dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that an audio tape introduced into evidence by the prosecutor that included Deputy Hardin’s objectionable statement of “he put a gun to your head. That’s aggravated battery” was not “directly solicited by the prosecution in this case.” Maj. op. at 1023. In addition, I would hold the hearsay statements were improperly admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) as prior consistent statements.
Solicited Statements
While Hardin’s statements were not directly solicited from the prosecutor in the traditional sense of witness examination, the record reveals the prosecutor wished to play excerpts from the tape but did not excise the portion of the tape that included Officer Hardin’s statements.1 It is not as if a witness volunteered the testimony to the prosecutor’s surprise. Instead, the record establishes that introduction of these statements was the result of a deliberate choice by the prosecutor. I am led to the inescapable conclusion that Deputy Hardin’s statements, played to the jury by audio tape, were directly solicited by the prosecutor.
The only question, therefore, is whether Officer Hardin’s statements amount to an opinion of Dike’s guilt. Rather than comparing the objectionable statement, “he [Dike] placed a gun to your head. That’s aggravated battery,” to other cases — compare Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1337-39 (Wyo.1992) (In response to prosecutor’s question of “What did you do at that point?” deputy sheriff testified that “I listened to her [complaining witness’] story and made a determination that she had been raped.”); Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Wyo.1999) (In response to prosecutor’s question of “what was your reaction to the victim at the time,” prosecution witness answered “[w]e believed her.”); Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1181 (Wyo.1998) (In response to prosecutor’s question whether witness had anything against the accused and his co-conspirator, witness answered “Just the fact that they killed somebody.”) — the majority states:
We believe that the jurors understood that the decision regarding Dike’s guilt or innocence was theirs to make after hearing all the evidence and that they recognized Deputy Hardin made the statements to calm and reassure the victim before he *1028could have formed an opinion because he made them before he knew all the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.
Maj. op. at 1023. That belief may or may not be accurate because of the “impossibility of assessing whether the jury relied upon [those statements] in reaching its verdict.” Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882 (Wyo.1990).
Hearsay
Next, I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) concerning admission of prior consistent hearsay statements. I would revive the analysis approved by this court in Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269 (Wyo.1986), the same analysis accepted by the United States Supreme Court in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995), and require that the motive to fabricate must come after the hearsay statements in order for those statements to be admissible as pri- or consistent statements under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Therefore, I would hold that admission of hearsay by eight prosecution witnesses, repeating the victim’s story, was improper and amounted to prejudicial error.2
Although this court attempted to clarify its position on this issue in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d at 70-72, the current state of the law is less than clear ten years later. The general rule is that prior consistent statements are not admissible where the person making those statements has testified fully in open court and been available for cross-examination. Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d at 1273; Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d at 70. Rule 801(d)(1), W.R.E,3 creates an exception to the general rule which, if satisfied, allows prior consistent statements into evidence. In Chambers, we recited the following rule on admission of prior consistent statements:
A witness’s prior consistent statements are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), W.R.E., unless they were made before the alleged fabrication or improper influence. Statements made by a witness after corrupting forces come into play could be just as fabricated as trial testimony and do not rebut the charge of fabrication just because they are consistent with his testimony at trial.
726 P.2d at 1273 (citations omitted).
However, in the later case of Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo.1987), as the majority observes, this court shifted course mid-stream. There the court wrote:
There is no express condition in the rule which states that the prior consistent statement must be made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose. In the absence of an express prohibition, we think the trial court should have the discretion to determine whether a prior consistent statement should be admitted whether or not it was made before an improper motive to fabricate arose.
Faced with this inconsistency, the court in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, attempted to reconcile Chambers and Makinen, drawing a distinction between prior consistent statements used for rehabilitative/credibility purposes and those that would be permitted as substantive evidence. The Stephens court wrote:
Should the trial court find that the improper influence or motive or the claim of recent fabrication antedated the consistent statement, and yet still determine that the probative value justifies admission, a limiting instruction must be given, if requested, to the effect that the statement may be *1029considered only for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of the declarant witness and that it should not be considered directly as proof of the matter asserted.
774 P.2d at 71-72.
I find the distinction between rehabilitative/credibility use and substantive use of the statements, as a practical matter, provides a distinction without a difference. First, as the Stephens court recognized, even if the statements are admitted only for rehabilitative purposes, whether the statements were admitted before or after the declarant testified was of little consequence: “preadmission may be justified as harmless error if the declarant does testify later in a manner that is consistent with a prior statement.” 774 P.2d at 71. Second, while the Stephens court suggests that a limiting instruction will assist the jury in its consideration of the prior consistent statements, even the dissenting justices in Tome recognized that such limiting instructions are either misunderstood or ignored by juries. 513 U.S. at 171, 115 S.Ct. at 707-08. Finally, “[wjhen a witness presents important testimony damaging to a party, the party will often counter with at least an implicit charge that the witness has been under some influence or motive to fabricate,” thus opening the floodgates to prior consistent statements that need only satisfy Rule 403. Id. 513 U.S. at 162, 115 S.Ct. at 703.
