dissenting:
I cannot join the majority in passing on the correctness of the district court’s ruling on trust disbursements for non-medical purposes, as I do not believe the order reviewed is appealable.
In the order, the district judge remanded the matter to the Department of Human Services for the agency’s determination within 15 days of Ellen Barker’s eligibility to receive medical assistance from June, 1987 through December, 1992. In the absence of a determination of her eligibility, we do not have a judgment to review for a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action. 12 O.S.1991, § 681, Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Engineering, 755 P.2d 669 (Okl.1988); Oklahomans for Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Okl., 634 P.2d 704 (Okl.1981); Reams v. Tulsa Cable Television, Inc., 604 P.2d 373 (CM.1979); Hurley v. Hurley, 191 Okl. 194, 127 P.2d 147 (1942). This is a prejudgment interlocutory order with no final characteristic or effect. It leaves the parties before the court with directions to return to the administrative agency for its adjudication of the issue in controversy in a subsequent proceeding. Reid v. Phillips Pe*1351troleum Company, 531 P.2d 340 (Okl.1975); Hughes Motor Co. v. Warner, 187 Okl. 255, 102 P.2d 594 (1940).
The remand is an authorized intermediate step under 75 O.S.1991, § 322(a). It does not, however, fall within the class of interlocutory orders appealable by right or an order which may be certified for immediate review. 12 O.S.1991, §§ 952, 993 and Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 15, App. 2. Neither may it be deemed a final order. 12 O.S.1991, § 993; 75 O.S.1991, § 323; Lawson v. Boston Chrysler Ply. & Dodge, Inc., 625 P.2d 1258 (Okl.1981).
An appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order made during the pendency of an action which leaves the parties in court to have the issues tried on the merits, unless the appeal is expressly authorized by statute. Weaver v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Tulsa, 263 P.2d 194 (1953); Dennis v. Lathrop, 204 Okl. 684, 233 P.2d 969 (1951).
The majority implies that the order took on a quality of finality because the trial court’s ruling on the relevance of trust disbursements made the result of the Department’s determination of eligibility predictable. Predictability of a subsequent order does not impart finality to a non-final order, however. Even when the court’s own judgment is at issue, a judge’s announcement of what judgment might be rendered under conditions yet to occur is not a judgment. Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Authority, 626 P.2d 314 (Okl.1981); Porter v. Tayer, 385 P.2d 808 (Okl.1963); Foreman v. Riley, 88 Okl. 75, 211 P. 495 (1923).
Findings of the court or statements of its opinions or comments do not constitute a judgment, but are only expressions by the court as to what its judgment should be. A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties and is distinct from the findings of the court. Tillman v. Tillman, 199 Okl. 130, 184 P.2d 784 (1947).
This appeal is premature. It presents no decision or final order for this Court to review and should be dismissed.
I am authorized to state that Justice OPA-LA joins with me in the views expressed herein.