Elmer Cambio, convicted of battery in violation of W.S. 6-2-501(b) (June 1983 Repl.), raises issues identical to those raised in Moon v. State, No. 88-304 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990), and identical to the three major issues raised in State v. Lowry, No. 88-312 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) and its companion cases, Vigil v. State, No. 88-310 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); McIver v. State, No. 88-311 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Magarahan v. State, *483No. 89-4 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); and Billis v. State, No. 88-250 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) [800 P.2d 401]. These major issues were also raised in Mollman v. State, No. 89-21, [800 P.2d 466] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Hudson v. State, No. 89-83, [800 P.2d 471] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); and Heggen v. State, No. 89-84, [800 P.2d. 475] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990). The major issues in all of these cases involved the constitutionality of W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.) (“new 301”) .
We affirm.
On April 30, 1988, Mr. Cambio was weeding a garden using a pitchfork. Several children, including the eleven-year old victim, who was sitting on a corral fence, were playing in the general area. After several of the other children went into a house, leaving the victim sitting on the fence, Mr. Cambio talked to the victim about, among other things, not being allowed to sit on the fence. Mr. Cambio jabbed the victim’s upper right thigh with the pitchfork, causing a contusion with three “partial-thickness” puncture wounds.
The state charged Mr. Cambio with one count of child abuse under W.S. 6-2-503(a) (Cum.Supp.1987). At arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Later, he appeared in court to enter a change of plea. Under a plea agreement, in return for Mr. Cambio’s plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of battery under W.S. 6-2-501(b) (Cum. Supp.1987), the state agreed to dismiss a charge of aggravated assault in a related case and reduce the child abuse charge to the battery charge. The parties had no agreement about sentencing. The district court judge accepted Mr. Cambio’s guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation report. At the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Cambio requested that the court consider placing him under “new 301” probation. The prosecutor stated that the state did not consent to that probation because of the gravity of Mr. Cambio’s conduct and the serious injury to the eleven-year old victim. The court sentenced Mr. Cambio to six months supervised probation, a $100 fine, restitution, and payment of $50 to the victims’ compensation account. The court declined Mr. Cambio’s invitation to disclose how the court would have ruled on “new 301” probation had the state consented to that treatment. This appeal followed.
Mr. Cambio raises issues identical to those raised in Moon v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo.1990), namely:
1. Whether W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), requiring the state’s consent to the court’s deferring further proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department’s sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1.
2. Whether 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 20, which proscribes altering or amending a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to change the bill’s original purpose.
3. Whether 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted' in violation of Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 24, which mandates the passage of a bill containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in the bill’s title.
4. Whether the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to sentencing under § 7-13-301 was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion and therefore violated Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2 and 7.
Although the state asserts that Mr. Cam-bio has not preserved these issues since he failed properly to raise them below, we have chosen to consider them for the reason explained in Lowry and its companion cases.
Our decisions in Lowry and its companion cases, especially Moon, are dispositive here. Applying those decisions, we hold that “new 301” is constitutional in terms of the issues raised here, that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to “new 301” treatment in Mr. Cambio’s case did not violate his rights to due process, and that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to “new 301” treatment in Mr. Cambio’s case was neither *484arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2 and 7. Accordingly, we affirm.
URBIGKIT, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in which MACY, J., joins.
MACY, J., files a dissenting opinion in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.