Breath alcohol analysis in Washington is currently tested using BAC Verifier DataMaster (Data-Master) machines, which have completely replaced the previously used Breathalyzers. The admissibility of DataMaster breath test results has been widely challenged in recent DWI prosecutions under RCW 46.61.502, Washington’s driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DWI) statute.
The three cases in this opinion, which represent many consolidated DWI cases, were linked due to the similarity of the issues raised. In each of the cases, the Defendants’ Data-Master breath test results were suppressed and the prosecutions were dismissed. The District Courts cited both constitutional and statutory grounds for the suppressions. We begin by addressing the issue of constitutional due process, the sole issue raised in State v. Matthews.
Because the basic facts underlying the cases are essentially the same, we detail the facts more fully in State v. Matthews and incorporate additional facts as needed in *472State ex rel. Dawson v. South Dist. Court and State v. Wittenbarger.
State v. Matthews
Each of the Defendants in this case was arrested for a suspected DWI violation. As part of the investigation, the Defendants each submitted to a DataMaster chemical breath analysis and registered a breath alcohol content above the legal limit of .10 percent. When DWI charges were brought in the Shoreline Division of King County District Court, counsel for the Defendants submitted pretrial motions for suppression of the DataMaster results on the grounds, among others, that their due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to preserve maintenance and repair records on the DataMaster machines. Because the cases involved identical issues, they were consolidated for a suppression hearing.
Rather than submit new expert testimony on the issues in this case, the parties stipulated to a record consisting primarily of the transcripts from two similar cases in Bellevue and Renton District Courts. The extensive detailed testimony addresses the technology of the DataMaster machines, the relevance and value of various DataMaster records, and the circumstances surrounding the development of the new Washington Administrative Code procedures for DataMaster operation and maintenance.
Under RCW 46.61.506(3), the State Toxicologist has the delegated authority to approve breath testing procedures and protocols and has recently drafted revised protocols and procedures for breath testing to reflect the switch to the updated DataMaster technology. The new procedures became effective in 1991 and are found in WAC 448-13. Under WAC 448-13-050, the accuracy of the DataMaster test results is ensured by adherence to specific testing procedures. For example, before a breath test is performed, the DataMaster operator must observe the individual for 15 minutes and check his or her mouth for substances that might affect the test. When testing begins, a blank test is *473conducted to ensure that the internal air of the DataMaster chamber contains no alcohol from a previous test that could interfere with the current results. Next, the individual blows into the machine, and the first breath sample is tested, followed by another blank test. At this point, a specially prepared simulator solution with a known alcohol content is tested to verify that the DataMaster is correctly. performing the chemical analysis. After a third blank test, the individual gives another breath sample followed by a final blank test. The results of these tests are printed out on a breath ticket.
In order to be considered valid, the entire test must be performed following all protocol, the blank tests must register a 0.00 alcohol content, the results of the two breath samples must be within plus or minus 10 percent of the average of the two measurements, and the reading from the simulator test must be within 10 percent of the known alcohol content. WAC 448-13-050, -060.
In addition to the breath test protocol, the State Toxicologist has developed a quality assurance protocol (QAP) designed to ensure the DataMasters are maintained in proper working order on a regular basis. See WAC 448-13-110. Under the QAP, a DataMaster is oificially approved for use only after a thorough inspection of its components. Such an inspection is also required at least every 12 months and after most repairs.
Under the new QAP, the actual procedures used to evaluate and approve the DataMasters closely resemble those previously used to certify the Breathalyzer machines. The State’s record-keeping policies, however, have been revised. For example, specific data from the inspections is no longer recorded. Instead of recording information such as initial voltage values, adjusted voltage values, and calibration factors, the technicians merely indicate that the required tests were performed with satisfactory results by checking a box on the inspection forms.
The Defendants contend that these detailed inspection records, along with additional repair and maintenance *474records no longer generated by the State, are necessary to their defense. In support of this contention, the defense presented the testimony of two experts, Dr. Richard Jensen, forensic scientist, and Carol Murren, former employee of the State Toxicologist. The experts essentially testified that all records of machine malfunctions and repairs would be useful and should be retained in order to assist the defense in challenging the reliability of the DataMasters.
The District Court suppressed the results of the Defendants’ BAC Verifier DataMaster breath test results on the ground that the State, by no longer generating certain maintenance repair records, deprived the Defendants of due process of law under both the Fourteenth Amendment and article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. The State filed a RALJ appeal in King County Superior Court, but before the appeal was heard, the Court of Appeals granted a motion for direct review. The appeal was then certified to this court and linked for oral argument with two similar cases. We find that neither federal nor state due process requires state law enforcement agencies to keep additional DataMaster records, and, therefore, we reverse the District Court’s suppression order.
In recent years we have left open the question of whether the due process clause of our state constitution places more stringent requirements on the State in the area of preservation of evidence for the defense. See State v. Furman, 122 Wn.2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993); State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992); State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, 810 P.2d 888 (1991). Today, after consideration of the six factors set out in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986), we hold that the state due process clause affords the same protection regarding a criminal defendant’s right to discover potentially exculpatory evidence as does its federal counterpart.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that criminal prosecutions conform with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness, and that criminal defendants be given a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Cali*475fornia v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984). To comport with due process, the prosecution has a duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense and a related duty to preserve such evidence for use by the defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); California v. Trombetta, supra.
Two Supreme Court cases, California v. Trombetta, supra, and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), developed a test to determine whether the government’s failure to preserve evidence significant to the defense violates a defendant’s due process rights. It is clear that if the State has failed to preserve "material exculpatory evidence” criminal charges must be dismissed. Recognizing that the right to due process is limited, however, the Court has been unwilling to "imposte] on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. A showing that the evidence might have exonerated the defendant is not enough. In order to be considered "material exculpatory evidence”, the evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489.
In Trombetta, the evidence at issue consisted of several DWI defendants’ breath test samples tested by the State and then discarded. Applying its test, the Court held that the destroyed breath samples were not material exculpatory evidence and reinstated the DWI convictions. The Court found the exculpatory value of the samples to be quite low, pointing out that given the accuracy of California’s Intoxilyzer the breath test samples would have been much more likely to be inculpatory than exculpatory. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489-90. Furthermore, the Court found that the defendants had means, other than retesting the original *476breath samples, to demonstrate their innocence. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 490.
. In similar circumstances, we held in State v. Straka, supra, that due process did not require the State to generate and preserve records of invalid message codes on the Data-Masters. These messages appear to alert the operator that the DataMaster is unable to perform a reliable test due to either an electrical misadjustment or the presence of mouth alcohol. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 879. We found the invalid sample messages were not material exculpatory evidence because they do not confirm or deny the accuracy of a particular breath test and, thus, are not directly related to guilt or innocence of an individual charged under the DWI statute. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 885.
Likewise, we find that the maintenance and repair records sought by the Defendants in this case are not directly related to the accuracy of a particular breath test. Unlike the breath test ticket, which contains specific information regarding the accuracy of each DataMaster reading, evidence of past repairs is only tangentially related to whether the machine is properly functioning on a given day. Any additional repair and maintenance records would merely be used by the defense to discredit the general reliability of the DataMaster results.
Moreover, DWI defendants have alternative means of attacking the credibility of DataMaster breath tests, including cross examination of the DataMaster operator regarding operator error, expert testimony regarding the DataMaster machines and infrared spectroscopy, as well as evidence of additional independent breath or blood tests obtained under RCW 46.61.506(5). To further assist them in their defense, the defendants have access to protocols, the Washington State Patrol policy manual, the qualifications of the Data-Master operator and the breath test ticket itself, which contains a detailed record of the DataMaster breath test results, including the readings of the blank tests and the tests of the simulator solution. See WAC 448-13-130; Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 875.
*477Thus, applying the Youngblood test, we find that the maintenance and repair records at issue in this case do not rise to the level of "material exculpatory evidence” and are, at best, only potentially useful to the defense. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, failure to preserve "potentially useful” evidence does not constitute a denial of due process unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the State. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
The Defendants concede that the State in this case has acted in compliance with its established policy regarding the evidence at issue, a fact that we have found in the past to be determinative of good faith. See Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d at 302. Cf. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. They argue, however, that here, unlike a typical preservation of the evidence case, the normal procedures themselves constitute a pattern of bad faith designed by the State to systematically deny DWI defendants access to useful evidence. They contend that it is patently unfair for the State to rely heavily on DataMaster test results to obtain DWI convictions on one hand, while simultaneously limiting the universe of evidence that the defense can use to challenge those test results. The Defendants also allege the State no longer keeps certain maintenance and repair records because defense attorneys have used them successfully to challenge DWI prosecutions in the past. They point to meetings between the State Toxicologist and prosecuting attorneys, arguing that the new protocols were drafted with a prosecutorial bias. The record reveals, however, that the defense bar also had opportunity to voice concerns regarding the proposed changes in protocol and the promulgation of WAC 448-13.
The fact that the State Toxicologist was aware the criminal defense bar was opposed to the changes in record-keeping policy and that defense counsel had found the old records useful does not lead us to conclude the State acted in bad faith when it made the changes. Rather, our review of the record convinces us the State Toxicologist was acting in good faith and pursuant to his statutorily delegated authority when he opted to revise the breath testing protocol *478and update the State’s record-keeping procedures. The protocols contained in WAC 448-13 represent a good faith effort on the part of the State to verify that the DataMasters are in good working order and are performing accurate chemical breath analysis each time an individual is tested.
Furthermore, the fact that the State has ceased to keep records it kept in the past does not in itself constitute a showing of bad faith. The Defendants have failed to convince us the State’s reduction in the amount of data retained from the results of the various tests performed on a DataMaster during a QAP inspection was improperly motivated. Specifically, the defense requested voltage values, frequencies and distances used to test radio frequency interference, values used to detect acetone, and previous calibration factors, all of which are no longer retained by the State. The State has not made any changes to the battery of tests performed on the DataMasters, and elimination in the records of the specific statistics and numerical values obtained from these tests is not inherently evil. In fact, the record shows that given the DataMaster technology, the State no longer had use for the specific readings. For example, the records of voltage values are no longer needed because any voltage fluctuations aífecting a breath test would show up on the breath test ticket at the time of a test.
In maintaining it acted in good faith, the State has provided logical and valid reasons for other changes in its record-keeping policies as well. For example, the telephone complaint forms requested by the defense were previously filled out each time a problem with a DataMaster was reported. Initially designed to provide the repair technicians with specific information regarding a malfunction, the forms were useless in practice because the technicians rarely received the forms until after they had repaired the malfunctioning machine. This indicates the State’s elimination of the forms did not stem from bad faith.
The defense also requested records of repairs to DataMaster circuit boards completed by Mark Stone, an electrician employed by the Washington State Patrol. Trooper *479Stone does not keep the notes from the technicians, which are often attached to the boards to alert him to the possible cause of the malfunction, because they often do not reflect the actual problem with the board. These notes would be of little value to the defense, and failure to keep these notes does not constitute bad faith. Once the boards have been repaired and placed into a machine, the Data-Master must again undergo a complete inspection to verify that it is functioning properly before it can be approved for use in the field. WAC 448-13-050. Records of this QAP inspection are available to the defense.
In our view, the records currently available to the defense contain ample information regarding the condition of the DataMasters. The new protocols, coupled with the improved DataMaster technology, create a system of accurate and reliable chemical breath analysis. Absent a more convincing showing by the defense, we make no finding of bad faith and, thus, find no due process violation.
Next, we move to the issue of our state constitution. Defendants argue that the State’s failure to generate and preserve the requested maintenance and repair records violates their due process rights under article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. They urge us to employ the "reasonable balance” analysis of State v. Vaster, 99 Wn.2d 44, 659 P.2d 528 (1983) and State v. Wright, 87 Wn.2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976), which would not necessarily require a finding of bad faith for suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence. As we held in State v. Straka, supra, however, the analysis in those cases was based on federal constitutional principles and, thus, to this extent is no longer valid under the holdings of Trombetta and Youngblood. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 883. In order to be revived, Vaster's "reasonable balance” test must be supported by an independent state constitutional analysis.
In State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986), we enumerated six nonexclusive neutral criteria that must be addressed before we will engage in state constitutional analysis: (1) the textual language of the *480state provision; (2) significant differences in the federal and state texts; (3) state constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences between the federal and state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local concern.
Const, art. 1, § 3 provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
This language is nearly identical to the federal provision, and no legislative history indicates that the state provision should be interpreted differently. Although our constitution. may generally provide more protection than the federal, we must analyze each particular issue individually.
Defendants rely primarily on factors 4 and 6. First they argue chemical breath testing is strictly a matter of local concern because the State is charged with developing testing and maintenance procedures for the DataMaster. Law enforcement, however, is always a matter of local concern. Defendants have failed to demonstrate how the State’s involvement in administering the breath testing program and enforcing our DWI laws relates to our inquiry of whether the preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence is a matter of particular state interest or local concern. Although they point to other jurisdictions that have rejected the Youngblood analysis under their state constitutions, we are not persuaded that the preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence is of particular local interest in Washington. This factor does not further our analysis of the particular question in this case.
Next, Defendants rely on preexisting case law in Washington to argue that we should retain the standard adopted in State v. Vaster, supra. Under Vaster a criminal defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility the unavailable evidence would affect the defense. The court must then balance this possibility against the ability of the State to preserve the evidence, the nature of the evidence and the circumstances surrounding its loss. Vaster, 99 Wn.2d at 52. *481Neither Vaster nor the cases cited in Vaster, however, included analysis of state law, and, as noted earlier, the federal principles applied in Vaster have been supplanted by the holdings in Trombetta and Youngblood. See Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 883; Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d at 303-04.
The defense also argues that, given the unique nature of DWI cases, we should place a heightened duty on the State to preserve evidence that could be used in a DWI defense. In their support, the Defendants cite to cases involving a DWI defendant’s right to counsel. These cases, however, analyze the right to counsel not only under the constitution, but also under the preexisting state court rule JCrR 2.11. See Spokane v. Kruger, 116 Wn.2d 135, 142, 803 P.2d 305 (1991); State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wn.2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980) (Fitzsimmons II); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wn.2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, 18 A.L.R.4th 690, vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff’d on remand, 94 Wn.2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980). Because any independent state analysis is based on the existence of former JCrR 2.11, these cases shed no light on any preexisting law regarding the state due process clause and are not helpful in this case.
We are not convinced separate and independent state grounds exist to support a broader interpretation of the state due process clause in the context of preservation of evidence. We hold Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988) provides the proper standard for preservation of exculpatory evidence, and under our analysis above, we find no due process violation. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s suppression order and reinstate the DWI charges under RCW 46.61.502(1).
State Ex Rel. Dawson v. South Dist. Court
The second case before us represents over 270 DWI cases consolidated in Snohomish County South District Court. In each of those cases, the Defendants underwent DataMaster breath tests, the results of which were suppressed on both constitutional and statutory grounds. On appeal in Snohomish County Superior Court, the District Court’s suppres*482sion orders were reversed and the DWI charges were reinstated. The Defendants appealed, and we review this case on certification from Division One. We affirm the Superior Court on all grounds.
First we address the trial court’s suppression of the Data-Master results on the ground that the State violated the Defendants’ due process rights by failing to generate and preserve certain DataMaster maintenance and repair records. The records requested by the defense in this case are essentially the same as those requested in Matthews. We refer to our due process analysis in Matthews and, for the reasons stated above, we find the records are not material exculpatory evidence and should not be suppressed absent a finding of bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
The evidence of bad faith presented in this case differs from that presented in Matthews, but it is equally unconvincing. First, the Defendants point to the State’s mishandling of certain maintenance and repair records that should have been available to them in this case. The issue, however, of whether existing records contained incorrect information or were improperly withheld from the defense is completely separate from our inquiry here whether the State acted in bad faith by failing to generate and preserve the records requested by the defense in this case.
The Defendants also argue that the State acted in bad faith because the State knew the exculpatory value of the records at the time it elected to no longer maintain them. They urge us to find that the State’s change in record-keeping policy was motivated by a desire to obtain speedier DWI convictions by depriving defendants of exculpatory evidence. Our review of the record, however, reveals no indication that the State has deliberately hampered the Defendants’ ability to defend their DWI charges. In fact, given the current breath testing technology, we find the records at issue here have little exculpatory value, and the State has acted reasonably in eliminating certain records to reflect the changes in breath testing technology. Because the previously used *483Breathalyzer machine did not possess the technological capability of monitoring its performance at each breath test, more records were previously needed to assure the machines were providing accurate breath alcohol measurements. The State Toxicologist has since exercised his delegated authority to approve an instrument and devise testing protocols that render the maintenance and repair records requested by the defense of little value. The Data-Master performs a control test of a simulator solution each time a breath test is administered, the results of which are printed on the breath test ticket. The breath test ticket, then, is a crucial document in determining whether the DataMaster was operating properly during a particular test, whereas the repair records requested by the defense would only be indicative of how a machine was functioning at a time other than while a particular test was being conducted. There is no substantial evidence that the State believes the maintenance and repair records no longer generated would exculpate the defendants. Rather, the evidence in the record indicates that the records currently maintained by the State provide adequate documentation of the reliability of the DataMaster machines. We find no due process violation.
Next, we address the District Court’s suppression of the breath test results under CrRLJ 6.13(c). CrRLJ 6.13 governs the admissibility of certain documents in criminal prosecutions and under section (c), the State may use a certificate instead of live testimony to establish that the breath test machine performing the test was examined, tested, and found to be in working order by a technician. CrRLJ 6.13(c) provides in pertinent part:
(1) . . . In the absence of a request to produce [a state technician or expert witness]. . ., certificates [stating that the breath test machine was in working order] are admissible in lieu of a state expert witness in any [DWI] proceeding.....
(2) . . . If the technician determines that... a BAC Verifier DataMaster instrument is not in proper working order at the time of examination, the technician shall [certify that the machine was not in proper working order and certify the date it was repaired].
*484(3) . . . The clerk of each court of limited jurisdiction shall maintain the certificates as a public record.
Subsections (1) and (2) include sample forms to be filled out by the state technicians inspecting the machines.
The District Court interpreted this rule as placing an affirmative duty on the State to fill out and file a certificate of nonworking order each time a DataMaster is examined and found to be in need of repair. Because the State could not produce CrRLJ 6.13(c)(2) certificates on the DataMasters used to test the Defendants in this case, the District Court suppressed the results of breath tests performed by the DataMasters. We find, however, that CrRLJ 6.13(c)(2) certificates have been rendered somewhat superfluous and that the State’s failure to file them should not result in suppression. Therefore, we hold the District Court’s suppression of the breath tests on this ground is in error.
The defense agrees that certificates of working order under section (c)(1) are clearly discretionary and need only be used when there is no live testimony. The defense asserts, however, that the language of section (c)(2) requires the State to file certificates of nonworking order regardless of whether the State plans to use live testimony at trial. We cannot agree with this interpretation. Nowhere in CrRLJ 6.13(c) is the State expressly directed to file certificates of nonworking order each time a breath test machine needs to be repaired. Rather, section (c)(2) directs an inspecting technician to fill out a form and certify when the malfunctioning machine was repaired, and section (c)(3) directs the clerk of the court to maintain the certificates as a public record. The rule is ambiguous as to whether the section (c)(2) certificates need only be filed when used in lieu of live testimony as the section (c)(1) certificates.
Court rules are interpreted as if drafted by the Legislature. State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 154, 761 P.2d 588 (1988), adhered to on rehearing, 113 Wn.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 906, 80 A.L.R.4th 989 (1989). We must construe court rules consistent with their purpose. See PUD 1 v. WPPSS, 104 Wn.2d 353, 369, 705 P.2d 1195 (1985). *485Accordingly, the spirit and intent of the rule should take precedence over a strained and unlikely interpretation. See Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wn.2d 133, 143, 821 P.2d 482 (1992).
CrRLJ 6.13(c) was adopted when the former WAC 448--12-010 was in effect. Under former WAC 448-12-010 to -020, proper working order of the Breathalyzer machines was determined through examination and certification of the Breathalyzers every 3 months. We find that CrRLJ 6.13(c) was clearly intended to interact with the WAC certification requirement and provide a uniform standard by which documentation of these certification inspections could be deemed admissible in court. Under this view, the use of CrRLJ 6.13(c)(2) certificates, like the use of section (c)(1) certificates, would be entirely discretionary.
The Defendants, however, cite a CrRLJ 6.13 task force comment that may indicate an additional purpose of section (c)(2) certificates was to provide notice to defendants that a machine was malfunctioning during a specific period of time. Even if notification was the original intent of the rule, however, such notice is no longer needed under the current breath testing program. At the time CrRLJ 6.13(c) was drafted, breath alcohol analysis was performed by the Breathalyzer machines. Former WAC 448-12 required Breathalyzer control test results to be recorded only once every 3 months during the certification process to determine the proper working order of the Breathalyzer. WAC 448-12 has since been repealed and replaced with WAC 448-13, under which the proper working order of the DataMaster is determined and recorded at the time of each breath test. WAC 448-13-060. The certification requirement has been dropped and use of CrRLJ 6.13(c) certificates recommended but not required as part of the annual QAP inspection of the DataMasters under WAC 448-13-010.
We refuse to adopt the District Court’s strained conclusion that the State’s failure to file CrRLJ 6.13(c)(2) certificates should result in the dismissal of all DWI cases. Given the breath testing protocol and procedure currently in place, we cannot say that the Defendants have been prejudiced by the *486lack of the section (c)(2) certificates in this case. Considering the initial purposes of CrRLJ 6.13(c)(2) certificates of nonworking order and the evolution of our state’s breath testing program, we find the District Court’s interpretation violates the spirit and intent of CrRLJ 6.13(c)(2). Therefore, we hold that the State’s failure to file a certificate of nonworking order does not require suppression of the breath test results.
We next examine the Defendants’ argument that their breath tests were correctly suppressed by the trial court because the tests were conducted on DataMasters operating with software that was improperly authorized by the State Toxicologist. The Defendants challenge the Toxicologist’s approval of the DataMaster software as arbitrary and capricious, alleging the tests performed by the Toxicologist on the software before approval were inadequate. We disagree.
Administrative action is arbitrary and capricious only when it is willful and unreasoning or taken without consideration and in disregard of the facts. See State v. Ford, 110 Wn.2d 827, 830-31, 755 P.2d 806 (1988) (holding the toxicologist’s initial approval of the DataMaster machine was not arbitrary and capricious). A regulation that is authorized and consistent with the authorizing statute is presumed valid, and the party attacking the regulation has the burden of rebutting this presumption. Ford, 110 Wn.2d at 831-32.
Two statutes are relevant. First, in former RCW 46.61.502(1), the Legislature has determined that a person is guilty of the crime of DWI while "[t]he person has 0.10 grams or more of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath, as shown by analysis of the person’s breath made under RCW 46.61.506 . . .”. Second, in RCW 46.61.506(3), the Legislature has delegated to the State Toxicologist the responsibility for approving methods for performing the breath analysis and determining a valid breath test.
As directed by the Legislature, the Toxicologist approved the software currently used in the DataMaster machines. While the Defendants point to weaknesses in the procedures used by the Toxicologist when he was testing the *487software, the critical fact remains that he did, in fact, approve the software. Cf. State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, 874, 810 P.2d 888 (1991). We find the Toxicologist’s approval of the software is consistent with the authorizing statute. Further, our review of the record reveals the software is currently performing accurate and reliable chemical breath analysis. The Defendants fail to demonstrate his approval of the DataMaster software rises to the level of arbitrary and capricious action.
Also pursuant to RCW 46.61.506(3), the Toxicologist has approved regulations and protocols which must be followed in order for a breath test to be considered valid. See WAC 448-13. Without citation to authority, the Defendants contend that these regulations violate both the confrontation clause and separation of powers principles. These arguments have no merit. Again, the Toxicologist has developed Washington’s breath testing program and has promulgated WAC 448-13 at the direction of the Legislature. These regulations do not unconstitutionally hamper the defendant’s ability to attack the accuracy and reliability of the evidence at trial, nor do they limit the court’s ability to evaluate the admissibility of evidence. The trial court retains the responsibility of determining if the State has met its burden of establishing the foundational requirements for admissibility under State v. Baker, 56 Wn.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960).
Finally, we reject the Defendants’ assertion that the Data-Master breath test should be suppressed because the Toxicologist and the State Patrol did not comply with RCW 42.17.290, Washington’s public records act. The record contains no evidence that the Defendants have pursued an appropriate remedy under the statute. See RCW 42.17.340. This issue is not properly before the court.
For the reasons stated above, the Superior Court’s decision to reinstate the DWI charges is affirmed.
State v. Wittenbarger
The third case before us involves several DWI Defendants whose cases were consolidated in Cascade District Court. *488The District Court suppressed the Defendants’ DataMaster breath test results and ordered their cases dismissed under RCW 46.61.502(1). On the State’s appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded for trial. The Defendants were then granted discretionary review in Division One of the Court of Appeals, after which their case was certified to this court and linked with the other cases in this opinion.
The District Court’s suppression rested on two grounds. First, the District Court held the breath tests were inadmissible for lack of foundation. The Superior Court reversed on RALJ appeal, finding the breath test results would be admissible if the State could establish on remand that the existing procedures and protocol were followed in evaluating the DataMaster machines. We affirm. Second, the court held the State’s failure to preserve DataMaster maintenance and repair records violated the Defendants’ due process rights. Again, the Superior Court reversed. As in State ex rel. Dawson v. South Dist. Court, we affirm this reversal, relying again on our analysis in the first case of this opinion, State v. Matthews. The Defendants’ arguments that their due process rights were violated are virtually identical to the arguments made by the Defendants in the previous two cases. Because we have already considered the relevant due process arguments then, we only briefly outline our reasoning here.
In short, the Defendants in this case requested certifications, CrRLJ 6.13 certificates, and other unavailable maintenance and repair records, claiming that these documents were necessary to their defense. As with the documents requested by the Defendants in Matthews, however, we find these records do not constitute "material exculpatory evidence” because they are not directly related to the guilt or innocence of a particular DWI defendant and because the Defendants have available alternative means of attacking the credibility of the test results. See State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, 885, 810 P.2d 888 (1991); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489-90, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 102 L. Ed. 2d *489281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988). Therefore, under Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, suppression is not required absent a showing of bad faith. Again, we have examined the record and have encountered no new or convincing evidence that the State acted in bád faith when it changed its record-keeping policy and eliminated these records. Accordingly, we find no due process violation.
Next, we examine the District Court’s holding that the Defendants’ DataMaster test results are inadmissible for lack of foundation under State v. Baker, 56 Wn.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960). Recently in State v. Straka, supra, we addressed this issue and found that when the State relies on results of machine breath tests in DWI prosecutions, the State must establish (1) that the machine was in proper working order, (2) that if chemicals were used in testing they were correct and correctly used, (3) that the operator was qualified and performed the test correctly, and (4) that the results are accurate. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 874-75 (citing State v. Baker, supra). If the State satisfies this initial burden, the test results are admissible. If the defendant presents rebuttal evidence, the issue of the reliability of the test results is for the trier of fact. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 875.
Analyzing the first prong of this test, the District Court held that without the unavailable maintenance and repair records, the State could not possibly establish that the Data-Masters were in proper working order. The District Court was also disturbed by a record of some "unauthorized tests” run on the DataMasters, which consisted of sample tests conducted by an unknown operator. The court found that the State must recertify the DataMaster machine after such unauthorized contacts in order to establish the DataMaster was in proper working order and lay an adequate foundation for the breath test results.
We find this conclusion to be in error and in direct conflict with our opinion in State v. Straka, supra, where we stated:
When the [breath testing] protocols at issue here and existing Code provisions are followed, there is sufficient assurance *490of accuracy and reliability of the test results to allow for general admissibility of [DataMaster] test results. . . .
Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 870.
At all times relevant to the suppression hearings in this case, the current WAC provisions had not yet been enacted. Former WAC 448-12 governed the approval of the DataMaster and the administration of the breath test. While former WAC 448-12-015 and -016 required periodic evaluation and certification of the Breathalyzer machines, WAC 448-12-210 and -220 did not require a similar certification process for the DataMaster machines, presumably because DataMaster machines possess the ability to perform and record, the results of a control test each time a breath test is administered.
We find the District Court’s decision to suppress the breath test results for lack of foundation to be an abuse of discretion. The existing WAC procedures and protocol (the same provisions that were in effect in Straka) did not call for certification of the DataMaster machines and clearly did not call for recertification after each so-called unauthorized contact. Even under the current provisions there is no such requirement. Furthermore, there was no evidence before the District Court that the unauthorized contacts in any way had a negative impact on the DataMaster machines.
We agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that if the State can meet its initial burden and establish it followed the approved protocol, the breath tests are to be admitted. Evidence of the unauthorized contacts could be used by the defense as rebuttal evidence to attack the credibility of the breath test results.
The Superior Court’s ruling reversing the District Court’s suppression order and dismissal under RCW 46.61.502(1) is affirmed.
Andersen, C.J., and Brachtenbach, Durham, Guy, and Madsen, JJ., concur.