dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Benewah County ordinance 13 is valid. To be valid, the ordinance “must not be in conflict with other general laws of the state.” State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 374, 399 P.2d 955, 960 (1965) (interpreting Id. Const, art. 12, § 2, which provides that “any county ... may make and enforce, within its limits, all. such local police . .. regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws.”). Thus, the ordinance in question is obviously invalid if it is in conflict with the general laws of the state. In addition, if the legislature has shown its intent to occupy the field of control of free roaming livestock, “any regulation by the county [would] necessarily [be] inconsistent with the general law.” Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 510, 210 P.2d 798, 800 (1949); see Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 209, 657 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting). I believe that Ordinance 13 is invalid for both reasons — it is in conflict' with the general laws of the State of Idaho and the legislature has preempted the field of livestock control.
I.
The legislature has established the “fencing out” doctrine for the State of Idaho. I.C. §§ 25-2202; 31-101 and -102; Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 833, 590 P.2d 85, 89 (1978) (“The legal fence laws of the State of Idaho are ‘fencing out’ statutes.’’) As the Court stated in Maguire, “These legal fence statutes recognized the rancher’s right to allow cattle to roam.” Id. at 833, 590 P.2d at 89. The only exception to the “fencing out” rule in Idaho, arises by the creation of a herd district pursuant to I.C. § 25-2401 et seq. See Maguire, supra. As this Court noted in Maguire, Idaho’s herd district statutes were enacted to provide “an alternative to landowners who wish to protect their land from damage caused by roaming stock, but do not wish or cannot afford to fence their land.” 99 Idaho at 833, 590 P.2d at 89 (emphasis added).
Ordinance 13 also purports to establish fencing laws, but contrary to the general laws of the state, this ordinance provides for “fencing in.” Section 8 of Ordinance 13 expressly provides that “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the custodian [of livestock] to erect and keep in good repair a lawful fence around the premises.” R. p. 9. Violations of this section result in fines of various amounts on the first four convictions, whereas a conviction of a fifth violation “constitutes a misdemeanor [which subjects] the violator to a term in the county jail for a period not to exceed six (6) *216months and/or a fine of three hundred dollars ($300.00) .... ” R.p.10. Although Ordinance 13, unlike the general state laws, purports to have no effect on civil liability, the conflict between the ordinance and the general laws of the state is clear; the majority today allows Benewah County to criminalize conduct that this Court recently recognized was “a rancher’s right” under the legal fence laws of the State of Idaho. See Maguire, 99 Idaho at 833, 590 P.2d at 89.
Ordinance 13 also conflicts with the general laws of the state regarding the control of livestock, in that it purports to criminalize conduct which the state law expressly allows under I.C. § 25-2118, which specifically provides that “[n]o person ... shall have the duty to keep [any domestic] animal [running on open range] off the highway on such range .... ” However, section 4 of Ordinance 13 states that “[a] custodian [of livestock] shall not permit his livestock to run at large on the public roads or highways ...." R.p.9. A violation of this section results in the same sanctions as were noted above. R.p.9. Thus, although the general law of the state is that there is no duty to keep livestock off the highways on open range, Benewah County has made the failure to keep livestock off the highways, including those on open range, a crime. A more direct and obvious conflict can hardly be imagined. Accordingly, Ordinance 13 should be struck down as being directly in conflict with the general laws of the State of Idaho.
II.
I am also of the opinion that Ordinance 13 should be struck down because the field of livestock control has been preempted by the legislature. The majority disposes of the appellant’s preemption argument rather quickly, seeming to suggest that the appellant has argued that the herd district statutes, I.C. § 25-2401 et seq., by themselves, demonstrate a legislative intent to occupy the field of livestock control. In so characterizing the appellant’s contention, the majority easily disposes of it, stating: “Herd district statutes which by their own terms are inapplicable to ‘open range’ areas do not preempt the field of livestock control in such areas.” With this bit of “analysis” and little more, the majority supports its conclusion that “the legislature has not preempted the field of livestock control as asserted by appellants.”
I do not read the appellant’s preemption argument as narrowly as does the majority. Nor do I think that our inquiry in this case should be whether the legislature has preempted the field of livestock control in open range areas. Although relying on the herd district laws as perhaps being the most demonstrative of preemption, the appellant, joined by amicus curiae, clearly relies upon the extensive scheme of regulations in the area of livestock control (not just the state herd district statutes) to support its contention that the legislature has preempted the field.
