injects the executive department into the business of the legislative department.8 Under both constitutions the judicial department has and exercises the power to adjudicate and declare legislative enactments unconstitutional, which by its nature injects the judicial department into the business of the legislative department. Under both constitutions, although the judicial department adjudicates and imposes legislatively determined sentences upon adjudicated criminal defendants, the executive department has and exercises a pardon power, which by its nature injects the executive department into the business of both the legislative and judicial departments.9 Moreover, in Wyo*415ming, the courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, “have traditionally elaborated the state’s common law and participated in a partnership of sorts with the state legislature in shaping the state’s law.” Keiter, supra, p. 535. If the state legislature disagrees with the court’s common law decisions, it can legislatively reverse them. Id.
Prom the foregoing discussion, we see that Wyoming’s constitutional scheme of state government is, like the federal scheme of national government, replete with checks and balances. Considering the organizational structure, the placement of powers and the system of checks and balances, we are convinced that the state’s framers had in mind a pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power. They intended that “practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153, 1199, 26 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring opinion). Separation of powers, then, merges into balanced government.10 We adopt this view and reject the “air-tight compartment” view of these criminal defendants.
2. Powers of Each Department
With this view of workable, balanced government, we now review this court’s past decisions that identify the division of the government’s powers in the criminal law area among the three departments. With these past decisions this court has painted the landscape of those powers. On review, we keep in mind the contentions of these criminal defendants. They contend the judicial department has the power to decide whether to defer a criminal prosecution and place a defendant on probation during the time period those prosecution proceedings are being deferred. Next, they claim that the disposition of deferral and probation without the entry of a final judgment of conviction or guilt is a sentence, and also that this power to decide to defer emanates from the judicial power to impose a sentence. MJP v. State, 706 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wyo.1985). They maintain that, as a result, the state’s consent requirement placed by the legislature in “new 301” is a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the judicial power by the executive department. We disagree with these contentions.
In its exercise of the legislative power, the legislative department has the exclusive power to determine and declare what acts shall constitute crimes and to prescribe punishments for those crimes. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo.1987); Cook v. State, 710 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo.1985); Williams, 692 P.2d at 235; Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1342 (Wyo.1983); Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1223 (Wyo.1982).
In its exercise of the judicial power, the judicial department has the exclusive power to adjudicate, to pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect. W.R.Cr.P. 33; S.Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 631 (1987) (Constitution of the United States-Analysis and Interpretation). By entering a judgment whether of acquittal or of conviction or of discharge, the judicial department is performing a significant act of government. W.R.Cr.P. 33(b); Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1344. On the other hand, the judicial department has no power to initiate a criminal prosecution. That department’s exercise of the prosecution power would be a constitutionally impermissible encroach*416ment on the executive department’s prosecution power. Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 873 (Wyo.1984).
The judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to try a criminal charge upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the charge, such as a belief that the particular act made criminal by law ought not to be treated as criminal. Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 74, 61 L.Ed. 129, 140-41 (1916), cited in Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1224 (Wyo.1982).
Where the court finds no legal error on which to reverse a final judgment of conviction, the court has no inherent power to expunge that judgment for the purposes of restoring the defendant’s civil rights or of alleviating the defendant’s fear of being classified as a habitual criminal in the event he commits further offenses. Because expungement of a final judgment of conviction has the effect of a pardon and the pardoning power belongs exclusively to the executive department, the judicial department’s exercise of an expungement power would be a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the executive department’s pardoning power. Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo.1984). Similarly, the judicial department has no power to grant an annulment of a final judgment of conviction. Ward v. State, 735 P.2d 707, 708 (Wyo.1987).
The judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed. Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. at 41-42, 37 S.Ct. at 74, 61 L.Ed. at 140, cited with approval in Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224. The judicial department has no inherent power to suspend a sentence. That power belongs exclusively to the legislative department. Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224. In Evans, this court relied favorably on State v. Mabry, 96 N.M. 317, 320, 630 P.2d 269, 272 (1981), where the New Mexico Supreme Court said:
“ * * * The vast majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question whether the courts have the inherent power to suspend sentences have answered in the negative. * * * A leading case is Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts do not have the power, absent authorization by Congress, to indefinitely suspend a sentence on good behavior. The Court examined common law authorities and found no support for the proposition that courts at common law had the inherent authority to suspend sentences indefinitely.”
Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224.
The judicial department has no power, after imposing sentence, to reduce the sentence imposed to one the court was not authorized by the legislature to impose at the original sentencing. The judicial department has no power to either impose a sentence below the statutory minimum at the time of the original sentencing or impose a sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum and then suspend execution of a portion of that sentence. Williams, 692 P.2d at 236-37.
The judicial department has no power to impose a sentence different from the sentence mandated by the legislative department. We have held that the legislature in “old 301” properly exercised its power to prohibit the court from considering probation for habitual offenders with life sentences. Schuler, 668 P.2d at 1342.
The judicial department has no inherent power to grant probation. The legislative department has exclusive authority over sentencing. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 752 (Wyo.1975). And, the judicial department has no power to grant parole after incarceration. The legislative department, in the exercise of its authority over sentencing, has placed that parole power with the board of parole, an arm of the executive department. Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1036-37.
Obviously, our Wyoming decisions agree with that said in Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 719 F.2d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 133 (1984), “Unlike interpreting the constitution or ad-*417judieating disputes, sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial function.”
The executive department, in the exercise of its executive power to faithfully execute the laws, has the exclusive power to make the charging decision and prosecute the person who has allegedly committed the act determined by the legislative department to be a crime. Padget, 678 P.2d at 872-73. In Padget this court declared unconstitutional a legislative act that purported to authorize the court to exercise the prosecution power belonging exclusively to the executive department. Although this court stated that, once the prosecution made the decision to prosecute, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature, we recognized that within the judicial process of criminal prosecution the prosecutor’s power to dismiss charges, to reduce charges, to defer charges, in sum to control the prosecution, was exclusive and not shared by the judicial department. We quoted from several different sources:
“The prosecutor has broad discretion to decide whether or not prosecution of an alleged crime will serve the public interest. [Citations.] He may, and should, consider a wide range of factors that bear on the merits of prosecution — the nature of the offense, the nature and severity of the sanctions that will be imposed upon conviction, the personal circumstances of the accused, the expense of prosecution and congestion in the courts. ⅜ * ⅜ ” Hoines v. Barney’s Club, Inc., [28 Cal.3d 603, 170 Cal.Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628, 635 (1980)] (Tobriner, J., dissenting). “A prosecutor’s discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention. See Miller and Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wash.U.Law Quarterly 1.” People v. District Court in and for County of Larimer, [186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974)].
Id. at 873.
In Jahnke, we upheld against a separation of powers challenge the constitutionality of W.S. 14-6-203(c) (1977), which placed the decision as to the appropriate court in which to prosecute a juvenile within the discretion of the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department. After noting that there is no constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile, this court stated:
Any decision to initiate criminal proceedings is vested in the prosecuting attorney, and the decision is discretionary. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869); State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983) (Thomas, J., concurring). Since one does not have an inherent right to be prosecuted as a juvenile but that is a privilege granted by the legislature, the legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, so long as there is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory classification. Woodward v. Wainwright, [556 F.2d 781, 785 5th Cir. (1977)]. See, e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir.1972).
Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 929.
We also added that
[t]he legislature of the State of Wyoming has chosen to vest in the prosecuting attorney the discretion with regard to what charges to file and in what court they should be filed. There may be circumstances which would justify judicial review of the prosecutorial discretion, but in the absence of such suspect factors as race, religion or other arbitrary classification, the exercise of discretion by the prosecutor in deciding whether to charge as a juvenile or adult involves no violation of due process or equal protection of the law.
Id. (citations omitted).
These principles relating to the prosecutor’s power to control the prosecution of a criminal charge were earlier expressed by the United States Supreme Court in this way:
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring * * * generally rests entirely in his *418discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as “the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 [1962],
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 610-11 (1978).
