dissenting in part, concurring in part.
For the reasons expressed in my dissent in the first appeal of this case, Cleary v. State, 548 P.2d 952 (Alaska 1976), I am still of the opinion that appellant’s original sentence was not clearly excessive. For those same reasons, and as further explained below, I now dissent from the majority’s holding requiring the superior court to enter a 10 year sentence as to each of the four robbery counts in cause No. 75-617 Cr. At the same time, I concur in several respects with the majority opinion in this case.
Despite my own strong disagreement with the reversal ordered in the first appeal, like the majority, I disapprove of the action taken by the superior court following our remand of the case. The imposition of a sentence of 20 years on each of the four robbery counts, made to run consecutively to the 5 year federal sentence, resulted in a term of potential incarceration identical to that held clearly excessive in the first appeal. The superior court all too clearly chose to disregard the mandate of this court by the rather clumsy process of simply juggling the numbers. In my opinion, no judge, regardless of his personal views, is entitled to ignore the requirements of the law. As stated long ago in State v. Salinas, 362 P.2d 298, 301 (Alaska 1961):
[U]pon remand of a case by this court it becomes the duty of the lower court to obey the mandate and render judgment in conformity. This rule is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority and is based on the policy that litigation must be finally ended, (footnotes omitted)
Failure to recognize that duty poorly serves the public interest in that it can only result in further controversy and, as it did in this case, the added cost of another appeal.
I also concur with the majority’s holding that a 20 year sentence for a particular robbery is clearly illegal in that it exceeds the maximum sentence of 15 years allowed by AS 11.15.240, the statute under which Cleary was charged and convicted.
*378My disagreement with the majority in this case, concerns the action that will now be taken. I see no justification for reducing the sentences any further than is required to bring them into conformity with the maximum term allowed by AS 11.15.-240. I would simply hold that to the extent that the sentences on the four robbery counts (No. 75-617 Cr.) exceed the statutory maximum, the sentences should be vacated. Thus, I would remand with directions that the superior court enter judgment reducing those sentences to a legal term of 15 years, to be served consecutively with the federal sentence of 5 years.