dissenting.
We may as well provide two chairs on the bench during sentencing — one for the judge and one for the prosecutor — and be done with pretense. I dissent for two reasons. First, I would hold that Wyoming’s separation of powers provision1 prohibits the prosecutor from exercising any power over sentencing. Second, I would hold that the 1987 amendments to what is now W.S. 7-13-301 violate Wyo. Const, art. 3, §§ 20 and 24.
I. WHAT WE HAVE HERE AND WHY I WORRY!
The majority opinion can be breathtaking at times in the display of its scholastic strength. It is, however, an excellent answer to the wrong question. The question is not whether our state’s separation of powers doctrine collides with a deferred prosecution scheme, but whether that doctrine prohibits prosecutorial participation during the sentencing process as provided by W.S. 7-13-301. The majority reforms the question to ask if sentencing is an “exclusive judicial function” and answers that question with a “no.” I would answer that question with a “yes.” Because the majority answers that question with a “no,” they make room on the bench for the prosecutor to participate effectively in sentencing.
The judicial processes of Wyoming law have infrequently, if ever, been compelled by majority authorship to grasp so extensively in an effort to justify a societally unproductive and judicially untenable legal position. Paraphrasing from a current admonition against achieving a result without actual precedential justification, the majority “reach[es] out peripherally in [] many directions in an attempt to authoritatively support an [unjustified decision]. The reader is inundated with a multitude of citations and a bulk of material running the gambit of quotations from historically well-known United States Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars” to justify a result which is only “useful” to multiply numbers *436of Wyoming felony convictions. City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 103, 120 (1989), Justice Holmes dissenting.
If these consolidated appeals challenge prosecutorial discretion under W.S. 7-13-3012 to defer criminal prosecutions, then there is no separation of powers problem and the statute in question may be considered constitutionally valid. But if these consolidated appeals challenge a legislative scheme to allow the prosecutor control over the sentencing process, then a collision with our state’s separation of powers doctrine appears unavoidable. I understand W.S. 7-13-301 to collide with our separation of powers doctrine since it allows the prosecutor, against the wishes of the trial judge and the defendant, to control the disposition of a case after the accused has been “found guilty’’. I would hold that once a defendant pleads guilty or is convicted by the jury, the role of the prosecutor has come to an end.
The majority disagrees and claims the role of the prosecutor remains active until the sentencing judgment is entered, but argues as if binding precedent drives their holding. Actually, existent legal rules have nothing to do with the achieved outcome. The cluster of federal cases advanced by the majority is no logical justification for re-authoring Wyoming law. Where the federal supremacy clause does not operate, Wyoming case law is the appropriate precedent and Wyoming precedent is dispositive. “ ‘When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.’ ” Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo.1984) (quoting People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d 89, 94, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 252, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (1970)). The majority now hands control over sentencing to the prosecutor when only two years ago we affirmed that “[t]o require the court to accept the recommendation of the prosecution as a matter of law would transfer the sentencing duty from the court to the prosecution, * * * It is the court’s duty to impose the sentence, not the prosecution’s.” Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 681 (Wyo.1988).
Today, the majority turns its back on its duty to guarantee the protection of individual rights and yields to enterprising ambition of a force within or without legislative action to take from the judiciary and give to the executive a power not theirs to give. Not only is the judiciary demeaned, but this holding overall makes no sense unless one examines the unprincipled impact of political theory upon appellate adjudication. Rather than binding precedent, this outcome appears driven by a political theory which tightens the grip of the prosecutor on the throat of the accused at every opportunity.3
As the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin has reminded us, several of the constitutional clauses guaranteeing rights to individuals are formulated in such general terms that in many cases judges cannot base their decisions on the text or the intent of the framers. Rather, they must base them, consciously or unconsciously, on a political theory of some kind, a theory that defines in the abstract the proper scope of governmental authority and individual liberty.
Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 Iowa L.Rev. 401, 402 (1986). Whatever name is given to the political theory in operation here, it is one which finds primacy in securing legislative supremacy over the rights of citizens unless those rights are enumerated. Such a philosophy does no more than articulate by rote a political theory which selects legislative primacy when the values *437of majority adaptation in representative government and rights of citizens collide.
If “ ‘[t]he general principles governing the construction of statutes apply to the construction of constitutions,’ ” County Court Judges Ass’n. v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960, 973 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991 (1918)), and if “[w]e construe every word, every clause and every sentence so as to avoid rendering the [constitutional framers’ and ratifiers’] actions futile or absurd.” Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 786 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo.1990) (emphasis added), how can we examine our separation of powers doctrine without examining simultaneously the potential impact of legislative enactments on the government’s ability to protect the rights of citizens against acts of tyranny by state officials?4 No analysis is given regarding the possible rights of the accused to be free from prosecutorial participation at this level in the judicial process. The dialogue is couched only in terms of historic prosecutorial power.
“The crucial operative aspect of rights skepticism is its attitude toward the resolution of [the] systemic tension [between majority rule and individual rights]. When a rights-supporting value of the Constitution is understood to be in arguable conflict with majority conduct, the rights skeptic insists that the case for the recognition of the right be made only under circumstances of textual, historical, or structural certainty; otherwise the majoritarian result must prevail. Under this conception, rights are narrowly defined exceptions to an otherwise prevailing general commitment to majority rule.”
Elfenbein, supra, 71 Iowa L.Rev. at 425 n. 124 (quoting Sager, Rights, Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 417, 441 (1981)). To maintain this skepticism, the majority leaves us with an unfathomable standard to guide our future judgment of when the legislature has violated the separation of powers doctrine. They say that as long as a legislative enactment does not disturb the “integration of dispersed powers into a balanced, workable government” and can be accommodated by a “pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power,” then there is no violation of the separation of powers. Although that is an unfathomable standard, it is a directed pathway to tyranny — ultimate autocracy of government — absolute sta-tism.
Incredibly, the majority opens their analysis only after first reforming the *438claim made by the several defendants. The majority writes that "these criminal defendants contend it is essential that we preserve each of the powers in separate, airtight compartments.” (Emphasis added.) I do not find in the record or in the briefs where the appellants argue for “airtight compartments”. The only reference to “airtight” I have found occurs in a case relied on by the majority which states “[t]he [federal] Constitution does not require three airtight departments of government.” Geraghty v. United States Parole Com’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1210 (3rd Cir.1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 133 (1984) (emphasis added). The majority takes comfort in Geraghty standing for the proposition that “[ujnlike interpreting the constitution or adjudicating disputes, sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial function.” Such comfort must be cold comfort because Geraghty, 719 F.2d at 1210 specifically cautioned that its dicta applied to the federal system because “[t]he federal Constitution, unlike some state constitutions, has no express provision which prohibits the officials of one branch of government from exercising functions of the other branches.” The majority mistakenly seizes upon a single phrase in Geraghty. From that single phrase, they claim that sentencing in Wyoming is not an exclusive judicial function but, political theories being what they can be, everything leading up to the entry of judgment is, of course, an exclusive prose-cutorial function.
The fundamental character of “blending” the constitutional separation of powers out of reality serves only to justify unprincipled result-oriented adjudication to suit a contemporary concept of political or economic morality. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299 (Wyo.1963). That course of governmental conduct was not acceptable to the United States Supreme Court in the steel industry seizure case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). In that case, it was the executive; but the interest of the constitutional drafters of the United States Constitution was for “hopes for freedom” to exist in responsibility no less in the judiciary. Our system has not chosen to give separately and singularly to the trial advocate — the prosecutor — the keys to the jail nor power uncontrolled to destroy the effective existence of a human being. The direct and collateral consequences of a felony conviction are, in today’s society, beyond rational recognition. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). We deal here with productive lives and fruitful existence, not just deficits, money and budgets. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). In exercise of constitutional responsibility and determination of guilt as assessed to the judiciary under the “stringent [ ] standard of disinterest as judges,” the zealous advocacy of the prosecutors cannot be given priority if the judiciary chooses not to relegate itself to be in authority only a mere mockery. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). We walked that way once before in impotency. Compare Gage, 377 P.2d 299 with Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F.Supp. 247 (D.Wyo.1964).5
Operating from the comfortable analytic position of only defending against a claim for “air-tight compartments,” the majority employs a framer’s intent analysis to discover the framers indeed had in mind a “pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power” that allows a prosecutor control over the outcome after the accused has pled or been found guilty. *439Never once, however, does the majority stop to separate intent from purpose. The historic purpose for separating governmental powers is to prevent tyranny.6 Because the separation of powers doctrine is designed to help prevent governmental tyranny, displays of tyranny by state government employees makes legitimate the question of why our separation of powers model sometimes fails to prevent those displays. By answering the wrong question so well, the majority adds to the potential for tyrannic power which they provided prosecutors in Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990) by declaring that citizens have no civil recourse against any prosecutor, even when the prosecutor willfully uses the awesome power of the state to settle a personal vendetta. In a real sense, it is even more compelling to ask why prosecu-torial power is being strengthened in the face of such structural failure7.
Do we examine a deferred prosecution scheme against the backdrop of our separation of powers doctrine? Or do we examine a legislative scheme to imbed the prosecutor’s role into the sentencing process against the backdrop of our separation of powers doctrine? Initially, these consolidated cases present events occurring after the guilty -plea or jury verdict was entered. The legislative scheme permits a prosecutor to require the appending of a felony designation to the plea and sentence. This is what these cases involve. The issue addresses whether the separation of powers doctrine is violated by this legislative scheme to strengthen the leverage of prosecutors by allowing prosecutors the discretion to require felony status as a constituent of any sentence. Punishment, confinement, or probationary responsibility is not altered by the prosecutorial veto under the Wyoming adjudicatory structure since the trial court can provide the same sentencing responsibility with or without the application of W.S. 7-13-301 in distinction to W.S. 7-13-302, except that the conviction of a felony is or is not appended.
The majority essentially redefines deferred prosecution to include post-plea action of the trial court and hands the reins of the sentencing process to the prosecutor.
In addition to nolle prosequi and acquittal, criminal charges may be disposed by three processes. Process one is the diversion programs8, process two is a plea or verdict without entry of a felony judgment, and process three is a plea or verdict with entry of a felony judgment. The majority misunderstands or does not recognize the difference between diversion, process one, and plea or verdict without final felony conviction, process two. The plea or verdict which has been entered by probation without felony conviction is no more revocable than is probation with the felony conviction. Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134 (Wyo.1989); Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26 (Wyo.1989); Angerhofer v. State, 758 P.2d 1041 (Wyo.1988); Chorniak v. State, 715 P.2d 1162 (Wyo.1986).9
*440II. HISTORY OF THE STRUCTURE OF WYOMING LAW
From before the time of statehood, Wyoming sentencing processes provided broad discretion to the trial court.10 S.F. 100, 10th Leg. (1909), enacted as Wyo.Sess. Laws ch. 87 (1909), successfully introduced “[a]n act relating to the parole of prisoners found guilty by a jury on their plea of guilty of crimes charged against them.” As first offense sentencing process, the enacted statute was a juvenile sentencing act with comprehensive characteristics for purposes of clarity and to differentiate a succeeding statute. This enactment will be called the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act.11
PAROLE.
Section 1. Whenever any person, not over twenty-one years of age, shall have been found guilty by the verdict of a jury empaneled to try his case, or by his plea of guilty, duly entered in the cause, of any felony except murder, rape of a woman or female child forcibly and against her will, or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the court in which such verdict was found or plea of guilty entered, shall ascertain, if possible, whether the offense of which the accused is found guilty is his first offense, as well as the extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and such other facts and circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know; and if satisfied that such person was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the law, may in its discretion, by an order entered of record, delay the passing sentence upon such verdict, or plea, and parole such person and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance * * * and the Court, if satisfied * * *, that such person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding manner and lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue such parole from time to time for the period of five years, at the expiration of which period the Court shall enter an order finally discharging such person, and no further proceedings shall be had upon such verdict or plea; Provided, however, That at any time after the expiration of one year from the date of said original parole the Court shall have the power in its discretion to terminate said parole and finally discharge such person and annul such verdict or plea of guilty.
