The present appeal raises two related issues: First, whether the probate judge notified and advised a surviving spouse of her rights under the election statute, § 2-4-101, W.S.1977, as required by that statute. Second, whether a surviving spouse may change his or her election if the surviving spouse has not been given notice and advice by the probate judge. The probate court held that the probate judge did not notify and advise appellee of her rights uhder the election statute, and therefore the appellee has the right to revoke her original election. We affirm.
Following the death of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., on June 18, 1976, a petition for probate was filed on July 23, 1976. On September 13, 1976 an order was entered by the probate court admitting Mr. Reno’s will into probate. On that same day the attorney for the estate forwarded a letter to Dollie M. Reno, Mr. Reno’s surviving spouse, in regard to a conversation that they had had concerning the estate. A copy of § 2-4-101, W.S.1977 (at that time § 2-47, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.) and two alternate notice of election forms accompanied the letter. The letter urged Mrs. Reno to sign one of the notice of election forms.
Mrs. Reno acknowledged that she had received the letter and the documents from the attorney for the estate. Furthermore, Mrs. Reno stated that she had read the statute and believed that the statute required her to sign one of the notice forms within 30 days of the date that her husband’s will was admitted to probate. She also testified that it was her impression that if she did not return one of the forms within the time specified by the statute she would be held “in contempt of court or it would hold up the proceeding or something.”
A personal emergency made it necessary for Mrs. Reno to go to the state of Washington on November 2, 1976, where she remained until January, 1977. During the time that Mrs. Reno was in Washington, she had several telephone conversations and also corresponded with the attorney for the estate regarding her desire to receive one-fourth of the decedent’s mineral rights in addition to taking under the will. Before going to Washington Mrs. Reno thought that she had retained her own attorney to represent her in the negotiations with the *552other heirs; however, it appears that Mrs. Reno’s attorney did not enter into negotiations with the heirs.
On November 30, 1976 Mrs. Reno signed a notice of election form waiving her right to take one-fourth of her husband’s estate under the election statute. When Mrs. Reno elected to take under the will she was under the impression that the negotiations with the other heirs had been completed or would be finalized by the time the court received her waiver.
On November 16, 1976 the probate judge sent a letter by certified mail to Mrs. Reno’s Story, Wyoming address notifying her of her rights under the election statute. Mrs. Reno testified that she never received the letter from the probate judge, and there is no evidence in the record to indicate otherwise. The record does reflect that this letter was accepted by Mrs. Reno’s stepfather. Mrs. Reno had authorized her stepfather to collect her mail while she was in Washington.
The Final Accounting and Petition for Distribution was filed on November 23, 1977. When Mrs. Reno received a copy of this document she became aware for the first time that she was not to receive one-fourth of the minerals. She subsequently filed an objection to the Final Accounting and Petition for Distribution on December 29, 1978.
After a hearing was held on February 20, 1979 the probate court found that Mrs. Reno had not received “any notice or advice from the judge of the probate court with regard to her rights of election,” nor “were her rights fully explained, or the consequences of her rights and actions explained” by the probate judge. It therefore held the election that Mrs. Reno signed was void. The court at the same time proceeded to give Mrs. Reno notice and advice concerning her rights under § 2-4-101, and granted her 30 days in which to make an election as provided in the statute. Mrs. Reno timely filed an election to take one-fourth of the estate in lieu of taking under the will.
Appellant’s first contention is that the requirements of notice as provided for in § 2-4-101, have been complied with. Appellant bases this contention upon the presumption that there was constructive receipt of the probate judge’s letter and furthermore that Mrs. Reno had actual notice of her right of election from the estate’s attorney. However, neither of these facts is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the election statute. Section 2 — 4-101 provides in pertinent part that a married person leaving surviving children or descendants of children by a previous marriage, and no such children or descendants of the marriage existing at the time of his or her death may by will dispose of not to exceed three-fourths of his or her real and personal estate to persons other than the surviving spouse. If the surviving spouse is given less than one-fourth, it is optional with him or her to elect to take one-fourth of the estate in lieu of any provision for the surviving spouse in the will. The section continues:
“In default of such election the will shall govern in the distribution of the estate, but in each of the above cases, in not less than sixty (60) days following the admission of the will to probate, the judge of the probate court shall advise the surviving spouse of his or her right of election and shall explain fully such right and the consequence thereof. In the event the probate judge fails in his duty to advise the surviving spouse within the time limit and in the particulars provided in this section, then the time of the election of the surviving spouse shall be extended to include thirty (30) days after such advice and explanation by the probate judge . .” (Emphasis added.)
