concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.
I believe that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not Petitioner Jodie Bear was an at-will employee. I, therefore, dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on that issue. I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.
Bear and Respondent Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc. agree that Bear was given a copy of the personnel policies when she was hired. Bear claims, however, that she does not remember having been presented with the first page of the personnel policies which contained the disclaimer. Volunteers of America asserts that Bear received a complete copy of the policies and was, therefore, bound by the disclaimer. The district court granted a summary judgment in favor of Volunteers of America on this issue, and the majority affirms the district court’s decision.
The disclaimer in this case contained places for the employee and the supervisor to sign. The record is, however, devoid of a copy of a disclaimer signed by Bear. Bear averred that she was not asked to sign a copy of the disclaimer until March 1996 and that she refused to do so then. Additionally, a Volunteers of America board member stated in his deposition that, although employees were routinely asked to sign disclaimers when they were employed, he never saw a copy of a disclaimer signed by Bear. The employer, of course, is not legally required to have its employees sign disclaimers; howev*1256er, the conspicuous absence of a disclaimer signed by Bear gives validity to Bear’s contention that she did not receive the disclaimer.
The majority opines that whether or not an individual employee received actual notice of the particulars of her employer’s personnel policies is irrelevant. The majority opinion cites Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corporation, 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554 (1994), as being support for its determination that the entire personnel policies, including the disclaimer, was binding on Bear, even if she was personally unaware of them. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employee was bound by the entire employment manual even though the employee had actually seen only a relatively small portion of the manual. 643 A.2d at 558-59. The court reiterated many times, however, that it was important for the entire manual to be widely distributed to the employer’s work force. Id.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that an employment handbook may effectively rebut the presumption that employment is at-will and create an implied-in-fact contract for continued employment. See, e.g., Loghry v. Unicover Corporation, 927 P.2d 706 (Wyo.1996). We have also held that a conspicuous, clear, and unambiguous disclaimer makes an employee’s reliance on other provisions of a handbook unreasonable and effectively sustains the at-will employment status. Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corporation, 867 P.2d 701 (Wyo.1994). In determining whether a disclaimer is sufficient, we consider the disclaimer’s prominence, its placement in relation to the other text in the manual, and the clarity of the disclaimer language. 867 P.2d at 703-04.
Volunteers of America’s personnel policies included a list of causes for termination, a grievance procedure, and a probationary period for new employees. Its personnel policies, without the disclaimer, undoubtedly created an implied-in-fact contract for continued employment. Volunteers of America’s work force was quite small. Evidence that one employee did not receive the disclaimer creates a factual question as to whether or not the entire personnel policies was widely distributed. Unless we are certain that the entire personnel policies, including the disclaimer, was widely distributed to the work force, we should not make it applicable to Bear. .1 would, therefore, reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for a trial on this issue.