Although there is no statutory provision expressly establishing open range grazing in Idaho, the rule is, and always has been, “that with the exception of cities, villages, and herd districts, livestock may run at large and graze upon unenclosed [unfenced] lands in this state.” Maguire, 99 Idaho at 836, 590 P.2d at 92; Johnson v. Oregon Short Line Railway Co., 7 Idaho 355, 362, 63 P. 112, 114 (1900) (holding that the English common law rule that a man must confine his livestock to his own premises “has never obtained in this state” (emphasis added)). With the rule of open range grazing as a backdrop, the legislature has over the years established an extensive system of regulations, contained primarily in Title 25 of the Idaho Code, covering almost every aspect imaginable in the area of livestock control. Although these regulations are many, a review of a few of the more pertinent chapters contained in Title 25 clearly reflects the legislature’s intent to occupy the field of control of livestock.
Contrary to what the majority opinion might lead one to believe, the legislature has devoted an entire chapter — Chapter 21 —to the topic of “ANIMALS RUNNING AT LARGE.” The provisions contained *217therein outline in detail the specific instances in which an individual can be criminally liable for allowing livestock to run at large. See I.C. § 25-2106 (allowing any hog or goat to run at large “within the limits of any city ... or in the vicinity of any farm, ranch, dwelling house, or cultivated lands of another .... ”); I.C. § 25-2109 (allowing any “stallion of less than $250 market cash and assessed value, ridgeling, or any unaltered mule or jackass over the age of eighteen (18) months to run at large)”; I.C. § 25-2113 (allowing “any cattle, horses, sheep or hogs to range or graze within the platted limits of any incorporated town or village of more than five hundred (500) inhabitants, between the first day of September and the first day of April, without a herder”); I.C. § 25-2115 (allowing any sheep to run at large “within the limits of any incorporated city, town, or village”).
In addition to outlining criminal liability, Chapter 21 details the procedures to be followed when livestock running at large in violation of the statutes (or trespassing hogs, I.C. §§ 25-2101 to -2105) are taken up. The statutes contained in Chapter 21 generally provide for notice to be given, for reasonable charges to be paid to the person who takes up such livestock, and for the sale of such livestock if it remains unclaimed.
Chapter 21 also governs in part the civil liability resulting from livestock running at large. I.C. §§ 25-2101 to -2104 establish, in essence, a “fencing in” rule for hogs and provide that the owner of hogs is responsible for damage done by trespassing hogs. Most significantly, I.C. § 25-2118 provides that the owner or person in control of livestock on the open range “shall not be liable for damage to any vehicle or for injury to any person riding therein, caused by a collision between the vehicle and the animal.” Similarly, I.C. § 25-2119, provides that “[n]o person owning, or controlling the possession, of any domestic animal lawfully on any highway, shall be deemed guilty of negligence by reason thereof.”
Chapter 22 of Title 25 details more specifically the rules governing civil liability arising from livestock running at large. I.C. § 25-2202 provides a civil remedy to landowners whose property although enclosed by a legal fence, is damaged by roaming livestock, thereby confirming the long standing rule requiring the “fencing out” of livestock as a general proposition. See Maguire, 99 Idaho at 833, 590 P.2d at 89. I.C. §§ 25-2204 to -2208 detail the procedures by which the assessment of damages is to be made and satisfied in such cases. In addition, I.C. § 25-2201 grants an injured party a lien on trespassing stock which break into a lawful enclosure “until he is recompensed for all damages committed by said animals . ... ” Protections and procedures similar to those contained in Chapter 22 are contained in Chapter 23, which pertains specifically to “ESTRAYS.”
Chapter 24 of Title 25 provides an exception to the general rule in Idaho that property owners must “fence out” livestock.
“Idaho and other western states provide for the creation of herd districts as an alternative to landowners who wish to protect their land from damage caused by roaming stock, but do not wish or cannot afford to fence their land.... In essence the creation of a herd district in Idaho reinstates the English common law within that district, placing a duty on the livestock owner to fence in his stock and holding him liable for damages caused if his stock escapes onto another’s land, regardless of whether that land is fenced or not.”
