On May 4, 1984, Mark Henry Lankford was found guilty on two counts of first degree murder. Following the verdicts, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Lankford to death. Lank-ford appeals the murder convictions and sentence, the denial of his amended petition for post-conviction relief, and the trial court’s denial of his second motion for new trial. The appeals have been consolidated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719 (1987). This matter is also before the Court on automat*864ic review under the provisions of I.C. § 19-2827 (1987).
In June of 1983, Mark Lankford and his brother Bryan Lankford packed their belongings and fled from their home state of Texas because Bryan had violated his probation for a robbery conviction and did not want to be sent back to jail. The Lank-fords eventually made their way to Idaho County, Idaho, where they camped in a remote forest campground for several days. At that same time, retired Marine officer Robert Bravence and his wife, Cheryl, were vacationing in a nearby campground.
On September 24, 1983, the bodies of Robert and Cheryl Bravence were found by hunters in the Idaho County forest. Approximately one-fourth of a mile from the bodies a 1982 Chevrolet Camaro registered to Mark Henry Lankford, of Houston, Texas was found. On or about the 5th of July 1983, a vehicle registered to Robert and Cheryl Bravence was located in Los Angeles, California. Fingerprints taken from items found in the Bravence vehicle were identified. as belonging to Mark Henry Lankford and Bryan Stuart Lankford.
On October 2, 1983, Mark Lankford and Bryan were arrested in Liberty County, Texas. Subsequent to the arrest, authorities found items belonging to the Bravences in a Liberty County campsite. The Lankfords were extradited to Idaho where they were tried separately for the murders of Robert and Cheryl Bravence. Bryan Lankford agreed to be a witness for the State at his brother’s trial because he believed the State Prosecutor had offered him an indeterminate life sentence instead of the death penalty in exchange for his testimony.
Bryan testified as follows: After reaching the Idaho County forest where they hid out, Mark and Bryan decided to steal an automobile from a campsite in the area. They reasoned that, because the monthly payments on Mark’s car were delinquent, the police would be searching for it and so they needed to abandon it to avoid capture. They left the car in the woods covered with brush and set off to steal another car. They walked down a mountain road which eventually led to a campsite occupied by Robert Bravence and his wife Cheryl. Bryan entered the campsite first, with a shotgun draped over his arms, and engaged the Bravences in conversation. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Bravence left the campsite to go down to a nearby stream for some water. After Mrs. Bravence left, Mark Lankford ran out from behind some bushes where he had been hiding, and into the campsite and ordered Robert Bravence to kneel on the ground in front of him. Mark Lankford then hit Robert Bravence in the back of the head with a brown wooden night stick. When Cheryl Bravence returned to the campsite she rushed to the side of her husband who was lying on the ground. Mark Lankford ordered her to kneel down on the ground next to the body of her husband and struck her in the back of the neck with the same nightstick. The Lankfords placed the Bravences' bodies into the Bravence van and drove back to their former campsite where Mark hid the bodies near his Camaro. The Lankfords then drove the Bravence van to Oregon and later to California where they abandoned it in Los Angeles. During their travels they purchased food and accommodations with the Bravences’ credit card.
Following Bryan Lankford’s testimony on direct examination, Mark Lankford, contrary to advice from counsel and the court, decided to act as his own attorney and cross-examine his brother. After Mark Lankford’s inadequate attempt at cross-examination and objection by his attorney, the trial court allowed the attorney to resume his role. At this point, Bryan Lank-ford invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and initially refused to answer the trial counsel’s questions on cross-examination.
In addition to Bryan Lankford’s testimony, pertaining to the causes of death, the State’s medical experts testified that the Bravences died from multiple blows to the skull.
After Mark and Bryan were each convicted in separate trials for the first degree murders of Robert and Cheryl Bravence, *865Bryan recanted the testimony he gave at Mark’s trial on three different occasions. At Mark's sentencing hearing Bryan testified that in a phone conversation he told a reporter with the Lewiston Morning Tribune that he had lied under oath at Mark’s trial and that it had been he who had bludgeoned the Bravences, that he used a rock and that Mark Lankford was not present at the scene. Later, at Mark Lank-ford’s motion for a new trial, Bryan Lank-ford indicated that he had lied to the Lewiston Tribune. Finally, after being sentenced to death, Bryan Lankford executed a written statement in which he indicated his full culpability for the Bravence deaths and Mark’s Lankford's innocence. Then on May 29, 1986, at Mark’s second motion for a new trial, Bryan testified that he was primarily responsible for the murders. He further testified that his testimony at his brother’s trial was false.
On October 15, 1984, the court issued its Findings in Consideration of the Death Penalty. Judgment and sentence of Death was imposed on October 16, 1984.
I.
Lankford’s Decision to Waive His Right to Counsel and Cross-examine His Brother Pro Se.
Mark Lankford claims that he was deprived of his right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution when the trial court allowed him to cross-examine his brother pro se. He claims that Idaho case law, Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 388, 395, 422 P.2d 55 (1966), and I.C. § 19-857 (1987), mandate that more than a mere affirmative waiver is needed to show that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Lank-ford claims that the trial court did not conduct the requisite penetrating and extensive examination into all of the circumstances of Lankford’s waiver; and, as a result, he was allowed to waive his right to counsel in the heat of passion and without sufficient knowledge of his waiver’s potential ramifications.