ABSOLUTE DISCRETION.
Sec. 2. The Court, in the exercise of its power to determine the previous good character of any such person, to determine the advisability of paroling such person, to determine the propriety of finally discharging such person at any time after the end of one year, and to determine the fact of violation of the terms of the parole and recognizance and propriety of imposing sentence upon such person, shall have absolute discretion, and no appeal or proceeding in error shall lie from the determination of the Court upon any of said questions.
*441NO DELAY.
Sec. 3. No delay in the passing of sentence or parole of a person as provided in this act shall be ordered against the consent or will of such person.
Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 87 (1909) (emphasis added).
Exercise of the parole or probationary status provided by the act was initially subject to consent of the charged individual because of exposure to a probation term of five years. That statute, initially limited to persons under twenty-one years of age, was followed in initial success with a 1931 change by which the age limitation was removed. Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 73, § 9 (1931).12
The sentencing statute was triggered by a conviction or a plea of guilty followed by imposed parole obligations and gave authority to the trial court to annul the verdict or plea in order that a conviction of a felony did not result. After the age limitation had been removed from the 1909 enactment, the statute remained essentially unchanged until Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 157 (1987). It was in the recodification of this Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act where the prosecutorial veto provision became appended by legislative passage as the provision from which this appeal is presented. What had started as a juvenile sentencing statute has now expanded to a first offender, non-conviction statute by W.S. 7-13-301 with transposition of provisions from another statute.
With the 1909 Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act in place, the legislature, by Wyo. Sess.Laws ch. 91 (1939), enacted a separate procedure as a new sentencing code which provided for suspension of trial as well as suspension of sentence by probation. Wyo. Sess.Laws ch. 91 (1939) in part provided:
Power of Court to Suspend Sentence or Trial in Some Cases — Probation.
Section 1. After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation.
County Attorney — Clerk of Court— Duties.
Section 2. When directed by the court, the county attorney shall fully investigate and report to the court in writing the circumstances of the offense, and the criminal record, social history and present conditions of the defendant, including, whenever practicable, the findings of a physical and mental examination of the defendant. No defendant charged with a felony, and, unless the court shall direct otherwise in individual cases, no other defendant shall be placed on probation or released under suspension of trial or sentence until the report of such investigation shall have been presented to and considered by the court. If such defendant is committed to any institution, a copy of the report of such investigation shall be sent to the institution at the time of commitment. In all cases the clerk of court shall forward copies of such report to the Board of Charities and Reform, and copies of all orders entered by the court.
Court May Modify Conditions.
Section 3. The court shall determine and may, by order duly entered, impose in its discretion, and may at any time modify any condition or conditions or probation or suspension of trial or sentence.
*442Extension of Suspension or Probation — Discharge—Violation of Conditions by Defendant.
Section 4. The period of probation or suspension of trial or sentence and the conditions thereof shall be determined by the court and may be continued or extended. Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of suspension of trial or sentence or probation the court shall by order duly entered discharge the defendant. At any time during the period of suspension of trial or sentence or probation, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of trial or sentence. As soon as practicable after the arrest the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and may proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of trial or sentence or probation had been ordered.
Fines.
Section 5. When imposing a fine and also placing the defendant on probation, the judge of the district court may permit such fine to be paid in such installments and over such periods of time as he deems possible and reasonable.
Power of the Governor.[13]
Section 6. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair the power of the Governor to grant a pardon or commutation in any case.
The difference between the 1909 Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act and the 1939 adult suspension of trial or sentence act was essentially operational. The Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act required plea or conviction and afforded an opportunity to avoid the felony conviction. Alternatively, the adult suspension of trial or sentence act, if applied following plea, permitted no remission of the felony status but could result, if applied for suspension of trial, with the same result as the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act. The practical difference between the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act and the adult suspended trial or sentence act is the provision in the latter where no plea was required for utilization if trial was suspended. Another obvious difference is the flexibility afforded in the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act permitting a conclusion after one year, which provision might not necessarily be equally available under the later statute.
The finality of the adult sentencing statute was established not only by the probationary terms but by provisions for entry of a judgment for the payment of a fine. Then, Wyo.Sess.Laws eh. 68, § 1 (1984) provided a potential for prison labor when the statute then numbered W.S. 7-13-301, 7-13-302, and 7-13-303 was amended to add:
7-13-303. Imposition or modification of conditions; work as a condition of probation.
⅜ ⅜ ⅝: ⅜; ⅝ ⅜
(b) As a condition of any probation, the court, subject to W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704, may order the defendant to perform work for a period not exceeding the maximum probation period.
7-13-701. Work for persons confined in county jail or probationers; generally.
(a) The sentencing court may require the following persons to perform work pursuant to W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704:
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*443(iii) Persons for whom work is imposed as a condition or probation pursuant to W.S. 7-13-303(b).
Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 68 (1984).
These two statutes were essentially restated in the 1987 Title 7 recodification with the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act restated as W.S. 7-13-301 and the adult suspended trial or sentence act restated as W.S. 7-13-302 through 7-13-307.14
*444The Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act was turned upside down by a Senate judiciary committee amendment (without change in the title of the bill) to provide prosecutorial veto for use of the sentencing statute by the addition of the words “with the consent of the defendants and the state.” The adult suspended trial or sentence act lost its principle reason for existence by deletion of the provision which permitted suspension of trial and entry of a probationary sentence. The provision for suspension of trial disappeared in the same way that the prosecutorial veto provision was inserted.
Without question, the adult suspended trial or sentence act was turned into a pure sentencing statute by deletion of the provisions. The majority now contends that the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act, circa 1909, was also turned into a diversion statute. The majority uses this contention to justify the legislature’s insertion of the prosecutorial veto as a limitation on sentencing authority of the judiciary.
The majority is totally wrong in context and the citation of authority fails to sustain the basic arguments presented. The only diversion feature of either statute had been found in the adult suspended trial or sentence act. These cases presented never considered the question of diversion.
First justification for finding the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act to be a diversionary process and not a sentencing statute is presented by the majority in discussion of prosecutorial powers of nolle prose-qui. The presentation is well structured, but contains a pervasive fault. Nolle pro-sequi has nothing to do with these cases and this prosecutorial veto power in the sentencing statutes. Pure nolle prosequi eases addressing executive and judicial discretion can be immediately excluded as totally inapplicable for any precedent in this case.15
Of more arguable relation, we can find the cited cases involving prosecutorial participation in pretrial diversion programs. A clearer look is required to perceive why even this line of authority really does not justify application since W.S. 7-13-301, as the successor to the 1909 juvenile sentencing statute, is still a sentencing statute and not a diversion program as it relates to the cases actually presented. What might have happened if diversion — probation *445without plea — had been attempted is hypothetical and not presented by any of the cases addressed. The reason is that judicial action is invoked only following trial conviction or guilty plea and the sentencing mechanism is restricted to a confined class of individuals and specific offenses. The statute provides a probationary sentence which is wholly unremarkable in sentencing technique with the only individualized feature different from many laws being the opportunity to avoid the burden of a conviction of a felony by good behavior. Over a lifetime, that burden will no doubt exceed any immediate detriment and responsibility impressed by compliance with terms of probation.
The structure of Wyoming criminal statutes for juvenile offenses vests exclusive authority in the juvenile courts for persons under the age of thirteen, court discretionary transfer authority under seventeen, and exclusive discretion in the prosecutor for youths age seventeen or older. W.S. 14-2-203; Menapace v. State, 768 P.2d 8 (Wyo.1989). Now, the prosecutor has discretion to require adult proceedings for young people seventeen or older and the power to insist on the entry of a felony judgment.
III. MAJORITY CASE LAW — DIVERSION CASE
The majority inaccurately cites a number of cases involving modern diversion procedures where discretion of the prosecutor has been favored for authority to justify prosecutorial veto of a sentencing statute. The cases do not fit!16 The pretrial diversion programs of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, Tennessee, Colorado, Oregon and Kansas do not provide authority for application to the similar Wyoming sentencing statute existent here since 1909 which is triggered only by a guilty plea or a jury verdict.
The idea of pretrial diversion is appealing. It represents an attempt to structure and make visible the informal prose-cutorial practices of noncriminal disposition. It also makes possible the early delivery of rehabilitation services on a formal rather than impromptu basis. And it offers the prosecution an alternative to its standard options of full criminal processing or informal screening-out without follow-up supervision.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ !⅜ ⅜ Sft
Pretrial diversion, which began six years ago with two pilot programs, has become today a reform movement “well on its way to institutionalization.” It is predicted that by 1987 there will be 150 programs diverting annually 150,000 persons before trial. But continued proliferation of pretrial diversion programs at this time is hard to justify. Existing programs must first meet the burden of showing that their promises have been or could be delivered. Otherwise, the practice of pretrial diversion, like “almost everything we do in the criminal field, is on the basis of faith.”
Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 Yale L.J. 827, 852-54 (1974) (quoting Zaloom, in 4 Crim.Justice Newsletter, October 15, 1973, at 4 and Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversion From the Criminal Justice System, 1972 (unpublished paper, Harvard Law School).
Principles of the diversion process case law originated very recently and principally from New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The New Jersey Supreme Court established the diversion program and then provided the character of its exercise involving both prosecutorial and sentencing court responsibilities. After the program was in place, the state legislature adopted the structure by enacted statute. In State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), reh’g 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) (Leonardis I), the pretrial intervention program (PTI) was established by the New Jersey Supreme Court to represent a procedural alternative to t)ie traditional system of prose-*446euting and incarcerating criminal suspects. The court noted that PTI was developed within the last decade. Various studies recognize “the desirability of alternative means for the disposition of criminal cases.” Id. 363 A.2d at 325. The system was to provide “prosecutorial options.” Id. at 325. As such, the prosecutor’s participation and discretion was confirmed. State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) (Leonardis II) addressed the exercise of that discretion in the PTI program. Considering that the pretrial diversion program was functionally a quasi judicial decision tailored to provide options to the prosecutor, the' court in Leonardis II discerned the character of supervised discretion of the prosecutor by judicial oversight. The Leonardis cases were followed by State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 432 A.2d 74 (1981) which addressed the development of a legislatively enacted statewide program of pretrial intervention as part of the New Jersey criminal code. The court recognized that
judicial review of a prosecutor’s decision whether or not to suspend criminal charges infringes on both the Legislature’s power to define crimes and the Executive’s responsibility to enforce the laws and therefore must be performed with sensitivity. Since the Legislature has established a PTI program with judicial review, the trial court correctly concluded that the problem of judicial interference with legislative authority has been eliminated.
Id. 432 A.2d at 79. The New Jersey program, did not involve a predicate of an adverse verdict or a guilty plea before participation was considered. The program was an alternative predating plea or trial. The succeeding case, State v. Collins, 180 N.J.Super. 190, 434 A.2d 628 (1981), aff'd 90 N.J. 449, 448 A.2d 977 (1982), addressed various procedural and differentiating features within New Jersey law and determined the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion to deny pretrial diversion was not abused and that the accused’s case would be then pursued to trial. The difference between pretrial diversion and post-conviction sentencing is clear.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise established an accelerated rehabilitation disposition program (ARD) which
“provides a means of suspension of formal criminal proceedings before conviction on the condition that the accused will do something in return, such as make restitution, participate in a rehabilitation program, under psychiatric treatment, hold certain employment, or otherwise modify his behavior. The ARD rules provide that after a defendant is held for court by an issuing authority or after an information or indictment, the district attorney sua sponte or at the request of defendant’s attorney, may move that the case be considered for ARD. The district attorney has the discretion to refuse to ask for ARD and to insist on prosecuting the defendant for the offense.
