I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion, but wish to make it clear that I do not say that all employees on a strike are entitled to relief. Whether any particular applicant is entitled to relief depends upon the showing of need, and the determination must be made initially by the county Welfare Board, subject to the right of appeal to the State Department. Section 71-306.
Here the state department has ruled in favor of relief, and we are not concerned with its determination on that point. The only question before us is may the Board award to recipients in the industry now on a strike, one-half of the amount awarded to other applicants and nothing to single men. Section 71-305 answers that in the negative by saying:
“Persons eligible for and in need of relief shall be, whether employable or unemployable, given equal consideration for public assistance as those persons eligible for assistance under other parts of this act.”
If such discrimination is ever justifiable, the power to make the discrimination must be granted by the legislature. Neither this court nor the State Welfare Department have authority to proceed in disregard of section 71-305, nor may we defeat the *307purpose of section 71-305 by giving- it a strained, unnatural and technical construction.
In the dissenting- opinion of Mr. Justice Castles, it is asserted that affirmance of the district court order will be to make “welfare funds strike funds” and thus require “all Montana taxpayers to contribute to strike funds.”
That is not so. Were we to reverse the order of the district court, welfare funds would still be strike funds. The order of the Welfare Board makes welfare funds strike funds, and not the order of the trial court or of this court.
The affirmance of the district court order may affect the amount of funds going- for relief, but it does not necessarily increase that amount over and above what the Welfare Department allowed. Some strikers may not be able to show a need, and hence will not be entitled to anything.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Castles states that affirming the district court order results in permitting the union to benefit from the welfare funds without divulging its resources. This likewise is not true.
It is true that it need not divulge its resources to the courts, but that is a matter to be considered by the Welfare Board as bearing upon the need of applicants, keeping in mind, of course, that “men do not live by bread alone.”
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Castles, after complaining of the use of welfare funds for strikers, then proceeds to the opposite view, and complains that the majority opinion is too harsh on strikers in that it requires striking families to become paupers in order to secure aid. This is not so. All that is necessary is that they show need.
As to whether mandamus is the proper remedy that question is settled by the case of State ex rel. Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 447, 92 Pac. (2d) 273. It is asserted in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Castles, that it was incumbent upon relators to show that assistance could not be had from the union before they are entitled to complain. The proper place to show *308that, if it be material, is before the Board. Here the Board has found that the strikers are entitled to relief. The correctness of that finding is not before us. The only issue here is, after making the determination that they are entitled to relief, may the Department reduce the amount to 50 percent of that awarded to nonstrikers and may they exclude single men.
Then, it is asserted that it is not shown that the Department has sufficient funds to comply with the requested order. If that circumstance would afford justification for the discrimination here in question, then the burden was upon the Welfare Department to make the showing of a lack of funds. As above noted, it does not follow that it will take more funds to comply with the order of the court than to comply with the order of the Welfare Department.
The suggestion in the dissenting* opinion of Mr. Justice Castles, that there is a violation of constitutinoal provisions since the strikers must be held to be on a strike voluntarily, is not well-taken. The Welfare Department itself has ruled that even though the strike is by voluntary action, that fact does not justify a denial of relief. For the same reason it does not justify a refusal to follow section 71-305.
If section 71-305 is bad law, or ought not to apply to strikers, that is a question that should be addressed to the policy making branch of our government, viz., the legislative department, and not the judicial branch of the government.
Both dissenting opinions stress the case of State ex rel. Blenkner v. Stillwater County, 102 Mont. 130, 56 Pac. (2d) 1085, 1086.
I do not regard that case as applicable here. In that case mandamus was sought to compel a transfer of funds from the ‘ ‘ general and other funds,” to the “warrant and interest” fund.
The court held that the application for the writ was insufficient because no transfer was permissible from “other funds” but only from the “general” fund, and it did not allege that *309there were sufficient funds in the general fund alone to make possible the transfer.
Here, the court’s order does not direct the payment of any money. Both dissenting opinions also rely on State ex rel. Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 447, 92 Pac. (2d) 273, as empowering the Welfare Department to prorate or reduce payments in order to stretch out the funds over a longer period.
We have not been given any facts as to whether or to what extent there is a shortage of funds, if any. If there must be a prorating it should be applied to all recipients.