dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the persistent violator allegation in this case. Moreover, this error by the district court was not harmless.
After the jury returned with guilty verdicts in this case, Harrington admitted to being a persistent violator. Thereafter, Harrington moved for leave to withdraw his admission. In his motion, Harrington sought leave to “withdraw his admission to the allegations of being a persistent violator.” The district court denied Harrington’s motion, but permitted him leave to renew it at a later time. Harrington then filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his admission and, thus, the relief Harrington sought remained the same. The motion for reconsideration was the sole matter before the district court when it dismissed the persistent violator allegation.
I.
ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Withdraw Admission
When moving for leave to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant must set forth the relief that he or she is seeking. See I.C.R. 47. Insofar as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the relief requested is just that, permission to withdraw that plea and, thus, to return the parties to the same position they were in before the plea was entered. An admission to a persistent violator allegation is analogous to a plea of guilty. The result of such an admission or guilty plea is that the prosecution is relieved of its burden of setting forth evidence to prove its allegation. A guilty plea may be withdrawn before sentencing only when a defendant demonstrates a “just reason” for withdrawing such a plea. State v. Acevedo, 131 Idaho 513, 516, 960 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct.App.1998). Thus, the proper course of action for a district court, after finding that the defendant has met the necessary burden permitting the court to do so, is to return the parties to the status quo.
Before sentencing, Harrington moved to withdraw his admission to being a persistent violator and, thus, requested that the district court return the parties to the status quo. Harrington was required to show just reason before the district court could properly permit him to withdraw his admission to being a persistent violator. Harrington, relied on State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1986), in support of his argument to withdraw his admission. The district court conducted a Brandt analysis and determined that it would treat the two felonies alleged by the prosecutor as one for the purposes of Harrington’s persistent violator status. However, the district court did not find just reason for permitting Harrington to withdraw his admission. Indeed, as the majority recognizes, the district court failed to ever rule on Harrington’s motion. Instead, based on its analysis under Brandt, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed the persistent violator allegation all together. The action by the district court in this case is analogous to a district court, in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, not ruling on that motion and instead dismissing the prosecutor’s information. This would be clear error. At best, one can only say the Brandt analysis conducted by the district court was premature. Thus, the district court erred by not ruling on Harrington’s motion or granting Harrington the relief he requested — permission to withdraw his admission to being a persistent violator.
Had the district court properly returned the parties to the status quo, the prosecutor would have been required to satisfy its burden of proving the persistent violator allegation on the felonies alleged, or any other felonies the prosecutor chose. Furthermore, had the district court ruled on the motion actually before it and granted Harrington the relief he requested, the prosecutor would have been made aware that, under Brandt, the district court would not consider the two prior felonies contained in the information sufficient for finding Harrington a persistent violator. Having the benefit of this knowledge, the prosecutor could have attempted to prove the persistent violator allegation based on any other felonies it chose to rely on, by *569moving to amend the persistent violator allegation insofar as the felonies alleged therein.
I find unpersuasive the majority’s insinuation that, due to the procedural posture of this case, it would have been too “late” and, thus, perhaps unlikely that the district court would have granted such a motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) states that the district court “may permit a complaint, an information or indictment to be amended at any time before the prosecution rests if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” The determination of whether the prosecutor should be permitted to amend the information rests in the trial court’s discretion. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88, 785 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct.App.1989). Amendment of a persistent violator allegation does not alter any charge nor does it charge a new offense and, thus, the prosecution has been permitted to amend a persistent violator allegation, by enlarging the list of prior felonies relied upon, even after the jury trial on the underlying substantive crime has concluded. See State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 559, 777 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Ct.App.1989). Indeed, the Smith Court permitted such an amendment after the evidentiary hearing on Smith’s persistent violator status had begun. Id. Therefore, the majority’s suggestion that it would have been too “late” for the district court to permit the prosecutor, at this juncture of the proceedings, to amend that portion of the information which alleged that Harrington was a persistent violator is contrary to existing Idaho precedent.
Moreover, the district court dismissed the persistent violator allegation without notifying the prosecutor that it was considering such an action. Idaho Criminal Rule 48 permits a district court to dismiss a criminal action upon its own motion if, among other things, the dismissal will serve the ends of justice. However, such action may be taken only after notice has been given to all parties. I.C.R. 48(a). It appears that without providing notice to the prosecutor and, thus, permitting the prosecutor to respond in a meaningful fashion, the district court dismissed the persistent violator allegation. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the persistent violator allegation without giving the requisite notice, thereby allowing the prosecutor an opportunity to respond.
