I respectfully dissent from the majority’s construction of Government Code section 12926, subdivision (c) (section 12926(c)). Time and again, this court has been constrained to articulate the legislative and constitutional limitations necessarily circumscribing the jurisdictional authority of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC or Commission). (See Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245 [284 Cal.Rptr. 718, 814 P.2d 704] [FEHC may not award compensatory damages for emotional distress caused by housing discrimination]; Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40 [276 Cal.Rptr. 114, 801 P.2d 357] [FEHC not authorized to award compensatory damages for sexual harassment claim]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323] [no FEHC authority to award punitive damages].) I fail to comprehend any rational basis on which the majority now acquiesce in yet another effort to expand administrative territory beyond the boundaries set by the Legislature. On the contrary, notwithstanding the intriguing variety of secondary sources used to divine legislative intent, they have construed section 12926(c) essentially out of whole cloth and materially departed from the reasonable, commonsense implication of the statute’s express terms, to wit, that only those employers having *246five or more employees, whether full-time or part-time, working every business day come within the Commission’s authority. In doing so, the majority fill the hollow cavity of ambiguous language with the silver amalgam of judicially created jurisdiction. The ache they leave will be substantial.
Legislative intent is the touchstone of judicial interpretation; and “a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.” (Dyna-Med., Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1386-1387.) Nevertheless, the majority analysis begins not with the actual terms of the statute but with the unexplicated conclusion that “ ‘regularly employing’ is susceptible of more than one interpretation.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 234.) Without examining the words themselves and delineating the possible ambiguities and reasonable alternative constructions, the majority embark on their quest for legislative intent without a chart or compass. As a critical consequence, they stray from the course of “according significance, if possible, to every word” and render the qualifier “regularly” virtually meaningless in this context.
The extralegislative sources relied on by the majority offer little assistance in this search for legislative design. Many of these are of dubious relevance;1 and, in any event, no clear consensus emerges: while some make reference to the number of employees on the payroll as dispositive of jurisdiction, others are silent or ambiguous on the point.2 Nor does the record suggest the Legislature considered any of these materials when enacting either section *24712926(c) or its predecessor.3 (Cf. Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 742-743 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115 [755 P.2d 299] [staff opinion distributed only to select committee members not evidence of legislative intent].)
The Commission’s decisions applying the statute and related regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7285.1, subd. (a)) might provide some insight: “ ‘Consistent administrative construction of a statute over many years, particularly when it originated with those charged with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.’ [Citations.]” (City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Com. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 680, 696 [125 Cal.Rptr. 779, 542 P.2d 1371].)4 Even assuming two decisions from 1983 and 1984 satisfy the standard for consistency and longevity, however, I am unpersuaded by the Commission’s superficial and facile analysis, which makes no attempt to grapple with the terms of the statute.
The first case, Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Travel Express, supra, No. 83-17, FEHC Precedential Decisions 1982-83, CEB 16, pages 3-5, relies solely on one federal district court decision interpreting “employer” as defined in title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). (Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary (D.Minn. 1975) 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (Bur. Nat. Affairs) 1325, 1326.) The federal statute provides that a person comes within the purview of the Equal Employment Act “who has fifteen or more employees for each working day . . . .” (Ibid.) Effectuating the remedial purpose of the act and according great deference to administrative implementation thereof, the federal court determined that Congress intended to bring both full-time and part-time workers within this definition and that therefore the number of persons on the payroll, not the number working any particular day, controlled. (Id., at p. 1327.) On this limited basis and citing its own mandate to “give[] a broad sweep to the definition of ‘employer,’ ” the Commission similarly concluded that the number of persons on an employer’s payroll was *248dispositive of its jurisdiction. (Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Travel Express, supra, No. 83-17, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1982-1983, CEB 16, p. 4].)
In my view, this determination is “clearly erroneous” and not entitled to any weight or deference.5 The Commission attempted no critical analysis of the actual words at issue. Regardless of a perceived “legislative directive to liberally interpret the act” (Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Travel Express, supra, No. 83-17, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1982-1983, CEB 16, p. 4), the language of the statute itself must initially inform its construction. The Commission failed to recognize this overarching mandate and in drawing so heavily on Pascutoi, supra, ignored a critical distinction in the wording of the federal and state code provisions. I see a substantial difference between defining an employer under the federal act as one who “has” a given number of employees and under the state scheme as one who is “regulairly employing” such persons. In this context, “has” is essentially equivalent to “employing”;6 and adopting the federal analysis renders “regularly” superfluous.
The Commission attempts no explanation for relying solely upon one federal decision construing dissimilar statutory language. An affinity of remedial purpose cannot justify a flagrant disregard for the integrity of state law and administrative jurisdiction. Moreover, under the Commission’s own regulations, “federal laws and their interpretations regarding discrimination in employment and housing are not determinative of the construction of these [FEHC] rules and regulations and the California statutes which they interpret and implement. . . .” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7285.1, subd. (b).)