Com. v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99, 371 A.2d 1346, 1347 (1977) (quoting Shade v. Com. of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Transp., 394 F.Supp. 1237, 1240 (M.D.Pa.1975)). The Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court addressed constitutional activity of the supreme court as a supervisory power in the establishment of the ARD program. Unquestionably, the ARD program is a diversion without conviction process and provides no informative authority for a separation of powers inquiry as is presented here. See likewise Com. v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 495 A. 2d 928 (1985). The similar inquiry into the proper exercise of discretion by the prosecutor for the ARD program was presented as the subject of Com. v. Ebert, 369 Pa.Super. 318, 535 A.2d 178 (1987). The program was described as “a pretrial disposition of certain cases through which the defendant can earn dismissal of the charges against him if he successfully completes a rehabilitation program.” Id. 535 A.2d at 179.
Florida has a statutory pretrial intervention program and the issue presented in State v. Cleveland, 390 So.2d 364 (Fla.App. 1980) was control or supervision of exercised discretion of the prosecutor before trial. The court noted:
The system is one of balancing. If the prosecutor takes the case to trial and the *447defendant is found guilty, the trial judge has the discretion under the law to sentence the defendant in whatever fashion the trial court sees fit.
Id. at 367. Obviously, the discretion of the prosecutor was to permit diversion or to proceed with prosecution. The Florida Supreme Court, in considering the same case, reiterated:
The pretrial diversion is essentially a conditional decision not to prosecute similar to the nolle prosequi situation postulated by [State v.] Jogan, [388 So.2d 322 (Fla.3d DCA 1980) ]. It is a pretrial decision and does not divest the state attorney of the right to institute proceedings if the conditions are not met. The pretrial intervention program is merely an alternative to prosecution and should remain in the prosecutor’s discretion.
Cleveland v. State, 417 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982). The court noted that the Florida system was different than the California program, citing People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405 (1974).
A special intervention program in the Cleveland municipal court was instituted to provide a form of rehabilitation in lieu of conviction and sentence. City of Cleveland v. Mosquito, 10 Ohio App.3d 239, 461 N.E.2d 924 (1983). The program was based on a statutory authorization for prosecuting attorneys to establish the program with cooperation between the court and the executive agency. The program retained the prosecutorial discretion of whether to continue with prosecution or utilize the diversion program. The activity and status demonstrated in the case essentially conforms to New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Florida pre-conviction diversion arrangements. The specific issue in Mosquito, 461 N.E.2d at 927 was the prosecutor’s place to deny the opportunity of Mosquito to “enter the program and escape trial.”
The constitutionality of the Tennessee pretrial diversion program was similarly considered in Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn.1978). The Tennessee system involved a memorandum of understanding between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant without effect until trial court approval. The ease confirmed the authority of the court to supervise the exercise of discretion and found the statute constitutional. The special concurrence is of particular interest in recognizing the three-stage process involving nolle prosequi or pretrial diversion, and, if neither, then verdict. The essential characteristic of the Tennessee system was premised on the agreement of the defendant and the prosecutor to be incorporated pretrial in the memorandum of understanding. The Colorado court in People, By and Through Vanmeveren v. District Court In and For Larimer County, 186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50 (1974) applied the same principle to the same kind of a deferred prosecution statute as a recognition of the prosecutor’s charging discretion.
Oregon statutes established a prosecuto-rial based pretrial diversion authority. The Oregon courts considered the exercise of discretion in State ex rel. Anderson v. Haas, 43 Or.App. 169, 602 P.2d 346 (1979) and the character of a hearing, if any, to terminate upon decision of the prosecutor in State ex rel. Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752, 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to prosecution in State v. Graves, 58 Or.App. 286, 648 P.2d 866 (1982). The thesis of the statute and the case law resulting is the well-established principle of prosecutorial discretion to prosecute. The program is structured in Oregon on an agreement between the prosecution and the defendant and little supervision is provided the court to require that the prosecutor enter into the agreement.
Kansas patterned its statute after the law enacted in Oregon. The Kansas court in State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132 (1980) recognized the same picture of a function in exercising discretion to enter into an agreement by the prosecutor while perceiving that the statute itself was largely a recognition of a prior practice of diverted or delayed prosecution. The court noted:
The control [of the prosecutor] is minimal and the overall effect is merely to make *448the process of diversion more formal by establishing a few procedural standards and establishing some degree of uniformity in procedure. The ultimate decision remains with the prosecutor.
Id. 620 P.2d at 1137-38. The court did note that the prosecutor, although possessing wide discretion, is not immune from judicial review of the exercise of that discretion for arbitrariness. Id. at 1139.
IV. NOLLE PROSEQUI — NO RELEVANCE
Nolle prosequi does not apply to judicial responsibility for sentencing after either a guilty plea or a guilty verdict. Since the plea of guilty has been made in each of these twelve cases and accepted by the court, nolle prosequi has absolutely nothing to do with the constitutionality of a prose-cutorial veto in the sentence entered which determines whether or not a probationary condition will be denied which might permit avoidance of the felony conviction status. There is a difference between dismissing a pending proceeding before guilt has been ascertained and control over sentencing.17 Gooden v. State, 711 P.2d 405 (Wyo.1985); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo.1984); State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1983), Thomas, J., specially concurring; United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100 (S.D.Ill.1945); State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990); Comment, The Nolle Prosequi Under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1978 Det.C.L.Rev. 491 (1978); Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 Yale L.J. 1069 (1990); Note, Criminal Law—Nolle Prosequi —Trial Court Has Power To Dismiss for Want of Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 996 (1966).
The majority opinion loses touch of the issue presented by the appellants. That issue is whether the legislature may delegate to prosecutors any form of control over sentencing. This issue concerns the core function of the judiciary over sentencing. See MJP v. State, 706 P.2d 1108 (Wyo.1985). The improper delegation of core functions to coordinate branches of government was reviewed in Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870. Sentencing is a judicial function. MJP, 706 P.2d 1108; Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1983), reh’g denied 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo.1985).
V. SENTENCING WITH PROSECUTORIAL INVOLVEMENT
There is a distinguished line of prosecu-torial veto cases which address the sentencing feature implicit in the Wyoming Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act of 1909. The principles first enunciated in California case law which addressed sentencing and separation of powers have taken hold in other jurisdictions whose courts addressed issues similar to the issue here.
The conflict first arose in Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 where, in sentencing, the court could dismiss a charged prior offense without approval of the prosecutor. That court indicated:
Thus,' even if the Legislature could constitutionally remove the power to strike priors from the courts, it has not done so, but rather has proposed to vest in the prosecutor the power to foreclose the exercise of an admittedly judicial power by an appropriate judicial officer. It is no answer to suggest that this is but a lesser included portion of the prosecutor’s discretion to forego prosecution, as the decision to forego prosecution does not itself deprive persons of liberty.
When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature. Just as the fact of prosecutorial discretion prior to charging a criminal offense does not imply prosecutorial discretion to convict with*449out a judicial determination of guilt, discretion to forego prosecution does not imply discretion to sentence without a judicial determination of those factors which the Legislature has never denied are within the judicial power to determine and which relate to punishment. The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise.
Id. at 996. The court held that the tested statute was “violative of the California constitutional separation of powers, as that concept demands that the branches of government be coequal and that a prosecutor not be vested with power to foreclose the exercise of a judicial power recognized in [statute].” Id. at 997. Tenorio was followed by Esteybar v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial Dist. of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal.3d 119, 95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140 (1971) where the prose-cutorial veto in determining that a charged defendant may not be tried as a misdemeanor was rejected as a violation of separate judicial responsibility and separation of powers. People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481 (1972) held that the legislature can control eligibility for probation, parole and term of imprisonment but cannot infringe upon a core judicial function by subjecting a judge to the control of the prosecuting attorney. “The imposition of sentence and the exercise of sentencing discretion are fundamentally and inherently judicial functions.” Id. 102 Cal.Rptr. at 143, 497 P.2d at 487 (quoting People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45, 52, 301 P.2d 241 (1956)).
When an individual judge exercises sentencing discretion he exercises a judical power which must be based upon an examination of the circumstances of the particular ease before him, and which is subject to review for abuse. (People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 95, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993.) Here, as in Tenorio and Esteybar the Legislature sought to vest the district attorney with unreviewable powers. * * *
We reiterate the statement made by Justice Schuaer in his dissent in People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 654, 25 Cal.Rptr. 697, 702, 375 P.2d 641, 646, in his analysis of the separation of powers doctrine, that “It bears reiteration that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the judicial process by subjecting a judge to the control of the district attorney.” [18]
Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. at 144, 497 P.2d at 488 (emphasis in original).
The California principles of excluding the prosecutor from control over sentencing was accepted in Arizona under State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 304, 689 P.2d 561, 563 (1984) (citations omitted):
The concept of separation of powers is fundamental to constitutional government as we know it. * * ⅜ It is essential that sharp separation of powers be carefully preserved by courts so that one *450branch of government not be permitted unconstitutionally to encroach upon the functions properly belonging to another. * * * The legislature may not enact a statute which is in conflict with a provision of the state Constitution.
In State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 786 P.2d 932 (1989), that principle was reaffirmed when the court considered whether the prosecutor could control sentencing discretion by his charging decision. The court found that the statute violated constitutional concepts of separation of powers, equal protection, and/or substantive due process. “[0]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.” Id. 163 Ariz. at 85, 786 P.2d at 936. The Arizona court severed the prosecutorial control feature in a fashion comparable to action taken by the Minnesota courts. Id. 163 Ariz. at 87, 786 P.2d at 938, appendix.19
In Illinois, courts have identified the difference between a sentence and the alternative treatment diversion:
“The Act provides an alternative to the usual criminal justice procedures; it allows a criminal defendant with a drug abuse problem to avoid the criminal justice machinery * * The treatment under the Act, unlike a sentence, is not a consequence of defendant’s guilt. It is instead an alternative to a criminal conviction and the regular sentencing alternatives available under [Illinois law].
People v. Teschner, 81 Ill.2d 187, 40 Ill. Dec. 818, 407 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1980) (emphasis in original and quoting People v. Phillips, 66 Ill.2d 412, 416, 6 Ill.Dec. 215, 217, 362 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (1977)). The difference was also recognized between disposition and imposition of a criminal sanction. Accord People v. Caldwell, 118 Ill.App.3d 1027, 74 Ill.Dec. 464, 455 N.E.2d 893 (1983).20
In State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982), the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered a statute which conditioned the power of a court to sentence without regard to the mandatory minimum provisions upon the discretion of a prosecutor. The Minnesota court observed
*451that the prosecutor is not only a member of the executive branch, but an advocate as well. His or her attention throughout the criminal trial is focused on achieving conviction, and appropriately so. But we expect too much when we look to the prosecutor alone for an evenhanded assessment of whether mitigating factors may exist in eases that have been successfully prosecuted. The present appeals amply illustrate the inadequacy of such a limited mechanism; it is neither constitutional, nor practical in our adversary system of criminal justice.
* * * * * *
* * * If the legislature gives such power to the prosecutors, it must also give it to the courts. It cannot constitutionally do otherwise.
Id. at 19.
In summary, not only does a rigorous analysis of the diversion cases cited in the majority opinion fail to authenticate the prosecutorial participation in judicial function, but the appropriately related authority uniformly denies that executive branch preclusion in essentially a sentencing decision which is not justified in Wyoming.
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS
As the majority points out, the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is not mandatory on the states. Dreyer v. People of State of Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84, 23 S.Ct. 28, 32, 47 L.Ed. 79 (1902). The doctrine is not mandated in the United States Constitution, but is understood to flow naturally from the division of government. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201, 48 S.Ct. 480, 482, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928).