Criminal defendants have the right to be represented by counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. In addition to guaranteeing the right to counsel, it has been held that the sixth amendment guarantees that a defendant has an independent constitutional right to proceed pro se when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812-836, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2529-2542, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324-325 (9th Cir.1982) (the Harris court found that the defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges filed against him and the possible penalties flowing from those charges, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self representation. The Harris court also held that the trial court must discuss with the defendant, in open court, whether the defendant’s waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, with an understanding of the charges, and possible penalties and dangers of self representation.) See State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300 (1980), in which this Court cites Faretta.
Ultimately, the decision of whether to exercise the right to counsel or proceed pro se is for the defendant to make. The role of the trial court is simply to ensure that where the defendant waives the right to counsel he or she does so knowingly and intelligently.
In this case, the trial court went to great lengths to ensure that Mark Lankford’s waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently, and to dissuade Lankford from proceeding pro se. The trial court warned him of the hazards he would encounter, that he had an insufficient background to examine the witnesses, and that he would be held to the Rules of Evidence if he elected to proceed on his own behalf. In spite of these warnings, Lankford insisted on waiving his right to counsel and proceeded pro se during the cross-examination of his brother. In response to Lankford’s insistence, the trial court did the only thing it could do — it granted his wish. Even though the trial *866court allowed Lankford to proceed pro se, the record reflects the court still protected him as much as it could under the circumstances. It allowed Lankford’s counsel to remain present during Lankford’s pro se activities; it assisted him on procedural points during his attempt at cross-examination; and finally, it allowed Lankford’s attorney to go through an entire recross-examination after Lankford terminated his botched attempt.
We affirm the trial court on this issue.
II.
The Trial Court’s Instruction That Malice Could Be Established by Proof That the Killing Took Place During the Perpetration or Attempted Perpetration of a Robbery.
Lankford argues that the giving of Instruction No. 24(a) was reversible error. The instruction reads:
The term malice does not necessarily import ill will toward the individual injured, but signifies rather a general malignant recklessness toward the lives and safety of others. Malice may be shown from the fact that an unlawful killing took place during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the crime of robbery.
Lankford claims that this instruction was incorrect in two respects. First, he argues that it states as a matter of law that a killing in perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony is malice per se. Second, he argues the jury could have reasonably interpreted the instruction as creating a presumption that a robbery was committed, thus, relieving the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a robbery.
As to Lankford’s.argument that the second sentence of Instruction 24-A misstates the law or is incorrect, we must disagree based upon our reading of Idaho’s requirements for the proof of murder in the first degree.
Idaho Code § 18-4001 (1987) provides in part:
18-4001. Murder defined. — Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought____
Idaho Code § 18-4002 (1987) provides that “such malice may be express or implied.” In addition, I.C. § 18-4003(d) (1987) provides:
18-4003(d). Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping and mayhem is murder of the first degree.
Thus, the proof of a murder in the first degree is established in all of its elements by proving (a) the unlawful killing of a human being (b) in the course of a robbery. The requirement of “malice aforethought” is satisfied by the fact the killing was committed in the perpetration of a robbery. In W. La Fave and A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law, § 67 Murder — “Malice Aforethought” and “Living Human Being,” pp. 528-530, and § 7 Felony Murder, pp. 545-547 and 554 (1972), the authors explain:
Murder is a common law crime whose complete development required several centuries. Though murder is frequently defined as the unlawful killing of another “living human being” with “malice aforethought,” in modern times the latter phrase does not even approximate its literal meaning. Hence it is preferable not to rely upon that misleading expression for an understanding of murder but rather to consider the various types of murder (typed according to the mental element) which the common law came to recognize and which exist today in most jurisdictions:
(1) intent-to-kill murder;
(2) intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury murder;
(3) depraved-heart murder; and
(4) felony murder.
At first the judges in fact did require for murder that the defendant actually have a previously thought-out (i.e., premeditated) intent to kill, though probably the spite, etc., was never actually necessary. Later (about 1550), English statutes *867made it murder to intentionally kill another by poisoning or by lying in wait; but these two situations would seem to be no more than typical cases involving a premeditated intent to kill, the almost literal meaning of “malice aforethought.”
Thereafter the judges started to invent some new types of murder where there existed no premeditated intent to kill. First of all, when the defendant intentionally killed his victim in a heat of passion aroused in him by the conduct of the victim — the issue being whether the defendant should be guilty of murder or of voluntary manslaughter — the judges decided that manslaughter required that the defendant’s passion be reasonable.
Secondly, when the defendant unintentionally killed another person in the commission of a felony — as where A set fire to B’s house (arson) and accidentally B or a member of his family was .burned to death — the judges held this to be murder (“felony murder”), though the defendant did not intend to kill at all and a fortiori did not premeditate a killing.