In Gooden, 711 P.2d at 409-10, this court recognized another aspect of the prosecutor’s power when it held that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to any plea bargain with the prosecutor, nor to the reduction or dismissal of charges. The process of plea bargaining or whether it will be engaged in is left to the prosecutor’s discretion. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560-61, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 42-43 (1977). Accord, Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223, 99 S.Ct. 492, 499, 58 L.Ed.2d 466, 476-77 (1978). The executive department, through the prosecutor as its officer, has the absolute right to prosecute. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 289, 291, 292, 64 L.Ed. 333, 342-43 (1919). As expressed in Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561, 97 S.Ct. at 846, 51 L.Ed.2d at 43: “It is a novel argument that constitutional rights are infringed by trying the defendant rather than accepting his plea of guilty.”
In our review of the prosecutor’s power to control the prosecution of a criminal case, we must also consider the prosecutor’s common law power. We have consistently said that we will read our statutes in harmony with the common law. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo.1984). In this light, we focus attention on the prosecutor’s common law power of nolle prosequi. At common law the power to initiate and control criminal proceedings is within the exclusive domain of the prosecutor. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100, 101-03 (S.D.Ill.1945); Thompson, 251 U.S. at 413-14, 40 S.Ct. at 292, 64 L.Ed. at 342; Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869); U.S. v. Schumann, 2 Abb.U.S. 523, 7 Sawy. 439, 27 F.Cas. 984, 985 (C.C.D.Cal.1866) (No. 16,-235); Padget, 678 P.2d at 872-73; State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368, 377 (Wyo.1983) (Thomas, J., specially concurring, with whom Raper and Rose, JJ., joined); Comment, The Nolle Prosequi Under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Det.C.L.Rev. 491 (1978). Indeed, as stated in 8B J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice 1148.02[1], 48-5 (2d ed. 1989): “At common law, a prosecutor had unfettered authority to initiate, control and discontinue a proceeding at any stage prior to appeal.” 11
An important feature of the prosecutor’s unfettered power was his power to enter a nolle prosequi to discontinue a criminal proceeding he had earlier initiated. “Nolle prosequi means: T am unwilling to prosecute.’ ” Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. at 101. As described in Brokaw:
The rule at the common law seems to have been, and in the present-day common law courts to remain, that prior to trial the prosecutor has the absolute uncontrolled power to enter a nolle prosequi; that after the empaneling of the jury until the return of a verdict the power is subject to the control of the court since it may not be used at that time to the prejudice of the defendant; and that following the return of the verdict the uncontrolled power of the prosecutor to enter a nolle revives and continues until such time as judgment is entered and sentence imposed, (emphasis added).
Id. at 102. (citations omitted). See also 8B J. Moore, supra, 48.02[1] at 48-5; 6 L. Orfield and M. Rhodes, Orfield’s Criminal *419Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 48.2-48.7, pp. 243-49 (2d ed.) (Lawyer’s Co-op 1987); Comment, Criminal Law-Nolle Prosequi-Trial Court has Power to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 996-1001 (1966) (placing the initial appearance of nolle prosequi in Stretton & Taylor’s Case, 1 Leon. 119, 74 Eng.Rep. 111 (K.B.1588)).
Commenting on the prosecutor’s nolle prosequi power, the court in United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262, 262-63 (D.C.Mont.1924), observed:
The power to determine whether a case shall be prosecuted to a conclusion must, of course, be lodged somewhere, and by common law the district attorney is made its repository. By no statute has Congress deprived him of it, in ordinary criminal cases. It is assumed he will exercise his power under a heavy sense of duty to enforce the law, to prosecute offenders, and to protect society, and with wisdom and justice.
The court cannot control him, unless, as in some states, it is given the power by statute. He is not even required to give a reason for dismissal.
In United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.1965), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700, the court noted, “It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.” In a concurring opinion, it was said:
“Responsibility for determining whether a prosecution is to be commenced or maintained must be clearly fixed. The power not to initiate * ⅜ * has to reside somewhere. And the more clearly pinpointed it is, the more the public interest is served through the focus of relentless publicity upon that decision. It may not, with safety, be left to a body whose great virtue is the combination of anonymity, transitory authority, and political unresponsibility.”
Id. at 182. (Brown, J., concurring specially).
In another concurring opinion, Judge Wisdom reviewed the separation of powers doctrine, the exclusive power of the executive department to prosecute, the incompatibility of the functions of prosecutor and judge, and the prosecutor's power to enter a nolle prosequi. In light of his review, he observed that, within the context of law enforcement, a government’s policy is involved. The executive department of that government is charged with carrying out the government’s policy on law enforcement and is usually informed on more levels than the other two departments of government. Id. at 193. “In such a situation, a decision not to prosecute is analogous to the exercise of executive privilege. The executive’s absolute and exclusive discretion to prosecute may be rationalized as an illustration of the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id.
Wyoming is a common law state, except in those areas where the common law has been changed by statute or court rule. W.S. 8-1-101 (Aug.1978 Repl.); Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo.1973); Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152, 52 A.L.R.3d 748 (Wyo.1971); Goldsmith v. Cheney, 468 P.2d 813, 816 (Wyo.1970); Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 538, 52 P.2d 1219, 1220 (1935); State v. Foster, 5 Wyo. 199, 208, 38 P. 926, 927-28 (1895). Wyoming’s statutory adoption of the common law of England originated from C.L. 1876, ch. 25 § 1. Our research has not uncovered any early Wyoming decision involving the prosecutor’s power to enter a nolle prosequi at common law. We have found, however, that by virtue of Laws 1890, ch. 73 § 133, the Wyoming legislature enacted W.S. 7-198 (1957) which, until superseded by W.R.Cr.P. 45(a),12 provided:
*420No indictment or information shall be nol-prossed, except by order of the court on the motion of the prosecuting attorney, and such motion must be in writing, and the reasons therefor must be stated in such motion and read in open court, before such order is made.
Other states have modified “the common law [of nolle prosequi ] to give courts a responsible role in the dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding * * *.” 13 United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir.1975). “[T]he Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recommended the common law approach be adopted requiring additionally only that prosecutors file motions with the court including reasons for the nolle prosequi.” J. Moore, supra, ¶ 48.02[1], at 48-3. The committee submitted the recommended rule to the United States Supreme Court. Reviewing the proposed rule, the Court “questioned the legal basis and wisdom of such a rule.” Comment, 1978 Det.C.L.Rev. supra, at 494-95. Resubmitting the proposed rule, the committee added “only the requirement of obtaining the defendant’s consent to the motion if filed during the trial.” Id. at 495. The Court deleted the proposed rule’s requirement of a prosecutor’s statement of reasons and added a requirement “by leave of court.” Id. As formally adopted by the Court, F.R.Cr.P. 48(a) states:
Rule 48. Dismissal
(a) By Attorney for Government. The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.
Nearly twenty-three years after the United States Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Wyoming Supreme Court’s adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective February 11, 1969.14 Boggs v. State, 484 P.2d 711, 714 n. 2 (Wyo.1971). W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) states:
*421Rule 45. Dismissal
(a) By the prosecuting attorney. — The prosecuting attorney may, by leave of court, file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint, and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.
After the effective date of this rule, W.S. 7-198 (1957), the nolle prosequi statute, was superseded and of no further force or effect. W.R.Cr.P. 56. Since W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) is the same as F.R.Cr.P. 48(a), we give great weight to federal precedent under F.R.Cr.P. 48(a) when considering matters arising under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a). Dobbins v. State, 483 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo.1971).15
According to Moore, the “by leave of court” requirement has been variously interpreted in the federal courts. Some federal courts believe they have broad discretion “to protect public interests in fair administration of criminal justice.” J. Moore, supra, ¶ 48.02[1], p. 48-4. Others adhere to the standard that the prosecution’s motion to dismiss should be denied only if “clearly contrary to manifest public interest.” Id., ¶ 48.02[2], at 48-7. Despite this disagreement on the scope of the court’s discretion, it is clear that the “by leave of court” requirement has modified the absolute power of the executive department so that the defendant is not harassed, by charging, dismissing and recharging without placing the defendant in jeopardy. Id. ¶ 48.02[1], at 48-5; ¶ 48.02[2], at 48-8. “The executive branch, however, essentially remains the judge of the decision to initiate a prosecution and to terminate it.” Id. ¶ 48.02[1], at 48-5. And, “[tjhere is a presumption that the prosecutor’s motion is made in good faith and in the proper discharge of his duties.” Id. ¶ 48.02[2], at 48-7.