Additionally, the district court erroneously considered the facts underlying the present felony when it dismissed the persistent violator allegation. When the district court dismissed the allegation, it stated:
I think there may be some advantage to reserving, if you will a persistent violator finding. Mr. Harrington is going to have to get his life in order. And he is going to have to start taking things seriously. And perhaps if he recognized that he has truly used up two of his three strikes, it will motivate him to get somewhere other than where we are right now____ And I think, quite frankly, a persistent violator finding should be reserved for a more serious situation where the judge at that point -. I mean, you can sentence somebody up to life on that rule.
(Emphasis added.). Thus, the district court determined that Harrington’s present case was not appropriate for a persistent violator “finding.” The decision whether to prosecute and what charge to file rests in the prosecutor’s discretion. State v. Storm, 123 Idaho 228, 233, 846 P.2d 230, 235 (Ct.App.1993). The prosecutor’s discretion includes the filing of persistent violator charges. Id. Thus, the district court invaded the province of the prosecutor when it determined that the instant case was not appropriate for a persistent violator finding.
Furthermore, the factual basis of the present crime is irrelevant to a persistent violator finding. Idaho Code Section 19-2514 states:
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life.
This Court has recognized that the legislature created the persistent violator statute to insure that habitual criminals will serve long*570er periods of incarceration than first-time felons. State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 340, 971 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Ct.App.1998). Enhanced punishment for recidivists serves the purpose of: (1) increasing punishment for those who have failed to learn to respect the law after suffering the initial penalties and embarrassment of a conviction; (2) protecting law-abiding citizens from the clear danger posed by the high incidence of repeat offenses; or (3) deterring criminals and others from committing subsequent crimes. See 39 Am.Jur.2d Habitual Criminals, Etc. § 2 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Although the sentence imposed after an individual is found to be a persistent violator is within the sound discretion of the trial court, the egregiousness of the instant felony is irrelevant to a finding that an individual is, in fact, a persistent violator. So long as the present crime charged is a felony, and the prosecutor proves that the prior convictions are felonies, the persistent violator inquiry is at an end. Thus, the district court erred when it determined that the present crime was unworthy of a persistent violator finding.
B. Harmless Error
Finally, the majority concludes that any error by the district court should be deemed harmless. I cannot agree. Generally, an error will be regarded as harmless if the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached, regardless of the error. State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 480, 927 P.2d 451, 453 (Ct.App.1996). The majority concludes “even if the [district] court had sentenced Harrington as a persistent violator, the [district] court would have imposed the same sentence.” (Emphasis added.). I cannot agree.
The district court, by dismissing the persistent violator allegation, precluded the prosecutor from setting forth evidence to prove that allegation. Moreover, because the district court’s sua sponte act precluded the prosecutor from moving to amend the persistent violator allegation in this case to include other prior crimes, the district court was without the benefit of the prosecutor’s evidence regarding such crimes. Finally, the record before this Court does not support the majority’s conclusion. Here, the district court stated that if it made a persistent violator finding, “it probably wouldn’t make that much difference with regard to the sentence that would be imposed.” Probably is defined as “in all probability; so far as the evidence shows; presumable; likely.” Blacks Law Dictionary 1201 (6th ed.1990). However, “beyond a reasonable doubt” is defined as “entirely convinced.” Id. at 161. The district court’s statement that finding Harrington was a persistent violator would probably not affect the sentence it imposed does not satisfy the reasonable doubt standard required in this Court’s harmless error analysis on appeal.
This Court has also recognized that there are collateral consequences of being found a persistent violator. Although the sentence imposed after a persistent violator finding is within the sound discretion of the trial court, we have previously stated:
The persistent violator status carries with it a certain stigma and may place pressure on the sentencing court to protect the public with a more lengthy sentence, as well as on prison officials who may be reluctant to grant parole. Therefore, a persistent violator finding will often cause enhancement of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court and may also defer one’s parole status.
Clark, 132 Idaho at 340, 971 P.2d at 1164. These collateral consequences also lead me to conclude that the district court’s error was not harmless.
II.
CONCLUSION
Thus, based on the facts of this case and the record before this Court, I am constrained to conclude that the district court’s order dismissing the persistent violator allegation against Harrington should be reversed. The district court did not require Harrington to meet the burden of demonstrating just reason to withdraw his admission, in fact, it never ruled on Harrington’s motion, the only motion that was properly before it. Moreover, the district court granted relief that Harrington did not request. *571Additionally, the district court failed to provide adequate notice to the prosecutor regarding its sua sponte dismissal of the persistent violator allegation. Furthermore, the basis for the district court’s action, the factual circumstances underlying the instant crime, was erroneous. Finally, I cannot agree with the majority that this error by the district court was harmless. Therefore, I respectfully dissent,