The judges still continued to say that murder is committed by one who unlawfully kills another “with malice aforethought,” now however adding the phrase “express or implied,” the word “implied” covering the four situations just described wherein literally there exists no premeditated intent to kill. Modern courts and legislatures still frequently define murder in terms of “malice aforethought, express or implied,” by which they mean the same types of murder as those which the English judges ultimately recognized, including felony murder, depraved-heart murder, intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury murder and murder committed in an unreasonable passion. (The foregoing history is contained in N.Y.State Law Revision Commission, Communication to the Legislature, Legislative Doc. No. 65, 536-540 (1937), reprinted in Hall & Glueck, Criminal Law & Its Enforcement 37-39 (2d ed. 1958). See also Moreland, The Law of Homicide chs. 1-3 (1952); 1 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883).)1
Under the facts of the instant case, according to Idaho law, the robbery not only supplies the malice element of the murder charge, but also it makes that murder a murder in the first degree as defined in I.C. § 18-4003(d). Therefore, the instruction was not in error.
As for Lankford’s second assignment of error on this instruction, we note that jury instructions must be considered together, without particular weight being given to one as opposed to the others. State v. Bryan Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 694, 747 P.2d 710 (1987). The trial court instructed the jury that the State must prove all elements for crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. This defeats Lankford’s argument that under Instruction 24(a) the State was not sufficiently obligated to prove robbery beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was instructed that robbery had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Golden, 67 Idaho 497, 502, 186 P.2d 485 (1947). Because Instruction 24(a) was a correct statement of the law of first degree murder in Idaho and because the court did instruct the jury that it would have to find all the elements of the crimes charged proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we find no error in the language of Instruction 24(a).
III.
The Trial Court’s Decision to Add to the State’s List of Aggravating Circumstances and to Deny Lankford’s Motion For Continuance.
Lankford claims that the trial court abused its discretion and interfered with his right to counsel when it denied his motion for a continuance to prepare for previously undisclosed aggravating factors *868which the trial court added to the prosecution’s proposed list of factors. The two factors added were factors enumerated in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(2) (commission of multiple murders) and I.C. § 19-2515(g)(7) (felony murder accompanied with the specific intent to cause the death of a human being).
While a decision to grant or deny a continuance generally rests within the discretion of the trial judge, the discretion is abused when it results in the abridgment of the accused’s right to counsel. State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977). In essence, Lankford’s argument is that defense counsel had no prior notice that the trial court was going to add two aggravating factors to the list presented by the prosecutor and that lack of notice, combined with the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance, effectively abridged Lankford’s right to counsel, thereby violating his rights under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights under art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Since the Idaho statute supplies the two subject aggravating factors, the district judge was required to give them consideration if circumstances were proven to support them.
This Court has acknowledged that I.C. § 19-2515(f) (1987) gives fully sufficient notice of the circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed and of the prerequisites governing such sentence. State v. Bryan Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710 (1987). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2961, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (wherein the court held that a statute gives fair warning of capital liability for an aider and abettor); and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 298, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2300, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), wherein the court held that the existence [of a death penalty statute] on the statute books provides fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the state ascribes to the act of murder). In light of both Idaho and United States Supreme Court rulings, the fact that the aggravating circumstances are documented in I.C. § 19-2515(f) provided Lankford with the requisite notice.
Not only do the statutes provide sufficient notice of aggravating circumstances, but Idaho’s sentencing system provides that the judge, not the prosecuting attorney, is responsible for sentencing. State v. Bryan Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710, State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) cert. den., 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). Because Idaho provides for judge sentencing, a prosecuting attorney’s sentencing recommendations are to be viewed as just that, mere recommendations. The trial judge makes the final decision as to what will be and will not be considered in sentencing. Finally, I.C. § 19-2515(d) provides that “[e]vidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing.”
Lankford had notice of all possible aggravating circumstances and that the judge could properly utilize any or all of them during sentencing. Thus, we find no error and affirm the trial court on this issue.
IV.
Sentencing — Participation of Jury.
Lankford asserts that the imposition of the death penalty with no participation by the jury in the sentencing process violates the Idaho Constitution.
In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), this Court ruled:
In 1983 this Court held “that there is no federal constitutional requirement of jury participation in the sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in the sentencing process, as contrasted with judicial discretion sentencing, is within the policy determination of the individual states.” State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 373, 670 P.2d 463, 474 (1983) cert. den. 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). See also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 902, 674 P.2d 396, 398 (1983) cert. den. 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887, (1984); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985) cert. den., 479 U.S. 870, 107 S.Ct. 239, 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); *869State v. Fain, [116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989)]. In 1984 the United States Supreme Court upheld death sentencing by trial judges. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984).
This Court has also held “that Art. 1, § 7, of the Idaho Constitution does not require the participation of a jury in the sentencing process in a capital case.” Sivak, 105 Idaho at 904, 674 P.2d at 400. See also Fain, [116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252] (1989).
Jaimi [Charboneau] contends that despite these decisions, since I.C. § 19-2515(g) “links an enhanced punishment to specific enumerated factual findings,” it “usurps the jury’s fundamental role in deciding whether the fact is so.” In Richmond v. Arizona, 434 U.S. 1323, 98 S.Ct. 8, 54 L.Ed.2d 34 (1977) Justice Rehnquist, sitting as a circuit justice, denied an application for suspension of an order denying certiorari or, in the alternative, for a stay of execution. In his opinion Justice Rehnquist stated:
Applicant raises a second argument in his petition for rehearing that was not raised either before the Arizona Supreme Court or in his earlier petition for certiorari. Applicant argues that the Arizona statute violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to provide for jury input into the determination of whether aggravating and mitigating circumstances do or do not exist. Such jury input would not appear to be required under this Court’s decision in Proffitt [v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976)].