We see a direct relationship between the prosecutor’s dismissal power under W.R. Cr.P. 45(a) and the prosecutor’s power under “new 301” to consent to deferral of further prosecution without entry of judgment of conviction. In light of our foregoing analysis of the respective powers of the three departments of government in the criminal law area and of our tracing the evolution of the prosecutor’s nolle prose-qui power, we conclude that “new 301” is the product of the legislative department’s correct recognition of the executive department’s power to initiate, control, and terminate criminal prosecutions before the judicial department exercises its power to enter a final judgment. Recalling the meaning of “judgment of conviction” under W.R. Cr.P. 33(b), we find that it correlates well with that phrase found in “new 301”: “The court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings * * *.” (emphasis added). This statute demonstrates the legislative department’s proper understanding that until the judicial department enters a judgment of guilt or conviction (final judgment) the prosecutor possesses the executive department’s power to control and terminate the prosecution at any time before final judgment. Thus, we find W.S. 7-13-301 compatible with W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) and 45(a) and solidly based on a proper understanding of and appreciation for the common law power of the prosecutor to control the criminal case even through verdict until the court enters a final judgment.
In the face of extensive case law identifying and describing the legislative department’s exclusive authority over sentencing, the contention of these criminal defendants that the judicial department has similar authority cannot stand. It is true that the judicial department has the power to impose sentence. W.R.Cr.P. 33(b); MJP, 706 P.2d at 1110. These criminal defen*422dants are wrong, however, in concluding that probation without entry of a judgment under “new 301” is the functional equivalent of a sentence. They fail to recognize what a sentence actually is.
As we pointed out earlier in this opinion: There is only one final judgment. The final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. Berman v. United States, 1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 165, 82 L.Ed. 204. This is consistent with Rule 33(b), W.R. Cr.P., providing that, “A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. * * * ” There is no judgment against the defendant until sentence is pronounced.
Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1349. In Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937), the Court explained that the sentence is the final determination of the merits of the criminal charge.
To create finality it was necessary that petitioner’s conviction should be followed by sentence * * *. In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for the purpose of appeal “when it terminates the litigation * * ⅜ on the merits” and “leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.”
Id., 302 U.S. at 212, 58 S.Ct. at 166, 82 L.Ed. at 205 (citations omitted).
The deferral of further prosecution proceedings and placement of a criminal defendant on probation without entering a judgment of guilty or conviction under “new 301” is by definition not a sentence. Deferral and probation without the entry of a judgment of guilty or conviction is not a final determination of the merits of the criminal charge. If the criminal defendant successfully completes probation, then the court discharges the defendant and dismisses the proceedings. In that event, there is finality. Discharge and dismissal occur without the court’s adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence. W.S. 7-13-301(d) (June 1987 Repl.).
On the other hand, if the criminal defendant violates probation, the court may proceed with the trial of the criminal charge if the criminal defendant has been charged but has not pleaded guilty or been tried and found guilty. W.S. 7 — 13—30l(c)(ii). Or, if the criminal defendant violates probation, the court may, if the criminal defendant has previously pleaded guilty or been tried and found guilty, enter a judgment of guilt or conviction and proceed to impose sentence. W.S. 7-13-301(c)(i). Thus, for those criminal defendants who violate probation there will ultimately be a final judgment of either acquittal or of guilt and conviction followed by sentence.
There is another reason why probation without entry of a judgment is not a sentence. A criminal defendant upon whom a court has imposed a sentence cannot reject that sentence. The court has the power to force that sentence on the criminal defendant. Under W.S. 7-13-301, since the criminal defendant’s consent is required, the criminal defendant is free to reject the tender of probation without entry of judgment. If this disposition were truly a sentence, then the criminal defendant could not reject it.
Viewed in this context, probation without entry of a judgment is analogous to a pardon. As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 150, 160-61, 8 L.Ed. 640 (1833), a pardon is like a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. A pardon may be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered. If that person rejects it, a court has no power to force it on that person. In Marshall’s view, a pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the executive department’s power to execute laws which exempts the person on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime that person has committed. The prosecutor’s consent to probation without entry of a judgment, like a pardon, exempts the person on whom it is bestowed from further criminal proceedings, specifically including a judgment of guilt or conviction. In the light of this favorable comparison, the prosecutor’s consent to that type of disposition is also seen as an act of *423grace, proceeding from the executive power.
We are not surprised that the pardon power and the prosecutor’s consent power reside within the same department of government. Seeing the prosecutor’s consent in this light, the symmetry of treatment is compelling. On the pre-entry of judgment side of the adjudicated guilt line, the executive department possesses the power to divert, or not, a criminal defendant into probation and away from further criminal prosecution in furtherance of the social policy enacted by the legislative department. On the post-entry of judgment side of the line, the executive department also possesses the power to divert, or not, a criminal defendant into pardon and away from further punishment.
Although “new 301” uses the word “probation,” the legislature has used it only generally to describe the defendant’s status before a final judgment of conviction or discharge has been entered. The legislature has not used it to mean a defendant’s status after the court has entered a judgment of conviction. See Hicklin, 535 P.2d at 753. Probation before entry of judgment is not a punitive sanction. It is an opportunity for rehabilitation before sentencing. The probationer is not an adjudicated convict. If probation is successfully completed, the probationer may be discharged without adjudication of guilt.
These criminal defendants mistakenly seize upon the single phrase in Padget that says when the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature. Padget, 678 P.2d at 872 (applied in People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d 89, 94, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 252, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal.1970)). From that single phrase they claim that whatever happens to the criminal charge after that point.is an exercise of judicial power, not executive power.
We agree that the prosecution of a criminal charge is part of the judicial process. In the prosecution phase of that judicial process, the judicial department exercises its powers and the executive department exercises its powers. The judicial department exercises its powers to control its docket, to administer court business, to adjudicate legal issues concerning the criminal procedures that necessarily attend the criminal proceeding, and to adjudicate substantive legal issues raised by the litigants. What these criminal defendants have failed to understand, however, is that during this judicial process the executive department is also at work exercising its powers. The prosecutor, as an officer of that department, is making decisions and controlling the criminal prosecution. In the exercise of these powers, the prosecutor may decide to add charges, to drop charges, or to reduce charges. The prosecutor may decide to dismiss some, but not all, charges. The prosecutor may decide to enter into plea negotiations. The prosecutor may decide to dismiss all charges and terminate the prosecution under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a), the nolle prosequi rule.
With respect to these decisions, and others like them, the prosecution is exercising its executive powers within the judicial process that leads to dismissal, discharge, acquittal, or conviction and sentencing. In their understandable zeal to seize upon the isolated phrase to support their position, these criminal defendants have overlooked this court’s main teaching in Padget: during the prosecution phase of the criminal proceeding that is part of the judicial process, the prosecutor shall exercise executive powers unfettered by judicial intervention. To emphasize this point we quoted favorably from People v. District Court in and for County of Larimer, 186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974): “A prosecutor’s discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention.” Padget, 678 P.2d at 873.
These criminal defendants also mistakenly rely on People v. Tenorio, which this court found helpful in our separation of powers analysis in Padget. In Tenorio the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana. He admitted an eight-year old prior conviction of marijuana possession. The marijuana possession statute provided no minimum term and a maximum term of *424ten years for a first-time offender. For a defendant with one prior conviction, like Tenorio, the statute provided a minimum term of two years and a maximum term of twenty years. A related statute provided that unless the prosecutor so moved the court could not dismiss from the accusatory pleading an allegation of fact which, if admitted, would change the penalty from what it would be if such fact were not admitted. In other words, if the prosecutor refused to move to dismiss Tenorio’s admission of the prior marijuana possession conviction, the court could not on its own dismiss that admission from the accusatory pleading, but must sentence Tenorio to at least a mandatory minimum term of two years. In violation of that statute, the trial court dismissed, without the prosecutor’s approval, Tenorio’s admission of his prior conviction from the complaint and granted Tenorio probation.
The state appealed the order granting probation. In affirming the order, the California Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s approval statute impermissi-bly infringed on the judicial power and violated California’s separation of powers principle. By its decision, the California court reversed People v. Sidener, 58 Cal.2d 645, 25 Cal.Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641 (1962). The court reviewed the Sidener opinion, including Justice Schauer’s lengthy dissent concurred in by two other justices that answered the majority’s historical argument by noting that nolle prosequi never existed in California. Justice Schauer had argued that the common law power of nolle prosequi was not part of that Mexican law retained by California’s 1849 constitution and that the nonexistence of nolle prosequi was codified by statute. Tenorio, 473 P.2d at 995. The Tenorio court concluded, however, that any arguments based upon California’s legal history before 1850 were undeterminative. The court found that from and after 1850 neither decision nor legislation denied that the judiciary has the power to dismiss. Id. at 996. The court said:
The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise.