Maguire, 99 Idaho at 833, 590 P.2d at 89. The provisions of Chapter 24 allow the county commissioners of a county to create herd districts upon the petition of the majority of the landowners in a district, which district cannot include open range. See I.C. § 25-2401 to -2404. I.C. § 25-2407 establishes criminal liability for persons, who in violation of a herd district order, allow their livestock to run at large in a herd district, deeming such persons “guilty of a misdemeanor.” In addition, I.C. § 25-2408 provides that in such instances the owner of the livestock “shall be liable to any person who shall suffer damage from the depreda*218tions or trespasses of such animals, without regard to the condition of his fence,” and grants a lien on the trespassing animals to the injured party for the amount of damage done.
In summary, it can readily be seen that the legislature has by its extensive scheme of regulations occupied the field of control of livestock. The legislature’s extensive scheme of regulations is consistent in every respect with the law that has always prevailed in Idaho, that there is generally no duty upon livestock owners to “fence in” their stock. See Maguire, supra. The statutes outline in detail the limited exceptions to this rule, and specifically define the circumstances under which criminal and civil liability can attach when damages are caused by roaming livestock.
The majority’s conclusion that the legislature, despite its extensive scheme of regulations, has not preempted the field of control of livestock appears to rest upon three points: 1) the Court’s opinion in the Maguire case; 2) the fact that the herd district statutes do not apply to open range; and 3) that the purpose and effect of Ordinance 13 “are different from the purpose and effect of a herd district.”
The majority alleges that “[ajppellant’s contention that the ordinance conflicts with the general laws of the state ... is largely answered by the recent opinion of this Court in Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978).” The majority supports this conclusion by selectively quoting from the Maguire case, and by setting forth the “holding” in that case — “that since 1963 the herd district statutes have not applied to ‘open range.’ ” Even were I to accept the majority’s characterization of the holding of the case,1 I could not agree that the Maguire case in any way answers the appellant’s argument that Ordinance 13 conflicts with the general laws of the state. The majority’s reliance upon the Maguire case is merely an extension of its assertion (discussed infra) that since the herd district statutes do not apply to open range areas, they cannot preempt local regulation in the area of livestock control. Furthermore, the majority’s reliance upon Maguire is misplaced. In Maguire, the Court repeatedly reiterated the long-standing rule in Idaho, that the law of this state is “that with the exception of cities, villages and herd districts, livestock may run at large and graze upon the unenclosed lands in this state.” 99 Idaho at 836, 590 P.2d at 92. That the majority today affirms the abandonment of this long-standing rule of law, all the while purporting to rely upon the case in which the rule was most recently reaffirmed, will leave cattlemen and students of the law utterly amazed.
Like, its reliance upon Maguire, the majority’s assertion that the herd district statutes “were not intended to preempt, and do not preempt, the field of livestock regulation [because they do not apply to open range areas],” in no way answers the appellant’s contention that Ordinance 13 conflicts with the general laws of the State of Idaho. As demonstrated above, the herd district statutes are but a part of an extensive legislative scheme of regulations, which scheme covers almost every imaginable aspect of the law pertaining to the control of livestock and in its entirety demonstrates the legislature’s intent to preempt the field.
It is interesting that the majority makes much of the fact that the herd district statutes do not apply to open range areas, because prior to 1963 “[h]erd districts were allowed to be created in any part of this state,” and the recognized purpose of the amendment of I.C. § 25-2402 to preclude the formation of herd districts in open range areas was to “protect the rights of livestock owners by prohibiting herd districts in areas where they historically grazed stock .... ” Maguire, 99 Idaho at 836, 590 P.2d at 92. Scholars of the law may find it truly incredible that the Court today bases its holding that there has been *219no preemption of the field of livestock regulation upon the fact that the legislature amended its statutes pertaining to the creation of herd districts and thereby limited to an even greater extent the already limited exceptions to the general rule of law requiring the “fencing out” of livestock. Rather than in any way suggesting that the legislature has not occupied the field of livestock regulation, to my mind the legislature’s action demonstrates its intent to control every aspect of livestock regulation— including that upon the open range — and its continual adherence to the rule of law which has always prevailed in the State of Idaho, that except in very limited and specifically, statutorily defined circumstances, there is no duty upon owners of livestock to “fence in” their stock.