434 U.S. at 1325, 98 U.S. at 9, 54 L.Ed.2d at 36. Jaimi correctly points out that this issue was not presented to the entire Supreme Court, but only to Justice Rehnquist. Jaimi argues that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) supports his position on this issue. It is interesting that Justice Rehnquist also wrote the opinion for the Court in McMillan, including the statement “that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact.” 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2420, 91 L.Ed.2d at 76. In his decision Justice Rehnquist cited Proffitt for the proposition: “Sentencing courts necessarily consider the circumstances of an offense in selecting the appropriate punishment, and we have consistently approved sentencing schemes that mandate consideration of facts related to the crime,____” 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2420, 91 L.Ed.2d at 76. The crux of the decision in McMillan was the conclusion that the fact at issue there — visible possession of a firearm— was not an element of the crimes for which the defendants were convicted, but were instead “a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty____” McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84, 106 S.Ct. at 2416, 91 L.Ed.2d at 72. That is how we view the aggravating circumstances listed in I.C. § 19-2515(g).
To accept Jaimi’s argument that the jury must be involved in determining whether aggravating circumstances exist, we would have to conclude that the aggravating circumstances listed in I.C. § 19-2515(g) are elements of first degree murder. We are unable to reach that conclusion. The circumstances listed in the statute are clearly circumstances to be considered in sentencing and not elements of first degree murder. It is not unconstitutional for a judge, instead of a jury, to determine whether any of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute exist.
Our opinion in this aspect of the case is not changed by the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988). In Adamson the Ninth Circuit held Arizona’s death penalty sentencing statutes to be in violation of the sixth amendment. During reargument of this case to determine what impact Adamson might have on our opinion here, the solicitor general for the state of Idaho acknowledged that there is no significant difference between the Arizona death penalty sentencing statutes and *870those of Idaho. Nevertheless, we are not convinced that Adamson correctly states the requirements of the sixth amendment on this issue.
Judicial sentencing in capital cases does not violate the sixth amendment. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Adamson attempts to distinguish Spaziano on the ground that in Spaziano “the Court never reached the particular contention Adamson has raised: that Arizona’s capital sentencing statute requires the judge to determine elements of the offense charged, thereby taking this factual element out of the jury’s hands in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” 865 F.2d at 1028. We disagree.
In Spaziano the Court noted that the Florida capital sentencing statute that was at issue directed the sentencing judge “to determine whether statutory aggravating circumstances were outweighed by statutory mitigating circumstances.” 468 U.S. at 450 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 3157 n. 4, 82 L.Ed.2d at 343 n. 4. The Florida statute was similar in the important aspects to those portions of I.C. § 19-2515 relating to death penalty sentencing. The Florida statute provided that the sentencing judge should weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If the judge imposed a sentence of death, the judge was required to set forth in writing “findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: (a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5), and (6) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” 1972 Fla.Laws, ch. 72-724, Sec. 921.-141(3)(b). The aggravating circumstances enumerated in the Florida law at issue in Spaziano were similar in some respects to those contained in I.C. § 19-2515(g). Significantly, one of the aggravating circumstances in Florida was: “The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-724, Sec. 921.141(6)(h). This is substantially the same as I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) that is at issue here, except that our statute adds the qualifying phrase, “manifesting exceptional depravity.”
The Florida Supreme Court noted in its decision “the trial judge found that the circumstances of the offense were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, and secondly, found that the defendant was previously convicted of felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Spaziano v. State, 393 So.2d 1119 (Fla.1981). On certiorari the United States Supreme Court held:
The fact that a capital sentencing is like a trial in the respects significant to the Double Jeopardy Clause, however, does not mean that it is like a trial in respects significant to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial____ The sentencer, whether judge or jury, has a constitutional obligation to evaluate the unique circumstances of the individual defendant and the sentencer’s decision for life is final. Arizona v. Rumsey, [467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984)]. More important, despite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding — a determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual. [Citations omitted, except] Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-249, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083-1084, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of that issue.
468 U.S. at 454, 104 S.Ct. at 3161, 82 L.Ed.2d at 347. These comments were made by the Court in considering death penalty sentencing by a judge under a statute substantially similar to our statute and with findings of aggravating circumstances similar to those here. This convinces us that the Court inherently considered and rejected the premise of the Ninth Circuit in Adamson: that a capital sentencing statute that requires the judge to determine aggravating circumstances takes this factual element *871out of the jury’s hands in violation of the sixth amendment.
116 Idaho at 145-147, 774 P.2d at 315-317.
For the reasons enunciated in Charboneau, we hold that Lankford was not entitled to jury participation in the sentencing process.2 Our position is strengthened by the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Hildwin v. Florida, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989) where the Court concluded that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.”
V.
The testimony of the Court Appointed Psychiatrist.
