I dissent. The trial judge directed defendant to pay, not to the minor, but to the attorneys the sum of $3,250 in addition to $3,500 previously paid, in full payment for all legal services rendered in the action from December 16, 1937 to January 29, 1945, but specifically excepted legal services rendered on the appeal from the order of February 26, 1942, and another order which is of no consequence on the present appeal. That was a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial judge if he concluded, as he evidently did, that previous payments of attorneys’ fees were ample to cover subsequent applications for fees. On the appeal from the order denying $3,500 as attorneys’ fees an appeal was filed (No. 13008) and then a motion for $750 on account of attorneys’ fees to prosecute the appeal (No. 13008) was filed. The ap*574peal, No. 13009, is from the order denying $750 to pay costs and fees on the appeal No. 13008.
On March 13, 1942, a motion made in advance of the performance of legal services was presented requesting $3,500 for proceeding with an appeal involving an order for attorneys’ fees. The court discovered that the attorneys requesting the fees had a contingent fee contract of 45 per cent with the guardian of the minor child. “Respondent also contended that plaintiff was not entitled to further fees and expenses because of misconduct and bad faith on the part of his counsel.” (Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326, 328 [140 P.2d 886].) The trial court held that the contract was valid and refused to make an order directing defendant to pay further fees. On appeal the major question was attorneys’ fees; that is, whether the plaintiff through his guardian should pay these additional attorneys’ fees or was it incumbent upon the defendant to pay. It was held that the fee agreement was against public policy and that attorneys’ fees under Civil Code section 196a “are part of the child’s right to support.” This quotation in Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326, 328 [140 P.2d 886] was adopted from Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal.App.2d 122, 132 [100 P.2d 806]. In the latter case the appellate court was discussing the participation of the attorneys in three trials and various motions and incidental proceedings for the benefit of the minor child.
In Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326 [140 P.2d 886], in addition to the specific reason given by the trial court for the denial of additional attorneys’ fees, the entire record, when read, may indicate that the trial court was convinced that the attorneys had been amply compensated. In that case the minor did receive some possible “support” in the declaration of the appellate court (p. 329) that “the contingent fee contract here involved was against public policy and therefore void.” (See, also, Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82 [142 P.2d 417].) In the Kyne case on motion for rehearing one of the participants in the opinion expressed grave doubt relative to the legal soundness of the opinion. (Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326, 334-335 [140 P.2d 886].) However, the minor may not be relieved entirely from responsibility. Notwithstanding that a contract may be against public policy “there arises an implied contract to pay for services rendered thereunder, and the remedy of action sounding in quantum meruit is available to recover the reasonable value thereof.” (Wiley v. Silsbee, 1 Cal.App.2d 520, 522 [36 P.2d 854].) In brief, the attorneys for the minor *575in this action may sue their client or their client’s opponent for a reasonable fee.
I do not understand that the attorneys have “renounced the contract,” as appears in the majority opinion. It is true that in Kyne v. Kyne the following statement appears (pp. 331-332) : “In what we have heretofore said we do not wish to be understood as intimating that the contingent fee agreement, even if valid, would preclude the court from making an allowance for attorneys’ fees. The attorneys for appellant have never sought to recover any fees under said agreement and have, at all stages of the proceedings since the order of the trial court awarding attorneys’ fees following the verdict of the jury establishing respondent as the father of the child, disclaimed any intention so to do and renounced any rights under said contract.” However, the attorneys seeking additional fees stated on March 8, 1945 before the superior court that “the child at the present time owes his attorneys a reasonable fee for the services on this appeal.”
Likewise, I do not understand that 1 ‘ On the order to show cause it [the court] awarded the minor $3,250 attorneys’ fees and $353.10 costs. ...” The costs were awarded to minor plaintiff but the “fees,” according to the order, are to be paid directly to the attorneys. Likewise, I do not understand that “The attorneys [on these appeals] are not parties in fact or in substance.”
In Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326 [140 P.2d 886], the appellate court merely determined that the contingent fee agreement in and of itself did not preclude an allowance for supplemental fees. The order disallowing fees was reversed with the statement (p. 334) : “Upon a new hearing all issues involved may be heard and determined.” The trial court finally granted a hearing and ordered fees on certain matters, but denied fees on the matters involved in Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326 [140 P.2d 886], If the application for additional fees had been granted, the attorney or attorneys would have received a sum in excess of the monthly stipend paid by the defendant to the minor over a period of approximately ten years. As an appellate justice I am willing to assume, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that the judge presiding in a domestic relation trial court department has the ability and the honesty of purpose prudently to separate all the circumstances that may indicate either a just or an exorbi*576tant claim for additional fees. The action of the trial court in denying fees on this particular item was discretionary. Evidently it took into consideration the sums of money theretofore allowed. It should not be said that it exceeded the bounds of reason in denying the application for $3,500 additional attorneys’ fees in view of all the facts of this case. (Makzoume v. Makzoume, 50 Cal.App.2d 229 [123 P.2d 72].)
The majority opinion states: “If it be urged, however, that a discretion was exercised, then we would be forced to hold that the trial court abused its discretion.” It also states: “Under the circumstances the value of the services on the appeals is an issue that the trial court is better equipped than this court to handle.”
Whatever may be urged in support of the appeal in Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal.App.2d 326 [140 P.2d 886] upon the theory that the decision therein was of benefit and therefore in “support” of the minor by elimination of the “contingent fee contract,” the last appeal, No. 13009, is based entirely upon the right of attorneys to demand a fee in advance upon a claim of fee without special or advantageous interest to the minor. Stripped of its decorative dress, under Civil Code, section 196a and the enforcement power similar to sections 137, 137.5, 138, 139 and 140, it is merely an action for attorneys ’ fees. The interest of the minor, at least so far as the contingent agreement is concerned, is eliminated. No authority has been suggested for superimposing attorneys’ fees on an appeal for fees which in the sound discretion of the court have been denied. If the views in the majority opinion should be approved, law business could generate law business by repeated motions for additional fees to appeal from denial of motions for fees or from the inadequacy of the amount of the order. In the interest of justice as applied to the facts of this case, and in the interest of justice generally, actions which tend to incite litigation for the benefit of attorneys should be discouraged. In my opinion each order appealed from should be affirmed.