This proceeding arises from the trial court’s grant of respondent’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that appellants’ claims against North Idaho College and one of its instructors, Charles D. Chastain, were tort claims barred by applicable provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. We are called upon to decide whether, as found by the trial court, appellants’ claims lay in tort and were, consequently, barred by provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, or whether such claims also state a possible cause of action in contract.
Russell Wickstrom, Kenneth Hash, Bruce Bennett and Kevin Ryan enrolled in a “Maintenance Mechanic (Millwright)” course at North Idaho College, taught by Charles D. Chastain. The school bulletin averred that, upon successful completion of the course, graduates would be qualified for employment as “entry level journeymen.” However, upon their successful completion of the course, appellants discovered that they were not qualified as entry-level journeymen.
After this discovery, plaintiffs sought legal advice, and a letter of demand, dated August 21, 1984, was sent to North Idaho College detailing appellants’ dissatisfaction with the course and their intent to take legal action if the college did not compensate them for sacrifices made in attending the course for eleven months. The letter, however, failed to state appellants’ names and addresses, the amount of any damages they had incurred and the nature of any injuries suffered.
Appellants filed a complaint December 3, 1984, alleging misrepresentation and that instructor Chastain “willfully, knowingly and intentionally failed, refused and omitted to properly and adequately instruct ... the matters set forth ... with the consent and knowledge of the defendant college.” They sought damages for lost wages, fringe benefits and anticipated increased earnings, general and punitive damages and attorney fees and costs.
The trial court treated respondents’ motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and granted same on grounds that the complaint had only stated a cause of action in tort. The trial court rejected appellants’ argument that a claim in contract had been stated, ruling that “misfeasance” rather than “nonfeasance” was at the core of appellants’ claims, and therefore, the causé of action was in tort. Additionally, the court noted that the damages sought reflected that the cause of action lay in tort rather than contract, as neither rescission nor restitution were requested.
The trial court further held that the Idaho Tort Claims Act applied and that its notice provision (I.C. § 6-907) had not been complied with. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted.
We first address the issue of whether appellants claims are, in fact, barred by provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Secondly, we discuss whether the claims could have stated a cause of action in contract.
I. THE TORT CLAIM
As part of a junior college district, North Idaho College may sue and be sued in its own name (I.C. § 33-2108). As a governmental entity, the Idaho Tort Claims Act serves as a limitation on its potential liability. (I.C. § 6-901 et seq.).
In the instant case, however, any discussion of the substance or validity of appellants’ tort claim against North Idaho College is moot, given that appellants have failed to comply with the notice provision of the I.T.C.A. (I.C. § 6-907). I.C. § 6-907 provides in relevant part:
6-907. Contents of claims — Filing by agent or attorney — Effect of inaccuracies. — All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall accurately describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a statement of the actual *452residence of the claimant at the time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six (6) months immediately pri- or to the time the claim arose.
The demand letter of August 21, 1984 failed to serve as notice of a claim pursuant to the I.T.C.A., since it failed to state the names and addresses of the claimants, the amounts of claimed damages and the nature of the injury claimed. The claim is, therefore, barred. I.C. § 6-907; Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d 730 (1982).
It should be noted, however, that appellants admitted at oral argument that the letter of August 21,1984 was never intended to constitute notice of a tort claim. Rather, appellants contend that their cause of action lies in contract. We turn, then, to that issue.
II. THE CONTRACT CLAIM
It is by now well-settled that the principal relationship between a college and its students is contractual.
[I]t is necessary to examine the relationship between a public post-secondary educational institution and a student. There seems to be almost no dissent from the proposition that the relationship is contractual in nature. Peretti v. State of Montana, 464 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Mont.1979) (rev’d on other grounds, Montana v. Peretti, 661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.1981)).
The court in Peretti goes on to explain: Since a formal contract is rarely prepared, the general nature and terms of the agreement are usually implied, with specific terms to be found in the university bulletin and other publications; custom and usages can also become specific terms by implication. Peretti, 464 F.Supp. at 786.
See also, Ward v. Washington State University, 39 Wash.App. 630, 695 P.2d 133, 135 (1985); Marquez v. University of Washington, 32 Wash.App. 302, 648 P.2d 94 (1982); Zumbrun v. University of Southern California, 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 603 P.2d 454, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1972).
In presenting the issue of whether a contract claim existed against North Idaho College before the trial court, appellants cited Zumbrun v. University of Southern California, 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499, 603 P.2d 454 (1972). In Zumbrun, the court held that the contract between the university and student had been breached where an instructor had failed to complete instruction of a course in protest of various university policies. No final exam was given, and all students were passed and given grades of “B.” Plaintiff contended that she had not been given the educational background promised upon completion of the course.
In finding that no contract claim could be made in the instant case, the trial court here distinguished Zumbrun by characterizing the actions of the professor in that case as “nonfeasance,” whereas the alleged faulty instruction of Instructor Chastain constituted an allegation of “misfeasance,” and was, therefore, more akin to an alleged tort violation.
Such a characterization misses the point. A breach of contract may occur through affirmative noncompliance with the terms of the contract (i.e. “misfeasance”), as well as by a failure to perform at all (i.e. “nonfeasance”).
It is clear, then, that a valid cause of action in contract could exist if the terms of the implied contract between appellants and North Idaho College were not complied with. For instance, if certain fundamentals of the course necessary to attaining qualification as an “entry-level journeyman” were not even presented in the course, such could be a breach of the implied contract between the college and the students in the “Maintenance Mechanic (Millwright)” course.1 In the case at hand, *453however, neither the record nor the complaint disclose the facts by which appellants contend the college-student contract was breached. There is no mention of how the course might have failed to comply with the terms of the contract as found in the school bulletin or catalogue.
It is well settled that, in the interest of justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend, (I.R.C.P. 15(a); Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 326 P.2d 994 (1958). In the instant case, appellants did not file for leave to amend their complaint, asserting their complaint adequately stated a cause of action in contract. Failure to apply for leave to amend is not, however, fatal, but this Court may limit the possible amendments to appellant’s complaint. General Hospital v. City of Grangeville, 69 Idaho 6, 201 P.2d 750 (1949).
Accordingly, we grant appellants fourteen (14) days in which to file an amended complaint, but limit such grant only to an opportunity to state a cause of action in contract, provided such exists.
For the reasons stated, the trial court’s ruling that appellant’s claims in tort are barred by applicable provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is affirmed. Its ruling that appellants did not state a cause of action in contract is affirmed, with appellants nevertheless being granted fourteen (14) days following remittitur in which to file an amended complaint in an attempt to state a cause of action in contract. Costs to appellants. No attorney fees on appeal.
BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ., concur. DONALDSON, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part.. Such fundamentals would include the number of days/hours required to complete a prescribed course of study and other objective criteria in a course’s presentation. Such a failure to provide objective fundamentals, which could result in a breach of the implied contract between *453college and student, would not implicate the policy concerns regarding the viability of contract claims predicated upon the more subjective nuances of the teacher-student relationship (i.e. methodology of teaching and other matters usually raised under the rubric, “educational malpractice,” which cause of action Idaho does not recognize.)