Id. at 996. The court made it clear that when an individual judge exercises sentencing discretion he exercises a judicial power, the exercise of which cannot be foreclosed by power given to the prosecutor by the legislature.
We cannot follow Tenorio for several reasons. The subject statute in effect there operated as a mandatory sentence statute. Although the California Supreme Court apparently feels that such a statute cannot operate to deprive the court of sentencing discretion, this court does not agree. In Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224, this court upheld against a separation of powers challenge the constitutionality of “old 301” which mandated a life sentence for a habitual criminal. We held that “old 301,” which precluded the court from suspending a habitual criminal’s mandatory life sentence, was a proper exercise of the inherent legislative power to prohibit suspension of sentence in any given case. We further held that the legislative department, not the judicial department, had the inherent power to suspend a sentence, and that the legislature is free to retain or delegate sentencing discretion when defining and setting punishment. It may properly delegate that discretion in whole or in part in the exercise of its exclusive authority over sentencing. Id. We recognized Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. at 42, 37 S.Ct. at 74, 61 L.Ed. at 140-41, which holds that the judicial department does not have the inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed. There, the court implicitly denied the judicial department has the power to refuse to try a criminal charge because it believed the act made criminal should not be treated as criminal. Id., 242 U.S. at 42, 37 S.Ct. at 74, 61 L.Ed. at 140-41.
Tenorio’s holding that the judicial department has the inherent power to dismiss *425a criminal charge in the interests of justice is directly contradicted by the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Ex Parte United States (cited favorably in this court’s Evans) that the judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to try a criminal charge upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the charge; by the United States Supreme Court’s holding that the executive department has the absolute right to prosecute (Bordenkircher, Weatherford, and Corbitt); by this court’s holding that the prosecutor does not have to enter into plea negotiations with a defendant and has the right to prosecute rather than accept a plea bargain (Gooden ); and by this court’s holdings that the judicial department has no inherent power to suspend a sentence {Evans); to expunge a final judgment of conviction which was without legal error and only for the purposes of restoring a defendant’s civil rights or of alleviating his fear of being classified as a habitual criminal {Stanton); to grant an annulment of a final judgment of conviction {Ward)', to reduce the sentence imposed to one which the legislature has not authorized the court to impose at original sentencing {Williams); to refuse to impose a sentence {Evans)', to grant probation (Hicklin); or to grant parole after incarceration {Sorenson).
Tenorio is also out of step with United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1989),16 in which a federal statute requiring the prosecutor’s motion before the sentencing court may impose sentence below the statutory minimum on the basis of the defendant’s cooperation with the prosecution survived separation of powers and due process challenges. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), upon the prosecutor’s motion, the court has the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Claiming that sentencing is a judicial prerogative, Huerta contended that a scheme which delegates to the executive branch’s prosecutorial arm the authority to control when a judge may consider cooperation with the government as a mitigating factor interferes with or usurps a constitutionally assigned judicial function.
In upholding the statute, the court first noted that the statute does not permit the prosecution to engage in “adjudication.” That power remains with the court. Next, the court observed that the prosecutor’s authority under the statute to affect sentences is more limited than other prosecuto-rial means by which it affects sentences, such as the exclusive authority to decide whether to prosecute-and to choose among alternative charges. Next, the court believed that the prosecution is uniquely fit to resolve the question whether a defendant’s cooperation has risen to the level of “substantial assistance.”
Recognizing that sentencing is not inherently a judicial function, the court concluded that the statute does not usurp a judicial function and, further, Congress has the power to eliminate all discretion in sentencing judges. Finally, the court found no precedent establishing a due process right of judicial review of the prosecution’s decision to forego a motion under the statute.
Although Tenorio found that California’s legal history before 1850 concerning the common law power of nolle prosequi was undeterminative, we do not have such uncertainty in Wyoming. Wyoming, as a common law state, with no historical legal ties to Mexican law, has recognized and continues to recognize the power of nolle prosequi in the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department.
*426Finally, these criminal defendants argue that deferral and probation under “new 301” must be “sentencing” because it is located in article 7, chapter 13, entitled Sentence and Punishment. That argument fails. As located, the statute is in close proximity to related statutes dealing with the treatment of criminal offenders. As these statutes comprise a coherent legislative scheme relating to criminal offenders, both before and after entry of judgment, it only makes sense that they occupy the location they do.
In light of the case law identifying and describing these governmental powers, and since probation without entry of a judgment is not a sentence, we are compelled to conclude that the power to decide whether a criminal defendant who has never before been convicted of a felony shall be treated under “new 301” belongs to the executive department as an integral part of its blended prosecution power. The “defer-probation” decision under “new 301” is not a decision to impose sentence; rather, it is a decision intimately related to the decisions to file charges, to reduce charges, to plea bargain, and to dismiss charges. All these decisions are committed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department. We hold, therefore, that the executive department, not the judicial department, has the power to decide whether to defer prosecution under “new 301.17 The exercise of that prosecu-torial discretion is not subject to judicial review as long as any unjustifiable or suspect factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary or discriminatory classification are not involved. Gooden, 711 P.2d at 408-09; Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 929.
“New 301” and “new 302” are the product of the legislature’s revisions of “old 203” and “old 301.” In “new 301” and “new 302” the legislature simply adjusted its sentencing and probation discretion. “New 301” provides for probation before entry of final judgment; “new 302” provides for probation after entry of final judgment. Obviously, the legislature has used the act of final judgment as its point of reference or demarcation. As W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) informs us, final judgment means adjudication and sentence. See Vigil.
The judiciary exercises the power of adjudication and imposition of sentence when it enters final judgment of conviction, but not before. The prosecution exercises its prosecution power before entry of final judgment, but not after. Probation before entry of final judgment occurs within the prosecution phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the prosecutor exercises the prosecution power during that phase, including the power to file charges, to reduce charges, and to dismiss charges, it is correct that the prosecutor also have the power to consent to deferral of prosecution proceedings before entry of final judgment.
On the other hand, probation after entry of final judgment occurs within the adjudication phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the judiciary exercises the adjudication power during that phase, including the power to impose sentence, we are not surprised that the legislature did not attempt to require the state’s consent to probation after entry of final judgment. It is correct that the judiciary have the power to impose probation after entry of final judgment.
What the legislature has done in “new 301” and “new 302” is not contrary to what it had done in “old 203” and “old 301,” which this court approved of as within the legislature’s legitimate exercise of its sentencing and probation authority. As we recognized in Evans, the legislature can retain or delegate its sentencing and probation discretion as it sees fit. It saw fit to do it in the manner it did in “new 301.” It is not within the power of the judicial department to question the wisdom of that exercise of the legislative department.18 *427We pass only on the legality and constitutionality of that exercise. Here, we hold that the exercise was legal and constitutional.
These criminal defendants object to the prosecution’s possession of the power to decide from case to case whether a particular criminal defendant shall suffer or not from the penalties and disabilities associated with and consequent upon entry of a judgment of conviction or guilt. Despite the prosecutor’s long-recognized possession of the power to charge, to reduce charges, to dismiss some or all of the charges, to plea bargain, and to dismiss the prosecution under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a), and despite the executive department’s long-recognized possession of the power to pardon, these criminal defendants wish that the power to consent to a criminal defendant’s probation without entry of a judgment resided in the judicial department rather than in the executive department. Under the state constitution, that cannot be. Once the prosecutor has decided to file the criminal charge, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to a preferred disposition of that charge. He has no right to a reduced charge, to a dismissal of some charges, or to a plea bargain. Gooden.
Possessing the nolle prosequi power, the prosecutor has played the role of being able to terminate a prosecution at any time before final judgment of guilt or conviction. Possessing the pardon power, the executive department has also played the role of being able to grant a pardon before or after final judgment.19 If granted before final judgment, the pardon prevented the attachment of conviction penalties, disabilities, and stigmas. If granted after final judgment, pardon removed conviction penalties, disabilities, and stigmas. Viewing in this light the prosecutor’s possession of the power to consents or not, to probation without entry of a judgment, we find no constitutionally impermissible reason why the consent power cannot reside where the legislative department has placed it. The power must reside somewhere and its residence with the executive department is constitutionally consistent with other sim: ilar powers at home there.
