dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because I believe that the magistrate abused his discretion in awarding spousal maintenance without first making the findings required by former § I.C. 32-705, I would remand to the magistrate for additional findings. The inquiry conducted by an appellate court in reviewing the decision of a trial court for an abuse of discretion is three-fold:
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App.1987). In my view, the magistrate abused his discretion because he did not act consistently with legal standards applicable to the choice of whether or not to award spousal maintenance.
The provisions of former I.C. § 32-705 require that two predicate findings be made before a court may proceed to make the findings as to the appropriateness of maintenance: (1) that the spouse who is ordered to pay maintenance have committed an “offense”, and (2) that the spouse seeking the maintenance award be deemed an “innocent” spouse. Although the magistrate recited conduct by the parties which the court construed as an “offense” by both of them, the magistrate did not specifically find that the party seeking maintenance—in this case, the former wife—could be deemed or characterized an innocent spouse. It is appropriate to remand for further consideration by the magistrate as to whether this threshold requirement has been met. For example, in Le Vine v. Spickelmier, 109 Idaho 341, 707 P.2d 452 (1985), the magistrate granted each party a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, finding no fault by either party, and awarded spousal maintenance to the wife. On appeal to the district court, the district court ruled that an award of spousal maintenance was improper absent a finding of fault, and remanded to the magistrate for a finding of fault. On remand, despite the earlier, seemingly inconsistent finding of no fault by either husband or wife, the magistrate found that the husband was the chief cause of the differences between the parties, and that he was at fault for the divorce. Similarly, in Neveau v. Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, 712, 652 P.2d 655, 660 (Ct.App.1982), a case involving the application of former I.C. § 32-706, this Court remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the magistrate directing that a finding be made as to whether a husband’s *484infidelity constituted “fault” justifying an award to the wife under the former maintenance statute.
We must construe the former I.C. § 32-705 in order to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In doing so, we not only look to the literal wording of the statute, but also “the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous construction, and the like.” Local 1494, Etc., v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978) (quoting Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963)). We must also assume that when the legislature enacted the statute it had full knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state, and that it did not intend to overturn established principles of law “unless an intention to do so plainly appears by the express declaration or the language employed admits of no other reasonable construction.” George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990). Thus, the legislature’s amendment of a statute’s wording is not always construed to mean that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute. Penrod v. Crowley, 82 Idaho 511, 356 P.2d 73 (1960). Rather, statutes are to be construed in light of the reason for their enactment or amendment, State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352, 630 P.2d 143, 144 (1981), and the court should avoid a construction that would cause absurd or unduly harsh results. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 60, 608 P.2d 861, 863 (1980).
In my view, the finding by the magistrate that the two spouses bore equal fault for the divorce does not preclude a finding that one or the other spouse may be deemed an “innocent spouse” for purposes of maintenance under former I.C. § 32-705. Pursuant to the above rules of construction, the term “innocent” as used by the Legislature when it enacted former section 32-705 in 1980, must be interpreted in light of past statutory and decisional law in existence at that time. The leading case of Shepard v. Shepard, cited by the majority opinion, although it interpreted the pre1980 maintenance statute, I.C. § 32-706, provides guidance as to the conduct requirements of a spouse who is to receive an award of maintenance. Under that former statute, only the wife could receive maintenance. The Supreme Court in Shepard stated that maintenance is discretionary, but that such an award is proper only when the husband is not free from fault, and when the wife’s fault, although “possibly sufficient to allow a divorce in favor of the husband, is not so grievous as to mandate a denial of alimony.” Shepard, 94 Idaho at 736-37, 497 P.2d at 323-24 (emphasis added), citing Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756 (1957). On remand, the magistrate should be guided by the formulation for evaluating the conduct of the spouse seeking alimony set forth in Shepard, to determine whether Lillian Marmon, although equally at fault for the divorce, may nevertheless be characterized as the innocent spouse for purposes of eligibility for maintenance, that is, one whose conduct is not so grievous as to mandate, in the sound judgment of the magistrate, a denial of alimony.