The state appeals from an order granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the search of his vehicle. ORS 138.060(3). Defendant consented to the search, but the court held that the officer lacked authority to request that consent. We affirm.
On November 3, 1992, Oregon State Trooper Johnson saw two vehicles being driven on a public highway, one of which was towing the other. Because the tow was being conducted in an illegal manner, Johnson turned on the overhead lights on his patrol car and stopped the drivers of the two cars for the violation. Johnson spoke to the driver of the towing vehicle and to defendant, who was steering the towed vehicle. Johnson prepared traffic citations and turned off his overhead lights, but he left his amber lights flashing. He gave defendant a citation, returned his identification, explained the citation and court process to defendant, said “take care” and began walking away. He then stopped, turned back and asked defendant if there were any controlled substances or weapons in the towed vehicle. Defendant replied “No.” Johnson asked defendant for permission to search the vehicle, which defendant gave. It appears from the uncontradicted testimony of defendant at the hearing on the motion to suppress that defendant was still standing outside the car when Johnson asked for permission to search.
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant testified:
“Q. Did you ever get the impression that you were free to leave?
“A. As soon as I got the ticket I thought that was the case until * * * he then asked me about my probation.
“Q. Okay, what did he ask you about your probation?
“A. He asked if I was aware that I was on probation, and I told him immediately, yes, I was. He asked what for. I had at that time * * * informed him of what it was for. Then he asked if it was okay to search me, and I told him that it was part of my probation stipulations; of course he could search me.”
*169Johnson conducted a search of the car and found a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in it and arrested defendant. ORS 475.992(4).
The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the methamphetamine on the ground that the officer lacked authority to ask defendant for consent to search. The court held that the continued investigation was unlawful in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed. The state assigns error to that ruling, which we review for errors of law. ORS 138.220; see State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75, 854 P2d 421 (1993).
The controversy in this case arises from uncertainty about the rationale and implications of State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 895 P2d 306 (1995). In Dominguez-Martinez, the court concluded that an officer’s questions about narcotics and request for consent to search, after initiating a traffic stop, were unlawful under ORS SlO^lO^Xb).1 In so holding, the court stated variously:
“It also is clear ** * * that an officer who stops a person for a traffic infraction may investigate only that infraction, unless the state can point to some basis other than the traffic infraction to broaden the scope of the investigation.”
And,
“Moreover, it is clear that, after the investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction is complete, an officer does not have authority under ORS 810.410 to continue to detain the person stopped for the traffic infraction.”
321 Or at 212. The court then concluded:
“The trooper’s authority to detain the two men dissipated when he completed the investigation ‘reasonably related to the traffic infraction * * * and issuance of citation.’ ORS 810.410(3)(b). Thus, as in [State v.] Farley, [308 Or 91, 775 P2d 835 (1989),] the officer’s authority to detain *170defendant under the statute had dissipated, and the men should have ‘been allowed to proceed’ without further detention. Accordingly, the trooper exceeded his authority to stop and detain a motorist in order to conduct a traffic investigation under ORS 810.410(3).”
321 Or at 213 (footnote omitted).
Thus, Dominguez-Martinez may reasonably be read as turning on either, or both, of two principles. First, an officer’s inquiries that are unrelated to the bases of a traffic stop violate ORS 810.410(3)(b) because they exceed the permissible scope of the traffic stop. Second, an officer’s inquiries that are unrelated to the bases of a traffic stop impermissibly extend a motorist’s detention. It is appropriate for this court, at least in interim fashion, to amplify Dominguez-Martinez'& holding and to provide some guidance to police agencies and lower courts as to its proper application.
To date, we have twice undertaken that function. See State v. Aguilar, 139 Or App 175, 912 P2d 379, rev den 323 Or 265 (1996); State v. Foster, 139 Or App 303, 912 P2d 377, rev den 323 Or 691 (1996).2 In Aguilar, the officer stopped the defendant for a traffic infraction and, thereafter, elicited the defendant’s consent to search. It was undisputed that the traffic stop had not ended at the time the officer obtained consent to search. Applying Dominguez-Martinez, we held that the officer ‘lacked authority, based solely on his belief that defendant had committed a traffic infraction, to ask defendant about drugs or request his consent to a search for drugs.” 139 Or App at 180 (footnote omitted).3 Accordingly, *171Aguilar rests on the premise that the officer’s inquiry impermissibly exceeded the scope of an ongoing traffic stop, i.e., absent some independent source of reasonable suspicion, an officer cannot engage in inquiries unrelated to the bases of a traffic stop during a traffic stop.
In State v. Foster, the defendant owned and was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic infraction. The driver was arrested for a parole or probation violation and placed in a patrol car. The officer who had effected the traffic stop then asked the defendant if there were drugs in the car and obtained permission to search the car. On those facts, we held that Dominguez-Martinez compelled suppression of the fruits of the alleged consent search, because the traffic stop had ended when the driver was arrested and placed in the patrol car, and, “[a]t that point, [the officer] needed a basis other than the traffic infraction to detain and question defendant.” 139 Or App at 307.
Thus, in Aguilar, there was no dispute that the traffic stop was ongoing at the time the officer requested consent, and we based our holding on a determination that the officer’s inquiries exceeded the scope of the ongoing traffic stop. Conversely, in Foster, we concluded that the traffic stop had, in fact, ended at the time the officer engaged in unrelated inquiries, and we based our holding on a determination that those inquiries impermissibly extended the passenger / defendant’s detention from a traffic stop.