As this court has previously discussed in Matter of Estate of Miller, Wyo., 541 P.2d 28, 30-31 (1975), before 1957 the right of election automatically expired six months after the will was admitted to probate and the statute contained no provision requiring the probate judge to give notice and advice to the surviving spouse. In In re Hartt’s Estate, 75 Wyo. 305, 295 P.2d 985 (1956), this court held that a widow was not enti-*553tied to elect to take against the will after the expiration of the statutory period, even though the widow did not know that she had a right of election during a time period. Undoubtedly in response to this decision, the legislature in 1957 included language in the election statute that specifically directed “the probate judge to give notice of and explain the right of election to the surviving spouse.” Matter of Estate of Miller, 541 P.2d at 31.
Although we are required to construe the statute as it existed in 1976, it is noteworthy that the legislature, in a consolidation and revision of the probate code, effective April 1, 1980, still requires the probate judge to advise and explain the right given the surviving spouse and it is only after there has been a failure of such spouse to respond that the will controls. Chapter 142, §§ 2-5-101 and 102, S.L. of Wyoming 1979.
It may well be that the legislature, considering the rule in Hartt to be harsh and inimical to the surviving spouse’s best interest, could have avoided the effect thereof by merely requiring that a notice be forwarded by the probate judge to the surviving spouse. We are not concerned with the motives that induced the legislature to go further and require advice and explanation. Our concern is to carry out the mandate of the legislature. While the dissent is correct in the view that the statute does not explicitly prohibit “constructive receipt” of the notice, it is nevertheless the case that the statute requires that the judge not only inform the surviving spouse of his or her right of election but also explain the consequences of that right. Matter of Estate of Miller, supra, 541 P.2d at 31. The concepts of “advice” and “explanation” are completely at odds with any notion of constructive notice. Both words bear the connotation of communication, that is, that the person addressed receives and understands the advice and explanation so that he can act intelligently in the matter. Such advice and explanation are an impossibility if the document of explanation is not received.
If constructive notice is adequate there is then no difference in principle between this case and Hartt. Certainly one way of describing that case is to assert that the widow there had constructive notice of what the statute provided. Yet we are sure that by amending the statute the legislature intended to bring about a different result in such situations. Similarly, to hold that the principle that notice to an agent is notice to the principal is applicable in this case, would be to subvert the plain language of the statute requiring advice and explanation. In the first place, there is no showing that Mrs. Reno’s stepfather ever had notice of anything; the most that can be said is that he received the document, not that he read it. There is no reason to assume that he would open and read his stepdaughter’s mail. The dissent would therefore impose constructive notice upon constructive notice to hold Mrs. Reno charged with knowledge that it cannot properly be said her “agent” had. More importantly, it is explanation, not notice that is required by the statute, and that statute does not contemplate the explanation being delivered to some third person, however close he might be to the spouse, who may or may not pass the information on to the spouse.
We consider the statute clear and unambiguous. As this court has held, when statutory language is clear, we will not look to statutory rules of construction, nor will we attribute another meaning to the statute. Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270, 274 (1977); State ex rel. Director, Worker’s Compensation Division v. Tallman, Wyo., 589 P.2d 835, 838 (1979). We therefore reject appellant’s argument that the statute requires only that the notice of right of election be mailed to the surviving spouse and that such notice does not necessarily have to be given by the probate judge.
The record supports the district court’s finding that Mrs. Reno did not personally receive the letter from the probate judge explaining her rights under the election statute. Constructive receipt of the letter is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. Therefore, Mrs. Reno was not given notice and advice as required by the election statute.
Appellant further contends that even if this court finds that the notice re*554quirement of the election statute has not been met, Mrs. Reno cannot revoke her original election. They support this contention by pointing to the fact that the record contains no evidence that Mrs. Reno signed the waiver in ignorance of material facts, or ignorance of the statutory right of an election. Nor was there any testimony establishing undue influence or fraud that would allow this court to set aside her election to take under the will. While we agree that the record reflects that Mrs. Reno knew she had a right to take under the will or elect to take one-fourth of the estate, it also shows that her election was made on a misapprehension that she had an agreement with the heirs which would have vested her with somewhat more than she received under the will. There is therefore no inequity in permitting her to withdraw from this election. In any event, this knowledge does not alter the fact that Mrs. Reno was not notified and advised in the manner contemplated by § 2 — 4—101. As this court stated in Matter of Estate of Miller, supra, 541 P.2d at 31:
“. . . this right of election does not terminate until notice is given either to the surviving widow in her lifetime or to such personal representative after her death.”
“[I]f the widow wants to change her mind during the period fixed in the statute, she may do so.” In re Hartt’s Estate, supra, 295 P.2d at 990. In the present case Mrs. Reno’s right to make an election under the statute did not terminate until thirty days after she was advised by the probate judge of her right of election, and she was therefore not barred from revoking her original election.
Affirmed.