On the other hand, Wyoming’s Constitution includes that specific separation of powers clause:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1. I also make note of our Constitution’s placement of the state’s judicial power:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as the legislature may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to time.
Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1.
Given our declaration that our constitution “is not a grant but a limitation on legislative power,” Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, 1124, reh’g denied 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo.1978), this court should strictly construe our separation of powers clause. In the same regard that the legislature cannot divvy up its basic legislative power to a staff agency, Legislative Research Com’n By and Through Prather, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky.1984), it also cannot properly reassign a judicial function for sentencing to an advocate of the executive branch of government. See, likewise, the consideration of delegation of the executive charging function to the judiciary in Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870. See, however, State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis.2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987), overruled 150 Wis.2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989), which in second opinion provided a converse result.
The majority limits judicial power to the power to “adjudicate,” by which it means to make the final determinations in a case and to administer its own affairs. I refuse to relegate judicial power to such a narrow sphere.
We have visited the concept of judicial power before. In Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 713-14 (Wyo. 1987), we characterized judicial power as follows:
It is unquestioned that courts have inherent powers beyond those specified in rules and statutes that are absolutely *452necessary to the courts’ ability to perform the functions for which they were created. ⅜ * *
* * * * * *
First it is said that courts possess an inherent power described as
“an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms ‘court’ and ‘judicial power.’ ” Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562, 77 A.L.R.Fed. 751 (3rd Cir.1985).
This power is essential to the separation of powers concept and allows a court to act notwithstanding contrary [constitutional] legislative direction. There is also an inherent power that is described as necessary to the efficient functioning and prompt and just disposition of litigation and business of the court. Thus, courts have an inherent power to summon witnesses and compel their attendance, to administer oaths, prevent abusive process, provide counsel for the indigent, correct records, relieve parties in default, discipline attorneys at law, and take other similar appropriate action. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 79. Finally, there is an inherent power to take such action as is useful to the efficient functioning of the court. What is necessary and what is useful may be difficult to ascertain and subject to considerable disagreement. It has been said that “the notion of inherent power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as ‘shadowy,’ ” “not possible to locate with exactitude,” and, therefore, should be exercised with great restraint and caution. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., supra, 757 F.2d at 561-562.
As nebulous as this concept is, this quotation indicates that judicial power extends beyond the limit which the majority assigns.
The majority speculates that our separation of powers clause was borrowed from the constitutions of Idaho and Montana. R. Prien, The Background of the Wyoming Constitution 56, 70 (1956) notes that Wyo. Const, art. 5, § 1, which contains the grant of judicial power, similarly has its roots in Montana. Thus, the meaning the Montana court assigns to this term could be persuasive authority and serve as an appropriate starting point. Cf. Matter of Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo.1977).
In State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747, 753 (1950) (emphasis in original and added), the Montana Supreme Court viewed judicial power this way:
Judicial power is not only the authority to decide, but to make binding orders and judgments. The kind of authority that is judicial in its nature relates to and acts upon the rights of person and property not created by this authority but existing under the law. This judicial authority in specific controversies between parties determines these rights as they exist and does so at the instance of a party to such controversy. These qualities distinguish judicial power from that which is simply legislative or executive.
Judicial power as contra-distinguished from the power of the law has no existence. Judicial power is exercised by means of courts which are the mere creations and instruments of the law, and independent of the law the courts have no existence. The law precedes the courts. The law governs the courts. Thus it is the function of the courts to expound and administer law in those causes properly before them in course of legal procedure.
Montana’s concept of judicial power embraces more than the majority’s “adjudication” and administration of court business view. Looking to other jurisdictions is also helpful to explain the concept.
Judicial power extends beyond the power to adjudicate a particular controversy and encompasses the power to regulate matters related to adjudication. * * *
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* * * Such power, properly used, is essential to the maintenance of a strong *453and independent judiciary, a necessary component of our system of government.
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis.2d 31, 315 N.W.2d 703, 709-10 (1982) (emphasis added). A court has all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. People v. Little, 89 Misc.2d 742, 392 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (1977). Judicial power comprehends all authority necessary to preserve and improve the fundamental judicial function of deciding cases. Clerk of Court’s Comp, for Lyon County v. Lyon County Com ’rs., 308 Minn. 172, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976). Judicial power is the legal right, ability, and authority to hear and decide a justicia-ble issue or controversy; such power is ordinarily vested in a court of justice. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 135 F.Supp. 304, 308 (S.D.Miss.1955). Judicial power consists of three elements: examination of the truth, determination of the law arising upon that fact, and ascertainment and application of the remedy. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Com’n v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., in Linn County, 222 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Iowa 1974). The legislature is vested with the power to enact the laws, but it cannot constitutionally enact laws that unduly infringe upon the powers of the court. People v. Felella, 131 I11.2d 525, 137 Ill.Dec. 547, 546 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1989).
The prosecutorial veto authority granted by W.S. 7-13-301 interferes with this core power. It denies the trial court the power to determine facts, for the prosecutor need not cite any facts to exercise the veto. It denies the trial court the power to determine an appropriate remedy in any individual situation. In short, the trial court’s essential function of delivering justice becomes short circuited due to the veto. No debate is necessary over the power of the prosecutor to decide whether to bring charges and what charges to bring, or to decide to drop the charges when he feels he has no case against a defendant. However, the prosecutor should not have the power to sit on the bench or make the decisions that lead to the final disposition of a case. Adjudication includes the process in arriving at the final outcome as well as deciding the outcome itself. Waugh v. 'American Cas. Co., 190 Kan. 725, 378 P.2d 170, 175 (1963). In Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d at 872 (quoting Esteybar, 485 P.2d at 1143), we adopted the following language from the California Supreme Court:
“When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.” ([People v.] Tenorio, supra [3 Cal.3d 89] at p. 94, 89 Cal.Rptr. [249] at p. 252, 473 P.2d [993] at p. 996.)
* * * * * *
“[T]his court [has] struck down under the separation of powers doctrine legislative attempts to subject an exercise of judicial power to prosecutorial concurrence.” * * ⅜ Hoines v. Barney’s Club, Inc., 28 Cal.3d 603, 170 Cal.Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628, 633 (1980).
The majority would like for us to forget that we made the second part of that statement.
The grant of power to the trial court to consider W.S. 7-13-301 disposition of a criminal matter is, no doubt, a legitimate legislative exercise of power. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 50 (Wyo.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983). The legislature may authorize the trial court to use broad discretion or no discretion at all in making its determination of how to dispose of such matters. People v. Bainter, 126 Ill.2d 292, 127 Ill.Dec. 938, 533 N.E.2d 1066 (1989); Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 18. But once the legislature acts, it cannot constitutionally condition the trial court’s decision upon prior approval of the prosecutor. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 786 P.2d 932. The present deviation from a historical standard of Wyoming law is demonstrated by State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo.1983), where this court refused to accept a Petition of Padget kind of delegation from administrative responsibility by legislative action. See likewise State v. Saltzer, 20 Ohio App.3d 277, 485 N.E.2d 831 .(1985). “Whereas the judicial branch must be and *454is largely independent of intrusion by the legislative branch, the executive branch exists principally to do its bidding.” Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616, 623 (Ky.1982).
W.S. 7-13-301 is an unconstitutional grant of power from the legislature to the executive branch. The prosecutorial veto provision of this statute violates the separation of powers provision of Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1 and usurps the judicial power granted the judiciaRbranch of government in Wyo. Const, art. 5, § l.21
I would reverse all of these consolidated cases except for Lowry. In Lowry’s case, where the trial court found the veto provision unconstitutional and applied W.S. 7-13-301 without the prosecutor’s consent, I would vote to affirm. Mower, 750 P.2d 679 was good law and should not be abandoned.22
VII. PENDING WYOMING CASES
The dozen cases presently pending in this court to test the uncontrolled discretion granted the prosecutor to deny usage of either segment of the non-felony conviction statute, W.S. 7-13-301, are a composite of our modern society. At issue is not the power of persuasion of the prosecutor; it is an undisciplined use of a veto to foreclose judicial probation sentencing alternatives. Not one of the cases involved a properly defined diversion status since in every case an actual plea was made, justified and accepted except the one county court case where the statute was declared unconstitutional by the county court judge.
*455What the trial court might have done in the individual case in the absence of the veto is not necessarily disclosed in these records. Probably at least in one case, a non-felony conviction structure would have been followed and, probably, in the face of the specific plea bargaining statute and with good reasoning and honest argument by the prosecutor, the felony conviction status would have been adopted by the trial court in at least several of the cases. This would have permitted the exercised discretion of the judiciary to leave further amelioration to the Governor under the constitutional powers of pardon and commutation.
Here, the clearly defined issue in every case now pending is the authority of the prosecutor to veto a favorable sentencing alternative without any necessary discre-tional responsibility or justification and to do this only to insist that a felony conviction results. In not one of these cases was there any semblance of another issue about terms, conditions or probationary aspects of the actual sentence granted which, in all cases, was probation.23 There is absolutely *457no case cited by the State or included in the majority opinion that justifies the unsupervised prosecutorial discretion after considering that the diversion cases are not prec-edentially applicable to the post-guilty plea sentencing cases involved here.
VIII(A). VETO WAS NOT PROPERLY ENACTED — CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION — CHANGE OF PURPOSE
The history of legislative misconduct and mistake, Wyo.Sess.Laws eh. 91 (1939) (as amended), emphasizes the need for the constitutional protection included in the Wyoming Constitution for limitations on the bill passage process. Those found in the Wyoming Constitution are similar to many states:
Laws to be passed by bill; alteration or amendment of bills.
No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20.
Bill must go to committee.
No bill shall be considered or become a law unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom and printed for the use of the members.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 23.
Bill to contain only one subject, which shall be expressed in title.
No bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24.
Vote required to pass bill.
No bill shall become a law except by a vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house, nor unless on its final passage the vote taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting be entered on the journal.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 25.
In addition, the very detailed Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 27 itemizes prohibitions against special legislation in the large number of individualized perspectives.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20 provides that “no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose,” and Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 24 relates to the single purpose and the purpose expressed in the title that challenges the constitutional validity of the committee insertion of prosecu-_ torial veto without changing the title in the bill.
H.B. 92, 49th Leg. (1987), which, with amendments, subsequently became Wyo. Sess.Laws ch. 157 (1987), was a product of the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee’s criminal code review of Wyoming’s criminal statutes which continued over a number of years. Earlier revision of the criminal code in Title 6 of the statutes occurred by enactment of Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 75 (1982) and Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 171 (1983) which were products of the same continuing program. With the exception of some specific substantive amendments, the revisionary purpose of H.B. 92 was stated for “eliminating duplications, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting and renumbering sections; providing definitions; repealing procedural provision superseded by court rules; ⅜ ⅜ ⅜.” In addition, substantive provisions were recognized in the title specifically to identify substantive changes by exclusion or inclusion. The included provision relating to this subject was providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation pri- or to the entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes.
Following House passage of H.B. 92, the Senate Judiciary Committee inserted prose-cutorial veto of the sentencing discretion of the trial court as a committee amendment. No change to the title was made to reflect *458the addition of the state’s consent. “The purpose of the constitutional requirements relating to the enactment of laws was to put the members of the Assembly and others interested, on notice, by the title of the measure submitted, so that they might vote on it with circumspection.” Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938) (emphasis in original).
If the separation of powers issue identified by the prosecutorial veto amendment was not significant, the extended consideration in majority opinion was wasted. The mother and father of Jeffrey D. Billis surely were not warned by information available in a process where no one outside of a few insiders would have been aware of the change in Wyoming law to give a power to the prosecutor to require felony conviction status for their son. Not only does the title fail to disclose creation of the prosecu-torial veto of judicial sentencing discretion, but conversély, it clearly conveys the impression that no actual change in the existent law is intended.