Lankford claims that the court violated his rights guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution when it compelled him to be a witness against himself at a psychiatric examination conducted by Dr. Estes. Lankford also claims that the court’s order subjected him to the psychiatric examination without assistance of counsel, thus, violating his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and his rights under Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
On May 17, 1984, the district court ordered Dr. Estes, a psychiatrist, to examine Mark Lankford and report upon his psychiatric medical condition. Dr. Estes followed the court order and questioned Lankford in the Ada County Jail. Lankford’s attorney was not present during the questioning. Following his examination of Lankford, Dr. Estes submitted his findings to the court. Later he testified as to those findings at the sentencing hearing. Dr. Estes testified that, prior to interviewing Lankford, he orally administered the Miranda Rights. Dr. Estes did not obtain a written waiver of Lankford’s Miranda rights nor did he inform Lankford that his statements would be used as evidence in proving the aggravating circumstances necessary for the death penalty. Dr. Estes did advise Lank-ford that their conversation would not be subject to any doctor/patient privilege. Prior to allowing Dr. Estes to testify about his interview with Lankford, the trial court questioned Dr. Estes to assure that disclosure of the interview would pass constitutional muster. The court found that the examination took place with the consent and approval of counsel, after written notice to counsel, and that Lankford’s comments to the psychiatrist were made voluntarily, with knowledge of his right to remain silent, and with knowledge that any statements he made could be used against him.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial psychiatric exams conducted prior to sentencing as well as those conducted prior to trial. Adequate protection of these rights requires that the examining psychiatrist Mirandize the patient. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). In Estelle, after the State announced its intention to seek the death penalty, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination to determine Estelle’s competency to stand trial. The examination was conducted in the jail where he was being held. The examining doctor determined that Estelle was competent to stand trial and he was then tried and convicted. A separate sentencing proceeding was then held before a jury, as required by Texas law. The doctor who had conducted the pre-trial psychiatric examination testified for the State. The jury determined that the death penalty should be imposed. The case ultimately made its way to the federal district court by writ of habeas corpus where the death sentence was vacated because the court found constitutional error in admitting the doctor’s testimony *872at the penalty phase. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed. The case was then appealed to United States Supreme Court which affirmed. The Court stated:
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, commands that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The essence of this basic constitutional principle is “the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple,, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-582, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1867, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (opinion announcing the judgment) (emphasis added). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596-1597, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964); E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7 (1955).
The Court has held that “the availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In this case, the ultimate penalty of death was a potential consequence of what respondent told the examining psychiatrist. Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made “ ‘the deluded instrument of his own conviction,’ ” Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, [367 U.S.] at 581, [81 S.Ct. at] 1867, quoting 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824), it protects him as well from being made the “deluded instrument” of his own execution.
We can discern 'no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent’s capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned. (Footnote omitted.) Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. at 462-463, 101 S.Ct. at 1872-1873.
As for the method of advising a suspect or defendant of his Miranda Rights, and of obtaining a waiver of those rights, there is no requirement that either be done in writing. The U.S. Constitution does not require a written warning or waiver, and Idaho has not required a written warning or waiver since such requirements were removed from I.C. § 19-853 in 1984. Accordingly, Dr. Estes did not violate Lankford’s constitutional rights when he orally advised Lankford of his Miranda Rights and accepted an oral waiver. Since Lankford was properly Mirandized and there was no formalistic infirmity with his waiver, the only question which remains is whether Lankford’s waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Lankford claims that his waiver was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent because Dr. Estes did not tell him that his disclosures could be used as evidence for the State during sentencing. We disagree. The very fact that he was Mirandized put Lankford on notice that what he said could be used against him during the sentencing hearing. This notice was furthered when Dr. Estes told Lankford that the doctor/patient privilege would not apply to Lankford’s disclosures. Additionally, Lankford’s attorney was involved in this process. The court sent defense counsel written notice of the court ordered psychiatric examination prior to the time it was conducted, and informed defense counsel that there was reason to believe that Lankford’s mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing. Defense counsel did not object at this point. A factor to be noted, although it is not pivotal to the outcome, is that Dr. Estes’ testimony is not alleged to have presented the court with any new facts about the commission of the crime — rather the new material dealt only with psychological opinion testimony.
Because Lankford was properly informed of his rights and he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights and *873because Lankford’s attorney knew that the psychiatric examination was going to take place, the court did not err in admitting Dr. Estes psychiatric testimony at the sentencing hearing.
VI.
The Trial Court’s Denial of Lankford’s Second Motion for New Trial.
Lankford next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his second motion for new trial which was based upon newly discovered evidence and the recanted testimony of the State’s key witness, Bryan Lank-ford.
The newly discovered evidence was a letter written by Bryan Lankford, which disclosed that he had lied when he testified that Mark had committed the murders, and that it had actually been he who committed the murders. The recantation of testimony occurred at the evidentiary hearing on Mark’s second motion for new trial; Bryan testified that he had lied at Mark’s trial and that his brother was not involved in the actual killings.
Mark Lankford now argues that whether this Court applies the test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence or the test for granting a new trial based on recanted testimony, a new trial should be granted because the only direct evidence that linked Mark Lankford with the Bravences’ murders was Bryan Lank-ford’s original trial testimony.