In holding that “new 301” is constitutional, we find that the legislature enacted it with full knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference thereto. We have construed the statute in harmony with the existing law and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence; the statute’s meaning and effect have been determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to court rule and court decisions. Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d at 486 (citing Civic Association of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)).
Having resolved the separation of powers issue, we next consider whether the legislature constitutionally enacted “new 301.”
V.
THE STATE’S CONSENT REQUIREMENT OF “NEW 301” WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENACTED
A. Legislative History
Earlier we identified and explained what the legislature apparently did in 1987 to change “old 203” into “new 301” and “old 301” into “new 302.” Now we will review the legislative history of House Bill 92 (H.B. 92) which became Chapter 157 of the 1987 Session Laws of Wyoming.
Sponsored by the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee, H.B. 92 was a revision of Title 7 of the Wyoming statutes. Digest of House Journal, Forty-Ninth State Legisla*428ture, 183-84 (hereinafter H.J.). The title of the bill states in relevant part:
Title 7 Revision.
AN ACT * * * to amend, amend and renumber or renumber W.S. * * * 7-13-101 through 7-15-107 * * *; revising Chapters 1 through 5, 13 through 15 and 17 of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes; * * * providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes
H.J. 183-84.
H.B. 92 renumbered “old 203” to “new 301” and provided changes in the category of persons qualified for probation before sentence and the procedures to be used before and after placing a qualified person on probation. H.B. 92, Forty-Ninth State Legislature, 87LSO-0102.01, pp. 155-58 (1987). The original version of H.B. 92 contained the requirement of the defendant’s consent to probation which was not contained in “old 203.” Id. at 156. Before leaving the House, “new 301” was the subject of a few relatively minor amendments. H.J. 184-85. On January 21, 1987, H.B. 92 was read for the third time in the House and was passed. H.J. at 186.
H.B. 92 then was sent to the Senate. There, several more amendments were made to “new 301.” The most significant amendment made by the Senate was the addition of the requirement of the state’s consent to probation. H.J. 189. These amendments were adopted and passed in the Senate. H.J. 191-92. H.B. 92 then went back to the House on February 19, 1987, and the House voted not to concur in the Senate amendments. H.J. at 192. The matter was referred to a joint conference committee composed of several members from the House and Senate. H.J. at 192.
The joint conference committee reported back a recommendation to adopt, among other amendments, the Senate amendment (H.B. 92SS1/AE) requiring the state’s consent to probation. H.J. at 192. The committee also recommended several other minor changes to “new 301.” H.J. at 193. On February 28, 1987, the House and Senate voted to adopt the report of the joint conference committee. H.J. at 194. The act was signed by the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate that same day and by the Governor on March 5, 1987. H.J. at 194. H.B. 92 now appears as Chapter 157, 1987 Session Laws of Wyoming.
B. “Alteration of Original Purpose” Issue
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, provides, “No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose”. The purpose of this kind of constitutional provision is “to preclude last-minute, hasty legislation and to provide notice to the public of legislation under consideration irrespective of legislative merit.” Anderson v. Oakland County Clerk, 419 Mich. 313, 353 N.W.2d 448, 455 (1984). See also Annotation, Construction and Application of Constitutional Provision Against Changing Purpose of Bill During Passage, 158 A.L.R. 421, 423 (1945). (Our research reveals no later supplementary annotation). In Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938), the court said that kind of provision “put the members of the Assembly and others interested on notice, by the title of the measure submitted, so that they might vote on it with circumspection.”
These criminal defendants claim that the original purpose of H.B. 92, as originally introduced, namely, providing procedures— including the requirement of the defendant’s consent — for placing a defendant on pre-guilt adjudication probation and discharging the defendant upon successful completion of that probation, was imper-missibly changed by the legislature’s amendment that added the requirement of the state’s consent. We disagree.
In our resolution of this issue, we are guided by Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98 (Wyo.1963), and Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918 (1912), 158 A.L.R. 421 *429(1945). In these cases this court looked to the title and the body of the original bill to determine its purpose and make a comparison of its purpose after amendment.
In Arbuckle, certain livestock owners sued the state veterinarian to recover possession of their cattle which the state veterinarian had seized and was going to sell in order to recoup the cost he had incurred in seizing and medically treating the owner’s cattle for scabies or mange after the owners had failed to treat them as he had earlier requested. The state veterinarian counterclaimed for the costs incurred in seizing and treating the cattle. The trial court certified to this court ten constitutional questions, one of which was whether the legislature violated the “alteration of original purpose” provision in the passage of 1909 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 164. As originally introduced, H.B. 137 stated in its title that it was “an act to amend and reenact sections 148 and 150 * * * of the Revised Statutes of Wyoming of 1899, relating to the duties of the State Veterinarian.” Section 150 of the bill stated that the duty of the state veterinarian was to superintend the slaughter and burning of condemned animals and to pay the expense of that activity from any contingent fund appropriated for his office.
The House amended the bill by the Jef-feris amendment, which, in pertinent part, added to the bill a section 2 which provided that section 148 of the revised statutes of Wyoming 1899 was amended and reenacted so that the state veterinarian had authority to take steps to prevent the spread of contagious disease among animals, including ordering livestock owners to dip and treat their animals, seizing animals when their owners failed to treat their animals, treating the seized animals and selling them to recoup the cost of those activities.
The plaintiff owners claimed that the Jef-feris amendment was for a different purpose from that contemplated in the bill as originally introduced. This court disagreed. It found that the original bill’s purpose concerned the state veterinarian’s duty, as did the amendment. Both the original bill and its amendment related to that state official’s duties concerning the prevention of the spread of infectious disease among cattle. This court found that the original bill and its amendment were not incongruous but related to that state official’s duties to prevent disease, and that they were in furtherance of that purpose and within the scope of the subject of the bill. It held that the amendment adding further duties did not alter or amend the original bill’s purpose. On this point, the court held the bill to have been constitutionally enacted.
Using Arbuckle ⅛ analytical approach, we achieve the same result. As originally introduced, H.B. 92 stated in its title that it was an act to amend and renumber, among other statutory provisions, §§ 7-13-101 through 7-13-107, providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation before entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation. As originally introduced, the body of the bill provided that the defendant’s consent was required as part of these procedures. The senate amendment of the original bill added the state’s consent requirement to the procedures for placing the defendant on this type of probation.
The criminal defendants here assert that the senate amendment changed the purpose of the original bill. They correctly identify that purpose as being revision of procedures for placing certain defendants on probation. We agree that the purpose of the bill as originally introduced concerns procedures for deferring further prosecution and placing a defendant on probation without entry of adjudication of guilt and discharging the defendant if he successfully completes that probation. One of those procedures is obtaining the defendant’s consent. The senate amendment refers to these procedures and simply adds one more procedure to accomplish the purpose of placing the defendant on probation. Both the bill and its amendment relate to those procedures and that purpose. They are not incongruous. They are in furtherance of that purpose, germane to and within the scope of the bill.
*430The Smith case helps us make our point. Several beer wholesalers sued members and the director of the Wyoming Liquor Commission to enjoin the collection of an additional four cents per gallon in excise taxes on malt liquors. The wholesalers contended that the provisions of 1963 Wyo. Sess.Laws ch. 194, § 3(a), purporting to increase the tax from two cents per gallon to six cents per gallon, were unconstitutionally enacted in violation of both the “alteration of original purpose” provision of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, and the “one subject” provision, of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24.
Focusing first on the “alteration of original purpose” issue, this court noted that the bill’s title, as originally introduced, stated that the act amended and reenacted a statute relating to the excise tax on liquors so as to prohibit a person’s importation or transportation of untaxed liquor into or within the state. Thus, the bill’s original purpose was to amend and reenact the statute “so as to prohibit” importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. The bill was amended, and the excise tax on malt liquors was increased from two cents to six cents per gallon. The legislature also established an identification card for persons twenty-one years or older to be presented when purchasing liquor. With these amendments, the bill contained three purposes: 1) prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquor, 2) four cent tax increase on malt liquor, and 3) liquor purchase identification card. Because of these amendments, the legislature then amended the bill’s original title to include mention of the identification card along with the prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. The legislature, however, failed to amend the original title to include the mention of the tax increase. This court held that the new purpose or objective of the tax increase impermissibly changed the bill’s original purpose of prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. Smith, 386 P.2d at 100.