The title is therefore misleading and gives rise to surprise. It follows then that those provisions which are beyond the subject, as expressed in the title, must be held to be inoperative, since the general public would not be put upon notice of the contents of the act from a reading of the title.
Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 102 (Wyo. 1963).
The general nature of the title does not strengthen the choice made by the majority in this case where specific subjects are given a title reference, but prosecutorial veto remains untitled.
Edwards v. Business Men’s Assur. Co. of America, 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82, 93 (1942) recognized that the title “must be a fair index of the matters in the bill” when it stated:
The purpose of the constitutional provision, supra, has been stated as follows: “First, to prevent hodge podge or ‘log rolling’ legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered in order that they have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.”
Id. 168 S.W.2d at 92 (quoting State ex rel. United Railways Co. v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449, 459, 133 S.W. 329, 331).
Furthermore, where the title is restrictive, the bill must be restrictive. Hunt v. Armour & Co., 345 Mo. 677, 136 S.W.2d 312 (1939).
The error made by the majority’s argument is the disregard of the compound constitutional questions presented. The one subject and title recitation of purpose requirement of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24 addresses a general informational function. Additionally, Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 20, amendment or alteration — the log rolling proviso-addresses surreptitious or unnoticed change after bill consideration starts. Here we have both a separate subject inserted and an amendment to achieve a different purpose during passage without changed title.24 The cogent analysis in Alabama Ed. Ass’n v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, 374 So.2d 258, 262 (Ala.1979) (emphasis in original) should be applied to the Wyoming Constitution:
*459There is no warning or notice to the members of the legislature nor to the public * * *.
If this Act is not violative of [the Alabama Constitution], then there is little, if any, room for operation of those sections and extensive “log-rolling” would result to the detriment of the citizens of this state.
If this Act does not violate [constitutional provisions], then any appropriation bill could carry in its body a hidden proviso that no judge, no legislator, nor the executive could receive the appropriations of his respective office until that official performs some act as a prerequisite.
If this were permitted no legislator, no public official, nor the public would know of the existence of the hidden proviso without reading the entire bill. To require reading the entire bill so as to discover its pertinent provisions would clearly fly in the teeth of the [constitutional] requirements. * * *
There are well-stated and very significant reasons for the constitutional provisions restricting bill passage. Spoken in terms of both legislator awareness and public information, the anathema to democratic processes is secret government conducted by insulated and isolated processes where special interests can reign supreme. For a majority which values the supremacy of majority rule over the potential rights of minorities so greatly, I am surprised they do so little to ensure that the legislative product is indeed the product of a majority.
If the substantive bill change reflected here by introducing the prosecutorial veto does not fall within the constitutional criteria, then it is hard to find anything that will do so considering the fundamentals of separation of power. Examination of Wyoming case law does not convince me that our predecessors on this court undertook to abandon the historical purposes of the text of constitutional limitations on bill passage processes. The cattle-dipping case of Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918 (1912) does not provide that authority for non-compliance in the prosecutorial veto statute. At issue in the case, as a purpose of the legislation, were details of the duties of the state veterinarian. The case addressed a rather ordinary addition relating to epidemic control of diseased animals. The germaneness of the change can hardly be questioned. Arbuckle, in discussing veterinarian duties, provides no light on this present subject. The majority ignores fact by comparing the prosecutorial veto of judicial sentencing authority to a veterinarian’s control over diseased animals.
It is strange that the majority finds support from Smith, 386 P.2d 98. In Smith, a bill directed to control out-of-state liquor importation suffered a barnacle during passage providing for an increase of the excise tax on malt liquors. The invalidity of the tax increase under the constitutional constraints of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 20 is clearly comparable to the prosecutorial veto of judicial sentencing power found here.
Generally speaking, if the matter contained in an amendatory or supplementary act is germane to the original act, a reference in the title to the section of the statute to be amended or supplemented accurately indicates the general subject of the legislation and is not in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a clear expression of such subject. * * *
Also, it has been held that such a reference, although not specifying the nature of the amendment, is adequate, where the subject matter of the actual amendment is “germane” to that of the provision amended — the theory being that the reader of the bill will get enough information by looking at the earlier law and the caption of the amendatory bill.
This general rule has no application, however, when the nature of the amendment actually is specified and the title of the bill indicates that a particular change in the original act is proposed. As for example, in both the original title and amended title of S.F. No. 103, the title specifies that § 12-5 is to be amended “so as to prohibit” certain acts. It does not indicate § 12-5 is to be amended in any other respect.
*460The attorney general’s office shows us no reason to believe and no authority for the proposition that this limited purpose of amending, “so as to prohibit” the forbidden acts, could be construed to include all subject matters germane to the original act. It does, however, place reliance upon what was said in the Board of Com’rs v. Stone case, supra, at 51 P. 607. In that case an attempt was made in the title to state the effect, or part of the effect, of the amendatory act, but the court found the statement to be entirely meaningless and therefore pronounced it harmless and of no effect. We fail to find any support in the Stone case for defendants’ position, and we know of no other reliable authority therefor.
On the other hand, we consider the following cases authority for holding that when a title particularizes the changes which are to be made in an amendatory act, the legislation is limited to matters specified, and anything beyond this limitation would be void regardless of how germane it might be to the subject of the original act[.]
Smith, 386 P.2d at 100-01.
The relevance of Smith is identified by our discussion of the Nebraska cases, including Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1959) and language found in 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 310 (8th ed. 1927):
The conclusion in Nebraska has been that an act is unconstitutional and void if the title is not broad enough to include the subject matter of legislation. In other words, as stated in 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 1908, p. 349 (3d Ed.), while a title need not set out the nature of the changes made, if it does, the body of the amendatory act may not contain any other matter, however germane it may be to the subject of the original act as a whole.
Sutherland, on the same page, further points out that if a narrow title is selected, the amendment should not go beyond its scope. Otherwise, the function of the title is defeated.
Smith, 386 P.2d at 101.
In Smith, 386 P.2d at 101, we further .recognized prior precedent of this court:
In the recent case of Morrow v. Diefenderfer, supra, at 384 P.2d 603, Chief Justice Parker re-emphasized an earlier pronouncement to the effect that the object of Art. 3, § 24, is to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation, caused by provisions in a bill of which the title gives no intimation. Also, an opinion written by former Chief Justice Blume for In re West Highway Sanitary and Improvement District, 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495, 500, makes it clear that the title to a bill should not be misleading or give rise to surprise or deception, and if a title is specific, it is not entitled to the liberal interpretation which would prevail otherwise.
A new subject was introduced by the bill amendment within the definition of Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 604 (Wyo. 1963) and a reasonable ground by which any legislator or other person could in fact claim surprise or fraud was provided. The Morrow circumstance cannot serve to provide validity to the first-time, new-subject amendment insertion.
Although the court in Matter of West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495 (1957) declined to decide Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 24 or the bill subject to be clearly expressed in the title, Chief Justice Blume provided thoughtful expression to the general rules by stating “[t]he title should not be misleading or give rise to surprise or deception. * * * If it is specific it is not entitled to the liberal interpretation which would prevail otherwise.” Id. 317 P.2d at 500.
In Matter of West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., Chief Justice Blume noted the title was both general and specific by reason of providing for the issuance of general obligation bonds, and he then reflected “[i]f the title had given authority only to issue revenue bonds, and the body of the act had made a provision for general obligation bonds, then, we think we would be required *461to hold that the title would be deceiving and hence in violation of Article 3, § 24, Constitution of Wyomingf.]” Id. at 500.
In the context of these principles, we could also follow another rule of construction stated in the opinion:
[With enumeration] we must apply the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alter-áis. Accordingly, “where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned.” * * * The rule is applicable in construing constitutional provisions.
Id. at 504 (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 333, p. 666).
In an opinion anchored in practical experience, I have no disagreement with majority citation and quotation that the Wyoming Constitution in this regard, as all others, should be liberally and reasonably construed (including guarantees of Wyo. Const. art. 1). Morrow, 384 P.2d at 603; Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 66 (Wyo. 1962); Board of Com’rs of Laramie County v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605 (1898). The difference we have embraces justification of a separation of powers issue by in-passage amendment of a legislative bill to provide for a prosecutorial veto of judicial sentencing authority for the first time. This creates a power in the prosecutor to decide that the accused must be branded a felon. In Morrow, the issue of difference between general obligation bonds and revenue bonds as a change was not decided in decision. In Brinegar, the controversy developed from a bill title relating to general powers of the fire marshal with text directed to the development of rules to control coin operated gasoline pump service stations. In State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636 (1924), the bill title broadly addressed Wyoming’s adventure into prohibition prohibiting the possession and manufacture of intoxicating beverages “and carrying into effect so far as the state of Wyoming is concerned the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States[.]” Id. 228 P. at 637. Bill provisions provided for gubernatorial removal of ineffective or inefficient law enforcement officers and came to be applied to the prosecuting attorney of Hot Springs County, Wyoming. Under the law, the amended and supplementary complaint filed with the governor charges that the prosecuting attorney of Hot Springs County “has been guilty of intoxication and drunkenness on some 14 stated dates * * * [and] he has at times willfully failed and refused to perform the duties imposed upon him by the said act, and has at frequent intervals by intoxication incapacitated himself from carrying on the work of county and prosecuting attorney.” Id. at 637.
In sustaining the relationship of the removal process to the title of the bill, the court stated:
The attention of the legislature was directed to the subject of suppressing the unlawful manufacture, sale, etc. of intoxicating liquors. The effectiveness of the law would have to depend largely on the faithfulness and diligence of the officers charged with its enforcement, and it was deemed proper to provide for removal by the Governor of those officers who refused or neglected to perform the duties imposed upon them by the act. This provision, of course, would apply to only those officers who have duties to perform under the act, and we believe that the further provision in the same sentence, for the removal of officers guilty of intoxication or drunkenness must be restricted in its meaning to the same class of officers, and as permitting their removal, if by intoxication and drunkenness they render themselves unfit or unable to perform those duties. This we believe to be the real meaning of the language in question, when considered with a proper regard for the subject-matter and the object sought to be accomplished. As thus interpreted, we believe the inclusion in the act of the provision for removal of such officers is not contrary to the constitutional requirement that every act shall contain but one sub*462ject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title.
Id. at 638.
I find support in that case by the statement that “[tjhis court has long recognized the principle that this section of the Constitution, though mandatory, must be liberally and reasonably construed,” to recognize that the prosecutorial veto amendment fails compliance here. Id. at 638. The only purpose of the prosecutorial veto insertion was to provide power to the prosecutor to make a first-time offender a felon with loss of citizenship and other disabilities. That power is directly related to the plea bargaining leverage by creating the advocate’s right to destroy lives as a function of non-agreement in plea or, as a constituent of plea, may bargain for probation. This is not a matter of form, it is a question of power within a three-department government in a democratic society.
I am no more enamored by the majority’s justification based on the nature of H.B. 92 as a partial revision of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes where the bill attends to “eliminating duplications, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting and renumbering sections; providing definitions; repealing procedural provision superseded by court rules,” and then addresses a specifically detailed subject described in the title. I would apply the Matter of West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., 317 P.2d at 504 (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 333, p. 666) rule on construction “ ‘where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned.’ ”
Revisers of statutes are presumed not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a construction which makes it consistent with the former statute. Duffield v. Pike, 71 Conn.
521, 529, 42 A. 641; [ (1899) ] Westfield Cemetery Ass’n v. Danielson, 62 Conn. 319, 26 A. 345; [ (1892) ] State v. Neuner, 49 Conn. 232, 235; 36 Cyc. p. 1067.
Bassett v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 Conn. 393, 161 A. 852, 854 (1932).