We note from the outset that while the decision of whether to grant a new trial is a discretionary matter for the trial judge. Idaho Code § 19-2406(7) (1987), limits the instances in which that discretion may be exercised.3
Idaho Criminal Rule 34, New Trial, states in part: “The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the interest of justice.” This Court, in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 384, 716 P.2d 1152 (1986) stated:
The question of whether the interest of justice requires a new trial under the circumstances of a particular case is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and the trial court’s decision thereon will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. (Citation omitted.)
Although I.C. § 19-2406 does not specifically address new trials on the basis of recanted testimony as opposed to the discovery of new evidence, the apparent intent of the legislature and opinions rendered by this Court exemplify the fact that recanted testimony is a form of new evidence and is thus covered by subsection (7). The trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion unless a new trial is granted for a reason that is not delineated in the code or unless the decision to grant or deny a new trial is manifestly contrary to the interests of justice.
As the Idaho Court of Appeals noted in State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 730 P.2d 1069 (Ct.App.1986), there are two different judicial approaches to determining whether the interests of justice require that a new trial be granted on the basis of recanted testimony.
One approach has been to treat the recantation as a form of newly discovered evidence. When a new trial is sought upon such evidence, the moving party must satisfy what has become known as the “Berry” test. This multi-part test, named after the case of Berry v. State, 10 Georgia 511 (1851), includes the re*874quirement that the new evidence probably would produce a different result. Berry has been adopted in substance by most state and federal courts. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 557 (2d Ed.1982) (hereinafter WRIGHT). It was approved by our Supreme Court in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976).
A second approach has been to treat recanted testimony as a problem distinct from newly discovered evidence. Perjured testimony affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that overlooked evidence does not. WRIGHT, § 557.1. Moreover, while a rigorous standard for obtaining a second trial upon new evidence may be justified as an incentive for the parties to marshal evidence and to present it at the first trial, the parties need no such incentive to combat perjury. The seminal decision establishing a distinct test for recanted testimony is Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928). There, as in the present case, a government witness announced after trial that he had given false testimony. The Larrison court held that a new trial should be granted when (a) “[t]he court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false,” (b) “[t]hat without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion,” and (c) “[t]hat the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.” (Emphasis original.) (Footnote omitted.)
Those courts which fail to discern any functional difference between the recantation of trial testimony and the discovery of new evidence after trial applied the Berry test in both situations. E.g., United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.1979) cert. den., 445 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 1337, 63 L.Ed.2d 775 (1980). However, most courts now apply the Larrison test to recanted testimony. E.g., United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.1975), cert. den. 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 65, 66, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976); see generally WRIGHT, § 557.1.
In Idaho, the relationship between Berry and Larrison has not been explored thoroughly. However, our Supreme court, without mentioning Berry or its adoption in Drapeau, has cited Larrison with approval. In State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1986), the Supreme Court explicitly noted Larrison’s three elements. The court then reformulated Larrison as follows:
[Ujnder the holding of Larrison, it would seem that in appropriate circumstances, where a defendant submits an affidavit by a government witness in which the witness recants his testimony and specifies in what ways he dishonestly testified and in what ways he would, if given the opportunity to testify again, change that testimony and where a defendant makes a showing that such changed testimony may be material to a finding of his guilt or innocence, a new trial should be held.
110 Idaho at 385, 716 P.2d at 1157 (emphasis added).
Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 151-152, 730 P.2d 1071-1072.
In the instant case, the trial court, upon consideration of substantial competent evidence, determined that the original testimony was correct and that the recantation was not believable. The trial court, as part of exhaustive findings and opinion on this issue, noted in part:
It is very crucial to note that Bryan Lankford’s recantation of his trial testimony was made under circumstances which raise a grave doubt as to its reliability.
Based upon a review of the files and records herein as well as a consideration of the testimony given by Bryan Lank-.ford at Defendant’s second motion for a new trial, this Court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by Bryan Lankford at the second motion for a new trial was false and furthermore that the testimony given by Bryan Lank-ford at the Defendant’s trial concerning *875the participation of the Defendant in the killing of the Bravences was true.
It is the opinion of this Court that it cannot be said that the recantation reasonably could affect the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, this Court does not conclude that evidence of the recantation would probably produce a different verdict. Finally, and based upon the foregoing, the recantation evidence does not, in the interests of justice, require that a new trial be granted.
Thus, our inquiry need go no further since the record demonstrates no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of a new trial.
VII.
Imposition of the Death Sentence.
Lankford claims that the trial court imposed the death penalty arbitrarily and under the influence of passion and prejudice in direct contradiction of the strictures of I.C. § 19-2827(c)(l).
A. Legal Principles.
We begin our analysis of Lank-ford’s claims by noting the following points of law. The right to due process requires an impartial trial judge. Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235 (7th Cir.1980). A judge may not be disqualified for prejudice unless it is shown that the prejudice is “a prejudice that is directed against the party litigant, and is of such nature and character as would render it improbable that the party could have a fair and impartial trial in the particular case pending.” Bell v. Bell, 18 Idaho 636, 641, 111 P. 1074 (1910); State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 259, 210 P. 208 (1922). The district court may properly participate in the examination of witnesses for the purpose of “clarifying the evidence, controlling the orderly presentation of the evidence, confining counsel to evidentiary rulings, and preventing undue repetition of testimony.” United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 72 (9th Cir.1977) (quoting United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 427 (9th Cir.1973)). However, prosecutorial acts by the trial judge may be violative of the defendant s constitutional rights.