I believe Chambers embodies the appropriate interpretation of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and the United States Supreme Court has held likewise. In Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156, 115 S.Ct. 696, 700, 130 L.Ed.2d 574, the Court held that the drafters of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) intended that rule to embody the common law requirement that a prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute a charge of fabrication unless the consistent statement was made before the source of bias, interest, influence, or incapacity originated. This interpretation was based upon the plain language of the rule, legislative history, and analysis of the policies underlying the adoption of the rule. In reaching its conclusion, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[t]he Rule speaks of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told.” Tome, 513 U.S. at 157-58, 115 S.Ct. at 701. Thus, the kind of impeachment contemplated and covered by the rule is the kind for which the premotive temporal requirement makes the most sense:
Impeachment by charging that the testimony is a recent fabrication or results from an improper influence or motive is, as a general matter, capable of direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court consistent statements that predate the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive. A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive. By contrast, prior consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment are involved.
Tome, 513 U.S. at 158, 115 S.Ct. at 701.
Without this requirement, parties desiring to fabricate stories would have merely to repeat their stories to numerous people and they would have ready-made witnesses who could sway juries with their numbers. However, “repetition does not imply veracity.” Stephens, 774 P.2d at 72. Perhaps more importantly the interpretation accepted by the majority would shift the emphasis in trial to out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones. Tome, 513 U.S. at 165, 115 S.Ct. at 705. The late Justice Cardine explained:
There is good reason for the rule excluding prior consistent statements. If the rule were otherwise, parties could prepare a multitude of self-serving, biased, inflammatory, video, audio, and written statements for trial; testify; and then introduce into evidence these consistent statements made prior to testifying. There would be no opportunity for cross-examination. The statements, as exhibits, might go with the jury and be used during deliberations. The same testimony would be repeated several times, unduly emphasizing that testimony over all other testimony in the case.
Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo.1987) (Cardine, J., specially concurring).
My research reveals that every state high court addressing the issue has adopted the *1030Tome temporal limitation, reasoning that, to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the prior consistent statement must precede the motive to fabricate. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 307 Ark. 41, 818 S.W.2d 573 (1991); Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837 (Fla.1997); Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620 (Ind.1998); State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 1995); Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 514 (Ky.1995); State v. Littlefield, 540 A.2d 777 (Me.1988); Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998) (adopting Tome but allowing prior consistent statements under unique Maryland rule with no federal counterpart); Owens v. State, 666 So.2d 814 (Miss.1995); State v. Veis, 289 Mont. 450, 962 P.2d 1153 (1998); State v. Morris, 251 Neb. 23, 554 N.W.2d 627 (1996); Peterson v. State, 103 Nev. 455, 744 P.2d 1259 (1987); State v. Leinen, 598 N.W.2d 102 (N.D.1999); State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902 (R.I.1995); State v. Ard, 332 S.C. 370, 505 S.E.2d 328 (1998); State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 674 A.2d 1258 (1996); State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34 (1997). But see, People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 19 (Colo.1999) (declining to reach the issue of whether 801(d)(1)(B) embodies a premotive requirement); State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 695 A.2d 1301 (1997) (allowing prior consistent statements to support witness credibility but declining to resolve whether New Jersey’s rule contains the Tome temporal requirement); State v. Brown, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 313 (1998) (allowing certain limited rehabilitative uses of prior consistent statements).
Athough some courts have noted that Tome leaves open the possibility of admitting prior consistent statements under Rule 803(24), it appears Wyoming stands alone in explicitly rejecting Tome on state law grounds. Not only do I believe Tome to be a correct interpretation of the rule, but adopting Tome would allow consistent application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in both Wyoming’s federal and state courts. See State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d at 165.
Finally, since the Wyoming Rules of Evidence are based upon and are virtually identical to the federal rules, the Tome analysis is valid here. “The Wyoming Rules of Evidence are based on the policy that conformity to federal practice is more important than uniformity of state practice.” Wyoming Rules of Evidence, Committee note. Accordingly, this court has chosen to follow the lead of the federal courts and adopt federal interpretations of the rules of evidence in previous cases. See, e.g., Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo.1996). We should follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Tome, thus reaffirming Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. In a related matter, the majority states that "Dike argued that the state should play the entire tape rather than isolate and play only the most damaging statements.” Maj. op. at 1022. That seems to imply that Dike made this argument prior to the introduction of the tape. However, it was only after the tape was played at trial, during his cross-examination of the witness through whom the prosecutor introduced the tape, that Dike’s counsel contemplated playing the entire tape. He eventually chose not to do so.
. In its brief, the State contends that testimony of "only three" witnesses was admitted as prior consistent statements. It argues that, of the other five witnesses, three witnesses’ statements were admitted as excited utterances and the testimony of two other witnesses was introduced without objection. However, because the majority treats all of the statements as prior consistent statements, I will do the same.
. W.R.E. 801 provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. — A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. — The declar-ant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. ...