The prosecutorial veto amendatory addition is not an alteration or omission; it is an entirely new subject which should have been inserted in Title 5, Courts, since it relates to Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1, separation of powers, and Wyo. Const. art. 5, judiciary to limit discretion and authority of the courts in criminal sentencing by a delegation of powers to the executive officer. Prosecutorial veto, with the prior body of Wyoming, was clearly so incongruous that it could not, by any fair intendment, be considered germane to a revision or recodi-fication of the earlier Wyoming sentencing statute of probation for first-time offenders derived from a juvenile sentencing statute. Cf. State v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177 (1952) which related to the criminal offense of practicing medicine without a medical license.
Although I believe the majority ranges far too broadly in approval of a revision which becomes a piggy-back medium for separate statutory changes, my challenge is to the new legislation in this case which was neither recognized in the title nor germane to the issues addressed within the Title 6 designation.25
All of the justifications for mandatory compliance with the constitutional criteria for enactment process are violated by the implicit phraseology and far reaching consequences of the words “and the state” as an unnoted and probably unnoticed bill amendment.
YIII(B). CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE ALSO MANDATORY FOR THE LEGISLATURE
*463There is one specific purpose in the state constitutional provisions addressing procedural requirements for legislative enactment. Service in the legislature is eminently persuasive of the wisdom of the constitutional provisions and requirements for compliance.26 There are few people, if any, who know what is going on when complex issues are presented during extended recodification.
Consequently, the theory of the procedural requirement of the Wyoming Constitution is to provide as much assistance and information to the individual member of the legislature as possible. The greatest danger develops from ingenious expertise when applied to recodification and revision. Without a legislative history foundation, such as is provided in the United States Congress or in many state legislatures by recorded debates and records of committee proceedings, the danger of accidental misadventure or surreptitious redirection is unfortunately enhanced without required disclosure. Sometimes only a few innocuous words are required.27
Not particularly different is the small amendatory addition to one of Wyoming’s basic sentencing statutes, but one which effectively turned the eighty-year Wyoming law upside down. It is fair to assess that, excluding a few lobbyists who knew what they were doing, almost no member of the 1987 session had any perception of either the existence or the importance of the insertion of the prosecutorial veto into the sentencing statute. I would find the significant change in the sentencing statute, H.B. 92, when enacted into Wyo.Sess. Laws ch. 157 (1987), to fail because: (1) the change was not described in the bill title as required by Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 24; (2) addition of the subject in H.B. 92 changed the original purpose in defiance of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 20; (3) the change did not comply with the • germaneness criteria of rules adopted by both the Wyoming House of Representatives and the Senate; and (4) the change substantially invaded the separation of powers of Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1 by denigration of the judicial sentencing power.
Admittedly, this court has been less than vigilant in observation of legislative carelessness and disinclined to follow constitutional enactment requirements. Eternal vigilance, which is the essential constituent of the oath of office to support, obey and defend the constitution, cannot be magically eliminated by dissertations of shared burdens and spread responsibility. No other official in our democratic society can be the recipient of a shared delegation of the judiciary’s responsibility for the maintenance of the state's Constitution and the United States Constitution. If the judiciary cannot, or chooses not to, then the system will inevitably fail.
VIII(C). BILL TITLE — SPECIFICITY AND ACCURACY
The general principle was specifically recognized by this court in Smith, 386 P.2d 98, discussed in detail hereafter, and re-recognized with the broader, non-specific title in State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 94-6, I.A.F.F. v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 303 (Wyo.1968), which stated:
*464In Smith v. Hansen, Wyo., 386 P.2d 98, 101, we pointed out, since the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as it pleases, it is obvious that it may sometimes so frame a title as to preclude matters which might with entire propriety have been embraced, but which must now be Excluded because the title is unnecessarily restrictive and the courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. We found that to have happened in the Smith case. If the title for the act now being dealt with had been restricted in the manner which the city contends for, it is entirely possible the act would be suffering the same fate as the act in the Smith ease did.
The criteria of the Wyoming constitutional provision that the subject be clearly expressed in the title was recognized in early Colorado cases:
“Moreover, we are bound to assume that the word ‘clearly’ was not incorporated into the constitutional provision under consideration by mistake. It appears in but few of the corresponding provisions of other state Constitutions — a fact that could hardly have been unobserved by the convention. That this word was advisedly used, and was intended to affect the manner of expressing the subject, we cannot doubt. The matter covered by legislation is to be ‘clearly,’ not dubiously or obscurely indicated by the title.”
People v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 69, 185 P. 657, 658 (1919) (quoting In re Breene, 14 Colo. 401, 24 P. 3 (1890)).
That court followed the same thesis in Friederich, 185 P. at 658:
In determining the first question: whether the title of the Act fails to clearly express the subject of the statute, we are aware that no legislative act should be nullified upon constitutional grounds unless such legislation is plainly in violation of the Constitution. It is equally true, however, that the authority of the fundamental law of the state must be recognized, approved and enforced.
Section 21 of Article 5 is practically identical with provisions found in most of the state Constitutions, providing that the subject of any act shall be expressed in its title. Our Constitution, however, declares that not only must the subject be expressed in the title, but that such subject must be “clearly” so expressed. The rule, as announced in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) page 178, is as follows:
“As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in an act which might with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with no dispensing power; the Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall be operative; it is no answer to say that the title might have been more comprehensive — in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so.”
By all authority and precedent it is firmly settled that the purpose of a statute must be ascertained and determined by its title, and that the title is presumed to be the controlling and conclusive index of the legislative intent.
See also Gronert v. People, 95 Colo. 508, 37 P.2d 396 (1934).
The clearly expressed subject is a mandatory requirement:
The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is directory, seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be conceded; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be *465enforced at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also seems to us that there are few evils which can be inflicted by a strict adherence to the law, so great as that which is done by the habitual disregard, by any department of the government, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously observed and obeyed.
1 T. Cooley, supra at 312-13.
The Nebraska court, in considering a comparable constitutional provision in State ex rel. School Dist. No. 6 of Pierce County v. Board of County Com’rs of Pierce County, 10 Neb. 476, 6 N.W. 763 (1880), found an amendment of a bill without a change in the title unconstitutional in purpose extension. In a succeeding lien controversy, that court restated the principled purpose of constitutional provisions in Miller v. Hurford, 11 Neb. 377, 9 N.W. 477, 479 (1881):
Our constitutional provision, that “no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title,” is but making inviolable the rule governing legislative bodies that “no proposition or subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.” Experience has shown that in the absence of constitutional restrictions the rule at times is liable to be overthrown, and objectionable and pernicious legislation is the result. To guard against this evil our constitution prohibits more than one subject being embraced in a bill. And while this provision has sometimes been attended with inconvenience, as in case of a revision of the laws, it is a safeguard against corrupt or improvident legislation, and its effect has been to simplify legislation and place every bill upon its true merits. But if, under the pretext of amending a section, a subject entirely foreign to the subject-matter of the section to be amended can be introduced, this barrier will be entirely broken down, and the constitutional guaranty in effect destroyed.
See likewise Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 869, 871 (1893), which stated:
We are fully conscious of the importance of the principle which forbids the courts to declare a statute unconstitutional where any substantial doubt exists, but we have no doubts in this case. The act is, upon its face, clearly violative of several constitutional provisions. To sustain it would be to invite their disregard in the future, if not to countenance the practice suggestively designated as “logrolling.” In such a case the duty of the court to set aside an act is as clear as its duty generally to presume the validity of statutes, and no considerations based upon the importance of interests affected can discharge the courts from performing such duty.
IX. CONCLUSION
In terms of legislative enactment process, this prosecutorial veto was not constitutionally inserted; in terms of notice for citizen participation, nothing was provided. The majority fails in constitutional responsibility on this test also.28
The ability of many nonviolent persons to function as productive members of society will be destroyed by the ability of prosecutors to insist unilaterally that they be branded as felons despite the judgment to the contrary by the trial judge. I dissent against the grant of power to an advocate to act as a judge then empowered needlessly to add numbers to our members of society who are stigmatized as felons and more likely to be unproductive burdens on those of us who must work. Who is pushing and *466who is leading all of us to the cliff of economic non-competitiveness is painfully obvious. I also dissent with profound concern for what has been done to the precious division of governmental power which helps keep tyranny at bay.
. Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1 states:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
. W.S. 7-13-301 (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
Placing person found guilty, but not convicted, on probation.
(a) If a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any misdemeanor * * *, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation * * *.
. See Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo.1990).
. It is also harsh, but appropriate, to reflect that the prosecutorial veto would be more acceptable if the appropriateness of punishment was visited upon those responsible authorities in Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo.1990) by challenge to the non-prosecution of the principal wrongdoers or in Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287 by a perjury conviction and sentence for the prosecutor. Crime does not first exist when the unwashed are apprehended. It is the ignored, absolved and protected that set the standard for an offensive and criminally infected society.
In context of Madison and Jefferson, ideals of democracy, individual rights, worthiness and the individual within a civilized humane society, these prosecutorial veto cases personify a result-oriented adjudication at its most virulent manifestation. Twenty or twenty-five years from now someone could easily win a Pulitzer or like award by following the future activities of the twelve people whose lives as potentially productive people were damaged or destroyed by the decision to require a conviction of a felony in contravention of the constitutional directive of our penal code of reformation and, usually, for no definable reason.
Status as a felon deals in undescribable and undiscernible present damage to both the individual and, through them, our society. Each miscreant who may seek to rehabilitate but then becomes a hardened criminal by societal failure is the direct responsibility of those who author these failures of fairness. Each future offense and each life lost by the criminalization of a broad group of our younger generation is a loss to all of us for which this court must take the primary responsibility. Inevitably, it will be those unable to protect themselves because of limited wealth or ineffective legal assistance upon whom prosecutorial veto will be most heavily inflicted.
It would be imbecilic or juvenile to ignore the recognition of the sweep of power and effect in the reorganized authority in our society of the prosecutorial veto. The unanchored and uncontrolled power will be implicit, explicit and omnipresent within the totality of the first offense violator and plea bargaining in criminal sentences. This is unanchored increased advocacy power beyond any reasoned fair trial constitutional concepts.
. It is interesting to acknowledge the perspective of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. that the most important case ever decided in his judicial career, extended as it has been, came to be the reapportionment cases required to correct legislative malfeasance and judicial impotence. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) as followed by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, reh’g denied 379 U.S. 870, 85 S.Ct. 12, 13 L.Ed.2d 76 (1964). Unfortunately, federal judicial response was called when state political opportunism was more important than the legislator’s constitutional oath and directed constitutional reapportionment obligations, and while nothing happened legislatively, the state courts collectively wrung their hands in disdain, despair and inaction. Gage, 377 P.2d 299.
. Consider A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist (1961).
. I would also consider Gale, 792 P.2d 570 important in this context due to the fact that prosecutors gave criminal immunity to a father after nearly a decade of sexually abusing his daughters.
. See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), reh’g 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
. A thorough exploration of the probationary sentence without felony conviction occurs in People v. Banks, 53 Cal.2d 370, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102 (1959), which involved criminal statutes similar in result to the pre-1987 Wyoming law.
In distinguishing the intermediate probationary sentence from the felony conviction, that court described:
By contrast, the defendant whose guilt has been established (by plea, finding or verdict) but who has not been sentenced to prison, i.e., where probation has been granted and the proceedings have been suspended without entry of judgment, is subject to no disabilities whatsoever except those specifically declared by some other provision of law or affirmatively prescribed by the court as terms or conditions of probation. The probationer in the latter case still retains his ordinary civil rights, unless the court has restricted them, among them being as a matter of law the right to a hearing and arraignment, with counsel, before judgment in the event that he is charged with a violation of the terms of his probation order. * * * He does, however, for some specific purposes — for administration of the probation law and other laws expressly made applicable to persons so situated — stand *440convicted of a felony. For example, under the statute probation may be revoked at any time * * * and the probationer may be arrested without warrant. * * * Such conviction, in itself and without pronouncement of judgment, establishes a status which is attended by certain disabilities.
