dissenting in part.
Central to the court’s reversal of the property division and spousal support award is its assertion that “[t]he trial court made conflicting statements in its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the duration of the marriage.” Op. at 250. In my view, a study of the superior court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety reveals that whatever “conflict” may be found in the superior court’s description of the marital status of Barbara and Larry simply reflects the ambiguity that characterized their relationship.
This ambiguity is well documented throughout the superior court’s findings of *256fact and conclusions of law. Taken as a whole, these findings of fact and conclusions of law support the superior court’s determination that from 1985 until 1992, Larry and. Barbara held themselves out as husband and wife, sharing what they considered to be a common law marriage. In 1992 the' parties were legally married in Mexico. They commingled their assets through October 1994. These findings are not clearly erroneous.
The court admits.the possibility that “[i]n stating that Barbara was married for eight years, the trial court may have meant that Barbara had a marriage-like relationship with Larry for eight years_ Other language in the findings of fact and conclusions of law implies that may have been what the trial court meant.” Op. at 251. Yet the court proceeds to reverse the property division and spousal support award because the superior court did not “expressly” state this or make any explicit reference to Murray v. Murray, 788 P.2d 41 (Alaska 1990), despite the superior court’s explicit determination that by 1985 the parties “were holding themselves out as husband and wife.”
We have never required that Murray be expressly referenced in a talismanic fashion. What is relevant is that the superior court made the distinction mandated by Murray between assets acquired before and during coverture — to the extent possible. Murray demands not a formalistic invocation of language marking the distinction between assets acquired prior to and during “coverture” — or, more appropriately, marriage1 — but, rather, meaningful consideration of the nature of the parties’ ownership of assets prior to division.
The superior court pursued precisely this inquiry, essentially determining that from at least 1985, Barbara and Larry commingled their assets. What the superior court’s findings suggest is that marriage was not a meaningful marker with respect to the Har-relsons’ acquisition of property. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law the superi- or court observed the distinction between assets acquired prior to and during marriage to the extent that such a distinction existed.
The court rightly notes that a superior court is free to consider the parties’ premarital relationship pursuant to Murray and AS 25.24.160(a)(4). The superior court did just that in dividing the Harrelsons’ property and, in my view, its conclusions satisfy the requirements of Murray. Courts should not effectively be foreclosed from equitably distributing property that was commingled in “quasi-marital” premarital relationships. Arguably, it is in these relationships that such a distribution is most just. This result is not dictated by Murray and, moreover, effectively undermines its basic premise.
Because I disagree with the court’s conclusion that “it is unclear to what extent the [superior] court’s treatment of the duration of the marriage” influenced its judgment, I would affirm both the property division of the superior court and its spousal support award.2
. "Coverture” is defined as
[t]he condition or state of a married woman. Sometimes used elliptically to describe the legal disability which formerly existed at common law from a state of coverture whereby the wife could not own property free from the husband's claim or control.
Black’s Law Dictionary 366 (6th ed.1990).
.. The superior court's thorough explanation of its award is ample evidence that it properly considered the relevant factors in reaching its conclusion and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so.