By contrast, in our present case, the senate amendment adding the requirement of state’s consent to the procedures provided in the original bill, unlike the new purpose or objective of a tax increase in Smith, did not change the original purpose of the bill. That purpose was, and remained after the amendment, the establishment of procedures for the deferring and placing of a defendant on probation without the entry of an adjudication of guilt and the discharging of that defendant upon successful completion of that probation.
In light of the objective of the “alteration of original purpose” provision and our decisions in Smith and Arbuckle, we hold that Chapter 157 of the Session Laws of Wyoming 1987 was constitutionally enacted in compliance with Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20.
C. The “One Subject” Issue
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, provides: No bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed, (emphasis added).
In past challenges to legislation on this constitutional ground, we have stated that the purpose of this constitutional provision is
to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation. It is not intended that the title shall be an abstract of all provisions contained in a bill; or that the title must encompass all of the aspects of the statute; or that everything therein affected need be delineated. Brinegar v. Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62, 66 [1962]; Morrow v. Diefenderfer, Wyo., 384 P.2d 601, 603 [1963]; Board of Com’rs of Laramie County v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 607 [1897],
State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 302 (Wyo.1968).
Sixty-five years ago we said that this particular constitutional provision must be liberally and reasonably construed:
This court has long recognized the principle that this section of the constitution, *431though mandatory, must be liberally and reasonably construed. In the case In re Fourth Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, 142, 32 P. 850 [1893], the court quotes the language of Judge Cooley to the effect that the generality of the title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary and fair connection. Cooley on Const.Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 206. In the same paragraph of that text (p. 205) it is said that, “To require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of a general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible.” And in the case of In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 339, 40 P. 520 [1895], it is said that an act is not invalidated for that reason so long as the subjects of legislation are congruous, cognate or germane, and in furtherance of the general subject of the enactment, even though the act may authorize many things of a diverse nature to be done. There may be subordinate subjects if they be “legitimate offspring of the main subject.”
State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 510-11, 228 P. 636, 638 (1924).
This constitutional provision contains an important exception. The requirement in this "one subject” provision that a bill contain only one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the bill’s title does not apply to a bill for the codification and general revision of the laws. We have recognized the meaning of this exception in State of Wyoming v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177 (1952).20 Regarding revisions and codifications, Sutherland informs us:
A revision is an act which restates the law embodied in one or more prior acts in order to clarify and harmonize the provisions of the prior acts and which may alter, add, or omit provisions. A codification is a revision and also a systematic arrangement of all the statutes of the state or all those concerning a general field of the law. (emphasis added).
1A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 22.27, p. 254 (4th ed. 1985).
Defendants contend that H.B. 92 was not a revision because a revision, by its nature, is not intended to change anything but only to restate what has already been legislated, so that revisions of statutes are not presumed to change the law. State v. Baker, 195 Conn. 598, 489 A.2d 1041, 1045 n. 4 (1985). They argue that the state’s consent requirement contained in “new 301” changed, rather than restated, what had been the law under “old 203,” namely, that the court in its discretion would decide whether to place a defendant on probation.
We disagree that a revision is merely a restatement of, not a change in, existing law. As noted earlier, Sutherland’s definition of revision makes room for the legislation’s altering, adding, or omitting provisions of existing law. We adopt that view. The court in Baker recognized that if the legislators use language in the revision that admits of a construction which changes the former law, then there is no presumption that the revision did not change the law. Baker, 489 A.2d at 1045 n. 4 (applying Bassett v. City Bank and Trust Co., 115 Conn. 393, 161 A. 852 (1932)). Considering the sweep of 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, evident in both its title21 *432and in its body, we hold that H.B. 92 was a codification and general revision of Title 7 criminal procedure. We observe that, in addition to identifying the statutory provisions to which the revision act applied, the legislature used clear language to describe what the revision was accomplishing: amending; amending and renumbering; revising; eliminating duplication, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting and renumbering; providing definitions; repealing provisions; modifying provisions; eliminating certain powers; providing procedures and deleting requirements.
The revision act was not intended to be a mere restatement of former law. Obviously, the legislators used language that admits of a construction which in many instances changed the former law. Specifically with reference to §§ 7-13-101 through 7-13-107, which encompass “old 203” and “old 301,” the act was “to amend, amend and renumber or renumber” those provisions “providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes *433.” 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, p. 299. No one who read the title and was thus aware of the passage of the law could reasonably claim to have been surprised or misled into thinking that the revision act was a mere restatement of former law.
We hold that since 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, originally introduced as H.B. 92, was a proper codification and general revision of the laws to which it pertained, it was excepted from the requirements of the “one subject” constitutional provision. We also hold that it was constitutionally enacted.
VI.
WHETHER W.S. 7-6-106(d) (JUNE 1987 REPL.), UNDER WHICH LOWRY, VIGIL AND McIVER WERE ORDERED TO REIMBURSE THE STATE FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER ATTORNEY’S FEES, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
In Lowry, when the county court judge appointed the public defender to represent Ms. Lowry, the judge found that she was presently unable to provide for full payment of attorney’s fees and other expenses of representation, but that she could afford to pay a certain amount to defray partial costs of representation. This finding was based upon the judge’s consideration of Ms. Lowry’s affidavit seeking court-appointed counsel in which she provided detailed information about her financial situation and present employment. Specifically, in her affidavit she stated she could afford to make monthly payments towards her court-appointed counsel in the sum of $50 per month. In the judge’s order, and based on his finding that Ms. Lowry could afford to pay some amount to defray partial costs of defense counsel, he ordered her to pay $50 per month. Later, when the judge, over the prosecutor’s objection, deferred prosecution and placed Ms. Lowry on probation under “new 301,” he ordered Ms. Lowry to reimburse the state and county $200 for the services of her court-appointed counsel.
In Vigil, when the county court judge appointed the public defender to represent Mr. Vigil, his appointment was based upon Mr. Vigil’s affidavit for court-appointed counsel in which he provided detailed information about his financial situation and employment history. Later, in the presen-tence investigation report Mr. Vigil provided further detailed information about his financial situation and his employment history. When the district court judge sentenced Mr. Vigil, he ordered him to pay the state public defender for all expenses and services according to the public defender’s standard fee schedule. The judge ordered this to be paid within Mr. Vigil’s five-year probationary period according to a court-approved payment plan.
In McIver, the county court appointed a public defender based upon Mr. Mclver’s affidavit in which he gave detailed information about his financial situation, employment history, educational background, and family background. A presentence investigation report provided further detailed information about his financial situation, employment history, educational background, and family background. When the district court judge sentenced Mr. Mclver, he ordered him to repay the state public defender for all expenses and services pursuant to that office’s standard fee schedule. The judge ordered this to be paid within Mr. Mclver’s three year probationary period according to a court-approved payment plan.
Under W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.) the courts have the authority to order a defendant to repay the state for the cost of defense services.22 Defendants Lowry, Vigil and Mclver raise for the first time on appeal the question of the constitutionality of this statute. They do not argue plain error. Since we find no jurisdictional claim and no fundamental right claim, we decline *434to consider this issue. Hopkinson, 664 P.2d at 50.
VII.
WHETHER PROSECUTOR’S REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO FIRST OFFENDER TREATMENT FOR MR. VIGIL VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
Since a judge’s sentence must be based upon only accurate information found in the presentence investigation report, Mr. Vigil argues that the prosecutor’s “sentence-like” consent decision must also be based upon only accurate information. See Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo.1987). Mr. Vigil claims that the prosecutor refused to give the state’s consent to “new 301” probation because Mr. Vigil was a drug dealer, but that he steadfastly denied he dealt drugs. We view the record differently from Mr. Vigil. In the presentence investigation report, Mr. Vigil states that he had previously sold drugs but felt it did not amount to much. At the sentencing proceeding, the district court judge called the presentence investigation report to Mr. Vigil’s attention and asked him if it contained any inaccuracies. Mr. Vigil said it did not.