Id., 1 Cal.Rptr. at 680, 348 P.2d at 113. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937).
. The present provisions of W.S. 7-13-301 are essentially the same as Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 84 (1909), except for the Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo.1990) amendment found in the last sentence. It is also effectively the same within its indeterminate sentence structure since enactment of a general criminal code for Wyoming. See The Compiled Laws of Wyoming, ch. 35 (1876).
. The act initially provided an upper age limit of twenty-five years. The reduction to twenty-one years occurred by amendment during debate. Senate Journal, p. 299. To correlate the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act to the majority opinion, this statutory proceeding is found in W.S. 7-13-203, 7-13-204 and 7-13-205 (1977) and is the ancestor of W.S. 7-13-301 into which the prosecutorial veto was inserted. See King v. State, 720 P.2d 465 (Wyo.1986).
. The revised statute cited above in introduced bill form raised the age limitation back to the twenty-five originally anticipated by the sponsor in 1909. During the 1931 passage, an amendment was successfully introduced which eliminated any age limitation and provided the structure of the statute which then continued until 1987 to be available without regard for an age limitation. This history justifies the description of Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act, although the law was essentially directed toward young people and particularly so because of the first offense limitation.
. Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 91, § 6 (1939), W.S. 7-13-306, entitled "Governor’s Power of Pardon Unaffected," also achieved an interesting metamorphosis in the recodification process which was originally found in the session laws as W.S. 7-13-307, captioned “Governor’s Power of Pardon Unaffected.” The new text with the same caption stated that ”[n]othing in W.S. 7-13-301 through 7-13-306 shall be construed to authorize the court to expunge the record of a person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense.” Somehow, the caption got re-edited in the current supplements to the statutes and now states as a title, "Expungement of criminal record.” The new language added by recodifi-cation and the disappearance of the prior statute is not explained. A title change for this text substitution was not included in the enacted legislation.
. Because of the importance to understand what occurred in recodification, the terminology provided in recodification was restated:
7-13-301. Probation before sentence; generally; terms and conditions; discharge; revocation of probation and imposition of sentence.
(a) If a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation of W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon terms and conditions set by the court. The terms of probation shall include that he:
(i) Report to the court not less than twice in each year at times and places fixed in the order;
(ii) Conduct himself in a law-abiding manner;
(iii) Not leave the state without the consent of the court; and
(iv) Conform his conduct to any other terms of probation the court finds proper.
(b) If the court finds the person has fulfilled the terms of probation and that his rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, the court may at the end of five (5) years, or at any time after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the original probation, discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings against him.
(c) If the defendant violates a term or condition of probation at any time before final discharge, the court may:
(i) Enter an adjudication of guilt and conviction and proceed to impose sentence upon the defendant if he previously pled guilty to or was found guilty of the original charge for which probation was granted under this section; or
(ii) Order that the trial of the original charge proceed if the defendant has not previously pled or been found guilty.
(d) Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose.
(e) There shall be only one (1) discharge and dismissal under this section or under any similar section of the probationary statutes of any other jurisdiction.
7-13-302. Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence; placing defendant on probation; fine and probation.
(a) After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and following entry of the judgment of conviction, the court may:
(i) Suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation; or
(ii) Impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation.
7-13-303. Investigation of defendant by district attorney or state probation officer; report of investigation prerequisite to probation or suspension of sentence; copies of report to institution and board of charities and reform.
(a) When directed by the court, the district attorney or the state probation and parole officer shall fully investigate and report to the court in writing:
(i) The circumstances of the offense;
(ii) The criminal record, social history and present conditions of the defendant; and
(iii) If practicable, the findings of a physical and mental examination of the defendant.
(b) No defendant charged with a felony, and, unless the court directs otherwise, no defendant charged with a misdemeanor, shall be placed on probation or released under suspension of sentence until the report of the investigation under this section is presented to and considered by the court. If the defendant is committed to a state penal institution, a copy of the report of the investigation shall be sent tp the institution at the time of commitment. In all felony cases the clerk of court shall forward copies of the report to the board of charities and reform together with copies of all orders entered by the court.
7-13-304. Imposition or modification of conditions; work as a condition of probation.
(a) The court may impose, and at any time modify, any condition of probation or suspension of sentence.
(b) As a condition of any probation, the court, subject to W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704 [7-16-101 through 7-16-104], may order the defendant to perform work for a period not exceeding the maximum probation period.
7-13-305. Determination, continuance or extension of suspension or probation; discharge; violation of conditions.
(a) The period of probation or suspension of sentence under W.S. 7-13-302 shall be de*444termined by the court and may be continued or extended.
(b) Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of suspension of sentence or probation under W.S. 7-13-302 the court shall enter an order discharging the defendant.
(c) For a violation of a condition of probation occurring during the probationary period, revocation proceedings may be commenced at any time during the period of suspension of sentence or probation under W.S. 7-13-302, or within thirty (30) days thereafter, in which case the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested. If after hearing the court determines that the defendant violated any of the terms of probation or suspension of sentence, the court may proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of sentence or probation had been ordered.
(d) The time for commencing revocation proceedings shall be automatically extended for any period of time in which the probationer is incarcerated outside this state during the probationary period for the conviction of an offense which is a violation of the conditions of probation, unless the probationer has made a valid request for final disposition under the interstate agreement on detainers, W.S. 7 — 15— 101 through 7-15-106.
7-13-306. Payment of fine in installments.
When imposing a fine and also placing the defendant on probation, the district judge may permit the fine to be paid in installments over a reasonable period of time.
7-13-307. Governor’s power of pardon unaffected. Nothing in W.S. 7-13-301 through 7-13-306 shall be construed to authorize the court to expunge the record of a person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense.
Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 157 (1987).
. Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870; State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368 (Wyo.1983); United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 40 S.Ct. 289, 64 L.Ed. 333 (1920); In re Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868); United States v. Schumann, 2 Abb. 523, 7 Sawy. 439, 27 F.Cas. 984 (C.C.Cal.1866); United States v. Am-midown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C.Cir.1973); United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.C.Mont.1924); United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass’n., 228 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.N. Y.1964); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100 (S.D.Ill.1945); Comment, The Nolle Prosequi Under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1978 Det.C.L.Rev. 491 (1978). This subject is more generously pursued in Section IV of this dissent.
. Not one of those cases stands as authority for an unqualified right of the prosecutor to make the decision that the offense, without necessarily affording a difference in probationary term, will result in a felony status. That is all this appeal and these cases are about — the uncontrolled power of the prosecutor to require in sentencing that a felony conviction will result.
. Responsible authority exists to implement judicial authority over the prosecutorial discretion to nolle prosequi even before the plea is entered and without regard for a plea bargain status in special situations. See Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 553 A.2d 233 (1989). Cf. Jackson v. State, 82 Md.App. 438, 572 A.2d 567 (1990), in stating a plausible exception.
. The California court in Superior Court of San Mateo County, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405 extended Tenorio, Esteybar and Navarro further than is required for application to the Wyoming statutes where pretrial diversion veto was also rejected. Superior Court of San Mateo County is like the cases cited by the majority, not really relevant to the Wyoming statute. See, however, Sledge v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 11 Cal.3d 70, 113 Cal.Rptr. 28, 520 P.2d 412 (1974) where the preliminary determination of the eligibility for division exercised by the district attorney did not constitute an invasion of the separation of powers prohibition.
In a most recent consideration in People v. Ames, 213 CaI.App.3d 1214, 261 Cal.Rptr. 911 (1989), the sentencing separation of power concept was revisited to determine whether judicial authority to change a plea bargain existed or the options were either acceptance or rejection. The court noted that ‘‘[t]he imposition of sentence and exercise of discretion are fundamentally and inherently judicial functions. * * * While no bargain or agreement can divest the court of the sentencing discretion it inherently possesses * * *, a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain." Id., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
. Unbending to the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. Carroll v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 106 Colo. 89, 101 P.2d 26 (1940) that a prosecutor had the right to prevent the judge from suspending sentence by withholding his approval as decidedly unpersuasive, the Arizona court severed the unconstitutional veto provision and upheld the balance of the statute. The court noted the differentiating status of Greenlee, 620 P.2d 1132 as a diversion agreement process and not involving a sentencing statute.
. In generic terms, State ex rel. Light v. Sheffield, 768 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Mo.App.1989) stated:
At the time Light entered her pleas of guilty to the drug charges, several sentencing alternatives were available to the trial court. It could have sentenced Light to a term of imprisonment as authorized by Chapter 558, RSMo, or pronounced sentence and suspended its execution, placing Light on probation, or, as the trial court did, suspend imposition of the sentence, with or without placing Light on probation. * * * The trial court, evidently in hopes that Light would mend her ways, suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on supervised probation for a term of three years, in which case, if Light successfully completed her probation, she would not have a criminal conviction on her record. * * * Suspension of imposition of sentence is an entirely different matter from imposing sentence and then suspending execution of it. In the first instance, the person has no criminal conviction, in the second, he does.
State v. Anderson, 645 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn.Cr. App.1982) considered an apparent requirement of the prosecutor for guilty pleas before a pre-indictment approval of a memorandum of understanding for pretrial diversion. The court said that if the requirement existed, it was a •nullity and “is in irreconcilable conflict with the provisions of the statute. A plea of guilty is a confession. It is an admission, or proof of guilt." Id. at 253.
The court noted that the statute provided that no confession or admission against interest during the pendency and relevant to the charges contained in the memorandum of understanding was admissible and stated “[t]here is no rule in this State which requires a defendant to admit his guilt in order to seek probation. To deny probation on that basis is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 253. The Louisiana Supreme Court achieved a similar result denying prosecu-torial veto to accord constitutionality to the statute in State v. LeCompte, 406 So.2d 1300 (La.1981).
. The ideological battle that is reflected in the philosophic differences between the majority and this dissent in application of separation of powers identifies the broad jurisprudential dispute. Minimizing separation of powers maximizes statism and dilutes and diminishes individual liberties and personal rights. Cf. Alfange, The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 Geo. Wash.L.Rev. 668 (1990). "The doctrine is not an end in itself, but a means of avoiding threats to individual liberty and of insuring that no branch of the government is disabled from effectively carrying out its constitutional responsibilities.” Id. at 669-70.
Comparable contemporary literature when closely read details the testiness between institutional power and individual rights implicit in blending separation of powers out of the constitution either nationally or within the state’s adjudicatory responsibility when inquiry is made about the intrinsic operation of functional government. Anderson, The Separation Doctrine — Prescription for Conflict or Cause for Creative Constitutionalism?, 14 Nova L.Rev. 227 (1989); Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 5 Seton Hall L.Rev. 435 (1974); Gressman, Separation of Powers: The Third Circuit Dimension, 19 Seton Hall L.Rev. 491 (1989); Gusman, Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 Am.U.L.Rev. 391 (1990); Marshall, "No Political Truth:" The Federalist and Justice Scalia on the Separation of Powers, 12 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 245 (1989-90); Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 De Paul L.Rev. 299 (1990); Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am.U.L.Rev. 277 (1990); Comment, Separation of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United States, 50 La.L. Rev. 117 (1989); Note, Separation of Powers: A New Look at the Functionalist Approach, 40 Case W.Res. 331 (1989-90). For result without recognition, consider Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transformation of Judicial Precedent, XXXI B.C.L.Rev. 641 (1990).
The issue within a democratic society is how is power created, defined and applied. For a discussion of the results without a delineation of the reasons, compare the three statutory interpretation discussions in Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 76 Geo.L.J. 319 (1989); Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 76 Geo.L.J. 281 (1989); and Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 76 Geo.L.J. 353 (1989).