The majority construction as well reads the qualifier “regularly” out of section 12926(c). One commonly understood meaning of “regularly” is “consistently” or “habitually” (see Webster’s New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1988) p. 1131) or, as the majority suggest, not “intermittently.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 241.) Merely having an individual on the payroll bears no particular relation to the frequency or regularity of that person’s job function. For example, a small business, such as a “Mom and Pop” grocery, may employ only two workers full time but need to supplement that work force for an additional period each day. For whatever reason, the proprietor may choose to hire three individuals, each of whom works one or two days each week, to fill the part-time position. Five persons would appear on the payroll, but not all of them would “regularly” report to work. Nevertheless, *249under the majority’s interpretation, the employer would come within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Of course, by hiring only one or two individuals to work part time, the same employer could avoid jurisdiction even though the nature of the business and the number of job opportunities remained the same in both situations. Moreover, even an employer who restricted his or her payroll to only four full-time and part-time employees daily would become an “employer” for purposes of FEHC jurisdiction if he or she hired a bookkeeper to work two hours once a month.
Fixing jurisdiction according to the number of employees on the payroll provides the Commission with a bright line determinative; but at the same time, it creates vagaries for the employer that can only inure to the ultimate detriment of employees, particularly those who work part time, denied jobs by employers seeking to avoid FEHC jurisdiction. The majority’s analysis neglects to consider any of these consequences or the potentially wide-ranging impact on both employers and employees. (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387.) Implementation of the Commission’s mandate to rectify and eliminate discriminatory practices in the workplace should enhance not defeat the primary goal of maximizing employment opportunities. (Cf. Gov. Code, § 12920.)
To avoid the anomalous results threatened by the majority interpretation while still effectuating the underlying remedial intent of the Legislature, I would construe section 12926(c) to invoke jurisdiction based upon the number of persons working each day. In other words, if five employees report for work every day, then the employer is subject to the Fair Employment and Housing Act irrespective of the number of hours worked. This approach provides an equally dispositive definition of “employer” but focuses more realistically on the size of the enterprise potentially subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, a matter clearly of legislative concern in providing an exemption.7 (See also Tobriner, California FEPC, supra, 16 Hastings L.J. at p. 342 [“the framers [of the Fair Employment and Housing Act] were interested primarily in attacking protracted, large-scale discrimination by important employers and strong unions”].) It also gives small employers a *250measure of control in structuring their work force. If an employer chooses to hire five part-time workers for each day’s work rather than three full-time ones, he or she has impliedly agreed to submit to the FEHC’s jurisdiction by virtue of that business decision. In my view, this result more accurately explicates section 12926(c) and more reasonably effectuates the purpose of the statutory scheme consistent with the underlying legislative goal of effecting compliance and remediating employment discrimination.
In the instant case, the Commission clearly should not have exercised jurisdiction because plaintiff scheduled five or more persons to work on only two business days. Accordingly, I would reverse the contrary determination of the Court of Appeal.
For example, “[ujnpassed bills, as evidence of legislative intent, have little value. [Citations.]” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d atp. 1396.) A defeated initiative measure can have even less. As the majority acknowledge, fair employment legislation from other jurisdictions does not track California’s statutory language. (See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 888 [153 Cal.Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329], overruled on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 313 [250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58]; cf. Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 557 [147 Cal.Rptr. 165, 580 P.2d 665] [Legislature presumed to intend like interpretation be given identical statutory language].) And while language in an employer pamphlet prepared by the FEHC possibly in 1961 may have guided the Commission’s own interpretation of section 12926(c), such a document does not typically inform legislative enactments. (See generally 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 96, pp. 149-150.)
For example, at least one commentator acknowledged, “Precisely how this rule [interpreting ‘regularly’] is to be applied in practice is not yet determined.” (Tobriner, California FEPC (1965) 16 Hastings L.J. 333, 343; see maj. opn., ante, p. 238.) Subsequent administrative construction is equally ambiguous: the pertinent regulation states an “employer” is one employing five or more individuals “for each working day” (Cal. Code Regs., tit 2, § 7286.5, *247subd. (a)(1)); however, the FEHC interprets the term to mean having five or more individuals “on the payroll.” (Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Travel Express (1983) No. 83-17, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1982-83, CEB 16, p. 4.)
For example, most of the commentaries postdate adoption of Labor Code section 1413, the predecessor statute, to which the majority attach considerable significance as the original source of the term “regularly employing.”
The majority cite City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 15 Cal.3d 680, 696, and Wotton v. Bush (1953) 41 Cal.2d 460, 466 [261 P.2d 256], for the proposition that “the court will look ... to administrative construction reasonably contemporaneous with the law’s adoption in order to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in using the phrase.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 234.) However, Commission decisions in 1983 and 1984 can hardly be considered “contemporaneous” with enactments in 1959 and 1980, particularly when their analysis does not reflect on any original legislative understanding. (See 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992 rev.) § 49.08, p. 67.)
The second case, Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Bee Hive Answering Service (1984) No. 84-16, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1984-85, CEB 8, page 13, merely follows Travel Express and thus shares its analytical weakness, as discussed below.
For present purposes, “employing” generally means “providing] work and pay for” and “engagfing] the services or labor of for pay; hir[ing].” (See Webster’s New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1988) p. 445.)
The majority imply plaintiff’s business should come within the Commission’s jurisdiction despite its relatively small-scale nature because California has 24,000 dentists and the “number of employment opportunities is, therefore, quite large.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 242.) I fail to discern the logic of this observation. These professionals do not function as a single business entity and may or may not engage in similar employment practices. Hence, their collective job availability seems of little relevance in determining whether subjecting them to the Fair Employment and Housing Act would have any practical impact. More significantly, in response to the majority’s interpretation of section 12926(c), some practitioners may, as plaintiff might well, eliminate part-time positions to avoid jurisdiction, with obvious negative consequences for employees.