I dissent. I agree with the majority’s determination that the ordinance in question lacked sufficient standards to guide the commission’s discretion in granting or denying a license in those cases wherein *666none of the enumerated disqualifying factors (e.g., prior conviction of obscenity offense) exists. In the instant case, however, Perrine had been conyicted of a prior obscenity offense and accordingly the commission had no discretion to exercise but was required by the ordinance to deny him a license. Thus, as applied to Perrine, the ordinance was not void for lack of standards.1
The majority also hold that a municipality is without authority to deny a bookstore license to one previously convicted of certain crimes, including the distribution of obscene materials. It seems evident to me, however, that such authority derives from the general police power to preserve, promote and protect the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
In his own words, James Perrine “learned the business of selling adult material” while working in and operating a San Francisco bookstore and motion picture arcade; subsequently, he acquired his own bookstore, “The Citadel” in Los Angeles. On July 11, 1969, Perrine was convicted for distributing obscene material (Pen. Code, § 311.2). Following the adoption of the ordinance in question, he applied for a license to operate The Citadel and another bookstore, The Arena, also in Los Angeles. He also sought a license for a picture arcade at The Citadel.
The majority confidently state that “We cannot assume that because petitioner was once convicted of violating Penal Code section 311.2, he will violate it again . . . .” To the contrary, I think it reasonably likely that he will. An advertisement for The Citadel bookstore, in the August 1970 Los Angeles Telephone Directory (Yellow Pages), page 352, openly announces: “Erotic Action—Underground Literature—Adults Only . . . Paperbacks, Magazines, Stag Films. . . .”2 But even without considering the foregoing evidence, the commission properly denied Perrine a license to operate a bookstore.
The rule is clear that a municipality may impose reasonable restrictions upon the conduct of an economic enterprise, including the requirement *667that a license to operate be obtained. “That First Amendment rights are being utilized on the premises does not exempt a commercial entrepreneur from compliance with reasonable regulations under the police power. The requirement that a license be obtained as a condition of engaging in the . . . business is a reasonable means of assuring compliance with police power regulations.” (Burton v. Municipal Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d 684, 690.) In Burton, this court struck down as overly broad an ordinance which permitted the licensing agency to refuse a license to a motion picture exhibitor “who has in the past shown motion pictures admittedly not obscene because he has failed to demonstrate to its satisfaction that the pictures he has exhibited are in ‘good taste,’ because a vocal segment of the community objects to them and because, in the board’s unfettered judgment, the operation of the theater, showing films with ‘immoral characteristics’ is not ‘compatible’ with a ‘better and healthier community.’ ” (Italics added; p. 695.)
Had the ordinance in Burton had more precise standards and had it authorized the agency to refuse to grant or renew a license for an exhibitor previously convicted for showing obscene films, the result reached in that case might well have been different. Burton expressly recognized the validity of regulations “specifically drawn to meet a proper public purpose, such as compelling the theater building to satisfy health, fire and safety laws, or requiring the operation of the business to comply with the law in other specific respects . . . .” (Italics added; p. 696.) Thus, Burton does support the position that a failure to comply with state law could constitute a proper ground for denial of a commercial license, whether or not First Amendment rights are thereby affected. Indeed, it has long been held that a municipality may properly deny a business or professional license -to one convicted of a crime bearing a reasonable relation to the nature of the operations sought to be licensed, on the theory that such prior offense is evidence of the applicant’s unfitness to engage therein. (Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 [42L.Ed. 1002,18 S.Ct. 573]; Hollingsworth v. Board of Medical Examiners, 188 Cal.App.2d 172 [10 Cal.Rptr. 343]; see Morrison v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal.3d 214, 220-230 [82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375].)
Promotion of public morality is a legitimate aspect of the police power. (See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 [75 L.Ed. 1357, 1362, 51 S.Ct. 625]; Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind, 67 Cal.2d 536, 548 [63 Cal.Rptr. 21, 432 P.2d 717]; 11 Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 159, 168, and cases cited.) The owner-operator of a bookstore is in daily contact with the public, including the impressionable young, and we have recently acknowledged that public distribution *668of obscene materials poses sufficient dangers to the public morality to support governmental regulation thereof. (People v. Luros, 4 Cal.3d 84, 91-93 [92 Cal.Rptr. 833, 480 P.2d 633].) A municipality should not be required to rely exclusively upon the operation and- enforcement of' state obscenity laws (which have, for a variety of reasons, proven somewhat ineffective in this state) in controlling the distribution of obscene material.3 A prior conviction of an obscenity offense furnishes a reasonable basis for concluding that an applicant such as Perrine will repeat the offense.4
I would deny the writ of prohibition.
McComb, J., concurred.
Our opinion in Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal.2d 684 [68 Cal.Rptr. 721, 441 P.2d 281], would not preclude us from upholding at least that portion of the ordi-. nance which applied to persons, such as Perrine, who had previously been convicted of an obscenity offense. In Burton, we noted that an ordinance failing to meet the required criteria is unenforceable “even though the defendant’s conduct may have run afoul of a statute which could have been adopted in satisfaction of those criteria.” (Italics added; p. 696.) In the instant case, the ordinance did contain a properly objective standard for denying a license (prior obscenity conviction); moreover, the ordinance contained a broad severability clause.^ Therefore, since the evidence is uncontradicted that the commission in fact denied Perrine a license for the sole reason of his prior offense, the ordinance was valid as applied to him.
We may take, judicial notice of petitioner’s advertisement under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).
Near v. Minnesota, supra, 283 U.S. 697, cited by the majority, does not compel a contrary conclusion. In Near, the offending ordinance permitted public officials to take legal proceedings against the owner or publisher of a newspaper upon a charge of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter, and to obtain an order suppressing further publication of the newspaper. The ordinance was not restricted to persons convicted of obscenity offenses, but extended to persons charged with promoting scandal and libel. (See p. 713 [75 L.Ed. p. 1366].) Moreover, the ordinance in Near operated as a prior restraint upon the publication of a newspaper; its effect upon the dissemination of ideas was direct and substantial. On the other hand, the instant ordinance does not restrain publication or distribution of any particular book or magazine; it simply denies those persons convicted of certain criminal offenses a license to operate a bookstore.
The majority’s statement to the contrary does not, I trust, indicate that they would also invalidate a properly drawn license revocation ordinance which provided that a bookstore or other license could be revoked in the event that subsequent obscenity offenses occurred. Such ordinances may ultimately become instrumental in inhibiting the distribution of obscene materials, and yet their rationale (like that underlying the license ordinance herein) must be that conviction- of a prior obscenity offense renders the distributor unfit to operate a bookstore, i.e., his conviction, affords a reasonable basis, for concluding that he will commit further offenses.