This case falls, at least factually, somewhere between Aguilar and Foster. In Aguilar, it was undisputed that the traffic stop was ongoing when consent was requested, and in Foster, it was beyond dispute that the traffic stop had ended by the time consent was requested. Here, in contrast, the issue was whether the stop had ended before Officer Johnson had requested consent to search and, even if it had, whether that request unlawfully extended defendant’s detention.
The bright line answer to that threshold inquiry in this and similar cases is that a traffic stop continues until the motorist has had an objectively and temporally reasonable opportunity to move on. As a practical matter, that means, in virtually all instances, that the traffic stop continues for *172Dominguez-Martinez purposes until the motorist has had a “real time” opportunity to move on. There must, in other words, be a distinct temporal “break in the action” between an officer’s indication that a motorist is free to go and any unrelated inquiries.
That clear and objectively based test is commonsensical, consistent with Dominguez-Martinez and Aguilar, and relatively easy to apply. Moreover, it gives proper effect to the restrictions embodied in ORS 810.410(3)(b). By requiring a real temporal break between the traffic stop and any unrelated inquiries, it dissipates the effects of the traffic stop detention and, consequently, “keep[s] traffic infractions decriminalized.” State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 119, 817 P2d 1306 (1991).4
In applying that test, the state bears the burden of proving that the requisite substantial temporal break occurred. Consent searches are an exception to the constitutional warrant requirement, State v. Arnold, 115 Or App 258, 261-62, 838 P2d 74 (1992), rev den 315 Or 312 (1993), and the state, as the proponent of the fruits of such a search, must demonstrate that consent was, in fact, validly obtained. Id. at 261. Because ORS 810.410(3)(b) precludes officers from seeking consent beyond the scope of a traffic stop, the state must demonstrate that: (1) the request for consent was reasonably related to the basis of the traffic stop; (2) the request for consent pertained to some independently sufficient nontraffic *173justification for the stop or its continuation, Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or at 212; or (3) the request for consent was made after the traffic stop had ended and a real temporal break had occurred between the termination of the stop and the subsequent request for consent. Here, it is uncontroverted that Johnson’s request for consent did not comport with the first or second of those conditions. Thus, the state was obligated to demonstrate the third.
The state did not meet that burden. That is, it failed to prove that there was a material temporal “break in the action” that afforded defendant an objectively reasonable opportunity to move on. The only evidence in this record as to the temporal break between Johnson’s statement to defendant to “take care” and the ensuing request for consent was that Johnson began walking away toward his patrol car, stopped, and then “turned back” and began inquiring about controlled substances and weapons, culminating in the request for consent to search. Defendant, who had been standing outside the car when Johnson said “take care,” was still standing outside the car when Johnson began the unrelated inquiries.
Given those facts, which evinced a break of no more than a few seconds, the state failed to prove the necessary material temporal “break in the action.” Accordingly, the traffic stop was ongoing at the time Johnson requested consent, rendering that request invalid as exceeding the scope of the stop.
Affirmed.
ORS 810.410(3)(b) provides:
“A police officer:
"* * * * *
“May stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.”
Cf. State v. Bailey, 143 Or App 285, 924 P2d 833 (1996) (stop did not end, for Dominguez-Martinez purposes, when officer told defendant that he was “free to go” because officer continued to retain defendant’s handgun); State v. Terhear/Goemmel, 142 Or App 450, 923 P2d 641 (1996) (officer’s statement to defendant, a passenger in a parked car, that officer had just seen defendant commit a traffic infraction effected a stop for Dominguez-Martinez purposes); State v. Jones, 141 Or App 63, 918 P2d 111 (1996) (officer’s request to search suspect for drugs during traffic stop exceeded scope of traffic stop); State v. Claxton, 140 Or App 168, 915 P2d 421 (1996) (officer’s request for consent to search car exceeded scope of traffic stop).
In so holding, we rejected our dissenting colleague’s suggestion that Dominguez-Martinez was materially distinguishable because Dominguez-Martinez was “about unlawful detentions or restraints of liberty after a traffic stop has ended” and, in Aguilar, “the questions were asked during the traffic stop, not after it was terminated.” 139 Or App at 191 (Edmonds, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
ORS 810.410(3)(b) grants limited authority to police officers to stop and detain people to investigate and cite them for traffic infractions. The legislature limited that grant of authority to ensure that prosecution of traffic offenses would not be considered to be criminal prosecution, thereby avoiding the costs and constitutional protections associated with criminal prosecutions. See Porter, 312 Or at 119-20. It would contradict that limitation to permit an officer to declare a stop ended and then proceed to do that which the officer could not do before the declaration and but for the stop — to inquire about criminal conduct unrelated to the stop. Therefore, to the extent that an officer uses a traffic stop to conduct a criminal investigation that is unrelated to the stop, the officer’s actions exceed the authority granted by the statute.
Furthermore, inquiries equivalent to those presented in this case would detain any reasonable person from continuing on the person’s way, at least to the extent necessary to listen and respond to them. Consequently, the requirement that there be a significant temporal break between the conclusion of a traffic stop and any unrelated inquiry implements the restriction in ORS 810.410(3)(b) that prohibits detention of people for purposes unrelated to traffic stops.