dissenting:
The majority opinion as written abandons our traditional appellate function and presumes to perform the factfinding function reserved to the trial courts and commissions. I disagree with any approach to an appellate case in which this Court retries the facts on appeal.
The majority purports to follow Local 1494 v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1356 (1978), for guidance in the present ease. The two cases are substantially similar and the scope of review enunciated in that case should guide our review in the present case. The Local 1494 case also involved the termination of public employees. In that case the Coeur d’Alene Civil Service Commission held a public hearing and issued its decision affirming the discharge of those employees. In the present case the hearing was held before a merit commission and was presided over by a referee, who was an experienced and competent attorney and who provided assistance and guidance to the commission.1 Based upon the recommendations of the hearing examiner the commission ruled that good cause existed for the discharge of the public employee. However, in both this case and in Local 1494 the district courts concluded that the local commissions issued inadequate findings of fact, and so the district courts made additional findings. In the Local 1494 case, we ruled that where such a commission submits inadequate findings and conclusions the district court, in reviewing the entire record to determine whether the commission’s decisions are supported by substantial evidence, may make additional findings, but only to explain its review of the case. The ultimate factfinder is still the commission. The district court in this case did just that and developed extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, all of which are supported by the record, just as was the ease in Local 1494.
Our function on appeal in this case is set out in Local 1494:
“On appeal, it is our task to make the same review of the commission’s action as *232did the district court in order to determine whether, on the whole record, the commission’s decision was substantially supported by the evidence and by applicable law.” 99 Idaho at 638, 586 P.2d at 1354.
Thus, our review requires us to examine the whole record; however, the purpose is to determine if the commission’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial competent evidence.
The commission in this case essentially found that there was good cause for the dismissal of appellant. The commission’s findings, though not detailed, indicate the following:
“The Ada County Sheriff counseled and directed Mr. Holloway regarding the adverse effects and requested corrective measures of Mr. Holloway’s action on multiple occasions. Contrary to the proper conduct of a prudent employee, Mr. Holloway failed to act in a proper manner in order to avoid conditions which would generate public criticism directed toward the Ada County Sheriff’s Department and further failed to exert necessary and timely efforts within his authority, to terminate conditions generating aforementioned criticisms when identified and instructed by the Ada County Sheriff.... Mr. Holloway was the responsible individual for an adverse condition unacceptable to the proper conduct of the Ada County Sheriff’s Department of which E.C. Palmer, Sheriff, is the responsible authority for such proper conduct. Mr. Holloway was advised to correct the identified cause of criticism. He failed to do so and was terminated, an action within, and appropriate of the authority of the Ada County Sheriff.”
Just as was the case in Local 1494, the district court, after its review of the entire record, developed even more substantial findings of fact and conclusions, all of which essentially supported the findings of the commission. Included below is an excerpt from the ultimate conclusions of the district court.
“Sheriff Palmer had good cause to terminate Sgt. Holloway’s employment because:
(a) The solicitation was deceptive.
(b) The solicitation violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
(c) The solicitations were not properly licensed.
(d) The solicitation was bringing the Sheriff’s Office into disrepute.
(e) The solicitations were not using the ‘sales pitch’ Holloway had told union members would be used.
(f) It is appropriate to require members of a law enforcement agency to maintain a high level of moral and legal integrity, and to avoid giving any appearance to the public that such is not the case.
(g) The deceptive, unlicensed solicitations continued despite the Sheriff’s continuing protests about it to Holloway over a considerable period of time.
(h) Sgt. Holloway, on behalf of the Union, had full authority to control the manner in which Wildwood Productions was conducting the solicitation of the business people of Ada County but failed to do so after notice and opportunity required it.
(i) Holloway permitted improper solicitations even after telling union members otherwise in a newsletter, and was not acting with union authorization in not stopping Wildwood from improper soliciting.
(j) Sgt. Holloway made no reasonable effort, either through or on behalf of the Union, to make Wildwood Productions solicit in a proper and legal manner. His attitude and actions gave an appearance that he was as concerned about any financial detriment to the solicitation as in correcting it, further indicated in appellant’s Exhibit 7.
“Sheriff Palmer acted in good faith in the termination since:
(a) He repeatedly and consistently made it clear to Sgt. Holloway, ever *233since he was advised on March 28,1978, of the proposed manner of solicitation, and continuing until the termination on September 14, 1978, that there had been past problems with telephone solicitations, that he was opposed to it, and that they must be legally conducted.
(b) A written letter at the time of termination clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons for Holloway’s termination.” (Emphasis added.)
The findings of the commission are fully supported by the findings made by the district court, and the findings of both tribunals are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. For example, one of the critical findings, Finding (h), is supported by testimony from Sgt. Holloway himself indicating that a clause in the contract pertaining to the sales pitch used gave the right to control that sales pitch to the union, and specifically to Roy Holloway as the head of the union. Sgt. Holloway’s testimony also indicates that he in fact exercised his control or right to control the sales pitch, albeit inadequately or unsuccessfully. The contract itself, Exhibit 2, signed by Roy Holloway, was in evidence. Testimony by Sheriff Palmer, the promoter Gary Allen, and Sgt. Holloway indicated that Sgt. Holloway had the right to control the solicitations. Finding (i) is supported by evidence that up until September 7, 1978, long after Sgt. Holloway had represented to the union and to Sheriff Palmer that improper solicitations were not being conducted, a taped trial telephone call was placed to the solicitor in which the solicitor was still misrepresenting its affiliation. The other findings and conclusions of the district court, and in turn the findings of the commission, are supported by substantial, competent evidence.
On appeal, the appellant has the burden of proving error. Because of this, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the decision of the factfinder. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Furness v. Park, 98 Idaho 617, 570 P.2d 854 (1977); Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irr. Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976). In the present case, the majority has done just the opposite. They have taken the evidence and viewed it in a light most favorable to appellant in order to reach their factual result. Because the findings of the district court and the commission are supported by substantial, competent evidence, the ultimate finding of the commission and the district court that there was good cause to terminate the employee in the present case should be upheld. While individual members of this Court might have concluded otherwise if we were the finders of fact, we are not. This Court cannot retry these cases. By doing so, we are encouraging a flood of appeals. If we continually retry the facts on appeal, we are abdicating our appellate responsibility and are not performing our proper appellate function.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.. The Court in Local 1494 did note the following:
“The commission appears to have performed its functions without the benefit of any staff, legal or investigative Apparently, this Court considered that factor in determining the standard of review. However, in this case the merit commission had the benefit of a competent and experienced lawyer as a hearing examiner who aided the commission in its factfinding process.