When the prosecutor told the district court judge why the state refused to give its consent to “new 301” probation, he referred to Mr. Vigil’s presentence investigation report admission of having previously sold drugs and explained that the state felt the pending criminal matter was not an isolated incident in view of that admission and that the state felt Mr. Vigil should not be absolved and have a clean record under “new 301.” The district court judge found the state’s position was rational. So do we. We also note that Mr. Vigil did not raise this issue below, but rather presents it here for the first time, and he has not claimed that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent was based on any suspect factor. Jahnke 692 P.2d at 927-28. Therefore, we find no merit to Mr. Vigil’s argument on this point.
VIII.
WHETHER PROSECUTOR’S REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO SENTENCING UNDER § 7-13-301 WAS ARBITRARY AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND, THEREFORE, VIOLATED WYO. CONST., ART. 1, §§ 2 and 7
In each of their respective cases, Vigil, Moon, Magarahan, and Billis claim that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to “new 301” treatment was arbitrary and abuse of discretion, thus violating Wyo. Const., art. 1, §§ 2 and 7.23
Both Ms. Moon and Ms. Magara-han claim that since the prosecutor in each of their cases gave no reason for the state’s refusal to consent to “new 301” treatment, those refusals were arbitrary and characterized by an abuse of discretion. The records in these cases are silent as to why the prosecutors refused to consent. As explained earlier, the prosecutor, not the judge, controls the prosecution up to adjudication. This court will not presume that suspect factors or arbitrary classifications exist. Ms. Moon and Ms. Ma-garahan cannot point to any suspect factors or other arbitrary classification in the record. We find no merit in their argument.
Under-this assignment of error, Mr. Vigil claims, as he did with reference to his due process claim, that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent based upon Mr. Vigil’s admitted previous drug dealing was arbitrary. We find no merit to this argument for the same reasons we found no merit to his due process argument.
Mr. Billis argues that his prosecutor’s refusal to consent to “new 301” treatment was arbitrary. He contends that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent is tantamount to sentencing, which we rejected earlier. This is a prosecutor's decision, and the court *435may not interfere with that, absent the presence of suspect factors. Mr. Billis’ contention that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent served none of the objectives of sentencing is without merit.
Last, Mr. Billis asserts that his prosecutor based the refusal to consent upon the arbitrary factor of his age. The record does not bear him out. The prosecutor refused to consent not only because of age but also because the state had already shown leniency by dismissing one count of delivery of cocaine under the plea bargain and because of the rather professional manner in which Mr. Billis had committed the drug crime. We find no merit in any of Mr. Billis’ assertions and hold that the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in refusing to consent to “new 301” treatment for Mr. Billis was not abused and was not based on any suspect factor or other arbitrary classification.
CONCLUSION
We hold that “new 301” does not violate the separation of powers doctrine and was constitutionally enacted. The due process rights of Mr. Vigil were not violated by the prosecutor’s refusal to consent. As to the claim made by Ms. Moon, Ms. Magaharan and Mr. Billis, we hold that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent was not an abuse of discretion and was not arbitrary.
Because they were not raised below, we decline to address the constitutional claims of Ms. Lowry, Mr. Vigil and Mr. Mclver that relate to reimbursement of defense counsel attorney fees.
URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MACY, J., joins.
MACY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.
. W.S. 7-12-102 through 7-12-104 (June 1987 Repl.):
The district attorney may take exceptions to any opinion or decision of the court made during the prosecution of a criminal case. Before being filed in the supreme court, the bill of exceptions shall be presented to the trial court which shall certify whether the contents of the bill are correct. If certified, the trial court shall sign the bill containing the exceptions and affix the seal of the court and the bill shall be made part of the record. The bill of exceptions shall be governed by rules as shall be promulgated by the Wyoming supreme court.
Following certification of a bill of exceptions by the trial court as provided by W.S. 7-12-102, the attorney general may apply to the supreme court for permission to file the bill for review and decision upon the points presented. If the supreme court allows the bill to be filed, the judge who presided at the trial in which the bill was taken shall appoint a competent attorney to argue the case against the state and shall fix a reasonable fee for his service to be paid out of the treasury of the county in which the bill was taken.
(a) If the bill of exceptions is allowed to be filed, the supreme court shall render a decision on each point presented.
(b) The decision of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may after-wards arise in the state, but shall not reverse nor in any manner affect the judgment of the court in the case in which the bill of exceptions was taken.
. W.S. 35-7-1037 (June 1988 Repl.) also provides a procedure for probation and discharge of first-time drug offenders. That statute is not, however, involved in any of these cases on appeal.
. We note in passing that in White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo.1984), in which the parties had not raised the constitutionality of W.S. 1-1-114 (1977), relating to the legislatively imposed requirement that the prayer for damages in a personal injury or wrongful death action shall not state any dollar amount or demand a sum as judgment, this court was compelled to consider the statute's constitutionality because of its apparent infringement upon the doctrine of separation of powers.
. § 7-13-203. Parole before sentence; generally; terms and conditions; discharge; revocation of parole and imposition of sentence.
If any person is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the court shall ascertain whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense, the extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and other facts and circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know. If the court is satisfied that he was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the law, the court may in its discretion, by an order entered of record, delay passing sentence and then parole the person and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance, conditioned that he will personally appear and report to the court twice in each year at times and places fixed in the order and that he will demean himself while at large in a law-abiding manner and live a worthy, respectable life, and that he will not leave the state without the consent of the court. The court, if satisfied at the time of appearance, that the person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding manner and lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue parole for the period of five (5) years, at the expiration of which the court shall enter an order finally discharging the person, and no further proceedings shall be had upon such verdict or plea. At any time after the expiration of one (l) year from the date of the original parole the court shall have the power in its discretion to terminate parole and finally discharge the person and annul the verdict or plea of guilty. At any time before the final discharge of the person that the court believes that the paroled person has attempted to leave the state or failed to comply with the terms of his parole the court shall cause a warrant to issue for the apprehension and arrest of the person and require him to be brought before the court. The court shall inquire into his conduct since his parole, and if satisfied from the inquiry that the person has violated the terms of his parole and recognizance, the court may impose sentence upon the verdict or plea against him in the manner and to the same extent as though the passing of sentence had not been delayed and the person had not been paroled or permitted to go at large.
. § 7-13-301. Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence; placing defendant on probation; fine and probation; suspension of trial and placing defendant on probation.
After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation.
. Prien, supra, appendix A, at 38.
. The doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Federal Constitution is not mandatory on the states. Dreyer v. People of the State of Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84, 23 S.Ct. 28, 32, 47 L.Ed. 79, 85 (1902).
. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 8.
Approval or veto of legislation by governor; passage over veto. — Every bill which has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor. If he approves, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, which shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the members elected, it shall become a law; but in all such cases the vote of both houses shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the journal of each house respectively. If any bill is not returned by the governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after its presentation to him, the same shall be law, unless the legislature by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall be a law, unless he shall file the same with his objections in the office of the secretary of state within fifteen days after such adjournment.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
.Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5:
Pardoning power of governor. — The governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment; but the legislature may by law regulate the manner in which the remission of fines, pardons, commutations and reprieves may be applied for. Upon conviction for treason he shall have power to suspend the execution of sentence until the case is reported to the legislature at its next regular session, when the legislature shall either pardon, or commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence or grant further reprieve. He shall communicate to the legislature at each regular session each case of remission of fine, reprieve, com*415mutation or pardon granted by him, stating the name of the convict, the crime for which he was convicted, the sentence and its date and the date of the remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve with his reasons for granting the same.
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
. The United States Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed founder James Madison’s flexible approach to separation of powers, saying, "Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence * * Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 659, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2620, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).
. 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 48.02[1] (2d ed. 1989) n. 1:
See United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C.Cir.1974); United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt and Neckwear Contractors Ass’n., 228 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y.1964); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100 (S.D.I11.1945); United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.C.Mont. 1924); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868).
