specially concurring:
I would briefly state my reasons for specially concurring. These reasons involve the nature and purpose of assessments for improvements and of the fund created by the legislation establishing the entity, whether an improvement district, irrigation district, or other similar agency.
We are not dealing here with a public fund in its true sense. “The term.‘public funds’ means funds belonging to the state.” Pensioners Ass’n v. Davis, 112 Colo. 535, 150 P. (2d.) 974. The Refunding Improvement Bond Fund, so described in the ordinance under consideration, is not a fund belonging to Pueblo; the city “was a trustee of the assessment funds, acting for the bondholders, who were the cestuis que trustent.” Haxtun v. Wangnild, 109 Colo. *20518, 127 P. (2d) 328; Wangnild v. Haxtun, 106 Colo. 180, 103 P. (2d) 474.
It must be borne in mind that the nature of a public fund derives from the type of exaction that is imposed to form the fund. Taxation “is that burden or charge upon all property laid for raising revenue for general public purposes in defraying the expense of government. Assessments are local and resorted to for making local improvements on the theory that the property affected is increased in value at least to the amount of the levy.” Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777. Assessments do not impose a personal liability; the liability is in rem, resting upon, and only upon the property benefitted. Rupp v. City of Tulsa, 202 Okla. 442, 214 P. (2d) 913. See Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma, etc., Dist., 66 Colo. 219, 181 Pac. 123.
Cities “in issuing and negotiating local improvement bonds, act merely as an agency; not of the city but as special agents of the improvement districts, to accomplish a public end.” (Emphasis supplied.) Sanborn v. Boulder, 74 Colo. 358, 221 Pac. 1077; Sterling v. Commercial Savings Bank, 116 Colo. 369, 181 P. (2d) 361. They are trustees acting for the bondholders. Haxtun v. Wangnild, supra. They are conduits for the disposition of funds not in a true sense of a public nature.
“The remaining question is: Was the court without jurisdiction to appoint a receiver? We can discover no objection to the receivership on jurisdictional grounds. The funds in the hands of the dental board are not public funds in any sense of the word.” Stern v. State Board, 50 Wash. 100, 96 Pac. 693. See Wilder v. City of New Orleans, 67 Fed. 567, involving the appointment of a receiver over a drainage fund.
We are not divesting the city of the administration and disbursement of public funds by recognizing as valid the appointment of a receiver to act in its stead. These funds do not become a part of the treasury of the city for the purpose of defraying the expenses of city govern*21ment; they never become the property of the city; they are held for the use of the bondholders. There is, therefore, no invasion of the functions of one branch of government by another.
Believing as I do regarding jurisdiction, I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall.