*632CONCURRING OPINION OF
ABE, J.The majority of this court has reversed the judgment of the trial court and I concur with the result, although I disagree with its reasoning.
The option paragraph which is in question reads as follows:
“Option to purchase. That if at the end of ten (10) years from January 1, 1954, the Lessees shall not be in default hereunder they shall have the right to purchase said property at a mutually agreed price and if said price cannot be determined by the agreement of the parties hereto, it shall be set by appraisal in the manner herein-before provided but in no case shall the sale price be less than SEVENTY-FIVE .THOUSAND DOLLARS ($75,000.00) net to the Lessor; . . . .”
I do not agree with this court’s interpretation that the paragraph provides that “if the Lessees are not in default at the end of ten (10) years from January 1, 1954, they shall have the right to purchase the property at an agreed price, or failing agreement, at a price to be set by appraisal. The price to be set by appraisal would be the ‘market value of the demised land exclusive of buildings. . . .’ ” And that the lessees have the right to exercise the option on January 1, 1964 or within a reasonable time thereafter.
On the other hand the lessees contend that the paragraph above mentioned gave them a continuing option to purchase the premises to be exercised at any time after January 1, 1964 for the remainder of the lease term provided the lessees were not in default on January 1, 1964.
- I cannot agree with the constructions given the paragraph by this court or the lessees. To me it is clear that the condition precedent to the lessees’ right to exercise the option to purchase is that the “Lessees shall not be in default” under the terms, conditions or covenants of the lease. The record shows that at the time the lessees attempted to exercise the option to purchase they were in default of the covenant to construct a new first-class building suitable for hotel or *633apartment costing not less than $100,000. Thus, the lessees not having satisfied the condition precedent they had no right to exercise the option to purchase. Jones v. United States, 96 U.S. 24, 27 (1877).
Under the decision of this court the important issue is whether the option to purchase was exercised within a reasonable time. The question of what is a reasonable time under the circumstances of a particular case is generally a question of fact. Lucas v. Swan, 67 F.2d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1933); Victorson v. Albert M. Green Hosiery Mills, 202 F.2d 717, 719 (3d Cir. 1953); Alpern v. Mayfair Markets, 118 Cal. App. 2d 541, 547, 258 P.2d 7, 10 (1953), I cannot agree with this court’s holding that under the record of this case the question whether the option to purchase was exercised within a reasonable time was a question of law which may be determined by this court.