In this appeal, Matthew Mollman, convicted of burglary, raises the three major issues that were recently raised in State v. Lowry, No. 88-312 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Vigil v. State, No. 88-310 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); McIver v. State, No. 88-311 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Moon v. State, No. 88-304 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Magarahan v. State, No. 89-4 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); and Billis v. State, No. 88-250 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) [800 P.2d 401]. These issues concern the constitutionality of W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.) (“new 301”), which provides procedures for deferral of prosecution and placement on probation without entry of adjudication of guilt in the case of first offenders.
Based upon information that Matthew Mollman, who lived across the hall from Frank Gambino in an apartment building, had been seen in the latter’s apartment, law enforcement authorities interviewed Mr. Mollman concerning the theft of Mr. Gambino’s portable television and a television converter box. Mr. Mollman voluntarily admitted to having taken that property without the owner’s permission. The *468state charged him with burglary in violation of W.S. 6-3-301(a) and (b) (June 1988 Repl.). Under a plea agreement, in exchange for Mr. Mollman’s plea of guilty to the felony, the state agreed it would not seek penitentiary time at sentencing, if Mr. Mollman had no prior felony convictions, and would also consent to probation without entry of adjudication of guilt under “new 301” if the presentence investigation report revealed nothing more serious than minor traffic offenses.
The presentence investigation report revealed that Mr. Mollman had previously been convicted of careless driving, running a stop sign, vandalism, driving while under the influence, improper passing, delayed entry, and driving left of center. At the sentencing proceeding the prosecutor said that the state refused to consent under “new 301” because vandalism was more serious than minor traffic offenses. The district court judge imposed a sentence of one year’s supervised probation, payment of restitution, and payment of $50 to the victims’ compensation account.
In his appeal, Mr. Mollman raises these three issues that were raised in Low-ry, Vigil, Mclver, Moon, Magarahan, and Billis:
1. Whether W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), requiring the state’s consent to the court’s deferring further proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department’s sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const, art. 2, § 1.
2. Whether 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, which proscribes- altering or amending a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to change the bill’s original purpose.
3. Whether 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 24, which mandates the passage of a bill containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in the bill’s title.
Although the state asserts that Mr. Moll-man did not adequately raise these issues in the district court and we should not consider them here for the first time, we have chosen to consider them as explained in Lowry, Vigil, McIver, Moon, Magarahan, and Billis.
Our decisions in Lowry and its companion cases are dispositive here. Applying our decisions in those cases, we hold that “new 301” is constitutional in terms of the three issues raised here. Accordingly, we affirm.