B. Analysis.
The following are the specific post-trial events Lankford claims evidence the trial judge’s prejudicial attitude, his abandonment of his judicial role. We analyze each in turn.
1. The trial court referred to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, formal sentencing and jury determination of sentencing as petty motions.
This problem has been adequately explained as being caused by an error in the transcription of the record. The court reporter mistook the word “pending” for “petty.”
2. The trial court called the prosecutor as a witness in support of the state’s position at Defendant’s first Motion for New Trial hearing.
Neither this allegation nor the record indicate that this was a prosecutorial or prejudicial act by the trial judge. Lankford appears to be asking that this Court infer that this was a prosecutorial action by the trial court evidencing bias. However, the record establishes that the trial court acted in the interest of clarifying testimony.
3. The trial court permitted the testimony of Dr. Estes as a court witness even though the state did not list him as a potential witness.
Contrary to Lankford’s allegation, defense counsel had ample notice that Dr. Estes might testify. Furthermore, the record does not establish that the trial court had any prior knowledge as to which party would be benefited by the testimony. We find no error on this point.
4. The trial court asked questions of Dr. Estes at sentencing in order to provide the foundation for introduction of his report.
The trial court’s questions were proper and designed to ensure that the expert’s testimony was admissible. Thus, *876these questions were actually asked for the protection of Lankford’s rights. It should be noted that the trial judge asked Dr. Estes these questions at the sentencing hearing, hot during trial. Because of this, there was no danger of interfering with the jury’s determination of the case, and it was important that the judge (in addition to securing Lankford’s constitutional rights), properly acquire the information necessary for sentencing. This was done without error.
5. The trial court supplemented the list of aggravating factors to be considered at sentencing sua sponte and refused to grant a continuance to meet the court imposed factors.
The appropriateness of the court considering the two additional aggravating factors is fully discussed herein in Section III, supra. Those aggravating factors were part and parcel of the crimes charged and the trial court’s sua sponte listing of them for consideration is not evidence of a prejudicial attitude but rather constitutes the trial court’s proper performance of its statutory duties.
6. The trial court sought to cross-examine Bryan Lankford at the second Motion for New Trial despite lengthy examinations by both parties. Failing to get a desired response, the district court struck the testimony of Bryan Lankford.
It is unfair to say that the trial court “sought to cross-examine” Bryan Lankford at the second motion for new trial. The court simply asked Bryan Lank-ford questions for the purpose of clarification. This was absolutely proper. As stated above, the granting of a new trial is a discretionary decision made by the trial judge. In a situation where a defendant requests a new trial because of recanted testimony, the trial court must be satisfied that the original testimony was false and that the new testimony is true if the judge is to grant a new trial. Accordingly, it is vital that the trial judge be allowed to ask questions for clarification and for the gathering of information during a hearing on a motion for new trial. The court did not err in interrogating Bryan Lankford or in striking his testimony.
7. The trial court examined several witnesses at the Second Motion for New Trial hearing in an attempt to elicit testimony favorable to the State’s position.
Upon reviewing the record we are not convinced that the purpose of the trial court’s examination of witnesses was an attempt to elicit testimony favorable to the State’s position. However, even if the motivation alleged by Lankford were true,, Lankford failed to specify the exact incidents of this alleged misconduct. As a result, he asks us to do what defense counsel said in its brief we cannot do, “look into Judge Reinhardt’s heart and mind to see if he was prejudiced toward the defendant or enflamed by the circumstances of the crime.” We find this allegation without merit.
8. The trial court suggested witnesses' and motions to the state at the Second Motion for New Trial hearing.
In this allegation defense counsel once again fails to identify specific points in the record to support this general allegation. Furthermore, Lankford fails to argue or establish that any prejudice resulted from these suggestions if in fact they were made.
VIII.
Aggravating Circumstances.
Lankford makes two arguments pertaining to the aggravating circumstances. First, Lankford argues that the aggravating circumstances set forth in I.C. § 19-2515 are unconstitutionally void fot vagueness. Lankford’s second argument is that even if the aggravating factors are constitutional and applicable, there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of their existence in this case.
A.
Constitutionality of Aggravating Circumstances
Lankford asserts that the aggravating factor that “their murder was espe*877dally heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity,” is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). In Maynard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the aggravating circumstance of an Oklahoma death penalty statute which referred to especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murders was unconstitutionally vague pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court reasoned that these aggravating factors failed to adequately inform the sentencer of what must be found in order to impose the death penalty and thereby left the sentencer with the ability to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
There is, however, an important distinction between the Oklahoma and Idaho aggravating circumstance statutes. The distinction is that Oklahoma has jury sentencing while Idaho adheres to judicial sentencing in capital murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are terms of art that are commonly understood among the members of the judiciary. As a result, the potential for inconsistent application that exists as a result of jury sentencing is eliminated where the judge sentences.