. W.R.Cr.P. 56:
From and after the effective date of these rules, the sections of the Wyoming Statutes, 1957, as amended, hereinafter enumerated, shall be superseded, and such statutes and all other laws in conflict with these rules shall be of no further force or effect:
1-59 through 1-63
The first sentence of 7-4
7-7
*4207-8
7-86
7-118 through 7-125
7-127 through 7-134
7-136 through 7-146
7-148 through 7-154
7-157 through 7-160
7-162 through 7-164
7-166 through 7-171
7-173 through 7-178
7-181 through 7-200
7-202
7-204 through 7-217
7-219
7-222
7-229
7-230
7-232
7-234
7-235
7-240
7-245 through 7-249
7-253 through 7-260
7-266
7-268 through 7-274
7-276
7-283
7-284
7-286
7-287
7-292 through 7-295
7-299 through 7-301
7-330 through 7-332
7-344
7-451
(Amended January 20, 1969, effective February 11, 1969; amended July 12, 1971, effective November 18, 1971.)
. As stated in 2 W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 13.3, p. 569 (1985),
[c]oncern over this unbridled discretion in the prosecution [to enter a nolle prosequi ] resulted in legislation or rules of court in many jurisdictions intended to restrain the nol pros power of the prosecutor. These provisions, at a minimum, forced the prosecutor to explain his reasons for doing so in writing, thus assuring greater visibility of the manner in which the prosecutor acted; at a maximum they required that he receive judicial approval to make his decision effective.
See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509, n. 11, 12 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied sub nom., Woodruff v. United States, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2168, 48 L.Ed.2d 795 (1976).
. See also Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 51-52 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246, for this court’s brief examination of the history of this court's rule making. See Armstrong, The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, A View by the Judiciary, V Land & Water L.Rev. 581-86 (1970) — part of a symposium on the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.
. See e.g., Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 902 (Wyo.1977) (W.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(2) identical to F.R.Cr.P. 12(b)(2)); Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Wyo.1976); (W.R.Cr.P. 7 essentially the same as old F.R.Cr.P. 5(b) and (c)); Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 931 (Wyo.1976) (portions of W.R.Cr.P. 9 essentially the same as F.R.Cr.P. 7)); Evanson v. State, 546 P.2d 412, 415 (Wyo.1976) (W.R.Cr.P. 32(c) identical to F.R.Cr.P. 31(c)); and Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, 523 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886, 93 S.Ct. 104, 34 L.Ed.2d 142 (W.R.Cr.P. 18(b) practically identical to F.R.Cr.P. 16(b)).
. Accord. United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 847, 107 L.Ed.2d 841 (1990); United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1145, 103 L.Ed.2d 205 (1989); United States v. Severich, 676 F.Supp. 1209 (S.D.Fla.1988), aff'd 872 F.2d 434 (11th Cir.1989). See also United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1058, 108 S.Ct. 2829, 100 L.Ed.2d 930; but see United States v. Roberts, 726 F.Supp. 1359 (D.D.C.1989); and United States v. Curran, 724 F.Supp. 1239 (C.D.Ill.(1989)).
. W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 13.6, p. 585 (1985): "A decision by the prosecutor not to divert a particular defendant and instead to proceed with prosecution on the preexisting charge is, in essence, a decision to prosecute * * *."
. Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo.1977). For the United States Supreme Court, *427Justice Cardozo put it this way: "We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason. We take this statute as we find it.” Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S.Ct. 417, 420, 77 L.Ed. 1004, 1010 (1933).
. Constitution of the United States of America-Analysis and Interpretation, pp. 491-94 (U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office 1987), where reference is made to Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1867), for the point that a pardon may precede the indictment or other beginning of the criminal proceeding.
. Codification is defined as: "CODIFICATION. The process of collecting and arranging the laws of * * * a state into a code, that is, into a complete system of positive law, scientifically ordered, and promulgated by legislative authority.” 7 Words and Phrases 540, 14 CJ.S. 1306.
A general revision of the laws, or of statutes, has been defined as follows:
“ 'Revision of the law’ ” on any subject is a restatement of the law on that subject in a correlated or improved form, which is intended as a substitute for the law as previously stated, and displaces and repeals the former laws relating to the same subject and within the purview of the revising statute. It implies a reexamination of the law.” People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 178 N.E. 133, 144, [1931].
Pitet, 69 Wyo. at 496, 243 P.2d at 184.
. 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157:
TITLE 7 REVISION
AN ACT to create W.S. 7-3-611; to amend W.S. 1-40-112(c) introductory paragraph, 6-10-*432106(a)(iii), 9-l-627(c), 20-3-101(a), 25-3-104(b)(iv) and 25-4-102; to amend, amend and renumber or number W.S. 6-3-702(c), 6-10110, 7-1-101 through 7-5-309, 7-13-101 through 7-15-107 and 7-17-101 through 7-17-103 as 7-1-101 through 7-6-115, 7-9-101 through 7-9-112 and 7-13-101 through 7-17-103; to renumber W.S. 7-1-123 as 7-1-103, 7-6-101 as 7-1-104, 7-7-107 as 7-7-103, 7-7-108 as 7-7-104, 7-8-103 as 7-8-102, 7-8-107 as 7-8-103, 7-8-110, as 7-10-104, 7-8-124 as 7-8-105, 7-9-101 as 7-1-104, 7-9-107 as 7-1-105, 7-10-105 as 7-10-103, 7-10-106 as 7-10-104, 7-10-117 as 7-10-105, 7-10-120 as 7-10-106, 7-11-207 as 7-11-203, 7-11-210 through 7-11-212 as 7-11-204 through 7-11-206, 7-11-406 through 7-11-410 as 7-11-403 through 7-11-407, 7-11-503 as 7-11-502, 7-11-514 through 7-11-516 as 7-11-503 through 7-11-505, 7-11-518 as 7-11-506, 7-12-105 as 7-12-104 and 7-12-205 as 7-12-201 as enacted by Chapter 147, Wyoming Session Laws, 1985; and to amend or amend and renumber W.S. 7-7-102, 7-7-109 as 7-7-105 and 7-10-101(b) as enacted by Chapter 147, Wyoming Session Laws, 1985 relating to criminal procedure; revising Chapters 1 through 5, 13 through 15 and 17 of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes; eliminating duplications, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting and renumbering sections; providing definitions; repealing procedural provision superseded by court rules; specifying when peace officers may issue citations for misdemeanors; modifying the offense of desertion and reducing the penalty; eliminating power of sheriff granted to railroad conductors and engineers; modifying procedures relating to the disposition of property seized or held by peace officers and eliminating the provision authorizing allocation of forfeited property to law enforcement agencies; repealing provisions relating to the governor’s reward for fugitives; modifying procedures relating to peace bonds; providing for limited personal items of a deceased to be released to his next of kin following a coroner's investigation; providing procedures for drawing and impaneling grand juries; limiting the term of county grand juries; deleting requirement of publication of grand jury report; providing for secrecy of grand jury indictment and proceedings; providing that in imposing an indeterminate sentence in a felony case the court shall set the minimum term at no more than 90% of the maximum term imposed; providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes; providing that a defendant given a split sentence of incarceration followed by probation is not subject to parole and good time provisions and is under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court while incarcerated; specifying when probation revocation proceedings may be commenced; creating the department of probation and parole and providing powers and duties of the director and probation and parole agents; providing for the arrest by a peace officer of alleged probation or parole violators upon the written statement of a probation and parole agent; providing when restitution shall be made a condition of parole; specifying how earnings of certain defendants and prisoners shall be disbursed; specifying sex crimes for which special examination and sentencing provisions apply, designating who shall perform examinations and designating where such convicted defendants may be committed; placing control of the reentry furlough program under the board of charities and reform; modifying provisions relating to the issuance and execution of death warrants; providing procedures relating to the examination of female prisoners sentenced to death who are believed to be pregnant; providing the public defender shall represent certain prisoners asserting violation of constitutional rights; specifying in which cases the state will indemnify sheriffs or other officers from civil liability in connection with prisoner labor; eliminating the state commission on prison labor and transferring functions to the board of charities and reform; providing for work release programs at each of the state’s adult penal institutions; and providing for an effective date.
. W.S. 7 — 6—106(d) (June 1987 Repl.):
If the court orders probation before sentence, suspended sentence or probation, the court shall order the needy person as a condition of sentence or probation to repay the state for expenses and services provided by appointed attorneys pursuant to the state public defender’s standard fee schedule.
. Wyo. Const., art. 1:
§ 2. Equality of all. — In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal.
§ 7. No absolute, arbitrary power. — Absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.