. Doubling the number of persons incarcerated in the states' penitentiaries, see Wyoming State Tribune, June 5, 1990, in one decade while the adult population declines by perhaps twenty-five percent should suffice. We do not need a prose-cutorial veto of judicial decisions and sentencing to add to the despair of societal illness involved in and resulting from the prevalence of crime in our society. Included in that category is that which may be committed by the prosecutors themselves. See Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287, Urbigkit, J., dissenting. See also current newspaper reports that the planned new Wyoming prison must be now doubled in size since a year or so ago when the selection committee started its site studies. The planned facility is over crowded before a site is selected or funding for architectural planning provided. Casper Star-Tribune, Sept. 22, 1990, at Bl.
. Victoria Lowry, Supreme Court No. 88-312, bill of exceptions from Campbell County Court, DUI case, April 14, 1988, disposition by plea bargain, guilty plea entered July 13, 1988 and sentenced August 16, 1988 pursuant to the plea bargain and upon objection by the State to application of the provisions of W.S. 7-13-301. The sentence entered was one year supervised probation and reimbursement of $200 in attorney’s fees. The original arrest came for speeding forty-four miles per hour in a thirty mile per hour zone in Gillette, Wyoming. Lowry was twenty, single, regularly employed, and had no prior record of any kind. The stated reason for the State’s objection to the use of W.S. 7-13-301 was the alcohol test result of .185.
Elmer Cambio, Supreme Court No. 89-169, Natrona County, April 30, 1988, child abuse. On February 21, 1989, Cambio entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor of battery. On May 31, 1989, he was sentenced to six month's supervised probation. At age fifty-seven, Cambio had minor traffic offenses and was regularly employed. The stated basis for the prosecutorial veto was the fact that the plea bargain arrangement had reduced the charges to a misdemean- or. The prosecutor stated:
Your Honor, I guess one of the first things [defense counsel] brought up, the State would oppose any 7-13-301 treatment. That was discussed time and time again in the negotiations involving this case. If [defense counsel] wants to apply for 7-13-301 treatment, and the Court deems that would be appropriate in this case, I would ask the court to dissolve the plea and proceed on the two felonies. [This is an absolute misstatement of fact. There was only one felony originally charged.] If a negotiated disposition, stay with it and don’t come back into court later and ask for more lenient treatment than negotiated with the district attorney.
(There is nothing in the record reflecting a negotiated agreement that Cambio would not try to achieve disposition under the purview of W.S. 7-13-301, although the functionality of the difference is de minimis considering that the conviction itself was a misdemeanor only.)
Jeffrey D. Billis, Supreme Court No. 88-250, Laramie County, December 1 & 10, 1987, two counts, delivery of controlled substance. Undercover agent solicitation at place of employment. On May 24, 1987, a plea bargain negotiated to one count and the second count was dismissed. Billis was sentenced on July 22, 1988 to three to five years, which was suspended. He was placed on supervised probation for three years. Billis, age thirty-three, had a wife and three children. His occupation was a mechanic. He had an epileptic honorable discharge from the Navy and had no prior record of any kind. The justification for the prosecuto-rial veto given was his age and the method of operation for the offense charged looked professional. Drug offense factor.
Vicki Moon, Supreme Court No. 88-304, Na-trona County. On September 24, 1987, Moon was charged with delivery and conspiracy of a controlled substance. Undercover agent purchase, actual delivery by third party. Charges were amended to conspiracy only. A plea bargain was obtained on December 23, 1987 and Moon pled guilty to conspiracy on May 12, 1988. She was sentenced on October 11, 1988 for a two year supervised probation period. At age twenty-nine, Moon was a single parent with three children, no prior felonies, two minor traffic offenses, was self-supporting, and had regular employment. Sentencing under W.S. 7-13-301 was rejected by the prosecutor without a reason stated. The basis argued by Moon was a somewhat innocent victim status and her desire to pursue a higher education at a Montana university.
Scott P. Mclver, Supreme Court No. 88-311, Laramie County, conspiracy to commit a burglary of a bottling truck in Cheyenne, two offenses. The crime was committed by another party. The plea was entered July 22, 1988 on the conspiracy charge. Mclver was sentenced on October 21, 1988 for eighteen to thirty-six months in the penitentiary, which was suspended, three years probation was given. At age twenty-two, Mclver was unmarried, a hard worker, and had a steady record of employment. The prosecutor objected to W.S. 7-3-301 treatment on the basis of the prior planning *456involved in the trip to Cheyenne by the three participants.
Willard Vigil, Supreme Court No. 88-310, Laramie County, January 22, 1988, delivery of a controlled substance to an undercover agent. The plea bargain was entered August 19, 1988 and he was sentenced on October 21, 1988 to two to five years in the penitentiary, which was suspended, and five years probation was given. At age twenty-six, Vigil had no prior record of criminal activity. The activity was the basis of prosecutorial rejection of W.S. 7-13-301 consideration by the trial court.
Nellie Magarahan, Supreme Court No. 89-4, Natrona County, March 31, 1988, improper endorsement of a federal income tax return check. The plea bargain was entered on August 11, 1988 and she was sentenced on November 15, 1988. Magarahan was sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. At age twenty, she had no prior felony convictions. 1981 Girls’ School custody, 1985 dismissed burglary charge. She was self-supporting and had prior restaurant employment. No justification for the pros-ecutorial veto was given.
Kirk Hudson, Supreme Court No. 89-83, Na-trona County, July 5, 1988, delivery of a controlled substance. Hudson pled guilty and the plea bargain was entered on November 15, 1988. He was sentenced on February 14, 1989 to supervised probation for two years. At age twenty-nine, he was a petroleum engineer, married, had no children, regularly employed and had no prior record except traffic offenses. This is a case of a user who became available as a source. The prosecutor opposed W.S. 7-13-301 usage without reason stated by veto.
Thomas Heggen, Supreme Court No. 89-84, Natrona County, March 29, 1987, false unemployment compensation claims, intent to defraud, nine counts totalling $1,584. On October 6, 1988, a plea bargain was arranged bring the charge down to only one count. Heggen was sentenced on February 14, 1989 to two years supervised probation. At age thirty-one, he was married with a family. These events occurred from a period of unemployment; child adoption problem with attendant difficulties and expenses. No prior criminal record. No reason was stated for the exercise of the prosecutorial veto.
Matthew Mollman, Supreme Court No. 89-21, Natrona County, May 4, 1988, larceny in taking a television set from an adjacent apartment. A plea bargain was arranged on August 26, 1988 and was sentenced to one year supervised probation. Guilty plea entered to a burglary offense. This case is unusual as one of the two among the dozen where the subject of sentencing under W.S. 7-13-301 was specifically included in the plea bargain decision. The prosecutor agreed that he would not object to a sentence W.S. 7-3-301 application if the presentence investigation report showed nothing more serious than “minor traffic offenses." On November 18, 1988, Mollman was sentenced pursuant to the guilty plea and plea bargain when the prosecutor then objected to a W.S. 7-13-301 sentence.
In addition to very minor traffic offense charges, the presentence investigation report included reference to one conviction of driving while under the influence and "12/29/85, Vandalism, Glenrock, Wyoming, Fine suspended, damages repaired.” Testimony reflected that conviction had not occurred since restitution was arranged for the damage caused in a juvenile "horsing around” occurrence. At age twenty-two, Mollman had no prior felony convictions, no significant misdemeanor charges except one, driving while under the influence, and the dismissed vandalism complaint. Justification for the prosecutorial veto was that the dismissed vandalism did not fit into the plea bargain.
Sandra Gezzi, Supreme Court No. 89-275, Laramie County. Gezzi's husband, a Cheyenne, Wyoming businessman, was sentenced to the Wyoming penitentiary for delivery offenses and she was charged with writing eleven bad checks in an amount of $510.41 on a discontinued bank account. On June 23, 1989, a plea bargain was obtained and she pled guilty to two charges, nine were dismissed. This is the second case where it is indicated that the W.S. 7-13-301 status was specifically the subject of the plea bargain and, in this case, no W.S. 7-13-301 consideration would be given by the trial court as a condition for the dismissed charges and the prospective probationary sentence. On September 15, 1989, Gezzi was sentenced to two to three years incarceration, which was suspended, and three years supervised probation was given. The file does not include the presentence investigation report so her age is indeterminate, although there are three minor children at home. The offenses were committed by economic necessity by virtue of her husband’s incarceration in order to have food for her children. The basis of the W.S. 7-13-301 rejection was continued sequence of crimes over a period of time and that the subject of W.S. 7-13-301 consideration was a specific decision in the plea bargain.
Carl Kruzich, Supreme Court No. 90-15, Na-trona County, October 12, 1988, two counts of delivery and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. A change of plea from an earlier guilty plea was entered on June 29, 1989. The plea bargain encompassed two years of supervised probation. On November 17, 1989, Kru-zich was sentenced to two years supervised probation. At age thirty-five, he was a homeowner, had no prior record except misdemeanor driving charges, and was regularly employed. The reason given for the prosecutorial veto was that drug cases were not appropriate for W.S. 7-13-301 type treatment in the opinion of the prosecutor.
These are only the presently appealed cases and do not include cases where the prosecutorial veto is used for bargaining "leverage" or, as in one city, the city council directed the city prosecutor to veto all requests as a city council determination for client direction to attorney. The W.S. 7-13-301 prosecutorial veto has appar*457ently become involved in many sentencing decisions since enactment.
. A poll of each of the ninety-four members of the 1987 Wyoming Legislature would be interesting to determine whether they were aware of any change and whether they knowingly voted to redelegate prior judicial sentencing discretion after entry of the jury verdict or guilty plea to a prosecutorial right of veto over the historical structure of Wyoming law for avoidance of felony conviction status if the probationary term was successfully served. Unquestionably, there is nothing in the title to give notice to the legislator or to the public generally. Cf. Ex parte Hilsabeck, 477 So.2d 472 (Ala. 1985), Adams, J., dissenting, and Knight v. West Alabama Environmental Imp. Authority, 287 Ala. 15, 246 So.2d 903 (1971), Coleman, J., dissenting.
. The Connecticut court addressed statutory amendment compared to revision in recognition that an amendment contemplated change while "a revision is by its nature not intended to change anything, but only to restate what has already been legislated.” * * * It is for that reason that "[r]evisors of statutes are presumed not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a construction which makes it consistent with the former statute.” State v. Baker, 195 Conn. 598, 489 A.2d 1041, 1045 n. 4 (1985) (quoting Bassett, 115 Conn. at 400-01, 161 A. 852).
. Even speed readers could not be informed as to the content in the mass of proposed legislation unless the title adequately describes and the specific language provides clues. At best, eternal vigilance against both accident and undisclosed intent is required.
. Any experienced legislator can cite samples and examples, but the most significant example occurred in the Wyoming legislature in the 1965 session when an Albany County legislator achieved a minor change in the state’s eminent domain statute which effectively gave the Union Pacific Railroad a stranglehold and veto on future underground trona development in southern Wyoming. In the following session, perhaps the most heavily lobbied and most changes in the state’s history occurred in reversal of the minor 1965 provision of Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 35 (1965). H.B. 208, 39th Leg. (1967), co-sponsored by the late Governor of the State of Wyoming, Ed Herschler, present United States Senator Alan K. Simpson, and Republican leader Harold Hellbaum, produced monumental expenditures in support and opposition, but when passed as Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 244 (1967), became the inducement for a billion dollar trona mining industry in Sweetwater County. In 1965, the statutory change was "housekeeping.” In 1967, it was a million dollar investment in legislative effort correction.
. It is interesting to speculate if the amending Senate committee had known what they were being asked to do and had consequently inserted that subject, "providing a veto of the judicial discretion for sentencing to grant status to the prosecution to demand commission of a felony status first offender,” in the title of the bill to provide a properly completed amendment whether consideration and approval of the ultimate legislation would have differed, either in the Senate committee or later during the enactment process with floor debate.