(dissenting)2 — The result of the majority opinion is to permit a commercial waterway district to repudiate a statutory sale of land made at public auction for $760 by notifying the purchaser two months after its consummation that its bid is to be rejected because of inadequacy in amount.
This holding is predicated upon the following provision which was included in the published notice of sale:
“ . . . The commissioners reserve the right to reject any and all bids received.”
In stating the reasons for my dissent, I think it is desirable to state in more detail what occurred at the county treasurer’s sale on June 4, 1958, and thereafter.
The deputy treasurer, acting as auctioneer, called for bids on the subject property. Respondent bid $760. The auctioneer then called twice for other bids. No response being made, he declared the property sold to respondent.
Present at the sale, in addition to one of respondent’s attorneys and three other representatives, were appellants’ attorney and the commercial waterway district’s secretary (who was also one of its commissioners).
Upon respondent’s bid being accepted by the auctioneer, one of respondent’s representatives produced its check for ten per cent of the sale price. This check had already been made payable to appellant instead of to the county treasurer. Thereupon, the check was endorsed by commercial waterway district No. 1, by its secretary, in the presence of its attorney, and delivered to the auctioneer. The check was later duly honored by the bank on which it was drawn.
Neither the secretary of the commercial waterway district No. 1 nor its attorney indicated to the representatives of respondent any dissatisfaction whatsoever with the transaction at, before, or after the sale.
Subsequent to the auction sale, the waterway district’s commissioners held regular meetings on June 6, 1958, and July 11, 1958, at which no action was taken with reference *462to this sale except to postpone action thereon. At the commissioners’ meeting on August 1, 1958, they repudiated the sale on the ground that the price was insufficient in amount.
Respondent then tendered the balance of the sale price ($684) and, upon appellants’ refusal to accept it, demanded a conveyance of the land. Thereafter, respondent instituted this action for specific performance and deposited this sum in the registry of the court. The trial court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment and entered a decree awarding the relief prayed for.
The narrow question presented is whether a sale of real property owned by a commercial waterway district, conducted by the county treasurer at a public auction pursuant to RCW 36.34.080, is complete and final when it is knocked down to the only bidder, where the notice of sale reserves to the district the right to reject any and all bids.
The authorities cited in support of the majority opinion relate to auction sales between private parties. I fail to see what bearing they have upon the problem here before us, which concerns the powers of a public body that has no authority to sell any property except in the manner and to the extent authorized by the legislature. The waterway district has no power to perform any act not expressly or by necessary implication authorized by statute.
Accordingly, we must refer to the pertinent statutory provisions to ascertain the powers of the waterway district to sell real property.
The power to sell property is given to the waterway district in RCW 91.04.200, which provides that such property may be sold “in the same manner as county property is sold.” See Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1 v. State, 50 Wn. (2d) 335, 311 P. (2d) 680 (1957).
There being no dispute of fact or question as to the regularity in the conduct of the public auction, we need only interpret' the language of those statutes relating to the sale of county property.
RCW 36.34.010 provides, in part:
*463“Whenever it appears to the board of county commissioners that it is for the best interests of the county and the taxing districts and the people thereof that any part or parcel, or portion of such part or parcel, of property, whether real, personal, or mixed, belonging to the county should be sold, the board shall sell and convey such property, under the limitations and restrictions and in the manner hereinafter provided.” (Italics mine.)
The statute then sets forth those limitations and restrictions under which the county may sell property and expressly states what rights may be reserved in the sale.
RCW 36.34.060 provides that sales of personalty, with certain exceptions, must be for cash.
RCW 36.34.100 states:
“The notice of sale of county property must particularly describe the property to be sold and designate the day and hour and the place of sale. If real property is to be sold on terms, the terms must be stated in the notice.” (Italics mine.)
Thus, the applicable statute provides that personal property must generally be sold for cash while real property may be sold on terms. Manifestly, the word “terms” as it is here used means financial terms, and does not refer to or encompass any reservations.
RCW 36.34.080 provides:
“All sales of county property ordered after a public hearing upon the proposal to dispose thereof must be made by the county treasurer at a designated place in the courthouse to the highest and best bidder at public auction.” (Italics mine.)
As I read the statutes cited above, the sale is complete when a bid is accepted by the county treasurer who acts as auctioneer. I cannot find anything therein which would authorize the commissioners to repudiate a valid statutory contract between the waterway district and the sole bidder after an offer has been made and accepted by the county treasurer, who is the district’s statutory agent.
The majority dismisses the case of Phillips v. Welts, 40 Wash. 501, 82 Pac. 737 (1905), because it was based upon *464an express statutory provision not now before us. In my opinion, that case is decisive of the issue here.
The Welts case, supra, was a mandamus proceeding instituted by respondent to compel the county treasurer to execute to him a deed to a certain lot in the city of Anacortes, which respondent allegedly purchased at a public auction. The lot had theretofore been acquired by the county pursuant to tax foreclosure proceedings. The sale in question was made pursuant to the act of March 9, 1903, Laws of 1903, p. 73. The published notice of sale contained the following language:
“Notice is hereby further given that all sales are subject to the approval of the board of county commissioners.”
At the auction, respondent was the highest and best bidder and the property was knocked down to him. Subsequently, the board of county commissioners, ref used to confirm the sale and respondent brought suit. Respondent’s contention, which was upheld by the trial court, was that the board had no authority in law to place such a restriction or condition upon the sale of the property.
On appeal, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the applicable statute authorized such a reservation. The statute, which was then in effect, provided that the county treasurer’s notice of sale must state the time, place, and terms of sale.
This court, in construing the phrase “terms of sale” stated:
“. . . The statute expressly provides that the commissioners may fix the ‘terms’ upon which the sale shall be made. It is suggested that this refers to the financial terms; but this could hardly be true in the light of the statutory provision that the sale must he made for cash. . . . ” (Italics mine.)
In the instant case, we have, no statutory language that is even analogous to that involved in the Welts case, supra. Although the statutes do authorize the sale of real property on terms, it is clear, as we have already shown, that this means financial terms only.
The statutes relating to the sale of county property pre*465scribe the manner in which a valid contract of sale shall be created. They do not grant the seller the right to repudiate such contract two months after the sale has been completed.
No statutory authority being shown which supports the waterway district’s position in this case, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Hill, Rosellini, and Foster, JJ., concur with Don-worth, J.Upon rehearing this dissent was substituted for the dissent originally filed in this case.