B.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lankford asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support three of the trial court’s findings of statutory aggravating factors. He argues that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he had a propensity to commit murder and was a continuing threat to society; (2) that there was insufficient evidence of heinous, atrocious or cruel acts manifesting exceptional depravity to set this apart from other first degree murders in which the death penalty was not imposed; and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the murders exhibited an utter disregard for human life as set forth in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 419, 631 P.2d 187 (1981).
The evidence was sufficient to support the aforementioned statutory aggravating factors.
1. Doctor Estes’ testimony that Lankford was an aggressive anti-social personality prone to violence combined with the fact that Lankford was convicted of two murders lends sufficient support to the trial court’s finding that he had a propensity for violence and to commit murder.
2. The brutal manner in which Lankford bludgeoned the skulls of his two victims clearly supports the trial court’s finding that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity.
3. The manner in which the Bravences were brutally murdered together with the fact that they were killed for the mere reason that the Lankfords wanted to steal their van support the court’s finding that the murders were committed with utter disregard for human life.
The record establishes that the aggravating factors were properly utilized by the court and that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
IX.
Proportionality of the Death Sentence.
The final argument Lankford raises on appeal is that the death sentence is disproportionate when compared to other cases in which the death penalty was or was not imposed. Lankford brings this argument pursuant to I.C. § 19-2827 which requires that all death sentences shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Idaho and that the Court shall specifically determine:
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar eases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
We have reviewed the sentence imposed and compared it with the sentences imposed in other capital cases.4 In making the comparison we have considered: (1) the nature of, and the motive for, the crime committed; (2) the heinous nature of the *878crime; and (3) the nature and character of the defendant to determine whether the sentence was proportionate and just. After thoroughly examining the record and evaluating these factors, we find nothing that would indicate that the sentence of death imposed against Lankford was disproportionate or unjust. The comments this Court made relative to Bryan Lank-ford’s sentence at 113 Idaho at 704, 747 P.2d at 726 are equally applicable to this case.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed are affirmed.
BAKES, C.J., concurs. JOHNSON, J., concurs in Parts I-VII and VIII(B), concurs specially in Parts VIII(A) and IX. SCHWARTZMAN, J. Pro Tern., concurs in Parts I and III through IX and concurs in the result in Part II. SHEPARD, J., sat but did not participate due to his untimely death.. See I.C. § 18-4002.
. Justice Huntley dissents from this Part IV and adopts his dissent in Charboneau, appended hereto as Appendix A, as his dissent in this case,
. The portion of this code section relevant to the case at bar reads:
19-2406. Grounds for new trial. — When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the. court may, upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases only:
7. When new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial. When a motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing in support thereof the affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, and if time is required by the defendant to procure such affidavits the court may postpone the hearing of the motion for such length of time as, under all the circumstances of the case, may seem reasonable.
. Those cases we have considered include: State v. Bryan Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710 *878(1987); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984); State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983); State v. Major, 105 Idaho 4, 665 P.2d 703 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983), cert. den., 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983); State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 655 P.2d 434 (1982); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982); State v. Stormoen, 103 Idaho 83, 645 P.2d 317 (1982); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980); State v. Padilla, 101 Idaho 713, 620 P.2d 286 (1980); State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341, 597 P.2d 227 (1979); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979); State v. Bradley, 98 Idaho 918, 575 P.2d 1306 (1978); State v. Birrueta, 98 Idaho 631, 570 P.2d 868 (1977); State v. Allen, 98 Idaho 782, 572 P.2d 885 (1977); State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977); State v. Gerdau, 96 Idaho 516, 531 P.2d 1161 (1975); State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1975) cert. den., 423 U.S. 1089, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974); State v. Hatton, 95 Idaho 856, 522 P.2d 64 (1974); State v. Standlee, 96 Idaho 165, 525 P.2d 360 (1974); State v. Foley, 95 Idaho 222, 506 P.2d 119 (1973); State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 506 P.2d 1340 (1973); State v. Atwood, 95 Idaho 124, 504 P.2d 397 (1972); State v. Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 483 P.2d 173 (1971); State v. Gomez, 94 Idaho 323, 487 P.2d 686 (1971); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. den., 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 947, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971); State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d 582 (1970); State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d 711 (1969); State v. Jiminez, 93 Idaho 140, 456 P.2d 784 (1969); King v. State, 93 Idaho 87, 456 P.2d 254 (1969); State v. Gonzales, 92 Idaho 152, 438 P.2d 897 (1968); State v. Chaffin, 92 Idaho 629, 448 P.2d 243 (1968); Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 429 P.2d 836 (1967); State v. Koho, 91 Idaho 450, 423 P.2d 1004 (1967); State v. Anstine, 91 Idaho 169, 418 P.2d 210 (1966); State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342 (1964); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); State v. Burris, 80 Idaho 395, 331 P.2d 265 (1958); State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266, 313 P.2d 706 (1957); State v. Buchanan, 73 Idaho 365, 252 P.2d 524 (1953); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) (considered only in terms of crime committed and penalty imposed); overruled on substantive law point in State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971); State v. Pettit, 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 199, 646 P.2d 441 (Ct.App.1982).