Plaintiff John Elwell appeals from the judgment of the district court which rejected his contention that he had been unlawfully terminated as principal of the Marsac Elementary School in the Park City School District. He contends that he had been denied due process of law1 and the safeguards assured by the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act.2
*462In preface to our examination of the facts and the contentions of the respective parties, we note our agreement with certain principles applicable thereto.
It is not to be doubted that a person threatened with deprivation of his employment (which is recognized as a substantial and important right)3 is entitled to be treated with fundamental fairness. This does not mean that the school board is necessarily bound to accord its employees all of the requirements which due process of law accords one accused of crime. But the notion of fundamental fairness entails that he be given reasonable and timely notice of the proposed action; be informed of the basis thereof with sufficient definiteness and clarity that he can understand and prepare to meet them; have the aid of counsel if he so desires; have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; be allowed to offer evidence in his defense; and be given a statement by the board as to the basis of their decision.4
Mr. Elwell was initially employed by the Park City School District in 1972 as principal of the Marsac Elementary School. He served in that position until the school board declined to renew his contract for the 1977-78 school year. The troubles which eventuated in that action date back to the conclusion of the 1974-75 school year in which the superintendent, defendant Richard L. Goodworth, gave plaintiff a letter calling attention to the fact that, though he recognized the right to differences of opinion, that should not stand between people in a working relationship; that such differences should not be aired in public; and warned the plaintiff against doing so.
Sparing extended detail, it appears that there continued to be friction between the plaintiff Elwell and superintendent Good-worth. This resulted in the superintendent submitting to Mr. Elwell what is called a “negative evaluation” on January 31, 1977, together with a notice that he was recommending that Mr. Elwell’s contract should not be renewed for the next school year, 1977-78.
After delivery of that letter, the parties had what is referred to as a series of “remedial meetings,” which did not result in resolving the problems between them. Subsequently, on March 7,1977, Mr. Goodworth sent a letter to the plaintiff which set out the allegations of insubordination and failure of cooperation and contained the significant statement:
Please be advised that the Park City School District will not offer you a contract for the school year 1977-78. As the Superintendent of schools, I exercise my prerogative in sending you this notice as I think is appropriate under Board policy and State law.
The plaintiff was also informed that he could appeal that decision to the Park City Board of Education.
Upon receipt of the letter of March 7, 1977, the plaintiff requested and was granted an informal hearing before the board concerning his termination. As a result of that hearing, the board did not take any action other than as indicated in the letter. Plaintiff Elwell then requested a formal hearing as to his termination. Because of the unavailability of plaintiff’s counsel, he requested and was granted several delays in hearing dates, and a formal hearing was finally convened on May 24, 1977. On that date, Mr. Elwell and his counsel were furnished a statement of the allegations; and upon his request, the board granted a further continuance to allow him an opportunity to examine and meet the charges.
On May 31, there was a plenary hearing before the full board in which the interested parties, including plaintiff Elwell and his counsel, were present. Witnesses were sworn, examined and cross-examined and documentary evidence was received. Upon the completion of the hearing, the board indicated that the official vote and decision *463would be made in an open meeting on June 3, 1977. In the meeting on that date, the board voted four to one against renewing Mr. Elwell’s contract. A letter was prepared and furnished to Mr. Elwell, which set forth the views of the majority of the board consistent with the charges against Mr. El-well and justifying the refusal to renew his contract.
Pursuant to the filing of this action in the district court, there was a plenary trial. Upon an examination of the allegations and the evidence, Judge Dean E. Conder made what impresses us as a fair and careful analysis thereof. He set forth in his memorandum decision the steps taken in giving plaintiff full and timely notice of the charges and ample opportunity to respond and defend against them. We quote from his memorandum in certain pertinent parts:
This court is also concerned about whether or not Mr. Elwell was given “procedural due process” as required by the law. In 1973 the Utah Legislature adopted the “Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act.”
* * * * * *
In 1974 the Board adopted this Act as its “procedures”....
The contract of the plaintiff provided in part: “7. This contract may be terminated or its renewal refused by the Board for misconduct, insubordination, for persistent violations of the rules and regulations of the Board, or instructions of the Superintendent.”
The law itself sets forth the minimum criteria for determining the orderly procedure. This court finds that all of those criteria were met in this case.
The memorandum decision then recites the various steps in the procedure delineated above and concludes that:
All of these steps are in compliance with the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act. On June 4, 1977, the Board voted 4 to 1 not to renew Mr. Elwell’s contract, and by letter dated the same day outlined its reasons. The court finds that the Board was fair and impartial in its determinations.
It should be here noted that the management, supervision and determinations of policy are the prerogative and the responsibility of the school officials; and that the courts should be reluctant to enter therein;5 and indeed should not do so unless it is shown that the complainant was in some manner deprived of due process of law, or that the action of the board was so entirely without justification that it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.6 The district court was not persuaded that the school board had transgressed those principles. Indulging the presumptions of verity to the findings and judgment of the district court to which they are entitled, we see no reason to disagree with its resolution of this controversy.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants (respondents).
HALL, J., concurs. STEWART, J., concurs in the result. WILKINS, J., concurred in the result before his resignation.. Amend. XIV, Constitution of the United States, Art. I, Sec. 7, Constitution of the State of Utah.
. Sections 53-51-1, et seq., U.C.A.1953.
. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).
. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).
. See statement in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).
. Brough v. Board of Education, 23 Utah 2d 353, 463 P.2d 567 (1970) and authorities therein cited; Board of Education v. Lammle, 122 Ariz. 522, 596 P.2d 48 (1979).