In its rejection of the appellant’s preemption argument, the majority finally relies upon its “holding” in this case that “the purpose and effect of the ordinance in question here are different from the purpose and effect of a herd district.” I cannot agree that this “holding” in any way negates the clear intent of the legislature to occupy the field of livestock regulation. It must be remembered, that our concern in this case is not with the herd district statutes alone, but with the entire scheme of state laws pertaining to the regulation of livestock. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the majority’s conclusion or holding, can only be reached through the use of tunnel-vision, or perhaps, by a complete failure, in reading Ordinance 13, to compare it with the general laws of the state.
The majority appears to suggest that the purpose of the herd district statutes is to impose civil liability on livestock owners whose stock trespass on the land of another. By noting that this is not the purpose of Ordinance 13 — since the ordinance expressly provides that it shall not apply to the resolution of any civil liability — the majority is somehow able to conclude that the legislature has not preempted the field and that Ordinance 13 is merely a permissible extension of the state regulatory scheme. Such a conclusion can be attained only if the majority ignores the fact that our concern in this case is with the entire legislative scheme of regulations.
Although certainly a purpose of the herd district statutes and other general laws of the state is to effect civil liability in cases of livestock running at large, the general laws of the state go far beyond that. The herd district statutes impose criminal liability for a violation of a herd district order and provide procedures by which trespassing animals in a herd district may be taken up. Other statutes provide similar civil and criminal liability and procedures for areas not included in a herd district. Undoubtedly, the general purpose of the herd district laws, as well as most of the statutes contained in Title 25 of the Idaho Code (all discussed more fully supra), can be properly summarized as being “to regulate and control the running at large of livestock.” In reaching its “holding” in this case, set forth above, the majority neglects to mention that this is the expressed purpose of Ordinance 13. See Ordinance 13, § 4, R.p.9. The majority also, rather strangely, neglects to mention that the means set forth in Ordinance 13 to achieve its stated purpose are almost identical to the means employed in the herd district statutes and the other general laws of the state pertaining to the regulation of livestock.2 I would be hard-pressed to conclude that these provisions of state law do not have the same purpose as the provisions of Ordinance 13— “to regulate and control the running at large of livestock.” Furthermore, even were I to concede that Ordinance 13 did *220have a purpose different from the purpose of the general laws of the state’, I could not agree that this would negate the clear intent of the legislature to preempt the field of livestock control. If the legislature has shown its intent to occupy a field of law, “any regulation by the county [is] necessarily inconsistent with the general law.” Clyde Hess Distributing Co., supra, 69 Idaho at 510, 657 P.2d at 1077 (emphasis added).
I.C. § 25-2401 empowers county commissioners to create herd districts, but specifically qualifies that power by the use of the phrase “as hereinafter provided .... ” It is clear therefore that the legislature by this language intended the procedures set forth in Chapter 24 to be the exclusive means by which county governing boards may exercise control in the area of livestock regulation. Since the county did not follow the dictates of Chapter 24 for creating a herd district, and there are no other provisions in the legislature’s extensive scheme of regulations authorizing the county to act in this field, Ordinance 13 is in conflict with the general laws of the state and is therefore invalid.
III.
In sum, the clear legislative intent to occupy the field of livestock regulation and the general laws of the state cause me to disagree with the majority’s conclusion in this case, and I am left somewhat confused by the majority's failure in addressing the preemption issue to provide the reasoning which will support its ultimate conclusion.
. The holding in Maguire might be more properly summarized as being that the trial court in that case erred in finding that a cattle owner had a duty to keep his cattle fenced in because the area was not one where by custom livestock were permitted to roam, thereby rendering statutory procedures for the establishment of herd districts unnecessary.
. Like many of the statutes contained in Title 25, including the herd district statutes, Ordinance 13 imposes criminal liability in certain instances in its attempt to control livestock running at large. Like the general laws of the state, Ordinance 13 sets forth procedures to be followed when animals running at large are taken up and disposed of, provides that the owners of such animals are liable for the costs of taking up and impounding the livestock running at large; and purports to impose a duty on peace officers to enforce the ordinance. Similar provisions, previously set forth in detail in the text are found throughout Title 25 of the Idaho Code.